WIKILEAKS: ANWAR TELLS DIPLOMATS HIS FUTURE IS PRIME MINISTER OR JAIL Posted: 03 Dec 2011 11:07 AM PST
Anwar Ibrahim told 40 assembled diplomats on July 22 he would either become Prime Minister or end up in jail, "and this time I'm not going to jail." While Anwar put on a brave face for the gathered diplomats, if indeed there are only two possible outcomes, at this point it is far more likely that Anwar finds himself behind bars rather than sitting in the Prime Minister's office. THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin ![](http://img863.imageshack.us/img863/8673/wikileaksmtoday.jpg)
Classified By: POLITICAL SECTION CHIEF MARK D. CLARK, REASON 1.4 (B AND D). Summary
1. (C) An energetic and seemingly confident Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim told 40 assembled diplomats on July 22 that in the face of government attempts to use sodomy charges to derail his political challenge, he would either become Prime Minister or end up in jail, "and this time I'm not going to jail." Anwar claimed that he had new information that revealed his accuser's extensive contacts with senior police officers prior to the alleged sodomy incident, as well as a medical report that found no evidence of sodomy on the accuser's body. Nevertheless, Anwar and his lawyer anticipated prosecutors would soon file formal charges. Anwar said he quickly would announce his decision to run in by-election so as to become a member of Parliament by September. Anwar's entry into Parliament was "critical" as a condition for those MPs who have agreed to defect to the Opposition. Anwar specifically thanked Ambassador Keith and the State Department for statements of concern, looked to the EU to take a similar stand, and urged other countries at least to raise privately their human rights concerns with Malaysian leaders. While Anwar put on a brave face for the gathered diplomats, if indeed there are only two possible outcomes, at this point it is far more likely that Anwar finds himself behind bars rather than sitting in the Prime Minister's office. End Summary. Two Possible Outcomes
2. (SBU) De facto Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim on July 22 briefed 40 foreign diplomats, including polchief, for over 90 minutes at the Petaling Jaya headquarters of his Peoples Justice Party (PKR). In his presentation, Anwar, looking energetic and confident, laid out a general proposition that given political conditions in Malaysia under UMNO party rule, he would either become Prime Minister or go to jail, "and this time I'm not going to jail." Review of Sodomy Allegations
3. (SBU) Anwar reviewed in detail the sodomy allegations he faces and the signs of political manipulation, drawing ready comparisons with his earlier prosecution for corruption and sodomy in 1998. He highlighted contact between his accuser, Saiful, and Deputy Prime Minister Najib, Najib's wife, and Inspector General of Police (IGP) Musa Hassan, stating he would release new evidence of calls or meetings between Saiful and the IGP weeks before the official sodomy complaint. The Opposition leader also claimed to have medical reports from an examining doctor who concluded that Saiful had not been sodomized or assaulted, but police suppressed the information. Anwar explained his concern over providing DNA samples that could be planted by police to falsify evidence against him, as reportedly happened in the 1998 case. GOM Leaders' Mala Fide Involvement Plain to See
4. (C) Anwar pointed out that no one was investigating the high level government mala fide involvement in the case, evident to the public on a daily basis. On his "commando style" arrest on July 16, Anwar said the "police tactics were intended to intimidate me, and show me as a dangerous criminal." Nevertheless, recent polling showed that the Malaysian public believed the case to be politically motivated. Anwar said he had forgiven those who acted against him in the 1998 corruption and sodomy cases. Showing some emotion, however, he vowed that once in power he would strike back at those involved in the current "frame-up," and then immediately clarified that they would face legal consequences. Charges Imminent 5. (C) Anwar explained the government likely would proceed to charge him with sodomy (a criminal offense in Malaysia, whether or not consensual) as a clear means to "derail" Anwar and the Opposition's political ambitions. The GOM already had identified a pliant judge and was assembling a prosecution team. If the government decides to proceed, "they must charge me very soon." Anwar's lawyer and PKR vice president Sivarasa Rasiah told polchief in even clearer terms that charges against his client were imminent. Quick By-Election "Critical" to Anwar's Plans
