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Malaysia Today - Your Source of Independent News


WIKILEAKS: SCENESETTER FOR ADMIRAL ANWAR'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

Posted: 16 Nov 2011 06:12 PM PST

Another of many subjects on which Mahathir has criticized Abdullah is the growing mil-mil cooperation between the United States and Malaysia, particularly with regard to the greater frequency of high-visibility ship visits. We have been pleased by the overwhelmingly positive media coverage our ship visits have received, in contrast to the quiet arrivals of past years. The flip side to this is that our visits are getting increased attention from ideological foes on the Islamic right, and from Mahahtir's opportunistic criticism. Deputy Prime Minister Najib has stoutly defended our cooperation before Parliament, and we do not see that our engagement is under threat. However, we do need to be cognizant of our increased military visibility and sensitive to GOM concerns, particularly with high tensions in the Middle East.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David B. Shear for reasons 1.4 b and d.

1.  (C)  Admiral Mohd Anwar Mohd Nor, Chief of Malaysian Defense Forces, will visit the U.S. from September 30 -October 12.  Admiral Anwar's visit provides us with an excellent opportunity to strengthen our efforts for mil-mil cooperation, influence Malaysia's military equipment acquisitions and strengthen our overall ties with a moderate Muslim nation and economic force in Southeast Asia.

2.  (C) Malaysia has been a difficult partner in the past. Malaysians nurse strong anti-colonial sentiments and (among the Malay majority) resentment over perceived ill treatment of Islam by the West.  Former Prime Minister Mahathir played on these sentiments to generate political support for himself and his ambitious economic agenda.  When he relinquished his post in 2003, he left behind a new economic power but also strained relations with much of the West.  Today, however, Malaysia presents us with important transformational opportunities.  In terms of its economic development, educational achievement, public welfare, and political stability, Malaysia stands out among Muslim-majority nations.

The Malaysians project a moderate version of Islam, and, over the longer term, could lend additional support to democratic forces in the Middle East and Iraq.  We also share strong common East Asian regional interests in stability and prosperity.  Malaysian counter-terrorism cooperation is indispensable in defeating Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in the region.  Malaysia's economy is one of the most open, diverse and well-developed economies in the Islamic world and in ASEAN.  Malaysia is our tenth largest trading partner, and economic ties could strengthen further if ongoing free trade agreement talks succeed.

Malaysia's Moderate Islam

3.  (C) Malaysia, with its entrenched majority coalition, is hardly an ideal democracy, but it can still serve as a useful model for evolving Islamic societies elsewhere.  The Malay people, long known for their tolerance, have become more conservative in recent years, but Prime Minister Abdullah has enshrined the Malay political elite's continued preference for moderation in his "Islam Hadhari" or "Civilizational Islam" policy.  Abdullah's key message is that Islam can become a leading world civilization again only if it embraces economic development, education, innovation and tolerance.

Malaysian Foreign Policy and US--A Mixed Bag

4.  (S) Abdullah champions his vision--albeit with limited impact to date--within the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which Malaysia currently chairs.  Malaysia supports Abbas, the Palestinian Authority, the MEPP roadmap, and Iraqi reconstruction. However, the Malaysian public remains highly critical of our Middle East policies, and the GOM is consistently critical of Israel, with which it has no diplomatic relations.  As chairman of the OIC, Malaysia recently volunteered 1,000 troops to participate in UNIFIL. After more than a month of lobbying, and apparently without the consent of Israel, UN SYG Annan agreed to allow Malaysia to send a force of 376 soldiers to support UNIFIL.  At the time of this writing, it is unclear how this issue will be resolved.

5.  (S) In early September, Malaysia surrendered the chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement, and as past chair remains a member of the leadership troika.  During Malaysia's tenure it championed policies which supported the NAM stance on the Iranian nuclear program, and engaged, often on overly friendly terms, with such problematic international players as Zimbabwe, Cuba and Venezuela.  Abdullah hosted Hugo Chavez for a visit to Malaysia in August, and assured Venezuela of his support for election to the Latin American chair on the UN Security Council.

6.  (C) As last year's ASEAN Chairman, Malaysia took great pride in hosting the first East Asia Summit last December. This summer Malaysia hosted the ASEAN Regional Forum and Ministerial Conference, attended by Secretary Rice and among others, LTG Frazier of the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The GOM backs the six-party DPRK nuclear talks and has criticized North Korea's truculence. The Malaysian government is publicly supportive of China's "peaceful rise", welcoming in particular China's growing imports of Malaysian products, despite lingering suspicions among some officials of China's long-term intentions.

7.  (C) In Southeast Asia, Malaysia has played an important and constructive role. In August Malaysia completed its peacekeeping mission to East Timor following the armed uprising that led to deployment of Australian, Malaysian and Portuguese forces. The GOM has also taken the lead in the southern Philippines peace process, hosting negotiations and contributing observers to the International Monitoring Team in the southern Philippine.  The Malaysians have urged the Thai government to resolve peacefully the unrest in Southern Thailand and are hopeful that the new junta will take a more conciliatory role in calming their northern border.

Malaysia's recent success initiating regional aerial monitoring of the Straits of Malacca (the "Eyes in the Sky" program), has helped reduce piracy in the Straits.  Malaysia is especially chagrined by Burma's intransigence because it championed Burma's entry into ASEAN.  Having publicly criticized the Burmese regime, though, FM Hamid appears to be at a loss as to what to do next. Since the ASEAN Regional Forum, Malaysia has generally taken a hands-off approach.

Bilateral Ties--Improving the Substance

8.  (S) In our bilateral relations, the GOM has begun matching improvements in tone with improvements in substance. PM Abdullah has openly espoused improved relations with the U.S., and values the good rapport he established in his meetings with the President.  In late May, A/S Hill conducted our first-ever Senior-Level Dialogue with Foreign Ministry Secretary General Rastam.  In July, Secretary Rice also met with PM Abdullah, FM Hamid, and most recently, President Bush met with PM  Abdullah on the sidelines of the UNGA in September.

Last year the GOM acceded to our long-standing urging and signed the IAEA Additional Protocol; the Malaysians have also recently started sending observers to recent PSI exercises; and the GOM is preparing to implement an export control regime.  An opening round in the FTA talks in June went well, but the second round in Washington in July was not nearly as successful. The third round has been postponed, and we are waiting for more positive overtures from the newly installed Secretary General for the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. It remains unclear if the two parties can meet the negotiation deadlines and agree to an FTA.

9.  (C) Although they keep the details closely held, the GOM has been a key regional partner on counterterrorism. Early round-ups in 2001-2002 of scores of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) suspects helped ensure there have been no terrorist attacks here.  However, Malaysian extremists, as illustrated by a series of recent arrests in Malaysia's Borneo states, still have the capability to support JI operations elsewhere.  We and our colleagues in Manila, Jakarta and other  Southeast Asian posts have embarked on a regional effort to strengthen these countries' border controls.  In 2003, Malaysia established the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counterterrorism (SEARCCT), which runs a full schedule of multilateral training courses, many conducted with U.S. support.

PM Abdullah's Challenges

10.  (C) Prime Minister Abdullah's main priorities are sustaining growth in Malaysia's increasingly developed economy, fighting corruption and encouraging more open, collegial government. No one doubts his sincerity but his mild-mannered and cautious approach has led critics to question his leadership. Now two and one-half years into his five-year term, Abdullah has appealed to the public for patience in delivering reform.

11.  (C) PM Abdullah currently faces a new problem:  in April, former PM Mahathir began openly attacking his successor for failing to follow through with many of the former PM's initiatives.  These attacks continued throughout the summer and will likely not subside any time soon. Mahathir can no longer dictate policy (unlike Singapore's Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew), but the old brawler continues to revel in public controversy.  Abdullah has so far maintained an "elegant silence" and tasked others in the Cabinet to explain his decisions.  At this point, Abdullah's still high popularity and the economy's continued solid growth should help ensure Mahathir's campaign fails. However, Mahathir's public insinuations that the PM and his supporters are "not Malay enough" may constrain the PM's public statements on foreign policy issues.

12. (C) Another of many subjects on which Mahathir has criticized Abdullah is the growing mil-mil cooperation between the United States and Malaysia, particularly with regard to the greater frequency of high-visibility ship visits.  We have been pleased by the overwhelmingly positive media coverage our ship visits have received, in contrast to the quiet arrivals of past years.  The flip side to this is that our visits are getting increased attention from ideological foes on the Islamic right, and from Mahahtir's opportunistic criticism. Deputy Prime Minister Najib has stoutly defended our cooperation before Parliament, and we do not see that our engagement is under threat.  However, we do need to be cognizant of our increased military visibility and sensitive to GOM concerns, particularly with high tensions in the Middle East.

