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Don’t attack other religions, said the Prophet Muhammad (UPDATED with Chinese Translation)

Posted: 22 Aug 2011 06:50 PM PDT

I suppose there are as many munafiqs amongst the Christians as there are amongst the Muslims. And these Christian munafiqs will scream and shout Jesus's name but when it comes time to choose the new government they will still choose the government that is backing the Christianity-bashing campaign.

NO HOLDS BARRED

Raja Petra Kamarudin

Christian groups permit prostitution, says report

(Malaysiakini) - Harping on the controversial issue of an "apostasy movement" by Christian groups, Malay language daily Sinar Harian today stepped up its criticisms and accused the movement of encouraging free mingling between the sexes and permitting prostitution.

Yesterday, the daily gave extensive coverage to a so-called "apostasy movement" in its regular Monday column, Bicara Isnin.

In the second part of the column published today, scathing allegations were levelled against the 'Christian movement' and were listed in an information text box titled Matlamat gerakan Kristian (Objectives of the Christian movement).

Sinar Harian listed four items that it said are among other programmes afoot "to destroy Muslims":

1. Social movement: encouraging free mingling between the sexes;

2. Moral degradation: damaging moral values with wild activities;

3. Permitting prostitution as a service occupation; and

4. Films and music: inserting negative or extreme elements and excessive music that leads to heedlessness and negligence.

The daily did not elaborate on these allegations.

READ MORE HERE: http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/173832

****************************************

That was what Malaysiakini reported today. It looks like some Malaysian Muslims -- with the endorsement of the Malaysian government -- are now stepping up the attacks. And they are not only attacking the Christians but also beginning to attack Christianity itself.

The Prophet Muhammad has cautioned Muslims about attacking other religions. If you attack other religions then you will trigger a reaction or retaliation and then those of the other religions will also attack Islam, argued the Prophet.

If the Muslims accuse Christianity as being an immoral religion that encourages and promotes free sex, then the Christians will accuse Islam of the same thing. And it would be easier to attack Islam because many issues related to slavery and permission to have sex out of wedlock with slaves is well documented.

"Slavery is a part of Islam," said Sheik Saleh Al-Fawzan, according to the independent Saudi Information Agency, or SIA.

Al Fawzan – a member of the Senior Council of Clerics, Saudi Arabia's highest religious body – says Muslims who contend Islam is against slavery "are ignorant, not scholars."

"They are merely writers," he said, according to SIA. "Whoever says such things is an infidel."

Al-Fawzan's best-known textbook, "Al-Tawheed – Monotheism," says most Muslims are polytheists, and their blood and money are therefore free for the taking by "true Muslims."

READ MORE HERE: http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=35518

Furthermore, Islam not only permits slavery and has never banned or outlawed slavery, but Islam also permits the slave-owner or master to have sex with his slaves.

Slaves are considered your property so you can do what you wish with your property.

READ MORE HERE: http://wikiislam.net/wiki/Qur%27an,_Hadith_and_Scholars:Slavery

I think Muslims need to pull the brakes on this Christian-bashing exercise. When you run down another religion then followers of that religion would also attack Islam. However, when they attack Islam, Muslims would get angry and threaten revenge and bloodshed.

I have said this before: the Muslims are Islam's greatest enemy. It is the conduct of Muslims that is giving Islam a bad name. This is the sad reality of this whole Christian-bashing exercise.

It looks like the damage has been done. The feelings of the Christians have been hurt beyond repair. It will take a long time for these wounds to heal. In the meantime, many Christians are going to demonstrate their disgust in the next election.

But of course, not all the Christians are going to vote against the government in the coming election. There will still be many Christians who think only of their personal interest. They will foam at their mouth talking about their Lord Jesus and so on. Then, come the election, they will still vote Barisan Nasional.

I suppose there are as many munafiqs amongst the Christians as there are amongst the Muslims. And these Christian munafiqs will scream and shout Jesus's name but when it comes time to choose the new government they will still choose the government that is backing the Christianity-bashing campaign.

Maybe it is good that these people bash the Christians and Christianity. That will teach these Christian munafiqs a lesson.
 

Translated into Chinese at: http://ccliew.blogspot.com/2011/08/blog-post_8604.html

 

Kredit: www.malaysia-today.net

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WIKILEAKS: FIGHTING, NOT TALKING - SOUTH THAI MILITANTS NO LONGER INTERESTED IN DIALOGUE, SAY ...

Posted: 23 Aug 2011 01:00 AM PDT

Eskay carried out the meeting with the knowledge of the Malaysian government, but without the participation of Malaysian officials, and recorded the encounter. In a departure from previous meetings, the young leaders rejected any possibility of political dialogue. Instead, they declared they had taken a vow to establish an independent Muslim Malay state, Pattani Darussalam, and would continue to carry out violence to achieve their aims.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KUALA LUMPUR 000447

 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP AND DS/ITA

 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2032

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINR, MOPS, ASEC, TH, MY

 

SUBJECT: FIGHTING, NOT TALKING - SOUTH THAI MILITANTS NO LONGER INTERESTED IN DIALOGUE, SAY FORMER MEDIATORS

 

REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 263 - MALAYSIA SAFE HAVEN FOR INSURGENTS

     B. KUALA LUMPUR 318 - CONCERNED BUT NOT ALARMED BY VIOLENCE

 

KUALA LUMP 00000447  001.2 OF 004

 

Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b and d).

Summary

1. (S) Southern Thai militants recently asserted they will pursue more violence and reject talks, according to two Malaysian mediators from the defunct Mahathir peace process.

The Honorary Thai Consul in Langkawi, Shazryl Eskay Abdullah (protect throughout), joined by retired head of the Malaysian Royal Police, Norian Mai (protect throughout), told A/DCM he met with a group of seven young Thai Malay militant leaders in late February and they explicitly ruled out dialogue with the Thai government. 

Instead, in a hardening of their position, the insurgents explained their intention to carry out further violence in pursuit of their goal of secession under the banner of Pattani Darussalam.  Norian, who also served as Malaysia's internal intelligence chief under Mahathir, stated the Thai Malay insurgents were better organized than previously thought. 

The militants were benefiting from some Middle East funding, via Singapore and Malaysia, possibly money solicited under false pretenses or diverted from humanitarian projects. 

Eskay, fresh from meetings with senior Malaysian officials, described a joint

Malaysian-Thailand decision to stand up respective committees to work on the insurgency issue, with Malaysia's group headed by retired military intelligence chief Lt. General Wan Abu Bakar. 

Eskay and Norian appeared pessimistic the Malaysian committee would be effective, while noting GOM doubts about the longevity of the current Thai government.  End Summary.

GOM Consults Former Mediators

2.  (S) A/DCM and poloff met in Kuala Lumpur on March 6 with the Honorary Thai Consul in Langkawi, Shazryl Eskay Abdullah, and retired head of the Malaysian Royal Police, Norian Mai, as a follow-up to our initial meeting with Eskay in early February (ref A) that focused on the southern Thailand insurgency. 

Both Malaysians had served as lead mediators in the now defunct 2004-2006 peace process carried out under former Prime Minister Mahathir's name.  The two men explained that the Malaysian government had not included them in a formal way in the GOM's current approach to the southern Thailand issue because of their association with Mahathir (a frequent critic of PM Abdullah). 

Nevertheless, the GOM consulted them, in particular because of their past experience and their continued contacts with Thai Malay militants, as well as old guard leaders. 

Eskay explained he had completed two days of consultations in Putrajaya, which included a March 6 meeting with the deputy chief of the external intelligence agency, MEIO.  Eskay said he was scheduled to meet MEIO chief Fauzi on March 7.

Insurgents Will Fight for Malay/Muslim State

3.  (S) Eskay and Norian stated that there had been a clear hardening of position by the southern militants this year. Eskay explained he had met in late February with a contact group of seven young militant leaders somewhere along the Kelantan state border with Thailand (an eighth member of this group could not travel, while a ninth had been killed in fighting earlier in February). 

Eskay carried out the meeting with the knowledge of the Malaysian government, but without the participation of Malaysian officials, and recorded the encounter.  In a departure from previous meetings, the young leaders rejected any possibility of political dialogue. Instead, they declared they had taken a vow to establish an independent Muslim Malay state, Pattani Darussalam, and would continue to carry out violence to achieve their aims. 

The militants believed they could not trust Thai authorities and that in any event the Thai security services and civil authorities were so fractured that they had no confidence in those who might sit across the table.  Any major, seemingly positive gestures by Bangkok to reach out to ethnic Malays likely would be followed by fresh attacks by the militants in order to destroy any good will. 

Given their disinterest in dialogue, the militants might become increasingly difficult to contact, Eskay stated.

4.  (S) Eskay complained that the Thai government had widely circulated in the Thai Malay communities the February 2006 "Peace Proposal for Southern Thailand" that resulted from the Mahathir peace process (ref A).  Bangkok had not responded to the proposal. 

Thai authorities, however, employed this as part of their psychological operations campaign to undermine the insurgency with a document that implied a peace deal - carrying the signatures of the old guard leaders - had been agreed to, but was being undermined by the militants.  This further hurt Thai government credibility, in Eskay's view.

Militants Better Organized

5.  (S) Norian commented that the militants employed a more sophisticated organization than most observers realized.  The seven members of Eskay's contact group operated in concert, but in different areas.  Bombers and shooters who carried out attacks seemed to come from a central pool, relying on local cells to set up and guard the scenes of the attacks. 

Brokers carried out a linkage role by conveying instructions and money to the cells, with a standard fee schedule in place for assisting in bombings and drive-by shootings.  As if on cue, women and children quickly gathered to protest arrests of suspects by Thai authorities. 

Eskay believed it likely the southern insurgents would try to destroy targets of more economic importance in the south, as the militants sought to create a situation of chaos and dependence upon the insurgents themselves.  Norian added that the violence is very localized, and not as widespread as some media reports suggest.

Militants Move Through Kelantan

6.  (S) Eskay described Kelantan state as the primary Malaysian transit and sanctuary area for southern Thai militants (ref A).  In response to our direct question, Eskay and Norian said they had not seen indications of foreign militants in southern Thailand or Kelantan.

Alleged Foreign Funding Takes Another Route

7.  (S) The insurgents did benefit from some foreign funding, Eskay and Norian noted while also suggesting that at least some of the funds were collected for humanitarian purposes and diverted to the insurgents.  This funding generally did not pass through Kelantan but rather through the states of Perlis and Kedah. 

Building on remarks from early February (ref A), Eskay said militants received some money via a Singapore bank and he promised to supply us with more information on the bank in subsequent communications.  The money reached southern Thailand through the informal, traditional banking networks operated by money changers at the border points of Padang Besar (Perlis) and Bukit Kayu Hitam (Kedah).  Some of the money went to ethnic Malay political figures in southern Thailand, who then dispersed it to militants. 

Eskay named Yala province political leader Arifin (NFI) as one recipient who used the funding to support the insurgency.  As to the origin of foreign funding, Eskay said some of the money came from the Middle East in response to Thai Malay appeals to support humanitarian projects for fellow Muslims.  He pointed out that a number of the militants had studied or visited the Middle East in past years.  Regarding foreign travel, several old guard leaders based in Malaysia traveled overseas on Malaysian passports, he explained.

8.  (S) Note:  An international journalist told us that Eskay had informed him of a December 2006 visit to Dubai by old guard separatists from the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), during which they collected Arab donations. 

In early February Eskay told us he did not believe the Thai insurgents had linked up with external terrorist groups.  End Note.

Ending Dual Citizenship Threatens Militants

9.  (S) Norian and Eskay noted that a decision by Malaysia and Thailand to end the practice of dual citizenship (by employing biometric identification and requiring individuals to choose one nationality) appeared to threaten the Thai militants, who were angry at this decision by Malaysia. Eskay said the GOM had not thought through the consequences of this approach, which might spark a large influx of southern Thais into Malaysia because many Thai Malays would opt to leave for their southern neighbor if forced and able to choose.

Abdullah in Bangkok Not Offered Mediation Role

10.  (S) Norian and Eskay, speaking as private citizens but coming out of meetings with senior GOM officials, said the Malaysian government recognized its clear interest in seeing an end to the violence in southern Thailand.  While there were sympathies for the plight of fellow Malays, secession was a non-starter. 