6. (SBU) Anwar claimed that the sodomy allegation had been timed to frustrate his previously planned announcement of a by-election bid. "My by-election is critical," he explained, because East Malaysian and other government MPs who wish to cross-over want Anwar to be a member of Parliament before they proceed with a vote of no-confidence against the government. (Note: Only as an MP would Anwar be eligible to become Prime Minister. End Note.) All but "several" MPs have stuck with their promise to cross-over, Anwar claimed, and the ruling UMNO party and police internal intelligence (Special Branch) knew this. Noting the Electoral Commission must hold a by-election within two months of a vacancy, Anwar indicated he would very soon decide on which race to pursue so as to become an MP by "mid-September." 7. (SBU) Why was it critical to seek the cross-overs and bring down the UMNO-led government rather than waiting until the next election, Anwar asked rhetorically. The Opposition parties would not face a free and fair election, he argued, and the provision for legal challenges to election results was designed to frustrate most challenges. Royals Will Uphold Constitution
8. (SBU) In response to a question on the views of the Malay rulers toward the Opposition's goals, Anwar said that normally politicians must be very cautious in making comments about the King and other Royals. "We need to keep then informally informed" of Opposition views and plans. "I understand they will act strictly in accordance with the Constitution," and Anwar said the Perak Regent's July 21 widely publicized remarks on the role of the monarchy "affirm that belief." PAS-UMNO Talks
9. (SBU) Regarding controversy within the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) over talks with UMNO, and the risk that PAS leaves the opposition fold, Anwar said this represented an internal party matter for PAS that the government was playing up in the media. PAS president Hadi Awang had spoken with Anwar on July 21 to reaffirm PAS's commitment to the Opposition coalition. Anwar said he had also received overtures from PM Abdullah, but had "promised to keep this confidential." Governance, Foreign Policy
10. (SBU) Anwar briefly described his approach to governance and foreign policy. "I'm a firm believer in market economics. Promoting democracy and market economics are critical, and go hand-in-hand," he stated. "We need to make Malaysia more attractive as an investment destination," something that UMNO had lost by its insistence on Malay preferences under the New Economic Policy, which disproportionately benefit Malays elites, not the poor. Malaysia needed "social and distributive justice" not based on race, but on need. In foreign affairs, Anwar said he would seek to maintain strong relations with the U.S. and EU, while also pursuing close ties to all countries, including "Iran and Sudan." He noted his strong objection to the U.S. "occupation of Iraq," while recognizing the Saddam Hussein committed many atrocities against the Iraqi people. Appeal to Foreign Governments
11. (SBU) Speaking to the group, Anwar thanked the U.S. State Department, Senator Biden and various international non-governmental groups for their statements of concern over his July 16 arrest. He noted that he had received private expressions of support from the South African government, and was in touch with prominent figures in Europe and Canada. Anwar said he expected the U.S. and the EU (heretofore silent) to speak out on important human rights and rule-of-law aspects of his situation. He skillfully prodded other countries by noting he understood their concern for their bilateral relations with the Malaysian government, and urged them at least to take up such human rights issues in private. "You must demonstrate the international community is not deaf and dumb to these human rights violations," he concluded. 12. (C) In a pull-aside with polchief, Anwar conveyed his personal thanks to Ambassador Keith for his remarks on the day of the arrest, and for the Spokesman's press statement in Washington later the same day. Polchief said these statements did not reflect partisan politics, but important principles for the United States. Comment
13. (C) Anwar put a brave, defiant face on the current situation for his first gathering before diplomats since he returned to active political life in late 2006. He appeared animated, energetic and at times emotional. Nevertheless, if indeed there are only two possible outcomes, under current circumstances it is far more likely that Anwar finds himself behind bars rather than sitting in the Prime Minister's office. We agree with his assessment that the government will soon take the next step and bring charges. While Anwar is an extremely resourceful politician, and largely enjoys public sympathy in this situation, the ruling UMNO party sees the case as a critical power match, controls the law enforcement apparatus and appears willing to do whatever it takes to stop Anwar's political designs.