LAFLEUR (September 2008)

 

WIKILEAKS: DOWNGRADE MALAYSIA'S HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION?

Posted: 15 Nov 2011 12:00 AM PST

During an accreditation review July 25, the ICC, whose secretariat is the United Nations' Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, found Malaysia's Human Rights Commission (SUHAKAM) did not comply with the Paris Principles. The Paris Principles define the international standards for an independent and effective national human rights institution. The announcement occurred as SUHAKAM prepared to host the 13th Asia Pacific Forum (APF) of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRI) from July 28 - 31.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

Classified By: Classified By: Acting Political Section Chief William G. Gray for reasons 1.4 (b and d).

SUMMARY

1. (C) Malaysia's Human Rights Commission (SUHAKAM) faces potential downgrading by the International Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (ICC) for non-compliance with the Paris Principles. If downgraded, SUHAKAM will be banned from attending the United Nations Human Rights Council Session and stripped of its full membership in the Asia Pacific Forum, the leading regional human rights organization in the Asia Pacific. 

The Malaysian government responded by questioning the validity of ICC's accreditation review but some local NGOs welcome the move as a wake-up call for the government to make SUHAKAM more independent and effective.  Most observers believe, however, that the government is unlikely to make substantive changes to SUHAKAM, however.  Post continues to engage the government and promote proactive human rights monitoring with SUHAKAM.  End Summary.

SUHAKAM faces downgrade by ICC

2.  (U) During an accreditation review July 25, the ICC, whose secretariat is the United Nations' Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, found Malaysia's Human Rights Commission (SUHAKAM) did not comply with the Paris Principles.  The Paris Principles define the international standards for an independent and effective national human rights institution. The announcement occurred as SUHAKAM prepared to host the 13th Asia Pacific Forum (APF) of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRI) from July 28 - 31.

ICC Recommendations to SUHAKAM

3. (U) The ICC provided SUHAKAM with recommendations on how to comply with the Paris Principles and gave the organization one year to meet the standards.  ICC recommended establishing a clear and transparent appointment and dismissal process for commissioners and increasing commissioners' tenures from the current two years.  Another deficiency noted was the lack of genuine "pluralism" in the composition of SUHAKAM's commissioners.  The ICC also expects SUHAKAM to increase engagement with other human rights bodies and the UN Human Rights Council.

The Downgrade's Impact

4.  (U) SUHAKAM's failure to comply with the ICC's recommendations will result in the ICC downgrading SUHAKAM from its current "A" status to "B."  If downgraded, SUHAKAM loses its right to participate in the regular sessions of the United Nations Human Rights Council, is stripped of its full membership in the APF of NHRIs and relegated to a candidate or associate member without voting rights in the APF's decision-making body, the Forum Council.

SUHAKAM and Local NGOs react

5.  (U) SUHAKAM Chairman Abu Talib dismissed the ICC's view and stated the committee seems to be developing "new rules of interpretation" of the Paris Principles.  He further lamented the ICC was just "relying on one Malaysian NGO's observation" in initiating the accreditation review and stressed that the Commission considers itself fully compliant with the Principles. 

Other SUHAKAM Commissioners followed Abu Talib's lead, but acknowledged that the nine-year-old SUHAKAM Act, which established SUHAKAM, should be amended to reflect current circumstances and provide the Commission more bite, especially for enforcing its recommendations.  On July 29, Deputy Prime Minister Najib stated that any change in the SUHAKAM act giving the organization greater independence and power needed "to be studied carefully."

6.  (SBU) In an immediate reaction to the ICC's review, 44 NGOs including Education and Research Association for Consumers Malaysia (ERA Consumer), the Malaysian Peoples Voice (SUARAM) (the two NGO's providing the ICC information for its report on SUHAKAM), and the Malaysian Bar Council released a joint statement urging the Malaysian government to adopt the ICC's recommendations and strengthen SUHAKAM. 

N. Marimuthu, President of ERA Consumer, told us the ICC's review was a "wake-up call" for SUHAKAM and the government and will embarrass the Government if SUHAKAM's status is downgraded.  The NGOs found an ally when de facto Law Minister Zaid Ibrahim, one of the few voices for reform in the cabinet, advised SUHAKAM to "develop a spine." Presenting a paper at the NHRI on July 29, the Minister said SUHAKAM must be proactive, more aggressive, take a vigorous stand on issues, and not hide behind the SUHAKAM Act. 

(Note: SUHAKAM's Chairman sometime uses the limiting statutes of the act to justify not/not investigating alleged human rights violations in high profile cases.) 

The Minister also supported the ICC's recommendations, adding that the government can no longer continue to be in denial (about its responsibility to safeguard human rights).

Comments

7. (C) While the ICC's announcement of SUHAKAM's possible downgrade set off alarms within the Malaysian government, the substantial reforms required to strengthen SUHAKAM's independence or broaden its jurisdiction are unlikely.  When first established, the government purposely undermined SUHAKAM's ability to investigate abuses by inserting legislated limitations.  For example, SUHAKAM cannot legally investigate alleged abuses if a police report is filed.  Post continues to engage the government on human rights and encourage proactive human rights monitoring within SUHAKAM.

KEITH (August 2008)

 

WIKILEAKS: INDICTMENT OF FOUR MALAYSIAN ENTITIES AND THE ADDITION OF NINE COMPANIES AND FIVE ...

Posted: 14 Nov 2011 06:22 PM PST

We believe these companies and individuals are associated with the Mayrow General Trading network and have been engaged in acquiring electronic components and devices capable of being used to construct Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), as well as other items for use in proliferation-related activities.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

1.  (U) This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 5.

2.  (SBU) BACKGROUND:  On September 17, a federal grand jury in Miami, Florida returned a superseding indictment charging eight individuals and eight corporations, including two individuals and two corporations in Malaysia, in connection with their participation in conspiracies to export U.S. manufactured commodities to prohibited entities and to Iran.  Information on this indictment was passed Septel.

Additionally, on Wednesday September 17, 2008, the U.S. announced the transfer of all the existing parties on the Mayrow General Order No. 3 to the Department of Commerce Entity List.  This transfer will improve the ability of exporters to screen potential recipients of items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). 

Also on that date, the Department of Commerce announced that a significant number of new entities identified through its Mayrow investigation will be added to the Entity List. 

While some of these entities and individuals are located in Iran, a number of entities are located in Malaysia.  Overall, entities and individuals in 13 locations will be affected.

Consistent with our nonproliferation cooperation, we seek to notify Malaysia about the details of this action, and urge Malaysia to share information with us regarding these companies/ individuals.

3.  (SBU) On September 17, Acting Assistant Secretary

McNerney notified Charge d'Affaires Ilango Karuppannan at the Malaysian Embassy in Washington of Commerce's actions and indicated that we would send a non-paper with additional details, which is provided in para 6.  The conversation was positive, and the GOM committed to look into the matter.  The Charge requested a copy of the list of companies, which ISN passed to the Malaysian Embassy.  (EAP/MTS emailed this list to Embassy KL on September 17 and the same list is included in the non-paper below.)

4.  (SBU) On June 5, 2006, the Department of Commerce published Mayrow General Order No. 3 imposing licensing requirements on most exports and re-exports of dual-use items to named entities.  The entities named in Mayrow General Order No. 3 were all affiliated with the Mayrow Trading Network (Mayrow) in Dubai, UAE and play a vital role in buying, funding, and supplying parts and knowledge to build IEDs and other explosive devices for use in Iraq and Afghanistan. The General Order was expanded on September 6, 2006 and June 8, 2007 to cover additional entities affiliated with Mayrow Trading Inc., including two Malaysian entities.

5.  (SBU) ACTION REQUEST:  Post is requested to approach appropriate host government officials to deliver the non-paper in para 6. In doing so, posts should pursue the following objectives:

-- Follow-up with Malaysian officials on the publication of additional Malaysian entities (companies and individuals) affiliated with Mayrow General Trading on the Department of Commerce Entity List.

-- Urge Malaysia to share any information it has with us regarding these companies/ individuals.

6.  (U) Begin U.S. non-paper:

-- On September 17, a federal grand jury in Miami, Florida returned an indictment charging eight individuals and eight corporations, including two individuals resident in Malaysia and two corporations in Malaysia, in connection with their participation in conspiracies to export U.S. manufactured commodities to prohibited entities and to Iran.