Prime Minister Abdullah's mid-February meeting in Bangkok, however, did not result in Thailand offering any mediation role to Malaysia.  In private conversation with Eskay, Deputy Prime Minister Najib insisted that Malaysia would need something official and in writing from Thailand in order to engage in any process. 

Uncertainty about the durability of the current Thai government factored into Malaysia's interactions with Bangkok at this stage, making Malaysians less enthusiastic for working on southern Thailand issues, outside of border security.

Malaysia and Thailand Stand Up Security/Intel Committees

11.  (S) On the margins of Abdullah's Bangkok visit, Malaysia and Thailand did agree to stand up security-focused committees tasked with examining bilateral approaches to ending the insurgency, Eskay explained.  Lt General (retired) Wan Abu Bakar, former Chief of Defense Intelligence, headed the Malaysian side, which included representatives from four agencies:  military intelligence, Police Special Branch, the external intelligence agency (MEIO), and the National Security Division of the Prime Minister's Office. 

General Vaipot Srinual headed the Thai counterpart committee.  Norian and Eskay said the Malaysia committee had yet to meet and they were not sure it would become an effective body.

Comment and Biographic Notes

12.  (S) Eskay and Norian do not speak for the Malaysian government and are "outsiders" to some extent by virtue of their close association with Mahathir.  Nevertheless, they have significant interaction with Malaysia's most senior officials dealing with southern Thailand.  Their pessimistic outlook on southern Thailand, and the likelihood the violence will continue or escalate, tracks with the views of many Malaysians in and out of government (ref B). 

Eskay credibly appears to have met with hundreds of Thai insurgents and sympathizers since 2004, and claims to have audio and video recordings of many encounters.  Eskay travels frequently to southern Thailand, while Norian said he rarely crosses the border. 

Eskay explained that to maintain the trust of Thai militants he does not provide their full information (e.g., cell phone numbers, exact physical locations of militants) to the GOM or Thai government.

13.  (S) Though describing themselves as part of Mahathir's inner circle of friends, Eskay and Norian claimed they are not involved in party politics.  They readily admitted to being wealthy by virtue of their businesses.  Eskay said he sells diesel fuel to China and owns a large ranch in Kedah state. 

Eskay and Norian are partners in some ventures, including a fertilizer plant in southern Thailand.  As the child of a Malay-Thai marriage, Eskay speaks Thai and Malay, as well as fluent English.  He spent some 10 years studying and working in Oklahoma and Texas, and speaks fondly of the United States. 

According to the Royal Malaysian Police website, Norian Mai served as Police Special Branch chief from 1994 to 1997, and as Inspector General of Police from 1999 to 2002.  We believe Washington possesses substantial biographic information on Norian.

SHEAR

 

Now let’s see what the MACC is going to do (UPDATED with Chinese Translation)

Posted: 22 Aug 2011 01:07 AM PDT

After that, Ho Hup's auditors discovered that Gani Patail's assistance to Vincent Lye went beyond just friendship. Vincent Lye had also bribed Gani Patail. But Vincent Lye was a cheapskate and he used Ho Hup's funds to pay for various renovation works for Gani Patail's second wife's house in Seremban.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

The Unholy Trinity of Gani Patail, Shahidan Shafee and Tajudin Ramli

Last year, Malaysia Today revealed Attorney-General Gani Patail's pilgrimage to Mekah that he and his family performed together with Tajudin Ramli's proxy, ex-police officer cum lawyer Shahidan Shafee.

It was a free Haj trip, paid for by Shahidan.

This is what we call corruption in the name of Allah and adds a new dimension to the concept of money laundering. Dirty money, when used to finance your trip to Mekah to perform the Haj, becomes squeaky-clean money.

Is JAKIM going to now come out with a new fatwah regarding whether your Haj trip, paid for with dirty money, is true Haj or bullshit Haj? Or is JAKIM only concerned about whether Muslims wear Santa Claus hats on Christmas Day?



Now, this was not just a wild allegation of 40% truth and 60% lie, as Mukhriz Mahathir would say. Malaysia Today provided Tabung Haji documents that clearly showed they travelled together and shared rooms like one big happy family of Mafia Dons.



This revelation caused an uproar, but only for a short while, because, as Tun Dr Mahathir said: Melayu mudah lupa. This Haj trip of Gani Patail is reminiscent of Chief Justice Eusoffe Chin's holiday to New Zealand with that infamous lawyer, VK Linggam, who made the phrase 'correct, correct, correct' popular.

As expected, and as is customary of how things are done in Malaysia, nothing much came out of this revelation. In fact, Gani Patail was 'investigated' and cleared by the MACC Operations Evaluation Panel (PPO) chairman, Tan Sri Dr Hadenan Abdul Jalil, who said that the case has been dropped because the investigation showed "no testimony to any criminal offence."

Okay, for those who do not understand what this means, in simple English it means NFA (no further action). In Chinese they would say 'I scratch your back and you scratch mine'. The Umno Members of Parliament call it the 'close one eye' syndrome.
 
Last week, the de facto Minister for Law, Nazri Aziz, directing the GLCs to withdraw their civil suits against Tajudin Ramli. Why do they want to do this? Well, according to Nazri, this is to help save the government a lot of unnecessary expenditure because court cases cost money.

Then again, could this be because of what Malaysia Today has been saying regarding Tajudin Ramli cutting a deal with the government? Nah! It cannot be. That would be dishonest and criminal in nature. Surely the government would not dare do something that illegal.

If you can also remember, Malaysia Today also revealed that Gani Patail used his prosecutorial powers to help his corporate friends involved in boardroom tussles. Malaysia Today provided a picture of Gani Patail with Dato Vincent Lye at the Ho Hup Bhd office.

After that trip, Vincent Lye's adversary in the boardroom tussle, Dato' TC Low, was charged in court for a very minor technical offence in order to tilt the balance in Vincent Lye's favour. Unfortunately for Vincent Lye, the minority shareholders ganged up on him and booted him out during an EGM.  


AG Gani Patail with Dato' Vincent Lye at Ho Hup's Office

After that, Ho Hup's auditors discovered that Gani Patail's assistance to Vincent Lye went beyond just friendship. Vincent Lye had also bribed Gani Patail. But Vincent Lye was a cheapskate and he used Ho Hup's funds to pay for various renovation works for Gani Patail's second wife's house in Seremban.

Now see the documents below of how Vincent had used Ho Hup's company funds to gratify his friends in the corridors of power.

So, will the MACC now charge Gani Patail?

Many have been hauled to the MACC office and were thrown out of the window for less than this. And this not only involves a larger amount but also involves the number one man in the AG's office.

Now let's see what the MACC is going to do. I place my bet on the MACC doing nothing and that Gani Patail will continue to serve and will retire a very rich man.

I suppose it is true when they say that Cina baruah Melayu. Is this not a case of the Chinese paying for the cost of the Malay's bonking partner?





 

Translated into Chinese at: http://ccliew.blogspot.com/2011/08/blog-post_9628.html

 

WIKILEAKS: NAJIB FIGHTS BACK; WEEKEND PROTEST FAILS TO IMPRESS

Posted: 21 Aug 2011 01:00 AM PDT

Speaking with reporters, Najib explicitly denied ever meeting Altantuya, and suggested Anwar's public revelations were an attempt to distract the public from the sodomy allegations against the Opposition leader. Najib, however, admitted that he had met Anwar's accuser, Saiful Bukhari Azlan, who had come to Najib's home several days before filing a police complaint, but this did not reflect a conspiracy.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KUALA LUMPUR 000575

 

SIPDIS

FOR EAP AND INR 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2028

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, KDEM, MY

SUBJECT: NAJIB FIGHTS BACK; WEEKEND PROTEST FAILS TO IMPRESS

 

REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 572 - NAJIB IMPLICATED IN MURDER

     B. KUALA LUMPUR 570 - GOM DELIVERS PROTEST TO USG

     C. KUALA LUMPUR 563 - ANWAR ON OFFENSIVE

     D. KUALA LUMPUR 557 - ANWAR TAKES REFUGE

     E. KUALA LUMPUR 73 - PROSECUTOR DOWNBEAT ON MURDER CASE

     F. 07 KUALA LUMPUR 291 - ALTANTUYA MURDER

 

Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark, reason 1.4 (b and d).

 

Summary

1.  (C) As de facto Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim went on the offensive last week, Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak wasted no time in denying any link to the Altantuya murder case, while diffusing another bombshell by admitting he previously had met the man accusing Anwar of sodomy.  On July 4, the private investigator who had implicated Najib in the murder case sat by silently as a lawyer read out a retraction of his statement publicized only 24 hours earlier.

The rising political boil led to rumors of potential arrest for Anwar the night of July 3.  A major Opposition political rally in the Kuala Lumpur vicinity failed to attract critical mass, as some supporters took heed of police warnings and talk of using the military to ensure order.  U.S. remarks related to the allegations against Anwar continued to generate opportunistic GOM criticism, including a letter from Foreign Minister Rais Yatim to the Secretary. 

Prime Minister Abdullah felt it necessary to announce that his government is stable, in the face of rumors to the contrary, while UMNO leaders prepared themselves for party elections.  A key lieutenant for Anwar Ibrahim assessed that PM Abdullah did not support use of emergency measures against the Opposition at this time, and said Anwar would continue with public rallies.  End Summary.

Najib: I Met Anwar's Accuser, But Not Altantuya

2.  (C) DPM Najib wasted little time in defending himself publicly following Anwar's July 3 press conference featuring private investigator Balasubramaniam and his explosive sworn statement linking Najib to the murder of Mongolian national Altantuya. 

Speaking with reporters, Najib explicitly denied ever meeting Altantuya, and suggested Anwar's public revelations were an attempt to distract the public from the sodomy allegations against the Opposition leader.  Najib, however, admitted that he had met Anwar's accuser, Saiful Bukhari Azlan, who had come to Najib's home several days before filing a police complaint, but this did not reflect a conspiracy. 

In a July 30 interview, Najib had insisted he was not involved in the case at all, while Opposition sources told us they had evidence and witnesses to the contrary (suggesting to us that Najib corrected the public record in order to preempt another disclosure by Anwar).

ISA Fears

3.  (C) In the immediate aftermath of the private investigator's statement tying Najib to the Mongolian murder victim, swirling rumors regarding Opposition protests, and public statements by the police alluding to a possible role for the military in maintaining order, Opposition sources told us Anwar feared he could be arrested under the Internal Security Act (ISA) as early as the evening of July 3.  As a precaution, Anwar completed a number of legal declarations with his lawyer during the July 3 afternoon. 

To mitigate risks that the planned July 6 anti-government rally could provide a pretext for a security crackdown, the Opposition decided to shift the venue from an open park to an enclosed stadium in Shah Alam in line with a request from police.

Investigator's 24-Hour Turn-Around

4.  (C) Najib's camp appeared to conduct a major counterstrike on July 4, as Balasubramaniam sat in a hastily arranged press conference beside a lawyer who read out a retraction of the private investigator's statement that he publicized only 24 hours earlier. 

The PI's new statutory declaration refutes all allegations connected to Najib, explicitly repeating each of the statements now declared false, and states that the earlier affidavit was completed under duress. 

Balasubramaniam remained silent and glum in the quick press encounter, in contrast to his open demeanor the previous day.  His about-face occurred after being called to a police station on July 3, shortly after the Anwar press conference.  Following his retraction, Balasubramaniam with his immediate family disappeared from public view, with some rumors that he is abroad.

Tepid Turnout for Key Rally

5.  (C) Rumored plans by the Opposition to stage a protest march in Kuala Lumpur on July 4 after Friday Muslim prayers failed to materialize, though police briefing detained two activists at the National Mosque.  Anwar traveled to Opposition-held Penang on Saturday, July 5, to preside over an Opposition rally there which drew an estimated 30,000 supporters. 

The big Opposition event, however, was slated for Sunday, July 6, in Shah Alam in Selangor state, also in Opposition hands.  Police issued warnings regarding the illegal nature of the July 6 rally, and set up road-blocks in the vicinity, actions that deterred attendance; however, police did not otherwise attempt to stop the event. 

The all-day affair, at one time billed as a "million-man" rally, attracted only a modest turnout of some 20,000, less than the 50,000 capacity of the stadium.  Anwar exhorted the crowd to throw out PM Abdullah's National Front (BN), but did not mention his earlier deadline of September 16 to bring down the government through the defection of BN members of parliament. 