KEITH (July 2008) |
Redrawing the Boundaries Posted: 28 Nov 2011 10:02 PM PST
The 26 new seats introduced into GE11 include 5 in Sabah (all won by BN), 6 in Johor (all won by BN), 5 in Selangor (all won by BN), 3 in Pahang (all won by BN), 2 in Penang (Karpal Singh became the only exception when he won the new Bukit Gelugor seat) and the remaining 5 new seats distributed over the remaining states (all won by BN) except for Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu (where PAS scored a resounding victory during GE10). This meant that BN won 25 of the new 26 contested seats nationwide. THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Hakim Joe In both 1995 and 1999 when Malaysia held GE9 and GE10 respectively, the total number of parliamentary seats that were contested was 192 and 193. This was increased to 219 in 2004 during GE11 after Badawi took over and subsequently the number rose to 222 in 2008 during GE12. One of the few reasons for this corresponding increase in constituencies is the population growth in Malaysia. In 1995, Malaysia had 20.14 million citizens. In 2004, the number increased 16.8% to 23.52 million and to 25.27 million or another 7.4% in 2008. As of 2011, the population of Malaysia stands at 28.73 million, an increase of 13.7% over the 2008 figures. 26 new seats were added in 2004 and another 3 seats in 2008. Will we therefore witness an increase in the number of parliamentary constituencies during GE13? Let us review the massive increase in parliamentary seats during GE11 (2004) when BN won a record 90.41% of all contested seats under Badawi. It must be noted that the incumbent government only won 63.9% of popular votes but yet won 9 out of every 10 contested seats. In comparison, when BN won a record 65.2% of popular votes in 1995, they only had 84.4% of seats in Parliament. The 26 new seats introduced into GE11 include 5 in Sabah (all won by BN), 6 in Johor (all won by BN), 5 in Selangor (all won by BN), 3 in Pahang (all won by BN), 2 in Penang (Karpal Singh became the only exception when he won the new Bukit Gelugor seat) and the remaining 5 new seats distributed over the remaining states (all won by BN) except for Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu (where PAS scored a resounding victory during GE10). This meant that BN won 25 of the new 26 contested seats nationwide. The 3 new seats in 2008 (GE12) were Igan, Sibuti and Limbang and were the result from a border re-demarcation exercise in Sarawak and were all won by BN (PBB). Igan was won uncontested, Sibuti won by a decisive 16% majority and Limbang by a mere 3% majority. Of the new parliamentary seats introduced since the 2003 delineation exercise by the Elections Commission (EC), BN has won 96.6% of these contested seats or 28 out of the 29 in total. It must also be especially noted that no new parliamentary seats were created in any Malaysian states that showed a swing to the Opposition. Penang had 2 new seats in 2004 because Badawi was from Bayan Lepas in Penang and traditionally a state that produces the PM is a sure-win for the government. Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu had zero new seats because the 1999 elections exhibited a significant swing to PAS. The trend also shows that the EC possesses a tendency to create new parliamentary seats in pro-BN areas and especially in semi-urban districts. In Kedah, for example, it moved an area that UMNO had won by over 5,000 votes in 1999 into a constituency that PAS had won by 3,000 votes. When this happens, instead of each party having one seat in Parliament, only BN is left with the parliamentary seat, albeit with a reduced majority but since Malaysia practices a "First Past the Post" voting system, a win from just one single vote is identical to a win of over 10,000 votes. Delineation exercises conducted by the EC are performed every 8 years and the last one was carried out in March 2003, which means that the probability of a new delineation exercise being held on or before March 2012 is extremely high. Malaysian should also take note that if more than 100 individuals object to the delineation, the EC must hold a public enquiry. The law provides that the EC can still go ahead with the exercise but it must now justify why it did not take the objections into account. The Malaysian government tells us that every citizen has to right to vote and that every registered voter possesses one single vote. What they do not tell you is that every vote does not carry the same weight. Putrajaya with one parliamentary seat only possesses 6,608 registered voters while Kapar in Selangor, with also one parliamentary seat has 112,224 registered voters. It is therefore an extremely steep uphill battle for Pakatan even before a single vote has been cast as everything is heavily stacked against them. The Opposition requires a minimal 15-point lead on polling day merely to obtain an overall majority of one parliamentary seat. And that is why we need to give our full support to BERSIH 3.0. |