-- In addition, on Wednesday September 17, the U.S. Department of Commerce transferred the parties currently on General Order 3 (the 'Mayrow General Order') to the Entity List.

-- Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation Patricia McNerney informed your Charge, in Washington of this action.

-- The Entity List is a public list of end-users that the U.S. believes pose a risk of diverting U.S.-origin goods to activities detrimental to U.S. foreign or national security interests, such as supporting terrorism or engaging in WMD-related activities.

-- This list informs the public about the export license requirements to export or reexport most items subject to the Department of Commerce,s export controls to the listed entities and therefore simplifies exporter,s screening of potential customers.

-- We previously informed Malaysia in 2007 that Malaysian entities, Vast Solution Sdn Bhd and Majid Seif, were added to the General Order on June 8, 2007.  They will now be transferred to the Entity List.

-- Also on Wednesday September 17, the United States imposed strict export licensing requirements on eight additional companies and four additional individuals in Malaysia.  As a result, a U.S. license is required for the export or re-export of any U.S. origin dual-use item to these listed persons.

-- We believe these companies and individuals are associated with the Mayrow General Trading network and have been engaged in acquiring electronic components and devices capable of being used to construct Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), as well as other items for use in proliferation-related activities.

 -- We are taking these actions because these commodities have been, and may continue to be, employed in IEDs or other explosive devices used against Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

-- U.S.-origin goods diverted to Iran via this network have included those controlled by the Commerce Department for missile technology, national security and anti-terrorism reasons, as well as those controlled under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.

-- This action will affect companies and individuals in thirteen countries, not just Malaysia.  We anticipate that these new requirements will have little or no bilateral trade impact.

-- We encourage you to share any information you have on these companies/ individuals with us.

-- We are providing you details on each of these companies and individuals for your information.

-- We will provide additional information, as it becomes available. We hope that your government will take appropriate actions to curtail these proliferation activities.

-- We note that having a comprehensive export control system would allow your government to better control these activities.

-- Our Congress is considering draft legislation which would require that trans-shipment countries without sufficient export controls be placed in the Department of Commerce's Country Group C as a 'country of diversion concern'. This would mean more restricted high technology trade.

-- We urge Malaysia to quickly enact and fully implement a comprehensive export control system.  We are ready to work with you and to provide any necessary assistance.

-- The following companies and individuals now appear on the revised Entity List:

Entities:

1.    Ace Hub System: Address: No. 15, Jalan PJS 11/16, Taman Bandar Sunway, 46150 Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia

2.    Analytical Solutions: Address: #GB (Ground Floor), Pearl Tower, O.G. Heights, Jalan Awan Cina, 58200, Kuala LUmpur, Malaysia

3.    Antcorp System: Address: 5-02 Wisma Pantai, Jalan Wisma Pantai, 12200 Butterworth, Penang, Malaysia

4.    East Tech: Malaysia (no address available)

5.    Eco Biochem SDN BHD: Address: No. 15, Jalan PJS 11/16, Taman Bandar Sunway, 46150 Petaling Jaya, Selangor D.E., Malaysia

6.    Fetsco Marketing SDN BHD: Address: 97C, Jalan Kenari 23, Puchong Jaya, Puchong, Selangor, Malaysia; and Suite D23, Tkt. 2, Plaza Pekeliling, Jalan Tun Razak, Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekkutuan, Malaysia

7.    Nexus Empire, a.k.a., Vast Solution: Address: 27-06, Amcorp Bldg, Jalan Persiaran Barat, Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia

8.    Vast Solution Sdn Bhd: Address: 27-06 Amcorp Building, Jalan 18, Persiaran Barat, 46050 Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia

9.    VTE Industrial Automation SDN BHD:  Address: 97C, Jalan Kenari 23, Puchong Jaya, Puchong, Selangor, Malaysia

Individuals

1.    Ahmed Rahzad, a.k.a. Saeb Karim:  Address: 27-06 Amcorp Building, Jalan 18, Persiaran Barat, Petaling Jaya, 46050 Selangor, Malaysia

Ahmed Rahzad may be associated with Vast Solutions in Malaysia.

2.    Ann Teck Tong: Address: 97C, Jalan Kenari 23, Puchong Jaya, Puchong, Selangor, Malaysia; and Suite D23, Tkt. 2, Plaza Pekeliling, Jalan Tun Razak, Kuala  Lumpur, Wilayah, Persekkutuan, Malaysia

Ann Teck Tong serves on the board of directors for Fetsco Marketing in Malaysia.

3.    Brian Kaam, a.k.a., Keem Chee Mun: Address: No. 15, Jalan PJS 11/16, Taman Bandar Sunway, 46150 Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia

Brian Kaam, a.k.a., Mr. Kaam Chee Mun, works for Ace Hub System SDN BHD and Eco Biochem SDN BHD in Malaysia.

4.    Majid Seif, a.k.a., Mark Ong and Matti Chong:  Address: 27-06 Amcorp Building, Jalan 18, Persiaran Barat 46050 Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia

Seif was added to EAR General Order Number 3 on June 8, 2007.

5.    Mohd Ansari:  Address: #GB (Ground Floor), Pearl Tower, O.G. Heights, Jalan Awan Cina, 58200, Kuala Lampur, Malaysia

Mohd Ansari has been identified as working for Antcorp System in Malaysia.

--------------------------

REPORTING DEADLINE AND POC

--------------------------

6.  (U) Post is requested to report any substantive responses within seven (7) days of receipt of this cable.  Lisa Meyers (ISN/CPI, 202-736-7939 MeyersLA@state.sgov.gov) and Daniel Bischof (EAP/MTS, 202-647-4932 bischofdr@state.gov) are the Department's POCs for this activity.

RICE (September 2008)

 

WIKILEAKS: UMNO AND ITS COALITION IN DISARRAY AHEAD OF ANWAR'S SEPTEMBER 16 DEADLINE

Posted: 13 Nov 2011 07:15 PM PST

On September 7, word leaked out that BN suddenly had organized a "compulsory" overseas study tour for all 81 parliamentary backbenchers (those who do not serve as ministers or deputy ministers) that would corral the MPs overseas from September 8 until September 17, a day after Anwar's deadline. (As of September 9, 41 MPs had departed; some MPs have refused to go citing fasting month activities with constituents.) UMNO leaders' explanations that the trip was essential for the MPs to learn about the latest agricultural techniques in Taiwan failed to convince; instead, this has appeared to most observers as a measure of desperation by a government unsure of its support.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark, reason 1.4 (b and d)

Summary

1.  (C) Prime Minister Abdullah and top leaders of his United Malays National Organization (UMNO) appear unnerved as they approach the September 16 deadline set by opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim for toppling Abdullah's National Front (BN) government.  UMNO's disarray and the weakness of the BN coalition have been exposed in the run-up to the 16th.  The strongest indications that Anwar could make good on his promise emanate from UMNO itself, including the party's public preoccupation with the question of crossovers and the seemingly desperate decision to corral BN MP's abroad so that they would be out of the country for Anwar's deadline.

UMNO's lack of self-confidence reflects the party's ongoing leadership crisis and lack of faith in Abdullah, absence of a viable new vision for the party, and the further erosion of support, particularly among non-Malays, for the ruling coalition since the March election set-back.  BN has frayed further along racial lines following caustic remarks about Malaysian Chinese by an UMNO division leader, who has refused Abdullah's instructions to apologize, a situation prompting an unusual warning from the Armed Force chief.  The government has not stopped Anwar with charges of sodomy, while Anwar received a strong boost through his successful election to parliament last month, bringing him one step closer to his goal of becoming the next Prime Minister.

2.  (C) UMNO's disarray and the exposed weakness of the BN multi-racial coalition, rather than the unlikely prospect of 30-plus crossovers by September 16, appear to be the most important story at this juncture.  Along with this come renewed doubts about Prime Minister Abdullah's longevity in office and his ability to see himself through December and the UMNO elections.  End Summary.

Uncertain Prospects for September 16 Crossovers

3.  (C) Prime Minister Abdullah and top leaders of his ruling UMNO party appear unnerved as they approach the September 16 deadline set by opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim for toppling Abdullah's National Front (BN) government.  With only one week to go before the 16th (which marks the formation of modern Malaysia through the incorporation of Sabah and Sarawak, appealing to would-be defectors in those states), no MPs have confirmed publicly their intentions to switch sides, nor do we or our close partner embassies have private confirmation of defections.  Anwar, who also leads the People's Justice Party (PKR), continues to intimate that crossovers will happen by September 16, or thereabouts, but his lieutenants and the leaders of his coalition parties, PAS and DAP, have hedged their comments to us and to the media.