The greatest stir of the rally came earlier in the day when a rock band singer flashed his buttocks to the audience during a performance, outraging the crowd and causing some conservative Muslim participants from the Islamist PAS party to abandon the stadium.

U.S. Remarks in the Mix

6.  (SBU) GOM and UMNO party officials continued to criticize both the U.S. and Anwar over the State Department Spokesman's June 30 remarks affirming our support for rule of law in light of the sodomy allegations against the Opposition leader.  Foreign Minister Rais Yatim over the weekend confirmed that he had sent a letter of protest to Secretary Rice over U.S. interference in Malaysia's internal affairs.

Home Minister Syed Hamid Albar called Anwar America's "snitch."  Education Minister and UMNO Youth leader Hishammuddin said the UMNO Youth wing would protest at the U.S. Embassy, as well as at the Turkish embassy (for sheltering Anwar June 29-30) and the Singapore high commission (for articles published in Singapore critical of DPM Najib's wife, Rosmah). 

Some 40-50 persons, purportedly from the Muslim Consumers Association, demonstrated briefly and peacefully at the U.S. Embassy on July 4; some carried signs equating the U.S. and Anwar with Zionism.  (Note:  We forwarded the Foreign Minister's July 4 letter to EAP/MTS. Despite the high-level criticism, we enjoyed good Malaysian official turnout at our Independence Day reception, held on July 3.  End Note.)

Prime Minister:  Everything Under Control

7.  (SBU) With the political scene buffeted by the Anwar-Najib maelstrom, and respected international media beginning to remark on Malaysia's "turmoil," as did the Asian Wall Street Journal, Prime Minister Abdullah tried to publicly reassure citizens and the international community alike. 

On July 3, Abdullah publicly stressed, "this government is a stable government, please believe that.... Don't panic about what is happening."  On July 6, the PM's comments turned more defense and emotional, as he hit out at "rampant" "slandering" and Opposition protests.  "I don't see the rationale for the continued demonstrations, or to play politics purely to create instability that could jeopardize the people's safety and it is also aimed at toppling the government elected by the people," Abdullah told reporters.

UMNO in Election Mode

8.  (SBU) Meanwhile, PM Abdullah's dominant UMNO party officially begins its election cycle in 10 days time, with the first phase, party branch elections, scheduled July 17-August 24.  Most senior UMNO leaders are devoting increasing time, particularly their weekends, to contact work with their respective party branches and divisions. 

While elections for the presidency, deputy presidency and other national leadership positions do not take place until December, successful candidates must lay the ground work now to ensure their nominations later in the process.  For example, internet journalists reported on July 7 that all 13 UMNO division leaders in Abdullah's home state of Penang had already decided to nominate Abdullah for reelection as party president, a move supposedly intended to forestall a push by Najib's supporters.

Down from the Boiling Point, for Now

9.  (C) Polchief met on July 7 with Sivarasa Rasiah, vice president in Anwar's Peoples Justice Party (PKR) and one of Anwar's lawyers.  Sivarasa said last week's political scene was volatile and "boiling," but the situation now had calmed down to a "simmer." 

He downplayed the immediate risk of the GOM employing emergency measures, such as ISA detention for Anwar and other opposition leaders, in large part because he believed PM Abdullah was not supportive of such measures at this stage.  Even though the police could arrest and hold Anwar for a period of 60 days, Abdullah would need to be on board with the decision. 

Second, Sivarasa argued that use of ISA against Anwar also entailed a willingness to declare a state of emergency to contain and tamp down street protests that would erupt, a step that again Abdullah, but also the King and fellow traditional rulers and perhaps the security forces were not backing at this time.

10.  (C) Sivarasa said Anwar would continue holding rallies, particularly in Opposition-held states, but would be careful to minimize the risk of these getting out of hand and creating a pretext for harsh government action. 

Sivarasa acknowledged that in the July 6 rally Anwar had not mentioned his now famous September 16 deadline for bringing down the BN government, and Sivarasa appeared to imply that this date did not reflect a particular plan, at least not one that he was privy to. 

Sivarasa downplayed the possibility of Anwar contesting in a by-election in the near future.

11.  (C) The PKR VP and lawyer thought that the police investigation into the sodomy allegations against Anwar had failed to turn up enough information for prosecutors to justify an actual indictment, though the police would never speak up to clear Anwar's name and the allegations, or an open investigation, would linger. 

Sivarasa stated that private investigator Balasubramaniam had confided in him, along with a number of others, some two months ago regarding information linking Najib to the Altantuya murder case.

Anwar would bring forward these witnesses to Balasubramaniam's remarks when needed.

Comment

12.  (C) Last week's palatable political tension, stoked by Anwar's offensive in face of the sodomy investigation and GOM counterattacks, has receded somewhat as of today.  The under-attended Opposition rally of July 6, considered by itself, failed to impress or convey a sense of popular momentum. 

BN leaders, Najib in particular, have been quick to conclude that the rally's failure to attract a packed crowd reflects a lack of support for Anwar.  Police warnings and reference to bringing in the military to ensure order no doubt dampened enthusiasm among Opposition supporters.  The political status quo threatens Anwar and plays into Najib's hands, however, suggesting that the Opposition leader will come out with fresh challenges to the BN government.

13.  (C) Najib and UMNO may have suffered longer term blows to their public credibility in the exchange of allegations with Anwar.  Detailed revelations about Najib, even retracted the next day, will tend confirm the widespread public belief that the DPM is linked to the Altantuya murder. 

The allegations against Anwar, however, appear as a repeat of the politically-motivated charges of 1998, even to those who put some stock in the reports.  For Najib this comes at the inopportune time with the start of the UMNO election cycle, and will dampen the possibility his camp can generate enough grassroots backing for a Najib bid to replace Abdullah as party leader come December.

KEITH

 

WIKILEAKS: MALAYSIA’S CHINESE MINORITY: THE POLITICS OF MARGINALIZATION (UPDATED with Chinese ...

Posted: 18 Aug 2011 01:00 AM PDT

Nevertheless, Chinese voters have poor alternatives. DAP and KeADILan are not sufficiently organized to provide a real alternative to BN, particularly given the disproportionate powers wielded by the UMNO-led coalition. The Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party (PAS), the strongest Malay-based opposition party, holds no appeal for the Chinese electorate. Without better alternatives, MCA and Gerakan will not lose their dominance of the Chinese vote.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KUALA LUMPUR 001975

 

SIPDIS

 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2016

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, MY

SUBJECT: MALAYSIA'S CHINESE MINORITY:  THE POLITICS OF MARGINALIZATION

 

REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 942

     B. KUALA LUMPUR 1935

     C. KUALA LUMPUR 1942

     D. KUALA LUMPUR 1913

 

Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

 

Summary

1.  (C) Malaysia's Chinese minority struggles to find new footing in national politics.  In September Singapore's Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew ignited a nation-wide debate on the marginalization of Malaysia's Chinese minority. 

Leaders from across the Chinese political spectrum agreed, at least privately, with LKY's conclusion and confided that most Chinese Malaysians feel marginalized by the United Malays National Organization (UMNO)'s race-based, Bumiputera policies. 

As the Chinese community grows restless, Chinese parties of the UMNO-led National Coalition (Barisan Nasional, BN) fear losses to opposition parties in the next general election.  The People's Movement Party (Gerakan) faces change at the top and candidates have begun to vie for the coveted chief minister's job in Penang. 

Many Chinese have questioned their own leaders after Prime Minister Abdullah humiliated current Penang Chief Minister and claimed the Gerakan-led state government is marginalizing ethnic Malays in Penang.

The Democratic Action Party (DAP) stands to gain Chinese votes, but remains unorganized and ill-prepared to capitalize on Chinese discontent.  Opposition parties in general fail to present a valid alternative to the BN.  A think tank report on Bumiputeras' economic share created another rallying point for the Chinese community's expressions of marginalization.

While post-Mahathir political openings allow Chinese political discontent to bubble to the surface, ethnic Chinese voters appear to have no realistic alternatives.  End Summary.

Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew Ignites a Fire

2.  (SBU) In September, Singapore's Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew ignited a political firestorm when he commented during a seminar that Singapore's neighbors, Malaysia and Indonesia, systematically marginalized their Chinese minorities.  Cries of outrage were heard from Malaysia's ethnic Malay leaders.

Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi publicly demanded an apology from Lee, and the two exchanged highly-publicized letters demanding and feigning apology.  Dozens of senior Malay officials derided Lee for his comments and a few Chinese members of the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition government came to the defense of GoM and denied there was any systematic marginalization of Malaysia's minorities. 

But most Chinese Malaysians agreed with Lee, and Chinese politicians that denied the accusation are now viewed with growing disdain.

MCA admits marginalization and fears backlash

3.  (C) Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) Vice President Ong Tee Keat, who also serves as the Deputy Minister of Higher Education, was one of the few ministerial level Chinese politicians who refused to deny publicly or privately the fact that Chinese Malaysians are marginalized. 

In a private meeting with poloff Ong commented that although Chinese leaders from MCA and the People's Movement Party (Gerakan) were bound to support government (i.e. UMNO) positions, their Chinese constituents were not satisfied with their responses.  Ong commented that in cases such as this, "silence is sometimes our only valid response."  But he acknowledged, "of course we are marginalized, big business to small stall owners know that -- but MCA cannot admit it." 

So when pressed by reporters for a public response to Lee's accusation, Ong related an old Chinese proverb -- "Whether the water in the tea cup is hot or cold, he who drinks it knows best."

4.  (C) According to Ong, MCA will face its greatest electoral challenge ever in the next two years.  In his opinion, there was great dissatisfaction with the status quo in the Chinese community that was only partially seen in the Sarawak elections when the opposition Democratic Action Party (DAP) won six seats (Ref A).

"Sarawak was a wake-up call for all Chinese parties," Ong told poloff.  MCA and Gerakan have studied the results of the Sarawak elections, but are not sure they can counter the growing discontent in their communities.  The Chinese component parties of BN no longer have community focused development projects to show their constituents, as these have all been redirected to Malay communities. 

"There was once a day in Malaysia when MCA would get the left-overs, but now we are just hoping to get some crumbs from the UMNO table," said Ong.  Ong admitted that an example of only getting the crumbs could be seen in the Ninth Malaysia plan wherein the government planned for the construction of 180 new elementary and secondary schools, none of which would be vernacular schools for either the Chinese or Indian communities. 

Only after loud outcries from the Chinese community did the Ministry of Education "cave in" and announce that two of the 180 schools would be designated as Chinese vernacular schools.  Again, MCA could not provide a proportional voice for the Chinese minority, and Ong believed the community took note.

Prime Minister claims Malays marginalized in Penang

5.  (C) In an ironic exercise in hypocrisy and political expediency prior to the UMNO district meetings in September, Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi echoed the earlier remarks of his son in law, Khairy Jamaluddin, and publicly charged Penang's Chief Minister Dr. Koh Tsu Koon, with systematically marginalizing the ethnic Malays of Penang. 

Penang is Malaysia's only Chinese majority state (but only by a razor thin margin) and is led by BN coalition partner Gerakan.

Despite the conflict resolution principles touted by the Barisan Nasional, at an UMNO divisional meeting in Penang, Abdullah publicly chided Koh and demanded immediate action to address the needs of the marginalized Malay community.

Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak later called for the Penang Chief Minister to more equally divide his executive powers with the Malay deputy chief minister, while federal Education Minister Hishamuddin Tun Hussein demanded Koh take unconditional immediate action to address the needs of the Malay community in Penang.  According to sources who attended the meeting, Koh was dumbfounded and unprepared to respond to the Prime Minister's accusations. 

Penang State Executive Councillor Dr. Toh Kin Woon later admitted in a private meeting with poloff that the PM thoroughly humiliated Koh, and although Malays in Penang have a higher per capita income than Malays in many other states, Koh was unprepared and unable to respond. 

Gerakan Central Committee member, Lee Kah Choon, stated to poloff that Koh was viewed by the whole Chinese community as weak:  "it is just his personality, and everyone comes to expect it."  It was this type of weakness, opined Toh, that places BN's Chinese component parties in danger of losing ground to DAP or the People's Justice Party (KeADILan) in more mixed districts. 