WIKILEAKS: The PR parties clearly have different visions for Malaysia Posted: 27 Nov 2011 06:14 PM PST
Reaching out to the two East Malaysian states is crucial to PR's bid to wrest federal power from the BN as the two states command about a quarter of the total number of parliamentary seats but have a tenuous relationship with UMNO which the opposition believes can potentially be exploited. In the meantime, PR leader Anwar faces a court trial and probable conviction on sodomy charges in early 2010. Still, the very existence of PR as a viable political force, coupled with the emergence of the uncensored and influential blogosphere that helped the opposition get its policy message to the public, has changed the political dynamics in Malaysia. THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin ![](http://img863.imageshack.us/img863/8673/wikileaksmtoday.jpg)
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR BRIAN D. MCFEETERS, REASON 1.4 (B AND D) Summary and Comment 1. (SBU) Summary. The three main Malaysian opposition parties held their first official joint convention on December 19, agreeing to a core platform of unified party positions and setting their sights on taking over the government during the next general elections. The opposition coalition known as the People's Alliance (PR) had previously been a well-organized but unofficial coalition consisting of the People's Justice Party (PKR), the Democratic Action Party (DAP), and the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS). This is the first time the three opposition parties cooperated on conducting a large-scale function that was open to the public, during which they approved a common policy framework which will be the cornerstone of the coalition's campaign to oust the ruling National Front (BN) when elections are held sometime before the end of June 2013. The PR coalition's agreed framework provides clear policies that it would implement should they gain power -- such as increasing oil revenue-sharing with oil-producing states from five to 20 percent -- while debunking the BN's claims that the PR is a collection of squabbling parties that fight more often than they agree. 2. (C) Comment. The importance of unity at the PR convention, including the much-photographed and widely disseminated image of the three opposition leaders holding their joined hands aloft, cannot be overstated. That picture serves to counter the campaign the government-influenced media has waged to undermine the coalition by highlighting the problems between the parties, treating their minor differences as major rifts, and exaggerating the inevitable infighting through selective use of quotes and false rumors. The parties clearly do have different visions for Malaysia, ranging from DAP's quest for race-blind liberal democracy to PAS's ultimate goal, placed on the back burner, of establishing an Islamic state. Even so, the leaders managed to convey that they were on the same page at the convention when they codified their areas of agreement in a lucid charter. For now, cohesion is winning, since the parties are united by their desire to unseat the BN -- whose United Malays National Organization (UMNO) has controlled the government since independence in 1957 -- and establish a more ethical government. 3. (C) Comment continued. The People's Alliance carried out a successful convention but faces an uphill battle. BN strategists have told us the ruling coalition is determined not only to win the next general election -- which Prime Minister Najib will likely not hold until he must in 2013 -- but is also determined to win back a two-thirds majority in Parliament, in part by offering popular reforms. In the meantime, PR leader Anwar faces a court trial and probable conviction on sodomy charges in early 2010. Still, the very existence of PR as a viable political force, coupled with the emergence of the uncensored and influential blogosphere that helped the opposition get its policy message to the public, has changed the political dynamics in Malaysia. Many of the values that the People's Alliance stresses -- such as accountable government and press freedom -- are in line with U.S. interests. While the opposition has a marked lack of clarity on many major foreign policy issues, it has a tendency toward protectionist rhetoric on trade, and would continue the current government's anti-Israel stance. End Summary and Comment. Party Leaders Pledge to Work Under One Banner 4. (U) The opposition coalition, called the People's Alliance (Pakatan Rakyat or PR in Malaysian), comprising the People's Justice Party (PKR), the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) held its first convention on December 19 with the theme of "Guiding change to ensure victory." Polcouns, Poloffs, and diplomats from other embassies attended the convention held in Shah Alam, the capital of the PR-controlled state of Selangor. This is the first time the three parties have come together to formalize the coalition after