UMNO Jittery, Corrals MPs Abroad

4.  (C) In the absence of concrete evidence of imminent crossovers, the strongest indications that Anwar could make good on his promise emanate from UMNO itself which seems gripped by doubt bordering on panic.  PM Abdullah, Deputy PM Najib, and other top UMNO leaders have issued repeated public denials that the government would lose its parliamentary majority, or that Anwar was a verge of presenting the King (who plays a crucial constitutional role in change-of-government scenarios) with a list of cross-over supporters. 

On September 7, word leaked out that BN suddenly had organized a "compulsory" overseas study tour for all 81 parliamentary backbenchers (those who do not serve as ministers or deputy ministers) that would corral the MPs overseas from September 8 until September 17, a day after Anwar's deadline.  (As of September 9, 41 MPs had departed; some MPs have refused to go citing fasting month activities with constituents.)  UMNO leaders' explanations that the trip was essential for the MPs to learn about the latest agricultural techniques in Taiwan failed to convince; instead, this has appeared to most observers as a measure of desperation by a government unsure of its support.

5.  (C) We have had private indications as well of UMNO's lack of self confidence.  The British High Commissioner (protect) informed the Ambassador that he recently received a telephone call from a cabinet minister.  The minister asked the British envoy whether Anwar really had sufficient numbers of MPs prepared to cross-over and bring down the government.

A senior leader within the UMNO Youth division contacted us to ask what the U.S. position would be when Anwar takes over the government through "undemocratic" means.  UMNO Youth subsequently called on the Bar Council and NGOs, organizations UMNO has derided in the past, to speak out against Anwar's plans.

Lack of Confidence; UMNO Leadership Unresolved

6.  (C) UMNO's lack of self-confidence in the face of Anwar's threats reflects the party's lack of consolidation since the March election debacle and unresolved, fundamental challenges to the party's future.  First, UMNO had not yet emerged from its leadership crisis.  Abdullah Badawi has remained Prime Minister and party president, not because he has rallied the confidence of UMNO leaders and the public -- he has not. 

By and large, UMNO members continue to view Abdullah as inadequate and weak-willed, and have provided only tepid support for Abdullah's plan to hand over power to DPM Najib in mid-2010.  Abdullah essentially has remained in place because Najib, his main potential challenger, has so far been too politically vulnerable to make a move.  Top-down party control mechanisms allow Abdullah to smother or shut off other challengers, and circumstances have not yet forced UMNO elites to take drastic action to force Abdullah's resignation.  UMNO anxiety over Abdullah's weak leadership remains, however, and is in a large part a function of the threat to UMNO posed by Anwar, as witnessed during the immediate aftershock of the March electoral setback. 

The greater Anwar's threat, the more UMNO leaders are willing to consider replacing Abdullah with a stronger, more competent defender of the party.  UMNO public rhetoric in early September, such as UMNO Selangor warlord Khir Toyo's public suggestion Abdullah could be eased out like Malaysia's first Prime Minister Abdul Rahman in the midst of race riots in 1969, has begun to take on the ominous tones we heard in the weeks following the March 8 election.

UMNO Yet to Find Viable Model for Renewal

7.  (C) UMNO's lack of confidence also grows out of its failure to reform or arrive at a viable vision for its political future.  Some UMNO leaders flirted with democratic reform and good governance concepts to revive the party's image and appeal to the public, skirting closer to the Opposition platform.  Such internal party consideration died out by early May, as UMNO saw that it could operate the levers of power even with a robust number of opposition seats in Parliament. 

PM Abdullah's announcement of a populist budget in late August also failed to give UMNO a boost or make up for politically unpopular fuel price hikes earlier in the year.  To the extent that UMNO leaders have embraced a model for consolidating and energizing the party, they have fallen back on the old model of Malay chauvinism, utilizing the UMNO controlled Malay language media to warn of the Opposition's threats to the primacy of Islam and Malay privileges.  Absent gross missteps by Anwar's non-Malay allies, such calls so far have had limited resonance among today's better-educated, less rural Malay population. Appeals for Malay Muslim solidarity to date also have failed to woo support from conservative PAS voters, who broadly rejected UMNO's behind the scenes overtures to select PAS leaders when these talks came to light.

Increased Stress on BN's Multi-Racial Coalition

8.  (C) UMNO's unresolved leadership crisis, lack of reform and resort to Malay chauvinism have had a clear negative impact on UMNO's non-Malay partners in the National Front coalition, already weakened by the exodus of non-Malay voters in the March polls.  Chinese and Indian support for BN has eroded further since March, as indicated by limited polling and escalating flare-ups between UMNO hardliners and Chinese leaders in the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Gerakan party.  The recent remarks by Penang UMNO division leader Ahmad Ismail, referring to Chinese citizens as "squatters", has touched off the most serious inter-racial feuding within BN, with MCA and Gerakan raising questions about their future within UMNO.

Abdullah Struggles to Contain Inter-Racial Feud

9.  (C) Abdullah thus far has not succeeded in controlling the Ahmad Ismail situation; Abdullah delegated an apology via DPM Najib, but Ahmad Ismail refused the party president's instructions to back down, providing a rebuke to Abdullah's leadership.  MCA and Gerakan announced on September 8 they had broken relations with UMNO within Penang state.  Abdullah reportedly will use the BN's September 9 leadership to try to end BN's current inter-racial feud and repair relations with MCA in particular. 

Prior to the meeting, Armed Force Chief Abdul Aziz remarked to an UMNO gathering that the government must act sternly against those who could provoke racial conflict, an unusual statement from the military that normally refrains from such comments and which in the local context may be taken as a warning to non-Malays.  While UMNO could succeed in patching up this immediate issue, UMNO's continued emphasis on ultra-Malay rhetoric guarantees growing strains with MCA and other BN partners, including those in East Malaysia.

Anwar Buoyed by Election

10.  (C) While UMNO and BN struggle internally, Anwar Ibrahim received a major boost with his late August election to Parliament which made him Opposition leader in Parliament and brought him one necessary step closer to becoming the next Prime Minister (only MPs may become Prime Minister).  Anwar's victory in the Penang by-election in his home district was never in serious doubt, but the huge margin of his victory, exceeding that of his wife in March, was grim news to

Abdullah and UMNO, setting off renewed calls within UMNO for Abdullah to step down quickly.  Since then, Anwar and his PKR lieutenants have tried to press their advantage by reaffirming that they have over 30 MPs ready to cross over, even while some have downplayed the significance of the September 16 deadline.  Anwar countered Abdullah's populist budget with his own economic vision.  As BN's racial problems deepened, he Opposition alliance (Pakatan) on September 8 sought political advantage by issuing a statement condemning UMNO's Ahmad Ismail and other UMNO leaders for racially charged rhetoric while affirming Pakatan's adherence to the Constitution's provisions for Islam and Malay prerogatives.

Sodomy Trial Pending; the Temptation to Deny Bail

11.  (C) The government's pursuit of sodomy charges against Anwar has not derailed the Opposition leader, but conversely has generated some sympathy for Anwar as a victim of persecution among the majority of the population who view the charges as politically motivated.  Anwar's continued bail and freedom of movement, pending the outcome of the trial which may consume many months, is a critical matter for the Opposition; Anwar in jail could not hope to negotiate crossovers and the formation of a new government, a role that only he can play at this juncture. 

Although the government so far has not pressed for Anwar's detention during the trial, and has made arguments for revocation of bail less credible by granting police bail in July and not challenging bail when Anwar was charged with the crime in August, UMNO leaders could be sorely tempted to revisit the question.

Detaining Anwar would be one way to try to put an end the cross-over threat, though such a move would entail costs including in the realm of public opinion.  (Note:  Anwar will appear in court tomorrow, September 10; PKR supporters currently are speaking about the possible denial of bail, while the authorities are warning against disruptions at the court venue.  End Note.)

Comment

12.  (C) We believe the odds are against Anwar getting the necessary 30 or more crossovers to bring down the government in one week's time, despite UMNO's evident insecurity.  Many MPs will want to be assured they are joining the winning side and not exposing themselves to excessive risk; the crossing over of parties, rather than individuals, would provide more security in this regard.  Parties also bring with them more bargaining power to a new coalition.  Aside from a few micro-parties, like SAPP in Sabah, there is little indication Anwar has sealed such party deals.  The Opposition also recognizes a risk if too many non-Malays join their ranks without a number of Malays in the mix, as this would feed immediately into UMNO's claims that the Opposition threatens Malay interests and Islam.