(Comment:  Chief Minister Koh is an intellectual, who holds a doctorate in physics from Princeton.  His technocratic style makes him popular with corporate leaders, who appreciate his business friendly approach to governing, but is ill-suited to the cut-and-thrust of party politics.  End Comment.)

Gerakan plans for leadership change

6.  (SBU) Koh, who in addition to duties as the Chief Minister of Penang is also Deputy President of Gerakan, is expected to become the Gerakan president in April 2007 when current president Dr. Lim Keng Yaik steps down.  Koh's elevation to party head will likely mean he will move from state politics to a federal ministerial position, and several Gerakan politicians are already jockeying for the anticipated vacancy as Penang Chief Minister. 

The three front runners for the job in Penang are currently Lee Kah Choon, Gerakan Deputy Secretary General and Parliamentary Secretary for the Ministry of Health; Dr. Teng Hock Nan, Gerakan Vice President; and Chia Kwang Chye, Gerakan Party Secretary General.

7.  (C) In a separate meeting with poloff, Lee Kah Choon admitted that, like MCA, Gerakan too would face a strong political challenge in the next general election, as they have not been able to overcome the perception that the Chinese community is continually discriminated against by the Malay majority government. 

Lee's only hope was that DAP "would continue to run dishwashers and truck drivers" for state and federal parliamentary seats, and thus would remain uncompetitive in the general elections in Penang. 

In another meeting, Dr. Toh Kin Woon lamented that UMNO was resorting to "blatant racist tactics that Malaysia has not seen since the late 1980s."  He attributed the rise in UMNO's racist rhetoric to PM Abdullah's weakness as a leader. 

"Malaysians need a strong leader who knows when to be ruthless.  Mahathir knew how to be ruthless, but he became cruel, and that's when he lost respect.  Abdullah is not cruel, but neither is he ruthless when he needs to be.  He is just weak; so he resorts to racist tactics to hold on to the majority Malays." 

He faulted Koh for not standing up to Abdullah regarding his accusations of the Chinese marginalizing ethnic Malays in Penang, and opined that such weakness in the party opened the door for the opposition to make significant gains in then next general election.

The Democratic Action Party lacks a national strategy

8.  (C) Notwithstanding their successes in the Sarawak elections (ref A), DAP has not yet formulated a national campaign strategy aimed at capitalizing on the growing discontent in the Chinese community (also see ref B). 

In Penang, Member of Parliament Chow Kon Yeow (DAP - Tanjong) admitted to poloff that his party traditionally has had very little success in recruiting high caliber candidates for parliamentary elections.  Such past failures have influenced the party's motivation to recruit more viable and electable candidates. 

According to Chow, DAP often struggled with supporting issues germane to the Chinese community, such as promoting vernacular schools, and therefore, at times seems to alienate itself from its natural voting base.  Chow indicated that DAP's current plan was to continue to run young party activists who had previously contested elections in Penang and hope that discontent with BN policies would draw voters to vote merely for the party rather than the quality of the candidate. 

Since many of the seats in Penang currently are held by third term parliamentarians, term limit laws prevent the incumbents from seeking re-election.  DAP hoped for a more level playing field if their candidates were not battling incumbents, Chow said, and thus anticipated better electoral results in Penang and other metropolitan areas of the country where Chinese voters are concentrated.

9.  (U) DAP Secretary General Lim Guan Eng has completed his term of exclusion following his conviction under the publications act, and DAP insiders expected him to contest for another seat in parliament in the next election. 

Lim and his wife have fallen out of favor with party members in Melaka, so Lim likely would challenge a seat in Penang or in Kuala Lumpur.  Such mobility is common among Chinese candidates, and due to his relative popularity, party officials were quite optimistic of Lim's election and ability to join his father Lim Kit Siang as a leader in the opposition.

Bumiputera Equity:  Chinese cry foul

10.  (SBU) The GOM's negative reaction to the recent public release of the Asian Strategy and Leadership Institute (ASLI)'s analysis of bumiputera equity in the marketplace has stoked the fires of Chinese discontent (Ref C).  With characteristic cries of sedition for daring to challenge government statistics, ethnic Malay politicians, including PM Abdullah and DPM Najib have done all in their power to discredit the ASLI report. 

Despite pressuring the Malay president of ASLI, Mirzan Mahathir, to retract the report, the Prime Minister and UMNO have not been able to quiet the discussion of bumiputera equity and their race-based policies aimed at perpetually increasing Malay market share.

(Comment:  Mirzan Mahathir is the son of former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad.  Ironically, the elder Mahathir and his two sons, Mirzan and Mukhriz, continue to publicly champion bumiputera set-asides, leading one to question the possible political maneuvers behind the release of the ASLI report.  End Comment.)

11. (SBU) Perhaps emboldened by his announcement that he will retire as Gerakan president in April 2007, Dr. Lim Keng Yaik, Minister of Energy, Water and Communications, stepped forward to challenge the government to release its statistics and explain how Bumiputera equity is only 18.9 percent rather than the 45 percent ASLI found. 

DPM Najib replied that the GoM can certainly release its methodology for its more "exhaustive study" and that Lim should not imply that the government is not transparent.  Despite Najib's remarks, the GoM has not released its methodology, and UMNO continues to hope that this issue will die a quick and quiet death.

Chinese politicians and activists, however, do not yet seem willing to let the issue die, and although the study reiterates what many Chinese have long believed, it now gives quantifiable evidence to support their feelings of discrimination.

Comment

12.  (C) The increasingly strong Islamic identity of the dominant Malay population has a natural corollary -- an increase in race based politics.  As Chinese sensitivities heighten regarding Malay-centric policies, discontent with the status quo grows.  Of note, political openings in the post-Mahathir era have allowed greater public airing of such discontent, albeit with limits. 

Abdullah's inability to shut down the divisive debate stands in stark contrast to Mahathir's firm control.  Comprising 25 percent of the total population, ethnic Chinese Malaysians have the most to lose of all the minority groups from the Bumiputera policies aimed at ever increasing Malay equity in the marketplace, often at the expense of Chinese equity.

While no one is yet predicting the collapse of the coalition Barisan Nasional, growing discontent in the Chinese community has led many political pundits to forecast that many Chinese will abandon MCA and Gerakan and vote for DAP in the next election.  We anticipate the next general election will be held in the fourth quarter of 2007 or first quarter of 2008, and although UMNO is not in danger of losing significant numbers of votes, Chinese component parties fear they will take a hit.

Nevertheless, Chinese voters have poor alternatives.  DAP and KeADILan are not sufficiently organized to provide a real alternative to BN, particularly given the disproportionate powers wielded by the UMNO-led coalition.  The Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party (PAS), the strongest Malay-based opposition party, holds no appeal for the Chinese electorate.  Without better alternatives, MCA and Gerakan will not lose their dominance of the Chinese vote.

LAFLEUR

 

Translated into Chinese at: http://ccliew.blogspot.com/2011/08/blog-post_2158.html

 

Do you know what we are fighting for?

Posted: 17 Aug 2011 06:14 PM PDT

Those are just some of the issues from my end. I am sure the committee will come out with more. One more issue that could be considered would be, just like for Senators, you can only serve a maximum of TWO terms. If Senators can only serve for two terms then why can't Members of Parliament and State Assemblypersons also do the same? Why do Members of Parliament and State Assemblypersons serve for life while Senators can only serve for two terms?

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

(New Straits Times) - The parliamentary select committee on electoral reforms will be headed by a minister with eight members of parliament, including from the opposition and an independent.

Minister in the Prime Minister's Department, Datuk Seri Mohd Nazri Abdul Aziz, said the formation of the committee was approved by the cabinet yesterday and a motion on it would be tabled at the next parliamentary session in October.

The committee will have five representatives from Barisan Nasional, three from the opposition and one independent.

Nazri said the cabinet also agreed to meet with the Election Commission soon to discuss the framework of the committee.

Read more: 9 to sit on polls panel http://www.nst.com.my/articles/9tositonpollspanel/Article/

*************************************

Probably 50,000 or so Malaysians came out for the BERSIH march on 9th July 2011. There were marches simultaneously organised all over the world in more than 30 cities. And the reason you marched is because you want to see electoral reforms.

But are you clear on exactly what type of reforms you would like to see? If you were asked to deliver a talk on electoral reforms would you know what to say? Well, maybe we can discuss that matter today.

1. The first issue would be regarding disenfranchised voters.

About one million or so Malaysians live outside Malaysia, according to what the Minister told Parliament. But most of these one million Malaysians can't vote during the general elections.

If you were to look at Article 119 of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia (below), you can see that there is a provision in the Constitution for overseas Malaysians to vote (or, if not so resident, is an absent voter). These overseas Malaysians would be regarded as 'absent voter'. 

So this is the first reform we need: to ensure the right of overseas Malaysians to vote.

2. Next would be the variance between seats.

Currently, the differential between Parliament seats is as low as 5,000 voters to as high as 125,000. This variance is too large. The variance should be not more than 20% plus-minus (or even 15% if possible, which would be better).

That means we need to set the 'benchmark' for each Parliament seat. For example, if the benchmark is fixed at 50,000 voters, then each Parliament seat should be between 40,000 to 60,000 voters (to achieve the 20% plus-minus variance).

For state seats the benchmark would, of course, be lower. If it is going to be 50,000 voters for Parliament seats, then for state seats it can be 20,000-25,000 voters.

Now, assuming we have a total of 15 million registered voters and the benchmark for Parliament seats is 50,000, this would mean we would have 300 Members of Parliament. If this is too many then the benchmark can be increased to 60,000 voters. Then the number of Members of Parliament would be reduced to 250 (from the current 222) -- or 65,000 voters if you want it to be reduced further to 230 Members of Parliament.

Anyway, this is for the committee to decide. The important thing, however, is that there must be a variance of 20% to 25%, plus-minus, between the Parliament seats. We can't have one seat as low as 5,000 voters and another as high as 125,000 voters. This is just not on.

And if the state seats are half the number of voters for Parliament seats, then we will have two state seats in one Parliament constituency and twice the number of State Assemblypersons as there are Parliamentarians.

3. Third would be the voting age.

Currently, you can own a gun, get married, drive a car, work, get hanged for the crime of murder/drugs, etc., at 18 (and ride a bike at 16). But you can't vote at 18.

Imagine that! The government treats you like an adult and takes your life at 18. But the government will not allow you to vote. The government trusts you enough to drive a car and raise a family at 18. But the government does not trust you to vote.

The voting age needs to be 18 and not 21. If you can hang an 18-year old Malaysian, then he or she certainly has a right to vote at that age. If an 18-year old is old enough to have a wife/husband and children, then he or she is certainly old enough to vote.

4. The other issues, of course, involve gerrymandering (which will be addressed once we address the issue of the variance between seats), fraud (which needs to be addressed through some detection method so that people can't vote more than once), postal votes (postal voting should be your choice like in the UK and not by compulsion like in Malaysia), etc.

5. Another issue I would like to see addressed is compulsory voting.

A law should be passed to make it compulsory for all citizens to vote. If you do not vote then the government should impose a RM1,000 fine on these people.

Australia has this system.

Furthermore, when you apply for a loan, credit card, hire purchase finance, electricity/water supply, telephone/internet, and so on, two documents need to be produced. One would be your identity card and the other your voter registration slip.

In short, if you do not have BOTH an identity card and a voter registration slip then you do not exist. You are a 'ghost'. You can't get a loan, credit card, electricity/water supply, telephone/internet, and so on.

Your proof of address and your proof of existence will be in both your identity card and voter registration slip. If you do not have an identity card PLUS a voter registration slip then you are not a Malaysian. In fact, you are not even a person. You just do not exist.

6. Those are just some of the issues from my end. I am sure the committee will come out with more. One more issue that could be considered would be, just like for Senators, you can only serve a maximum of TWO terms. If Senators can only serve for two terms then why can't Members of Parliament and State Assemblypersons also do the same? Why do Members of Parliament and State Assemblypersons serve for life while Senators can only serve for two terms?

If we impose a two-term rule for Members of Parliament and State Assemblypersons, this will ensure that the old cocks and old hags will be retired to make way for fresh meat.

7. Oh, and one last thing, are we brave enough to follow the example of some other countries and make it law that not less than 30% of the candidates contesting the election must be women?

Yes, in some countries this is law (I think Sweden is one such country). And since more than 52% of Malaysian voters are women (yes, only 48% men vote) why should the candidates not, by law, be not less than 30% women? 