announcing its formation on April 1, 2008, right after the March 2008 general election. The election, which has been described as a "political tsunami," saw the opposition capture five of thirteen state governments and 47 percent of the popular vote, with the opposition parties winning 82 out of the 222 parliament seats and thereby denying the ruling National Front (BN) coalition its customary two thirds majority in parliament. (Note: this is significant because it denies the BN the ability to amend the constitution, an option it frequently used in the past for political advantage. End Note.) Approximately 1,500 delegates from all three parties attended the convention. The three parties recently submitted their application to the Registrar of Societies to formally register as an official political alliance; they are currently awaiting a response from the registrar. 5. (U) After a raucous opening that featured Malay drummers and Chinese dragons, the convention started with speeches by three key leaders representing each of the three opposition parties. PKR Advisor and de facto opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim represented PKR; Penang Chief Minister and DAP party Secretary General Lim Guan Eng represented DAP; and PAS party president Hadi Awang represented PAS. All three leaders pledged their party's commitment to the coalition. Anwar Ibrahim stated that the People's Alliance is not just a political party but "a political movement that will bring about genuine change in the country." He urged the PR component parties to emerge from the "cocoon of their narrow sectarianism" and "to be fair to all the people" if they are serious about defeating the BN in the next general election. 6. (U) DAP Secretary General Lim Guan Eng, to laughter and applause, described the ruling BN as "the dark side" that "oppresses, depresses and suppresses the people forever." Echoing Anwar's call, Guan Eng urged the people to support PR whereby its policies will focus on "justice, freedom, truth, welfare and devotion to God," a clear a message to win over Muslim support. He pointed out that the PR leaders' objective is to "defend the national interest" compared to the BN leaders who only defend "their own self interest." He concluded his speech by pointing out that PR is fighting for the future generation of the country. 7. (U) PAS President Hadi Awang reassured the coalition partners that his party is committed to the People's Alliance, and would never join the BN's dominant party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). (Comment: Since the March 2008 general election, several senior PAS leaders have been promoting the idea of a PAS-UMNO unity government for the sake of Malay and Muslim unity. These PAS leaders who have been advocating this unity government were at the convention, including Hadi himself, indicating that the party is firmly committed to align itself with the PR. End Comment.) In his speech, Hadi quoted extensively examples from the Koran that promoted a plural society based on justice. He stated that in Islam it is cruel to discriminate against minorities, and urged non-Muslims not to take seriously the brand of Islam as promoted by UMNO, which he described as "not holding on to the true teachings and principles" of the religion. The three leaders avoided lashing out at Prime Minister Najib or other BN leaders by name, but Hadi drew applause when he noted that Putra Jaya, the federal capital, was only a few kilometers away from Shah Alam. Common Platform -- Accountability and Transparency Galore 8. (SBU) Pakatan leaders unveiled a 33-page common policy framework described by a journalist from the BN-influenced "Star" newspaper as "a masterpiece of compromise between three dissimilar political visions" that contained promises of sweeping reforms and equality. The common platform, unanimously adopted by the 1,500 delegates at the end of the convention, has four major points: a transparent and genuine democracy; a high-performance people-centric economy; social justice and human development; and a better federal-state relationship and foreign policy. All three political parties pledged in the common framework to defend the Constitution; to practice needs-based affirmative action (as opposed to the race-based policy practiced by the BN); abolish all laws that violate human rights including the Internal Security Act; and restore and respect the separation of powers between the three branches of government. Other pledges include introducing a minimum wage (Malaysia has none); providing more powers and funds to the states; making the Election Commission, Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC), Human Rights Commission (Suhakam), National Oil Company Petronas and other major government institutions directly accountable to Parliament, and having Parliament approve the appointment of important government posts such as the inspector general of police, attorney-general, MACC commissioner and auditor-general.