13.  (C) It is plausible that Anwar arranges for some MPs to crossover on or by September 16, preserving the credibility of his threat and giving him a basis for arguing that it is only a matter of time.  If no one jumps by September 16, Anwar's arguments will be harder to make, and he may lose the momentum he currently enjoys from his recent election to Parliament.  Nevertheless, Anwar has committed himself to the project of bringing down the UMNO/BN government through crossovers, rather than waiting for another national election in three or four years time.  September 16 will not be the end of Anwar's push.

14.  (C) UMNO's disarray and the exposed weakness of the BN multi-racial coalition, rather than the prospect of September 16 crossovers, appears to be the most important story at this specific juncture.  Crossover panic represents a symptom of UMNO's predicament more so than a reflection of Anwar's strength.  Along with this come renewed doubts about Prime Minister Abdullah's longevity in office and his ability to see himself through December and the UMNO elections.  As collateral damage from UMNO's leadership struggle and preoccupation with warding off Anwar, we can expect government policy-making to continue at best in an ad hoc fashion when it is not paralyzed altogether.  Attention to foreign policy will take a distant back seat unless it is linked to political survival at home.

KEITH (September 2008)

 

WIKILEAKS: SABAH DEPORTATIONS A POLITICAL BAND-AID

Posted: 09 Nov 2011 12:00 AM PST

A retired senior intelligence official frankly admitted to us earlier this year that the previous government of Mahathir also facilitated illegal immigration from Indonesia and the Philippines in order to better balance the state's ethnic and religious equation as a measure to ward off any future separatist sentiments in Sabah, in addition to attracting UMNO votes needed to control the state. A Royal Commission, operated properly, would likely expose the depth of UMNO and BN's political corruption and vote manipulation, further inciting Sabahans.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark Clark for reasons 1.4 (b and d).

Summary

1.  (C) Residents of Malaysia's Sabah state, in northeast Borneo, are dismissive of the Government's latest "crackdown" against illegal immigrants.  The federal government launched the campaign as a measure to meet demands by Sabah politicians who are being wooed to shift their support to the opposition led by Anwar Ibrahim.  The deportation campaign, which has by-passed factories and plantations that depend on migrant workers, is widely perceived as "lip service" and a "political exercise" not meant to solve the problem. 

Most observers believe that any truly effective operation to expel illegals would damage the state's economy, which is highly dependent on cheap migrant labor.  Local politicians are critical of the crackdown and questioned the federal government's motives.  A call for a Royal Commission of Inquiry to probe the causes of the massive illegal migration is unlikely to gain traction as such a commission could expose current and Mahathir-era politicians' efforts to manipulate votes and change the state's ethnic balance by illegitimately providing Malaysian papers to illegal immigrants.  End Summary.

Deportations a "Political Band-aid"

2.  (C) The Government of Malaysia (GOM) announced in July it would undertake a campaign of mass deportations of illegal immigrants in the East Malaysian state of Sabah, the latest in a series of such campaigns launched every three or four years.  The embattled government of Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi took this decision against the backdrop of possible defections by Sabah MPs to the opposition led by Anwar Ibrahim.  Many Sabah politicians, and the indigenous population, rate illegal immigration as the state's foremost problem and blame the federal government for both facilitating illegal migrants and failing to take corrective action.  Using their new-found role as possible swing votes in the national Parliament, Sabah politicians have put immigration enforcement high on their list of demands.

3.  (C) Simon Sipaun, Vice-chairman of Malaysia's Human Rights Commission (SUHAKAM) told Emboff he estimates 1.9 million illegal and/or undocumented people live in Sabah, higher than the GOM's official number of 240,000.  The GOM announced plans to deport 100,000 - 150,000 persons, and allocated 50 million ringgit (an estimated 15,625,000 USD) to fund the operation.  Local observers in Sabah told Poloff that the crackdown's accomplishments were minimal as of mid-August.  Authorities screened 19,686 persons from August 1-17 of which only 2,697 were detained and sent to immigration detention centers.  The government also instituted a three-month grace period to allow local businesses in Sabah to register and by doing so legalize their undocumented employees.

4.  (C) Muhammad Radzi Jamaludin, Principal Assistant Secretary in the MFA Southeast Asia Division, conceded to Poloff recently that many Filipinos were returning only a couple weeks after their deportations.  He said some stay an additional week in the Philippines "on vacation" in their home villages prior to returning.  According to Radzi, another unexpected wrinkle was that some Malaysians (all women) are falsely claiming Filipino citizenship and upon reaching the Philippines announced their Malaysian citizenship and said they desired to stay with their spouses, who were being deported.  He added that the majority of Filipinos in Sabah entered legally, but overstay their visas.

Malaysia's Immigration Department is reportedly recording biometrics of deportees to identify those who attempt to re-enter.  On August 29, Ramlan Ibrahim, Undersecretary for Southeast Asia in the Foreign Affairs Ministry told poloff and Staffdel Luse that all deportations were being conducted humanely and were targeting only the able-bodied.

Public and Observers not Impressed

5. (C) New Straits Times journalist Jaswendar Kaur told Poloff that authorities were selective in rounding up illegal immigrants.  The focus of the sweeps centered on shantytowns and bypassed plantations and factories, whose owners are politically well-connected.  Manufacturing associations dependent upon foreign labor were approaching the government, arguing that mass deportations would adversely affect factory operations.  Kaur saw little difference in current deportation efforts from prior crackdowns.  Emboff was in Sabah from August 18-22 and discussed the deportation operation in casual conversations with local Sabahans.  No one expressed any particular excitement about the operation. Such government efforts occur every four-five years and most Sabahans had a "we've seen it all before" attitude.

Sabah BN Politicians Skeptical

6.  (C) Yong Tek Lee, former Chief Minister and President of the Sabah Progressive Party (SAPP) who has called for the Prime Minister's resignation (ref B), met with Emboff on August 21.  In his view, if the government were serious about tackling the illegal immigrant issue, it would commit more than 50 million ringgit.  He viewed the deportations as little more than lip service to the concerns of Sabahans.  He maintained that the ruling National Front (BN) government spent more on the recent Permatang Pauh by-election (ref A) than in trying to control illegal immigration in Sabah.

Several Sabahans interviewed by Emboff expressed similar opinions.  Bernard Dompok, Minister in the Prime Minister's Office, told us he wanted a Royal Commission of Inquiry to investigate who is supplying illegal immigrants in Sabah with Malaysian documents such as identity cards.  Otherwise, he believes, any crackdown will be ineffective.

COMMENT

7.  (C) Sabahans consider illegal immigration a major concern, even though important segments of the state's economy are highly dependent on cheap migrant labor.  Many view illegal immigrants, especially Filipino Muslims, as upsetting the political balance in Sabah, whose native majority is Catholic. 

The lack of enthusiasm among Sabahans for the current illegal immigrant crackdown illustrates the overall mistrust of the BN government and its peninsula-centric policies.  The crackdown to date is selective and explicitly avoids raids on key areas of migrant employment, such as manufacturing, logging, palm oil plantations, and service industries, which could be forced to curtail operations without their illegal migrant workers.

Sabahans see the immigrants being deported as "low hanging fruit," enabling authorities to demonstrate that they are "doing something" about the problem.  According to Jaswendar, a previous short-lived crackdown that proved too effective in detaining illegal immigrants was stopped after local business leaders complained and the police official who planned the operation was punished and transferred.

8. (C) Dompok's desire for a Royal Commission is likely to remain unfulfilled.  The central government and the leading UMNO party for many years facilitated issuance of Malaysian documents to illegal immigrants in exchange for their political support. 

A retired senior intelligence official frankly admitted to us earlier this year that the previous government of Mahathir also facilitated illegal immigration from Indonesia and the Philippines in order to better balance the state's ethnic and religious equation as a measure to ward off any future separatist sentiments in Sabah, in addition to attracting UMNO votes needed to control the state.  A Royal Commission, operated properly, would likely expose the depth of UMNO and BN's political corruption and vote manipulation, further inciting Sabahans.