*************************************

Article 119 of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia

 (1) Every citizen who -

 (a) has attained the age of twenty-one years on the qualifying date; and

 (b) is resident in a constituency on such qualifying date or, if not so resident, is an absent voter,

is entitled to vote in that constituency in any election to the House of Representatives or the Legislative Assembly unless he is disqualified under Clause (3) or under any law relating to offences committed in connection with elections; but no person shall in the same election vote in more than one constituency.

 

WIKILEAKS: SABAH: POROUS BORDERS; PROBLEMS WITH FOREIGNERS; UNHAPPY UMNO COALITION PARTNER ...

Posted: 16 Aug 2011 01:00 AM PDT

Two PBS state assemblymen, Ching Eng Leong and Samson Chin Chee Tsu, told us on October 4 that former PM Mahathir began the initiative prior to the 1994 state assembly election, in order to ensure UMNO's political takeover of Sabah. UMNO's control was further solidified during the 1999 state election, as UMNO granted more foreigners citizenship and voting rights under what came to be known as "Project Mahathir." 

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUALA LUMPUR 001948

SIPDIS

 

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, DS/ATA AND DS/IP/ITA

 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2016

TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PGOV, PINR, KDEM, KISL, SMIG, ASEC, MY

 

SUBJECT: SABAH: POROUS BORDERS; PROBLEMS WITH FOREIGNERS; UNHAPPY UMNO COALITION PARTNER

 

REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 1862

     B. KUALA LUMPUR 1935

 

Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b , d).

 

Summary

1. (C) The police, political leaders, a human rights official in the East Malaysia state of Sabah recently expressed their concerns to us about rising crime and the security impact from the high number of foreigners - both legal and illegal - residing in the state.  Sabah's Acting Police Commissioner said illegal migrants and other foreigners committed three out of four violent crimes in the state, but he did not address terrorist threats or transnational crime syndicates.

On other issues, a Sabah state minister from Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi's political party, UMNO, criticized the PM's intellectual capacity and said the PM's inner circle gives him "bad advice."  The minister predicted the UMNO national assembly in November would be "a timid affair."  One of the 16 commissioners from Malaysia's government-funded national human rights commission (Suhakam) told us the government views Suhakam as "a pest." 

Seconding other comments from the Suhakam commissioner about the large influx of foreigners into Sabah, two state assemblymen expressed trepidation about the state's security situation.  The pending U.S. Border Control Assessment Initiative (ref A) will assist our efforts to better understand the security ramifications of Sabah's porous borders and identify ways the U.S. can assist.  End Summary.

Police Face Challenges from Criminals - And Parliament

2. (C) Sabah's Acting Police Commissioner, Mohd Bakri Zinin, told us on October 4 that "illegal migrants and other foreigners" account for about three-fourths of violent crimes committed in the state.  He said almost all the crime was locally based and that transnational crime syndicates were "not much of a problem" in Sabah.  Zinin notably did not address the issue of terrorists either located in or transiting Sabah.  When asked about the potential for human trafficking into the Malaysian federal territory island of Labuan, near Sabah's western coast, Zinin stated flatly, "There is no trafficking problem in Labuan.  Those women are all volunteers who claim to be victims when caught."  (Note: Septel addresses prostitution on Labuan.  End Note.)

3. (C) Zinin criticized a recently enacted amendment to the criminal procedure code that eliminated prosecutors' usage of police-obtained confessions in trying criminal defendants. Confessions are now only admissible if done in front of a magistrate. 

Zinin said the amendment "will hurt our ability to get convictions."  He stated, "As a result, we'll likely make greater use of (Malaysia's four preventative detention laws), even though we know this will bring criticism from Suhakam and the NGOs." 

(Note: The laws he referenced are the Internal Security Act, Restricted Residence Act, Dangerous Drugs Act, and Emergency Ordinance.  They allow the police and the internal security ministry to jointly incarcerate individuals for extended periods without trial, in cases where police lack sufficient evidence to obtain a criminal conviction.  From our local sources, we believe 700 - 1,000 Malaysians suspected of criminal activity are currently jailed under the Emergency Ordinance alone.  End Note.)

UMNO Minister Swipes at Prime Minister Abdullah...

4. (C) While making unsolicited comments about Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi's public image and job performance, Sabah's Minister of Youth and Sports, Masidi Manjun, told us, "Abdullah is not an intellectual and is a bit slow in his thinking."  He said the PM is "getting bad advice from his inner circle" regarding both the content and "scripted shouting" of some of his latest speeches to his ethnic Malay political base. 

Manjun, who formally headed Sabah's primary government-funded think tank (the Institute of Development Studies), told us of a private comment made by former PM Mahathir during a recent trip to Japan.  Mahathir reportedly told a senior Japanese politician, "Japan is the home of the rising sun, and Malaysia is home to the rising son-in-law."

This was a reference to PM Abdullah's son-in-law Khairy Jamaluddin, who serves as the deputy president of UMNO Youth.

With Mahathir's recent failure to be elected as an UMNO delegate at the party's national assembly in November, Manjun predicted the assembly will be "a timid affair," with no major pronouncements or surprises.

...And Foreigners in His State

5. (C) Manjun complained that Sabah was "flooded with foreigners."  He singled out Filipino Muslims from Mindanao as "especially troublesome."  He said, "They are not as devout as us."  He told us the state's Filipinos were "using our social services and not integrating into society," and that "vagrancy and violence" were rampant within Sabah's Filipino community.  He called Sabah's maritime and land borders "very porous" and expressed concern that Sabah's foreign residents were starting to become politically active.

He acknowledged, however, the economic importance of Sabah's foreign population.  With regard to Sabah's large number of illegal foreign workers, estimated to total over 750,000, Manjun said, "We need them here, or our economy would collapse."

Fallout from UMNO-Fueled Population Boom in Sabah

6. (C)  UMNO's main Sabah-based partner party, PBS, remains publicly indignant about UMNO grants of citizenship and related voting rights during the 1990s to over 600,000 foreigners (predominantly Muslims from Indonesia and Mindanao), in return for those individuals' votes in Sabah's state assembly elections. 

Two PBS state assemblymen, Ching Eng Leong and Samson Chin Chee Tsu, told us on October 4 that former PM Mahathir began the initiative prior to the 1994 state assembly election, in order to ensure UMNO's political takeover of Sabah.  UMNO's control was further solidified during the 1999 state election, as UMNO granted more foreigners citizenship and voting rights under what came to be known as "Project Mahathir." 

According to Samson, PBS switched from its opposition party status in 2000 and allied itself with UMNO.  Ching said, "UMNO had completely taken over by that time.  They paid off our party leaders and several assemblymen in cash, and threatened to freeze our constituencies out of federal and state funding if we didn't join them." 

Since 2000, the state assembly has remained 100 percent controlled by the UMNO-led coalition; opposition parties in Sabah have no elected representatives.

7. (C) Suhakam recently researched the allegations surrounding Project Mahathir and concurred with PBS' findings.  According to Suhakam, Sabah's legal resident population increased 362 percent to 2.6 million from 1970 to 2000, compared to a population increase of only 135 percent over the same time period in the neighboring state of Sarawak. 

This substantial increase in Sabah's legal residents excludes an influx of over 750,000 foreigners holding invalid identity cards and visas - or no documents at all - according to Suhakam.  According to Samson, a UK-educated lawyer whose electoral district encompasses Tawau on the east coast near the Indonesian border, Filipinos and Indonesians outnumber Malaysians 3 to 1 along Sabah's east coast from Sandakan to Tawau. 

He said, "The security situation in the area is not good."  He also claimed that corruption in Tawau is rampant among police and immigration officers.  He said it had "tripled over the last 30 years."

He and his wife recently refused to attend an event that gathered public and private sector leaders on the resort island of Mabul, off the east coast of Sabah, as he feared an attack on the gathering by Mindanao-based Muslim extremists. The event took place without incident.

Government Ignores Suhakam

8. (C) With regard to the plight of Malaysia's largely impoverished rural indigenous persons in Borneo, Suhakam's Vice Chairman and resident Commissioner in Sabah, Simon Sipaun, echoed the sentiments expressed to us by his fellow Suhakam commissioner in Sarawak (ref B). 

He said he spends most of his time on indigenous persons' issues and lamented the government's lack of support for Suhakam.  He said, "We're viewed as a pest." 

Sipuan told us that prisons in the state are "50 percent to 75 percent overcrowded" and that about three-fourths of all prisoners are illegal migrants and other foreigners.  He described conditions in the state's three illegal migrant detention centers as "overcrowded and generally poor." 

Sipuan felt the large number of Filipinos on the state's east coast represented a potential security threat "if they decide to become more politically active, or if parts of Mindanao become more autonomous."

Comment

9. (C) Among all Malaysian states, Sabah faces uniquely severe border control and related security pressures. Filipinos and Indonesians move easily - and often illegally - between Sabah and their respective home countries. 

UMNO leaders in Sabah and Kuala Lumpur will likely continue to remain silent with regard to the deleterious effects of Project Mahathir, as this initiative achieved its primary goal (UMNO political dominance) many years ago; they consider it "old news."  In any case, a significant reduction in Sabah's foreign-born population could only be reversed in the near term through an UMNO-led effort to round up and deport the very workers that drive Sabah's natural resource-based economy. 

While Malaysia periodically launches campaigns to expel illegal workers, even PBS' leaders concede this is highly unlikely to be carried out to the point of seriously harming the state's economy.  The U.S.  Border Control Assessment Initiative (BCAI) focused on the Sulu and Sulawesi sea areas of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines will enhance our understanding of the security challenges facing Sabah and ways we can assist.  We currently are working to obtain GOM approval for the Sabah field portion.

SHEAR

 

Translated into Chinese at: http://ccliew.blogspot.com/2011/08/blog-post_17.html

 

WIKILEAKS: MALAYSIA REACTS TO CEASEFIRE

Posted: 14 Aug 2011 01:00 AM PDT

Khairy Jamaluddin's antics provided a sometimes entertaining, sometimes maddening diversion throughout the Lebanon crisis. He organized a large and noisy but non-violent July 21 rally in front of the Embassy during which he was pictured by the press at the Embassy's gate, haranguing marchers with a bull horn. Khairy led a July 28 demonstration on the Kuala Lumpur Convention Center during Secretary Rice's participation in the ARF, demanding unsuccessfully to deliver a harshly worded petition to the Secretary, and his appearances often seemed to direct more attention to himself than to his cause.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

C O N F I D E N T I A L KUALA LUMPUR 001587

 

SIPDIS

 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2016

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, IS, LE, MY

SUBJECT: MALAYSIA REACTS TO CEASEFIRE

 

REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 1559

     B. KUALA LUMPUR 1354

     C. KUALA LUMPUR 1397

     D. KUALA LUMPUR 1377

 

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David B. Shear for reasons 1.4 (b, d)

 

1.  (C)  Summary:   Malaysian officials have welcomed the passage of United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1701, and the Malaysian media's preoccupation with the Middle East crisis has quickly diminished.  GOM officials reaffirmed their commitment to a lasting peace in the Middle East and reiterated their commitment to send peacekeeping troops to support the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

Despite some rhetoric and political posturing, Malaysia seems willing to work with the UN in determining what, if any, Malaysian forces would appropriately augment UNIFIL.

Until they were corrected by the Prime Minister, leaders of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) Youth movement called for boycotts of American products and for a cessation of Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations. UMNO Youth leaders admit they are making concessions to their conservative base, but have generally returned their focus to the domestic agenda.  Calls for a boycott of American products largely fell on deaf ears, but the demand that the GOM terminate the FTA talks reflects the extent to which the GOM will have to work in order to generate domestic support for an FTA.  End Summary.

GOM Supports UNSCR 1701

2.  (C)  Senior Malaysian officials including Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi and Foreign Minister Hamid have strongly supported the ceasefire in Lebanon.  Notwithstanding recent reports that Israel may object to peacekeeping forces from nations that do not have diplomatic relations with Israel, Abdullah, Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak and FM Hamid have all declared publicly that Malaysia will send troops to support UNIFIL over Israel's objections. 

However, privately, Malaysia's Under Secretary for Multilateral Affairs Shahrul Ikram has told us that Malaysia will naturally allow the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations to decide if Malaysia should send troops and what their composition would be.  He also reported that Malaysia wants to help, but will naturally work through the UN to ensure UNIFIL has the appropriate composition to complete the mission.

And the Negative Public Rhetoric Cools

3.  (C)  The Malaysian public and media reacted strongly to the Lebanon crisis, and, in addition to sustained criticism of the U.S. in the local press, the Embassy experienced demonstrations on several Friday afternoons at the end of July that were larger and noisier than usual.  But the passage of UNSCR 1701 and the August 14 implementation of the ceasefire in Lebanon quickly deflated much of the negative political rhetoric prevalent in Malaysia after the start of hostilities. 

Politicians and reporters have largely returned their attention to domestic politics: a new budget session in parliament scheduled to begin on September 1, preparations for the November UMNO General Assembly, and former Prime Minister Mahathir's jabs at the government.  Despite overwhelming coverage of the war prior to the ceasefire, most newspapers did not headline the implementation of the ceasefire, nor did they give front-page billing to the return of displaced Lebanese families back to southern Lebanon.

Malaysian officials have continued calls for comprehensive peace and reaffirmed their commitment to send peacekeeping troops to Lebanon (ref A).

Khairy Jamaluddin: Criticizes the FTA Talks; Calls for Boycott of U.S. Goods

4.  (C) UMNO Youth deputy chairman and Prime Ministerial son-in-law Khairy Jamaluddin's antics provided a sometimes entertaining, sometimes maddening diversion throughout the Lebanon crisis.   Khairy's influence on his father-in-law and some of his recent financial dealings have been the target of former Prime Minister Mahathir's ire for several months, and, no doubt sensing that political opportunity knocked, he decided to lead a highly visible UMNO Youth effort to flay the U.S. for its support of Israel.  He organized a large and noisy but non-violent July 21 rally in front of the Embassy during which he was pictured by the press at the Embassy's gate, haranguing marchers with a bull horn. 

Khairy led a July 28 demonstration on the Kuala Lumpur Convention Center during Secretary Rice's participation in the ARF, demanding unsuccessfully to deliver a harshly worded petition to the Secretary, and his appearances often seemed to direct more attention to himself than to his cause.  The frenetic Khairy also called for a stop to U.S.- Malaysia FTA talks and for a boycott of the "American" brands Coca-Cola and Starbucks, statements that were rebuffed by the Prime Minister.

5. (C)  Khairy has been less vocal since the cease fire went into effect.  Our subsequent meetings with UMNO Youth executive committee leaders confirmed that UMNO Youth rhetoric over the past two months was intended to appeal to UMNO's more conservative base.  They have told us that it was also aimed at preventing the Islamic opposition party PAS from gaining momentum given the recent clashes between Abdullah and former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed (ref D).

Having achieved those ends, UMNO Youth has returned to its preparations for the UMNO General Assembly in November and the general elections anticipated for next year.  We expect the occasional jab from Khairy and his UMNO buddies as preparatory meetings for the November UMNO General Assembly continue, but we doubt the drumbeat will reach the decibel levels heard through late-July and early August.

Calls for Boycott Not Threatening

6.  (C)  Khairy's call for the GOM to boycott the US seems to have gained little traction publicly and politically. U.S. firms operating in Malaysia are watchful, but not overly concerned by Khairy's calls for a boycott.  The local Coca-Cola bottler recalled that a similar boycott call in 2002 following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan had no impact on sales. 

Both the Coke and Starbucks franchisees (the local operations actually are owned by Malaysian companies) plan to take no action, believing the best approach is not to draw further attention to the issue. 

At the monthly meeting of the board of governors of the American-Malaysian Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) August 16, members expected that the boycott would fade quickly, so long as the situation in Lebanon remains under control.  The board also agreed to take no action in response to the call for a boycott at this time.

Effect on FTA Remains To Be Seen

7.  (C) We doubt that the Lebanon crisis itself had a lasting negative effect on GOM support for the FTA talks.  But Khairy's opportunistic attack on the talks underscores the extent to which the negotiation may be vulnerable to Malaysian domestic politics.  At a minimum, it also demonstrates the extent to which the GOM will have to work to convince even the ruling party's rank-and-file of the benefits of a FTA with the U.S.

LAFLEUR

 

Ahah! Did we not say so?

Posted: 11 Aug 2011 05:48 PM PDT

According to Tajudin Ramli: "At all material times, I was acting as a nominee and agent of the Government and in the performance of a public duty and I was bound to act under the instructions and directions from the government."

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

Do you remember these series of articles of two years ago?

 

1. The untold MAS story: part 1 (http://malaysia-today.net/archives/23997-the-untold-mas-story-part-1)

2. The untold MAS story: part 2 (http://www.malaysia-today.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24040:the-untold-mas-story-part-2&catid=71:archives-2009&Itemid=100106)

3. The untold MAS story: part 3 (http://www.malaysia-today.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24085:the-untold-mas-story-part-3&catid=71:archives-2009&Itemid=100106)

4. The untold MAS story: part 4 (http://www.malaysia-today.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24137:the-untold-mas-story-part-4&catid=71:archives-2009&Itemid=100106)

5. The untold MAS story: part 5 (http://www.malaysia-today.net/archives/24183-the-untold-mas-story-part-5)

6. The untold MAS story: part 6 (http://www.malaysia-today.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24190:the-untold-mas-story-part-6&catid=71:archives-2009&Itemid=100106)

7. The untold MAS story: part 7 (http://mt.m2day.org/2008/content/view/24191/84/)

8. The untold MAS story: part 8 (http://www.malaysia-today.net/archives/24192-the-untold-mas-story-part-8)

9. The billions that MAS lost: the shit is finally hitting the fan (http://www.malaysia-today.net/mtcolumns/29091-the-billions-that-mas-lost-the-shit-is-finally-hitting-the-fan)

10. UMNO's Corporate Cornucopia (http://malaysia-today.net/mtcolumns/special-reports/35228-umnos-corporate-cornucopia-)

 

Okay, that is certainly a lot of reading so you can read those ten reports above in your spare time (actually there are many more but suffice you read just those ten).

For the benefit of those who would like to cut to the chase or get straight to the bottom line, as they would say, this is what the issue is all about:

1. When Tajudin Ramli took over MAS, the national airline company had RM600 million in cash reserves. When he left MAS seven years later, the national airline company had a hole of RM8 billion, a gap of about RM9 billion. This was revealed in the letter to Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi dated 26 March 2007 (see item 8 above).

2. The police investigation led by CCID chief, Ramli Yusuff, revealed a high level of fraudulent transactions, breaches of fiduciary duties, and breaches of various statutory duties. He then recommended that action be taken against Tajudin Ramli.

3. The basis for launching this investigation were the two police reports that MAS made -- Dang Wangi Report No. 347/02 dated 4 January 2002 and Dang Wangi Report No. 12532/05 dated 4 May 2005.

It appears like this was an airtight case against Tajudin Ramli. So why would the government want to drop its case against him?

Well, probably this article would explain why (http://malaysia-today.net/mtcolumns/34253-umnos-hands-in-every-pie).

According to Tajudin Ramli: "At all material times, I was acting as a nominee and agent of the Government and in the performance of a public duty and I was bound to act under the instructions and directions from the government."

Yes, that was what he signed in his Affidavit of 18 April 2006.

So can you see why the government has to drop its case against Tajudin Ramli? If they proceed with the case and this matter is argued in court, then the whole world will know that Tajudin Ramli is just the 'Ali Baba' front for some hidden hands who have thus far managed to remain hidden. However, once the hearing starts, then the 'hidden hands' would no longer remain hidden, just like the 'hidden hands' behind Anwar Ibrahim's Sodomy 2 matter who are slowly being brought to the surface.

Hmm…I remember many saying that these untold stories on MAS are a figment of my imagination and pure fantasy. Do you still think this is a fantasy story and a product of my imagination going into overdrive?

Yes, justice may be delayed, but it can never be denied. As I have always said, in Malaysia, 90% of rumours are always finally proven as fact in the end. And that is why Malaysians believe in rumours.

I suppose when Anwar is subjected to the 'guilty unless you can prove your innocence' rule, we too can apply the same rule and say that: you are guilty unless you can prove your innocence.

The evidence points to a verdict of guilty. Let the government now prove that it is not guilty but innocent. Until then, I stand by what I said two years ago. And the fact that the government wants to drop this case and sweep everything under the rug just enhances the suspicion of guilt.

Over to you, Nazri, and let truth be told. After all, we are not supposed to lie during the fasting month, isn't it? Or can we?

 

WIKILEAKS: PM ABDULLAH REGROUPS, REAFFIRMS UMNO ELECTION PLAN

Posted: 11 Aug 2011 01:00 AM PDT

Beginning September 22, Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim's camp circulated two streams of rumor in what - in the absence of more information - appears to be a continuation of psychological warfare against UMNO and the National Front (BN) government. On September 22, Anwar advisor Khalid Jaafar whispered to us during a reception at the Ambassador's Residence that Anwar would meet the King on September 23 to discuss the parliamentary majority that Anwar alleges he now has and the formation of a new government.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUALA LUMPUR 000847

 

SIPDIS

 

FOR EAP, EAP/MTS AND INR

 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2028

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, MARR, KDEM, MY

SUBJECT: PM ABDULLAH REGROUPS, REAFFIRMS UMNO ELECTION PLAN

 

REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 833 - SEPT 18 SETBACK

     B. KUALA LUMPUR 821 - ABDULLAH TAKES DEFENSE MINISTRY

     C. KUALA LUMPUR 815 - SEPT 16 ANTI-CLIMAX

     D. KUALA LUMPUR 810 - UPROAR OVER ISA

 

Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark, reason 1.4 (b and d).

 

Summary and Comment

1.  (C) Embattled Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi claimed support from state-level officials of his ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO) for his re-nomination as party president, in an effort to bounce back after some national UMNO leaders on September 18 urged the PM not to contest in the December party poll.  Subsequently, Abdullah again affirmed his commitment to seek reelection together with Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak, while other senior UMNO leaders reiterated calls for Abdullah to step down. 

On September 22, Anwar's camp spread news that the Opposition leader would meet the King the following day; we have no information to suggest such a meeting took place.  PM Abdullah said reports that he was in indirect talks with Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim over a transfer of power were "rubbish;" Anwar also issued a public denial and advocated caution.

2.  (C) Comment:  Rapidly approaching the Muslim holiday period beginning October 1-2, and the October 9 start of the party's divisional meetings, the UMNO leadership crisis remains critical and unresolved.  Reports of Anwar Ibrahim meeting the King or opening up a third-party channel to negotiate with PM Abdullah do not appear credible. 

Anwar's most recent pronouncements sound a cautious tone and avoid setting deadlines for bringing down Abdullah's government, and it is unclear how far Anwar Ibrahim can push his agenda before the end of September.  End Summary and Comment.

Abdullah Claims State-Level Backing

3.  (SBU) PM Abdullah traveled to Perak and Kelantan states and held meetings with some UMNO state-level leaders over the September 20-21 weekend in an attempt to regroup support for his re-nomination as UMNO president following his setback in the heated UMNO Supreme Council meeting on September 18.

(Note:  Some prominent UMNO national leaders during the September 18 meeting reportedly warned Abdullah he would not get sufficient nominations from the UMNO party divisions and urged him not to seek reelection in the December party polls, ref A.  End Note.

On September 23, Abdullah held a late night meeting with the UMNO liaison chiefs from nine states, with Johor, Sabah and Teraengganu not represented (along with Sarawak, which does not have an UMNO branch). 

Following the meeting, a senior aide to Abdullah told reporters that the Prime Minister had received the strong endorsement of the party's state chiefs for his transition plan, which involves PM Abdullah and DPM Najib's reelection in December, and transfer of power from Abdullah to Najib by June 2010.  Other UMNO participants in the meeting noted a "unanimous" decision in favor of the 2010 transition plan.

4.  (C) Comment:  By going to the state level, and reporting strong endorsement from state leaders, Abdullah sought to counter criticism from national leaders that he would not receive sufficient backing for his reelection.  State liaison chiefs are appointed by the party president -- Abdullah -- and thus largely beholden to him, but they also exercise important political power among their respective state's party divisions.  End Comment.

5.  (SBU) After remaining awkwardly quiet on September 19, the Prime Minister's spin machine operating through the mainstream media and some on-line news portals, like The Malaysian Insider, started up again on September 20.