KEITH (September 2008)

 

State-of-the-art technology, maybe

Posted: 08 Nov 2011 04:04 PM PST

Malaysia is going to buy six patrol boats at a total cost of RM6 billion or RM1 billion per patrol boat. Of course, Malaysia's patrol boats are going to be far advanced and more sophisticated than those of the Philippines who paid only RM31.5 million for theirs. The Philippines's patrol boats can only patrol the waters. Malaysia's patrol boats can…well…patrol the waters.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

Second Hamilton-class ship to be deployed to West Phl Sea (USD10.5 million or RM31.5 million)

USCGS Dallas : The Second Hamilton Class Ship to be Transferred to the Philippines

MANILA, Philippines - The second Hamilton-class patrol ship that will be acquired from the US would also be deployed to the West Philippine Sea area to secure the country's natural resources, the Navy said yesterday.

Navy spokesman Lt. Col. Omar Tonsay said the ship, which may be transferred to the Philippines by the first or second quarter of 2012, would also guard the energy projects in Malampaya off Palawan.

He said the acquisition of the ship from the US will improve the military's maritime defense capability.

"It (acquisition) will boost our external defense and it will add to our desired fleet of Hamilton-class vessels," Tonsay said.

A Navy inspection team, led by Navy Vice Commander Rear Adm. Orwen Cortez, was sent to South Carolina last week to inspect the US Coast Guard vessel being eyed for acquisition.

The team conducted the inspection from Oct. 31 to Nov. 5 as part of the Navy's continued efforts to upgrade naval capability.

In a statement, Tonsay said the team inspected the US Coast Guard cutter Dallas, which would be acquired through the US Excess Defense Articles project.

The inspection involved orientation tours, preliminary transfer discussions, and ship's organization and mission briefings.

"An in-depth inspection of the entire ship, examination of the actual equipment on board, and checking of machinery records were also conducted to ensure the actual status of the ship," Tonsay said.

He said the Navy team and the US Coast Guard discussed matters pertaining to the transfer of the ship to Manila.

"These (matters) include the readiness status of the vessel where it was determined to be mission ready and is expected to be a hot transfer," Tonsay said.

"This means that the ship is still very much in active service in the US and will be decommissioned only to effect its transfer to the Philippines," he added.

The US Coast Guard cutter Dallas is a weather high-endurance cutter and has features similar to the BRP Gregorio del Pilar, the first Hamilton-class cutter acquired by the Navy from the US Coast Guard.

The US Coast Guard had used the ship for drug and migrant interdiction, law enforcement, search and rescue, living marine resources protection, and defense readiness.

It is powered by diesel engines and gas turbines and is re-equipped with a helicopter flight deck, a retractable hangar, and facilities to support helicopter operations. The ship can accommodate up to 180 officers and sailors.

Earlier, the government acquired its first Hamilton-class vessel from the US Coast Guard to upgrade the military's external defense capabilities.

The ship, which has been renamed BRP Gregorio del Pilar, was deployed at the West Philippine Sea to secure energy projects. The vessel is expected to be commissioned this month.

The transfer cost for the Gregorio del Pilar has been pegged at P450 million (USD10.5 million or RM31.5 million). It was acquired under the US Foreign Military Sales program using proceeds from the Malampaya project funds.

The Gregorio del Pilar is classified as a cutter, a high-speed vessel that can cut through waves. The ship is now the Navy's largest vessel.

The 380 feet-long vessel was turned over by the US Coast Guard to Philippine officials in California last May 13. It arrived in Philippine territory last Aug. 17.

 

WIKILEAKS: MALAYSIAN OPPOSITION NOT SO CONCERNED ABOUT ECONOMIC POLICY

Posted: 07 Nov 2011 07:08 PM PST

The lack of economic expertise among the allied opposition parties underlines some of the difficulties they would have if they were to take over the federal government. The opposition-controlled state governments are struggling just to line up a few advisors and there is little expertise among politicians, let alone agreement. Pua is DAP's one and only economic advisor in a coalition in which the other two parties, KeAdilan and PAS, economic expertise is sorely lacking.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

Classified By: Acting Economic Counselor Juha Salin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary:  On Thursday, August 14, Econ Counselor and Econoff met with Tony Pua, opposition Democratic Action Party (DAP) Member of Parliament.  Pua is DAP's one and only economic advisor in a coalition in which the other two parties, KeAdilan ("Justice") and PAS (Islamic), economic expertise is sorely lacking.  Pua explained that the opposition's economic polices on maintaining an open business climate and attracting investment were not much different from those of the current government. Fighting corruption was the top priority in opposition-controlled states, but Pua said if he had his way he would make education priority number two, beginning with efforts to attract world-class universities to open branch campuses in Malaysia. End summary.

OPENNESS TO BUSINESS; FIGHTING CORRUPTION...

2. (U) Pua said the economic policies of the PKR opposition coalition would be the same as under the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition with a commitment to an open business climate and attracting foreign direct investment among its top priorities.  There was some disagreement within the PKR on how to fix the "New Economic Policy," a system of racial preferences favoring the majority Muslim Malays.

3. (SBU) All three opposition parties agreed to make fighting corruption a priority by improving transparency and accountability and implementing projects through open tender, he said.  Even if it  was their only achievement, "cutting the fat" (fighting corruption) over the next two years would deliver significant gains, he said.

...BUT LITTLE AGREEMENT ON ANYTHING ELSE

4. (SBU) Coordination among the three opposition parties remained a problem, he said.  They had not formed a "shadow Cabinet"; they had not been able to agree on any power-sharing plan.  Other major differences remained, particularly a plank in the PAS platform to make Malaysia an Islamic State.  While PKR defacto leader Anwar often made populist statements demanding a reduction in fuel prices or more subsidies on food, there was no mechanism to consult with others in the coalition before making such pronouncements.  "If Anwar thinks it sounds good, he says it," Pua explained, "and we just have to live with it.  We don't voice our disagreement, but we disagree."

ECONOMIC POLICY NOT A VOTE-GETTER, NOT A STRONG POINT

5. (C) Economic policy simply was not a priority, Pua explained, because it was not a "vote-getter."  Economic expertise was sorely lacking in the three-party opposition coalition, he said.  While the Central Bank has talented staff to advise the federal government, the state governments under opposition control had neither a civil service competent in developing or advising on economic policy, nor the resources to hire such talent.  The maximum pay for a state-level government employee without a title of "Director" was RM 5,000 per month, but Pua was helping Penang Chief Minister Lim Guan Eng find willing economists to form an economic policy team, and the money to pay them.  So far, he had not had much luck.  "Smart people don't want to touch politics," he explained, "and even the think tanks are tied to the BN."

6. (U) While Pua had drafted a fifty-page "shadow budget" which is available on DAP's website, neither of his allied parties had focused on economics, he said.  The Islamic Party (PAS) had issued a two-page document with broad, vague principles and goals, and KeAdilan had not released anything.

PUA'S WISH FOR MALAYSIA: BETTER EDUCATION

7. (U) When asked what his top priority would be to improve Malaysia's economy, Pua immediately said education.  He said he would try to get world-class universities to open branch campuses in Malaysia, for example, an Executive MBA program by Harvard.  "Smart people create jobs and wealth, and attract multi-national corporations," he said.  Econ Counselor pointed out that U.S. universities had looked into coming to Malaysia in the past, but had declined because the Ministry of Education had not allowed them to determine their own curriculum.

COMMENT:

8. (C) The lack of economic expertise among the allied opposition parties underlines some of the difficulties they would have if they were to take over the federal government.  The opposition-controlled state governments are struggling just to line up a few advisors and there is little expertise among politicians, let alone agreement.  The bright side is that the opposition seems fully aware of its shortcomings in this regard and is unlikely to make sweeping changes. Bad ideas undoubtedly will emerge, but the Chinese business community should be able to veto them through their DAP representatives.

KEITH (August 2008)

 

WIKILEAKS: RELIGIOUS, RACIAL POLITICS MARK RUN-UP TO CRITICAL BY-ELECTION

Posted: 05 Nov 2011 08:29 PM PDT

A hostile crowd of about 500 protesters assembled in front of the building, including representatives from the Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party (PAS), Anwar Ibrahim's People Justice Party (PKR) (including a Member of Parliament), the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), and Muslim-based NGOs. A group of protesters led by Peninsular Malay Students Federations (GPMS) Vice-president Jais Abdul Karim and PKR MP Zulkifli Noordin stormed the building shortly after the forum began. Police at the scene made no attempt to stop the protesters, but actually escorted them inside, where the demonstrators disrupted the proceedings, using racial epithets and other derogatory language and forcing Bar Council President Ambiga Sreenevasan to close the forum. Police did not make any arrests of the protestors, but have announced that they are investigating the forum's organizers.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

Classified By: Classified By: Acting Political Section Chief William G. Gray for reasons 1.4 (b and d).

 1.  (C) Summary.  The ruling National Front (BN) coalition is gearing up to oppose Anwar Ibrahim's return to parliament via an August 26 by-election.  BN tactics include intense rhetoric with religious and racial connotations.  A Malaysian Bar Council forum on conversion to Islam was shut down by a group of Muslim protesters spanning the political spectrum, a development that has provided the BN and government-controlled media with opportunities to rouse the emotions of their Muslim/Malay base. 

In the meantime, the Government has again threatened to shut down a Catholic newspaper for "dabbling in politics."  Government and BN spokesmen continue to label Anwar an "American stooge" and accuse the USG of "meddling" in the internal affairs of Malaysia.  Post expects the rhetoric to continue to intensify with both sides viewing the by-election as part of the zero-sum power struggle between UMNO and Anwar.  End Summary.

Protesters Block Forum

2.  (SBU) The Malaysian Bar Council attempted to hold a forum, entitled "Conversion to Islam," at their national headquarters on August 9.  Included in the forum was a panel discussion of two high profile conversion cases involving the difficulties faced by non-Muslims in conversion cases related to religiously mixed marriages. 

A hostile crowd of about 500 protesters assembled in front of the building, including representatives from the Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party (PAS), Anwar Ibrahim's People Justice Party (PKR) (including a Member of Parliament), the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), and Muslim-based NGOs.  A group of protesters led by Peninsular Malay Students Federations (GPMS) Vice-president Jais Abdul Karim and PKR MP Zulkifli Noordin stormed the building shortly after the forum began. 

Police at the scene made no attempt to stop the protesters, but actually escorted them inside, where the demonstrators disrupted the proceedings, using racial epithets and other derogatory language and forcing Bar Council President Ambiga Sreenevasan to close the forum.  Police did not make any arrests of the protestors, but have announced that they are investigating the forum's organizers.

3.  (SBU) Criticism of the forum has crossed political lines and split both the opposition and ruling alliances.  On August 8, de facto Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim, taking a position similar to that of Deputy Prime Minister Najib, said that such forums should be held behind closed doors and not openly.  However, PKR Deputy President Syed Husin Ali condemned the group that entered the Bar Council, including PKR MP Zulkifli. 

Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi said he hoped such forums would not be organized in the future, explaining, "issues concerning religion are very sensitive" and since matters on religion "are spelt out," there was no need for discussions.  Abdullah added that he would leave it up to the Home Ministry to decide whether action, including using the Internal Security Act (ISA) and Sedition Act, might be taken against the Bar Council.

4.  (SBU)  Syed Hamid, Home Minister, said he "hoped that the Bar council got the message that there are certain things that are out of bounds for public discussion, even if held in a private place."  DPM Najib dismissed the protesters' disruption, saying it was "expected" and blamed the disruption on the Bar Council for its "stubborn" insistence on holding the forum. 

De facto Religious Affairs Minister Ahmad Zahid encouraged authorities to take action against the Bar Council for its "defiance" by proceeding with the forum. He claimed the forum had a "hidden agenda to disparage Islam."  While UMNO leaders have united in criticizing the Bar Council, the non-Malay parties of the BN, including Gerakan and MCA, have emphasized the need to address the problems the Bar Council was attempting to discuss.

Catholic Herald Under Renewed Pressure

5.  (SBU) GOM has renewed its pressure on the Catholic weekly newsletter Herald for allegedly "dabbling" in politics (reftel).  The Home Affairs had issued a show-cause letter on July 16 accusing the paper of committing two offenses - not focusing on religion and religious activities, and carrying an article purportedly degrading Islam. 

The division issued another warning on August 12 that Herald's permit will be suspended if it goes ahead with a planned editorial on the Permatang Pauh by-election in its forthcoming issue.  The Herald has a circulation of 12, 0000 and carries reports in English, Bahasa Malaysia, Tamil and Chinese.  Editor Father Lawrence Lim denied that the publication had breached permit conditions.  In his reply to the Home Affairs Ministry, Father Lim stated that the Ministry had not defined the concept of "religion" in the application form for a publishing permit and neither is there a definition in the Constitution.  Father Lim pointed out that the forthcoming editorial was only asking people to pray for a just and fair by-election.

Anwar Portrayed as U.S. Puppet

6.  (SBU) The GOM is continuing its fierce rhetoric on Anwar Ibrahim, describing him as an American lackey.  Foreign Minister Rais Yatim fired the first salvo by stating that the USG should not meddle in Malaysia's internal affairs, arguing that even the UN secretary-general has not said anything about how Malaysia is handling its legal matters. 

The press has quoted Rais as saying that he planned to write a letter to the UNSYG Ban complaining about U.S. "meddling.  Rais has maintained that the official U.S. stance as well as statements by former Vice President Gore and former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor violated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Charter. 

Echoing the foreign minister's view, UMNO Youth Internal Bureau Chairman and former PM Mahathir's son Mukhriz Mahathir described Anwar as a political puppet of the United States government.  He added that the statements by the USG and its former leaders are "a concerted conspiracy to install their lackey in Malaysia."  The UMNO-owned Malay newspapers have also prominently editorialized on allegedly close links between the U.S. and Anwar.

The Next Steps

7.  (SBU) Anwar and BN continue to prepare to submit their by-election nominations on August 16 while his lawyers, confident they have a very strong case, prepare for the next stage of the legal process, which resumes on September 10. Anwar is expected to make appearances at a series of political rallies leading up to election day.  Although BN publicly talks about defeating Anwar, privately they concede his likely victory and seek to make the margin as small as possible.  Poloffs will monitor the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party Congress on August 15 in the Opposition controlled state of Perak as well as the by-election on August 26.

Comment

8.  (C) The response to the Bar Council forum has illustrated the Government's willingness to utilize religious sensitivities and tensions for political gains.  The involvement of party members from PAS and PKR show the fragile nature of the Opposition's coalition and the potential for UMNO strategists to continue exploiting the coalition's lack of cohesiveness, especially along religious and racial lines. 

The Malay language press on August 13 gave prominent and sympathetic coverage to a demonstration by thousands of students at the exclusively Malay Mara Technical University against a proposal by the new PKR-controlled Selangor state government to "integrate" the university by allotting 10 percent of the places for non-Malays. 

As the by-election draws near, BN will likely increase the rhetoric, including implications that Malays' preferred status will disappear if Anwar and the opposition seize control of the government.  The message emerging in the Government-controlled media is that Anwar represents increased instability and a loss of sovereignty to the West, particularly the United States. 

While fierce, religious and ethnic-tinged rhetoric is not unusual in Malaysian politics, the intensity of the current campaign likely reflects the views of the major players that the Opposition/BN power struggle is a zero-sum game.  Anwar believes he must become prime minister or go to jail over the politically-motivated sodomy charges and top UMNO leaders fear political defeat would mean loss of their positions of privilege and in some cases even result in exposure to possible criminal charges for graft and corruption.

KEITH (August 2008)

 

WIKILEAKS: HOME MINISTER ASSEMBLES DIPLOMATS, DEFENDS HANDLING OF ANWAR CASE

Posted: 04 Nov 2011 08:38 PM PDT

The GOM is becoming aware of the negative impact the Anwar case has had on its international reputation and is acting to change the negative foreign perceptions. Today's briefing was an attempt by the GOM to influence the diplomatic community, counter Anwar's own messaging the day before, and work against critical international media attention. The Minister shared no new information with the group as a whole and we doubt the briefing swayed diplomats to change their prior opinions; indeed, we heard a good measure of cynicism from some of the gathered diplomats.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

Classified By: POLITICAL SECTION CHIEF MARK D. CLARK, REASON 1.4 (B AND D).

Summary

1.  (C) Home Minister Syed Hamid Albar briefed foreign diplomats, including the Ambassador, on the sodomy case against Anwar Ibrahim on July 23, one day after de facto Opposition leader conducted his own diplomatic briefing.

Syed Hamid dismissed claims of conspiracy, defended the police handling of the case, and emphasized that Anwar was being treated fairly as "Malaysia follows the rule of law."

In a follow-on conversation, the Home Minister told the Ambassador the government believed the criminal act of sodomy was consensual, and stated authorities would decide whether to prosecute prior to the expiration of Anwar's bail on August 18. 

Today's briefing reportedly was the result of a Cabinet decision.  The GOM is becoming aware of the damage the Anwar case has had on its international reputation and is acting to challenge negative foreign perceptions.  End Summary.