Reporting from government sources and associated commentary reaffirmed that Abdullah was moving ahead with the joint ticket with Najib, and that the transition plan remained on track and was not likely to be derailed.

Open UMNO Split Continues

6.  (SBU) As Abdullah reaffirmed his transition plan and intention to seek reelection, senior UMNO leaders Muhyiddin Yassin and Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah adamantly stuck to their positions that Abdullah should step down by December.  On September 23, Razaleigh issued a lengthy condemnation of UMNO's undemocratic power politics and the party's failure to reform:  "We cannot afford to allow these disturbing trends to play out their destructive course while we suffer a de facto leadership vacuum..." (full text forwarded to EAP/MTS).

DPM Najib, who departs the evening of September 24 for the UN General Assembly, largely avoided comment, feeding local perceptions that he is attempting to keep some room open to receive party nominations for president, possibly with Muhyiddin as his number two. 

Former Prime Minister Mahathir continued his attacks against Abdullah, and heaped blame on Najib for facilitating Abdullah's continuation in office.

Opposition Rumors; Anwar's Caution

7.  (C) Beginning September 22, Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim's camp circulated two streams of rumor in what - in the absence of more information - appears to be a continuation of psychological warfare against UMNO and the National Front (BN) government.  On September 22, Anwar advisor Khalid Jaafar whispered to us during a reception at the Ambassador's Residence that Anwar would meet the King on September 23 to discuss the parliamentary majority that Anwar alleges he now has and the formation of a new government.

Other rumors of Anwar meeting with the King and other Royals persist in Kuala Lumpur.

8.  (C) On September 23, Tian Chua, Anwar's information chief, publicly announced that the Opposition had opened negotiations with Prime Minister Abdullah through a third-party channel.  PM Abdullah immediately dismissed this claim, calling it "rubbish." 

Anwar later issued a statement referring to Tian Chua's remarks as "misinformed."  Avoiding setting any new deadlines for toppling the government, Anwar in his statement said, "We will proceed cautiously towards our goals and we agree neither to be provoked into hasty action nor to take an irresponsible approach that would lead to instability and greater uncertainty in the country."

(Comment:  Earlier on September 23, the GOM confirmed two years detention without trial under the Internal Security Act for controversial blogger Raja Petra, septel.  Opposition leaders continue to tell us that they seek to avoid creating a pretext for the government to arrest them under the ISA. End Comment.)

RAPSON

 

WIKILEAKS: ANWAR IBRAHIM'S SODOMY TRIAL II - A PRIMER

Posted: 09 Aug 2011 01:00 AM PDT

Most observers conclude that a conviction in Anwar's case, one upheld on appeal, would essentially end Anwar's political career given the legal penalties and Anwar's age (62). According to the Federal Constitution, a member of Parliament will be disqualified from holding his seat if he is convicted of an offense and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than one year or to a fine of not less than US $570 (RM 2,000) and has not received a free pardon.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 KUALA LUMPUR 000529

 

SIPDIS

 

FOR EAP/MTS

 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2019

TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, KJUS, MY

SUBJECT: ANWAR IBRAHIM'S SODOMY TRIAL II - A PRIMER

 

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR MARK D. CLARK, REASON 1.4 (B AND D).

 

Summary and Comment

1.    (C) Malaysian Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim will go on trial beginning July 8 on charges of sodomy -- a criminal offense in Malaysia -- with a former aide.  Anwar was previously tried and convicted of sodomy in 2000 in a heavily manipulated trial that the U.S. concluded "was marred by deep flaws in the judicial process."  The verdict was overturned on appeal in 2004. 

Senior Malaysian authorities were very aggressive in handling the present case during the initial period of June-September 2008, but, coinciding with the passing of Anwar's deadline to bring down the government through Parliamentary cross-overs, have since taken a more measured "rule-of-law" approach in public.  Authorities have not taken all the legal and extra-legal measures available to them, for example, to challenge Anwar's bail provisions or resolve an earlier impasse regarding the court venue.

Anwar's conviction in this trial, which may last many months, could end his political career; the judge would decide whether Anwar would remain free pending an appeal.  This cable provides a primer for the Department's reference, including background on the 2000 conviction and the present case, a synopsis of the specific legal charges and penalties, a summary of likely evidence to be presented in court, and three possible scenarios for the trial.

2.  (C) Comment:  The issue of the specific actions between Anwar and his aide will play out in court and, we suspect, in a very sensationalistic fashion.  The facts surrounding the case, however, make a compelling argument that the government's prosecution of the case is foremost a political act against the Opposition leader. 

Whether the incident in question was wholly concocted or has some basis in fact, the case is not part of a morals campaign or a normal criminal matter and has been the subject of extensive political interference and manipulation.  As one consequence, much of the Malaysian public remains deeply sceptical about the government's prosecution of Anwar Ibrahim. 

Anwar's flawed trials in 1998-2000 produced a public uproar and attracted international condemnation; in today's information-intensive environment, such effects may be exacerbated depending on events in court.  Embassy will provide draft press guidance for the Department's consideration prior to the July 8 trial date.  End Summary and Comment.

Sodomy Case I, 1998-2000

3.  (SBU) Under the government of former Prime Minister Mahathir, Anwar Ibrahim was charged and convicted of sodomy (and abuse of power) in a sensationalistic trials in 1998-2000, directed and heavily manipulated by Mahathir against his former deputy.  Anwar was charged with sodomizing his wife's driver. 

During his pre-trial detention, Anwar was beaten by the then Inspector General of Police.  The High Court convicted Anwar of sodomy in August 2000 and sentenced him to nine years imprisonment. 

The U.S. expressed deep concern with the first sodomy trial, noting "that the trial and (Anwar's) resulting conviction and nine-year jail sentence were marred by deep flaws in the judicial process."

After Mahathir stepped down in favor of Abdullah Badawi, the Federal Court overturned the conviction in September 2004 and released Anwar from prison (Anwar's separate conviction for abuse of power remained in place).  The Federal Court found there were "many unusual things that happened regarding the arrest and confession" of certain prosecution witnesses, including the fact that Anwar's driver stated that he was paid to make the allegations against Anwar. 

In an unusual move and possible political compromise, the Federal Court judges included in their judgment the conclusion that there was evidence to confirm "the appellants were involved in homosexual activities," but added that the prosecution failed to prove the alleged offenses beyond reasonable doubt.

Because Anwar's conviction on the separate charge of abuse of power was not overturned, he was barred from political office until April 2008.

Sodomy Case II, 2008

4.  (SBU) Less than four months after Anwar Ibrahim's People's Justice Party (PKR) and its opposition partners made significant advances in the March 2008 national elections, and three months after Anwar became eligible for political office, an aide to Anwar, Mohd Saiful Bukhari Azlan, filed a police report on June 28, 2008, alleging that he had been forcibly sodomized by Anwar on several occasions. 

The following day, Anwar took refuge in the Turkish ambassador's residence, claiming that he feared a repetition of his 1998 arrest and for his personal safety.  He remained with the Turkish ambassador for only one day, departing after public assurances of his safety from the Foreign Minister and Home Minister. 

In the midst of a highly charged political atmosphere, which included Anwar's claims that he could bring down the government through Parliamentary defections by September 16, 2008, and new allegations linking then DPM Najib with the Altantuya murder case, the police investigation proceeded. 

It came to light that Saiful had had contact with the office of then DPM Najib prior to working with Anwar, and more significantly Saiful had met with Najib (and allegedly his wife Rosmah) at Najib's home just prior to filing his police complaint. 

Najib first denied publicly he had any connection with the case, and then acknowledged meeting Saiful, an admission that preempted internet reports about to be released by blogger Raja Petra (who is now a fugitive from sedition charges).

5.  (SBU) As authorities made known their intention to arrest and charge Anwar for sodomy, Anwar's lawyers arranged for his voluntary appearance before police for questioning and charging.  Contrary to the agreement, on July 16, police in commando-style outfits waylaid Anwar's convoy en route to the police station and arrested him on the street.  Police questioned Anwar, took him to a hospital to provide a DNA sample (which Anwar refused, citing lawyers' advice and fear of "manipulation"), and held him overnight.  Anwar was released on police bail by a magistrate on July 17.

The Charges

6.  (SBU) On August 7, 2008, prosecutors charged Anwar Ibrahim before a Sessions Court under Section 377B of the Penal Code, which reads:  "Whoever voluntarily commits carnal intercourse against the order of nature shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to twenty years and shall be liable to whipping."  Section 377A of the Penal Code defines "carnal intercourse against the order of nature" as including sodomy. 

Prosecutors specifically charged Anwar with the sodomizing of Saiful Bukhari Azlan at a Kuala Lumpur condominium (owned by Anwar's friend) on June 26, 2008.

Although Saiful originally claimed he was forcibly sodomized on several occasions, the prosecutors chose not to pursue charges against Anwar under a separate Penal Code section (377C), which pertains to non-consensual sodomy (with a higher burden of proof), and also to focus on only one alleged incident. 

It is important to note that under Malaysia's legal system, prosecutors may amend the charges during the course of the trial.  Saiful himself does not face charges for the alleged acts.  The Court ordered Anwar to remain free on a personal bond of US $5,700 RM 20,000 and did not impose other restrictions (for example, Anwar has been free to travel abroad and has done so on many occasions since August 2008).  The government did not attempt to dispute or revoke the bail provisions.

Wrangle and Delay over Court Venue

7.  (SBU) Following Anwar's formal charging, and with Anwar's 9/16 deadline looming in the background, prosecutors quickly moved to transfer the case from the Sessions Court to the High Court. 

The prosecution argued on September 10, 2008, that such an important case with possibly complicated legal issues should be dealt with at the High Court and produced a certificate signed by the Attorney General to move the case, which under normal circumstances automatically results in a transfer. 

However, Anwar's lawyers objected to the transfer out of concern that the more politicized High Court level would result in a pro-prosecution judge hearing the case, as happened during the first sodomy trial in 1999-2000. 

In November 2008, independent-minded Sessions Court judge Komathy Suppiah rejected the certificate of transfer, noting that Attorney General Gani Patail faced allegations of evidence tampering in Anwar's 1998 case and the transfer order signed by the AG would "undermine the public perception of the judiciary."

8.  (C) Judge Komathy was overruled in March 2009 by High Court judge Mohamad Zabidin Md Diah who decided the Sessions Court has no authority to refuse the Attorney General's transfer order; Zabidin himself was then assigned to preside over the sodomy trial. 

Anwar's lawyers filed an appeal against the transfer; the Court of Appeals only began to hear the appeal on June 30; based on precedent, Anwar's camp admits the appeal has little chance of success.  Zabidin initially attempted to schedule the trial to begin in May 2009; defense lawyers argued they needed more time and hoped their appeal would be heard prior to the trial. 

(Note:  The High Court often takes one to two years before setting trial dates in normal criminal cases.  End Note.

Zabidin subsequently set the trial to begin on July 1.  Anwar's lawyers filed an application to compel the prosecution to provide them with full documentation and evidence that will be introduced at the trial, which the prosecution has thus far failed to do in apparent violation of the Criminal Procedure Code. 

With the hearing on the disclosure of evidence set for July 1 (now pushed back to July 3), Judge Zabidin postponed the trial start to July 8.  The judge originally specified a three-week duration for the trial, but lawyers assume that the trial will take many months to conclude.

The High Court Judge

9.  (C) High Court Judge Mohamad Zabidin Md Diah is a lawyer by training.  After private law practice, he joined the judicial service as a Sessions Court judge and was elevated to judicial commissioner in 2004.  After two years on contract, Zabidin was promoted to become a permanent High Court judge in 2006. 

Zabidin is not a well-known judge and is not associated with high profile or controversial judgments, according to our senior legal contacts.  Anwar's lawyers allege that Zabidin is beholden to the government and will favor the prosecution; the judge's unusual rush to bring the case to trial is viewed by the defense as an early indication of his bias.

Government Switches Gears

10.  (C) Senior government and UMNO party officials adopted a very aggressive public and private approach to the Anwar case during the June-September 2008 period.  This included frequent, prejudicial statements in public, and strong claims in private to other politicians and diplomats regarding Anwar's guilt. 

This intensive phase encompassed the initial news of the allegations and Anwar's formal charging, but also Anwar's own aggressive political posturing and claims that he could bring down the government by September 2008 through Parliamentary crossovers. 