Home Minister: "We want the truth to be told"

2.  (SBU) Home Minister Syed Hamid Albar on July 23 delivered a hastily-arranged briefing on Anwar Ibrahim's sodomy case to 96 representatives of the diplomatic corps.  The Ambassador and poloff attended.  The briefing came the day after Anwar's own briefing to diplomats (ref A). 

The Minister stated the briefing was not a "rebuttal," but just to "state the facts" and present the government's side of the case.  Syed Hamid explicitly and repeatedly encouraged the assembled diplomats to use the information in the briefing to "put some of the picture right." 

The Minister acknowledged the government is "fighting a battle of perception" and that Anwar's case was making "Malaysia familiar with (the concept of) trial in the media."  He said the idea of a government conspiracy against Anwar was "nonsense." 

After the briefing, he told reporters, "To us, there is no need to be afraid of the truth.  Let them hear both sides.  Whether they believe it or not is another matter but I think they will appreciate our transparency."

3.  (SBU) Syed Hamid's briefing reiterated previous declarations that the GOM was not influencing the case.  He repeatedly offered examples of how the police responded with deliberate caution in its investigation of the allegations.

The Minister stated Anwar received special treatment, not usually afforded suspects, such as not being arrested immediately and having his lawyer present while the police questioned him.  He defended the manner in which police arrested Anwar by stating Anwar's home is well fortified and protected by armed private security. 

He denied police wore baklavas (masks) when making the arrest, noting that "normal police" arrested Anwar and those in Baklavas were merely providing security.

4.  (SBU) Syed Hamid referred to Anwar's sodomy charge in 1998 to support the current allegations of sodomy.  He further stated, "We want the truth to be told.  Let us investigate it and we will then know whether to proceed (with charges)."

"Malaysia follows rule of law"

5.  (SBU) Syed Hamid explained that officials had not yet provided Anwar with the police report alleging sodomy because Malaysian law prohibits releasing such a report until the accused is formally charged.  He reiterated that every part of the investigation and police actions is within legal boundaries and that "Malaysia follows the rule of law."  He cited the removal of the Inspector General of Police (IGP) and Attorney General (AG) from an active role in the case because Anwar accused them of abuses when Anwar was in custody in 1998.  He declared the police and attorney general personnel investigating the case do not report to the IGP and AG. 

(Note:  The government announced the AG and IGP's recusal several weeks into the case.  End Note.)

Minister takes swing at "outside" interference

6. (SBU) Alluding to but not specifying critical statements made by USG officials and American NGOs, Syed Hamid said Malaysia does not need the involvement of outside bodies to ensure citizens are protected.  He continued by describing Malaysia as a rule of law country willing to do whatever was necessary to protect its citizens.  The Minister also stated Malaysia has different morals and standards from other countries, represented by its own laws, which it must follow.

Decision to prosecute before August 18

7.  (C) Ambassador Keith and other selected western diplomats had the opportunity to sit with the Minister following the briefing.  The Ambassador asked Syed Hamid how often it pursued sodomy cases and whether prosecutors treated consensual cases differently from non-consensual ones.  The Minister replied that there were many sodomy cases and that once a police report was filed, prosecutors still tended to file charges regardless of whether the act was consensual or not. 

He confided to the table that police believe the accuser, Saiful, consented to being sodomized, but later regretted participating in the act.  Syed Hamid alleged the 23-year old was so upset over the sodomy that he attempted suicide prior to filing the initial police report.  Saiful made his official complaint only after he went for a regular medical exam and told the doctor he was previously sodomized.

The Minister also told the Ambassador prosecutors would make the decision on whether to charge Anwar prior to the expiration of his bail on August 18.

Comment

8. (C) The GOM is becoming aware of the negative impact the Anwar case has had on its international reputation and is acting to change the negative foreign perceptions.  Today's briefing was an attempt by the GOM to influence the diplomatic community, counter Anwar's own messaging the day before, and work against critical international media attention.  The decision to hold the briefing was taken by the Cabinet earlier in the day at its regularly scheduled meeting, a ministry official told us, which accounts for the lack of advance notice. 

The Minister shared no new information with the group as a whole and we doubt the briefing swayed diplomats to change their prior opinions; indeed, we heard a good measure of cynicism from some of the gathered diplomats.  The government's decision to hold the event and the Ambassador's discussion with the Home Minister afterward served to reinforce our belief that the GOM already has decided to charge Anwar for sodomy, and it will take this next step by mid-August.

KEITH (July 2008)

 

WIKILEAKS: PAS LEADER FAVORS TAKING POWER THROUGH NEXT ELECTION; SNAP POLLS POSSIBLE

Posted: 03 Nov 2011 01:00 AM PDT

Nasaruddin Mat Isa, Deputy President of the opposition Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) and Member of Parliament, told us on May 21 that PAS was not very happy with talk of ruling National Front (BN) Members of Parliament crossing over to the opposition Peoples Alliance and thus bringing down the BN government. PAS leadership believed that the Alliance at this juncture should maintain the current political status quo and strengthen their administration in the five opposition-held states.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

Classified By: POLITICAL SECTION CHIEF MARK D. CLARK, REASON 1.4 (B AND D).

Summary

1.  (C) Nasaruddin Mat Isa, Deputy President of the Islamist opposition party PAS, speaking with us on May 21, said the opposition should seek to take power through the next federal election, rather than through immediate defections by ruling coalition MPs, in part to reduce the risk of a harsh crackdown by the National Front government. 

PAS leaders are geared up for possible snap national elections, but opposition parties would not rerun elections in the five states they control.  Nasaruddin linked Mahathir's surprise resignation from the UMNO party with the Cabinet's decision to release a prominent report on judicial corruption that implicates the former Prime Minister.  End Summary.

Elections, Not Defections

2.  (C) Nasaruddin Mat Isa, Deputy President of the opposition Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) and Member of Parliament, told us on May 21 that PAS was not very happy with talk of ruling National Front (BN) Members of Parliament crossing over to the opposition Peoples Alliance and thus bringing down the BN government (refs B and C).  PAS leadership believed that the Alliance at this juncture should maintain the current political status quo and strengthen their administration in the five opposition-held states. Once the opposition parties can demonstrate to the public that they can deliver, the people will support the Peoples Alliance and topple the BN government in the next election.

Furthermore, even if enough BN MPs were to cross over to the Alliance, UMNO and BN leaders will not give up power easily. By virtue of his position, PM Abdullah is still very powerful, and "he still has the option of declaring emergency rule" or using the Internal Security Act (ISA) to detain UMNO's opponents, although Nasaruddin quickly added Abdullah "is no Mahathir" (i.e., not as likely to use authoritarian methods).

Snap Polls Possible, But Not in Opposition States

3.  (C) PAS leaders were geared up for Prime Minister Abdullah calling a snap election if the current "political impasse persists in UMNO," Nasaruddin said.  He stressed, however, that if the PM dissolves Parliament, the Alliance will not follow suit in dissolving the state legislative assemblies of the five states under their control.  An MP from Anwar Ibrahim's Peoples Justice Party (PKR) who joined us, nodded in agreement. 

(Note:  State governments need not follow the federal electoral cycle, though in recent history all states except Sarawak have held elections coinciding with the national polls.  End Note.)

Mahathir's UMNO Resignation Linked to Judicial Probe

4.  (C) Nasaruddin pointed out proudly that it was a PAS member who "brought down" Mahathir by precipitating the former Prime Minister's decision to resign from UMNO (ref A).

(Note:  At a public forum on May 19, Mahathir called on UMNO members to leave the party temporarily as the only way to bring down PM Abdullah.  Reportedly, one member of the audience who turned out to be a PAS member dared the former PM to lead the way in leaving the party, and Mahathir obliged on the spot.  End Note.)

5.  (C) In addition, Nasaruddin contended that Mahathir's shock May 19 announcement was influenced by the Cabinet's decision on May 16 to publish the Royal Commission report probing allegations of corruption in the judiciary (the Linggam inquiry).  The report concluded that six prominent government and judicial figures including Mahathir were involved in the manipulation of appointments of top judges for political purposes. 

The PAS leader speculated that the publication of the photographs of six personalities in the front pages of newspapers even before the Attorney General Chambers started its investigation must have angered the former PM who felt that his legacy was crumbling.  In the rural areas, particularly in the Malay heartland, the six photographs are shown at evening rallies (ceramahs) associating them with a famous 1960s Malay movie "Enam Jahanam" (or "Doomed Six").

KEITH (May 2008)

 

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