After Anwar's deadline passed in September, and after resolution of the UMNO leadership battle in favor of Najib's succession in October 2008, we observed a definite toning down of the Government's approach, and a shifting to a lower gear.  For example, we did not hear reports of government intervention to quickly resolve the matter of the court venue, which effectively delayed the prosecution by some seven months. 

Anwar's bail provisions remained in place and unchallenged.  Public statements by senior government officials, outside of by-election campaigns, became infrequent.  This toned down approach has continued through the present; it would fit within a hypothetical decision to demonstrate that the trial is a law enforcement matter, rather than a political battle. Regardless, it is clear that the government has not taken all the legal and extra-legal steps against Anwar that it could have since September 2008.

GOM Confidence:  Waning or Recalculating?

11.  (C) Many of our government and UMNO contacts have insisted to us, emphatically so in the early months of the case, that the evidence against Anwar is very conclusive, often hinting at video footage and physical evidence like DNA (see below). 

Recently, some contacts sympathetic to Anwar but not part of his team claimed the government over time had become less certain it had sufficient evidence to convict Anwar. 

According to one unconfirmed account, in June several key aides to PM Najib advised him to drop the case against Anwar because the evidence was not strong enough for an easy conviction and the political cost of forcing through a guilty verdict would be too high.  It is also possible that the toned down rhetoric from the government has been misinterpreted as uncertainty on the authorities' part.

Evidence at the Trial  

12.  (C) Based on available information, we believe the following evidentiary aspects will feature in Anwar's trial:

Saiful's complaint:  The testimony of Saiful is central to the government's case, and he is expected to take the stand. Saiful has continued to assert that he was forcibly sodomized, although the charges under Section 377B do not require proof of a non-consensual act; given his youth (age 23) and physical size, Saiful will need to explain specific circumstances of the incident to support his assertion of rape.

Medical reports:  As publicly revealed by defense lawyers, Saiful underwent two medical examinations on June 28, 2008, just prior to lodging a police report.  The first examination by a Burmese doctor at a local hospital concluded there was "no conclusive clinical findings" suggestive of sodomy, and the doctor recommended he be examined at a government hospital in line with police procedures in such cases.

(Note:  The Burmese doctor briefly left Malaysia after being held for questioning by police.  End Note.

The second examination at the police-approved government hospital also failed to uncover medical evidence of sodomy, according to copies of hospital reports released by the defense.

DNA:  The defense team believes prosecutors will introduce DNA evidence, based on DNA samples held by the police since 1998, and are preparing expert witnesses.  The government's hurried passage in Parliament of a DNA bill, approved by the lower house on June 23, is widely seen as tied to the Anwar trial and will permit the government to utilize the 11-year old samples.  The defense could claim the samples were planted, as is widely believed to be the case in Anwar's earlier prosecution.

Anwar's alibi:  Anwar's lawyers claim that five persons will testify that Anwar was with them at the time of the alleged incident.  They also claim that police attempted but failed to intimidate some of these defense witnesses to change their accounts.

CCTV:  The prosecution may use CCTV footage from the condominium where the alleged incident took place to confirm Anwar's presence at a specific date and time.

Character witnesses:  As happened in the 1999 case, it is very possible that prosecutors introduce witnesses to attack Anwar's character and actions aside from the alleged 2008 sodomy incident.  There are unconfirmed reports that the prosecution will call 30 witnesses to the stand.

Defense witnesses (PM Najib and wife Rosmah?):  In an effort to demonstrate the political motivation in the government's case, defense lawyers could call PM Najib, his wife Rosmah, and other senior officials such as Najib's aide Khairil Anas Yusof who appear connected to the case (Najib and Rosmah because they met Saiful and discussed his reporting to the police).  While this will make for momentary drama, we expect the judge to disallow such moves.

Bail and other Conditions during the Trial

13.  (C) Anwar's legal team has expressed concern that the prosecution may apply to revoke the personal bond that allows Anwar to be free pending the trial or seek to impose other conditions, such as impounding his passport or restricting his movement to within Kuala Lumpur. 

The lawyers acknowledge that there is not a strong precedent for overturning the existing bail decision.  In several recent politically-charged court cases, however, Malaysian judges have ignored precedent decisions.

(Note:  We have no information on the prosecution's intentions in this matter. End Note.)

What if Anwar is Convicted?

14.  (C) Most observers conclude that a conviction in Anwar's case, one upheld on appeal, would essentially end Anwar's political career given the legal penalties and Anwar's age (62).  According to the Federal Constitution, a member of Parliament will be disqualified from holding his seat if he is convicted of an offense and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than one year or to a fine of not less than US $570 (RM 2,000) and has not received a free pardon.

This stipulation comes into effect after all appeals are exhausted (at the Court of Appeals and Federal Court).  The constitution also provides that a convicted person can only be active in politics after five years from the date of his release from prison.  At age 62, a second conviction could effectively bar Anwar permanently from political life.  In the event of a conviction, Anwar will certainly appeal. 

The judge will decide whether Anwar remains free pending appeal or immediately goes to jail.  While officially remaining a Member of Parliament pending the final outcome, he would be unable to operate from prison as the Opposition leader.

Political Interference and Manipulation

15.  (C) The issue of the alleged actions between Anwar and Saiful will play out in court, and sodomy, even a consensual act, is a crime under Malaysian law.  The facts surrounding the case, however, make it clear that the government's prosecution of the case is foremost a political act against the Opposition leader. 

The Malaysian government does not aggressively prosecute cases of sodomy; we find record of some 55 cases since 1991, or an average of 3 per year.  The vast majority of such cases involve adults assaulting minors.

Anwar's prosecution is not part of a morals campaign.  The GOM does not aggressively target non-heterosexual behavior; if it did so, a recent cabinet minister, senior staff associated with PM Najib and other prominent citizens linked to the government also would find themselves under investigation.

16.  (C) Aside from the immediate comparison with Anwar's previous prosecution for sodomy, which was grossly manipulated by former Prime Minister Mahathir, the indications of political interference and manipulation in the present case are compelling; much of the information is in the public realm.  Collateral reporting, not addressed here, provides further substantiation.

Najib connection:  Keeping in mind that Najib and Anwar remain bitter enemies, it is striking that Najib met personally with the complainant Saiful prior to the police report, and allegedly arranged for Saiful to have intensive contact with senior police officials in the days before he filed the complaint.

Senior officials' involvement:  From the very early stages, the senior-most officials in the government, including then PM Abdullah, current PM Najib, cabinet ministers, the AGO and national police chief (the latter two having played important roles in Anwar's 1998-1999 flawed trials) and officials of the ruling UMNO party have been intimately involved in decisions regarding the case, according to Embassy contacts and publicly available sources. 

Despite the current toned-down government approach, and emphasis that the Anwar trial is a normal law enforcement matter, senior-most executive and UMNO party officials continue such a directing role.

Leakage of information:  Senior government leaders provided law enforcement information on the case to leaders of Anwar's coalition partner, the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), in an unsuccessful attempt to split PAS from the opposition.  A recent internet report claims that the government has provided some government-directed press editors with a "sneak preview" of evidence against Anwar.

Public statements:  From the initial public reports of the complaint against Anwar in June 2008 to Anwar's election to Parliament in August 2008, PM Abdullah and other senior leaders spoke publicly and frequently about Anwar's alleged crime and the need for justice, and the case featured prominently in the parliamentary campaign against Anwar.

There have been far fewer statements since September 2008, except during by-election campaigns.

Press:  The Government-directed mainstream press, which includes all major dailies and all TV stations, provided extensive coverage of Saiful's allegations while severely limiting reporting on Anwar's response during the heated period of June-August 2008.

Alleged intimidation:  The police detained for questioning the doctor who first examined Saiful, causing him to leave Malaysia temporarily out of concern for his safety.  Police also pressured the hospital in question to hold a press conference to state that the doctor was not qualified to conduct such an examination, according to our sources.

According to defence lawyers, several of their witnesses have been threatened by police in an effort to change their testimony.  The Imam for the Federal Territories (including Kuala Lumpur and the administrative capital Putra Jaya) claimed publicly that he was forced to witness an "improper" Islamic oath taken by Saiful; he was subsequently sacked by the Prime Minister's Department.

Customized Legislation, the DNA bill:  The government hurriedly prepared a bill on DNA evidence, following shortly after Anwar's refusal to provide a DNA sample at the time of his arrest, which compels suspects to provide samples and allows authorities to utilize previously stored samples in new criminal cases.  The government originally introduced the bill in August 2008 and voted it through the lower house only on June 23, 2009; several steps remain before it becomes law.

Public Scepticism

17.  (C) In the run-up to Anwar's August 2008 arraignment, public opinion polling conducted by the Merdeka Center, Malaysia's most respected opinion survey group, revealed that a preponderance of Malaysians believed the charges against Anwar were unjust, indicating a deep public scepticism regarding the government's case. 

We understand that new polling on this question will be released before the July 8 trial date.  Pollsters have informed us that the new data continues to reflect widespread public suspicions.

Reportedly, only 15 percent of ethnic Malays and 10 percent of Malaysians overall believe Anwar's prosecution to be justified.  Outside of government circles, many Embassy contacts, including those who give credence to rumors of Anwar's personal life, take it as a matter of fact that the government is prosecuting Anwar for political reasons. 

In a public statement made on June 24, former Bar Council president (and U.S. Woman of Courage awardee in 2009) Ambiga Sreenvasan urged the government to drop the charges against Anwar in order to restore credibility to PM Najib's ruling coalition.

Scenarios

18.  (C) When viewed as a political matter, a number of potential scenarios for the Anwar prosecution present themselves; below we review three that are most apparent.  In these scenarios we assume that Najib will exercise the deciding voice on how and whether to proceed, though he also will need to weigh the opinions of other UMNO ruling party elites.

-- Conviction at all costs:  Based on an assessment that Anwar is a threat to UMNO's continued rule at least at the time of the next national elections, Najib and UMNO elites decide that the political costs of prosecuting Anwar are acceptable and pursue the matter aggressively inside and outside the courtroom with the overriding goal of convicting Anwar and removing him permanently from politics. 

While asserting that this is purely a law enforcement matter, the government exerts political pressure as necessary, accepting reputational risks in the process, and achieves a conviction after months of high-profile drama in the courtroom.  The courts hear and reject Anwar's appeals in an expedited manner, well ahead of the next national elections in 2012 or 2013. 

This scenario appeared to be in play during the initial months of the case and in the lead up to Anwar's September 2008 deadline to overturn the ruling coalition's majority; it has been less apparent since then.  Recalling the deep personal animosity between Najib and Anwar, and the singular importance of Anwar to the opposition coalition, this scenario remains plausible, even though Anwar's immediate threat to UMNO's rule has passed.

-- Merits of the case, reputational damage:  In a second scenario, the government proceeds with the prosecution but refrains from exerting undue pressure to achieve conviction, believing that the evidence presented and/or the court proceedings themselves will sufficiently damage Anwar's reputation and this will outweigh harm to the Najib administration's credibility. 

Conviction remains the desired outcome, supported by sufficient evidence, but the government accepts some risk of a final verdict of innocence after all appeals are heard.  This scenario rests on the assumption of sufficiently clear evidence against Anwar that will swing public opinion in favor of the government even in the event of an eventual acquittal.  Absent greater information on the government's evidence against Anwar, it is difficult to judge the prospects for this scenario.

-- Withdrawal:  In a third scenario, Najib and UMNO elites decide that the government's case is not strong enough to pursue, entails unacceptable political costs, or is no longer necessary because of the diminished threat from Anwar.  The government withdraws the charges prior to the trial start of July 8, or shortly after the trial begins, possibly under conditions of "discharge not amounting to acquittal."

(Lawyers tell us that such a discharge in theory would allow the government to reactivate the case at a future time, thus maintaining this as a lever over Anwar.) 

Najib, confident that he can beat back an opposition challenge in the next election, attributes the original decision to prosecute to the previous administration of Abdullah Badawi and takes credit for respecting the rule of law in this high profile case involving his determined political nemesis. 

In contrast to 2008, Najib's currently secure position as UMNO leader and Prime Minister, along with Anwar's diminished threat, make this scenario a political possibility, though some UMNO elites and perhaps Najib himself may not want to give up the opportunity to remove Anwar Ibrahim from politics once and for all.

KEITH

 

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