9. (U) With regard to the contentious issue of religion, the coalition pledged to establish a "comprehensive mechanism" (including forming a royal commission) to resolve cases where there is an overlap of civil and Islamic Syariah laws. On foreign policy, the PR wants to strengthen Malaysia's role in the international arena by promoting a foreign policy that is based on "universal justice, (conflict) resolution through negotiations, and emphasis on inter-civilization dialogues for peace, security and prosperity." The Alliance also wants to strengthen diplomatic and trade relations with regional partners, especially with ASEAN member countries. 10. (SBU) The common platform also made special reference to the East Malaysian States of Sabah and Sarawak, where PR promised to increase the oil royalty from the current five percent to twenty percent (as promised for all other states with oil and gas revenue) and resolving long-standing problems faced by indigenous peoples. PR also promised to form a royal commission to resolve the outstanding issue of illegal immigrants, a major problem in Sabah which has been largely ignored by the federal government. PKR Vice President and prominent Sabah politician Jeffrey Kittingan, rumored to be at odds with PR leader Anwar, told Poloffs that, on the contrary, he was very happy the PR had given special attention to the two East Malaysian states. (Comment: Reaching out to the two East Malaysian states is crucial to PR's bid to wrest federal power from the BN as the two states command about a quarter of the total number of parliamentary seats but have a tenuous relationship with UMNO which the opposition believes can potentially be exploited. End Comment.) Differences Still Exist 11. (SBU) Despite the euphoria over the unveiling of a common platform, differences exist among the parties. PAS leaders have told us that the party is not abandoning its objective of forming an Islamic state in Malaysia, while DAP leaders are continuing to promote the dismantling of race-based policies and secularization of the government. The parties also are squabbling over representation at the state level. For example, PAS-controlled Kedah does not have a DAP politician in the state cabinet, much to the chagrin of DAP. The reverse is true in the DAP-controlled state of Penang. In Selangor, PAS wants the state government to ban the sale of alcohol in Malay majority neighborhoods, but the PKR and DAP-dominated state government have balked at this suggestion. 12. (SBU) The most prominent spat de jour between the parties is the restoration of local elections. Local elections in Malaysia were suspended in 1969 following large-scale race riots and abolished in 1972. Under the status quo, local councilors are appointed by the respective political parties that control the state government. In the run up to the March 2008 general election, opposition parties pledged to restore local elections if elected. However PAS and some PKR leaders opposed the restoration of local elections as they were worried that some local governments would be dominated by non-Malays should elections be held openly. To overcome these differences in opinion, PR has decided to postpone and tone down the discussion on restoring local elections, stating that the coalition is committed to "strengthen local government democracy and democratically enhance the competency and effectiveness of the delivery system and guarantee transparency at all levels." KEITH (December 2009) |
WIKILEAKS: How in 2008 BN paid for its 2006 sins Posted: 24 Nov 2011 04:04 PM PST
When tension rises, the blood of Malay warriors will run in our veins. UMNO is willing to risk lives and bathe in blood in defense of race and religion. Don't play with fire. If they (non-Malays) mess with our rights, we will mess with theirs. Since the tragic racial riots in 1969, UMNO and the Malays have been too patient and tolerant. The special rights of the Malays and the position of Islam as the official religion are enshrined in the Federal Constitution. UMNO should stand firm on these issues and not back down for the sake of the Malay race. We should defend it to the last drop of our blood. THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin ![](http://img863.imageshack.us/img863/8673/wikileaksmtoday.jpg)
Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b, d). Summary 1. (C) The defense of Malay rights, heated racial rhetoric, and Islamic themes dominated the 2006 UMNO General Assembly, with the often jolting Malay speak reaching Malaysians directly for the first time through unfiltered, live television coverage. Deputy Prime Minister Najib opened the 2006 UMNO General Assembly with the declaration that there was no time limit for the "Malay Agenda" and its plethora of race-based affirmative action plans aimed at raising the status of ethic Malays. Prime Minister Abdullah reaffirmed the need for the New Economic Policy and pledged to continue the focus of reducing the income gap between races. Abdullah's key-note address focused on the goals he set three years ago when he took office. Abdullah celebrated a more open society, but urged restraint in dealing with "sensitive issues" of race and religion. He criticized Islamic extremists in Malaysia and questioned Malaysia's intolerance. Other speakers focused heavily on race-based issues, and heaved blame and criticism on Chinese and Indian coalition parties. Coalition partners received a warning: don't question the status of Malays and Islam in Malaysia. Recognizing the effects of such rhetoric, Abdullah and Najib issued statements to mend fences with coalition partners. UMNO has had second thoughts on live telecasts of future general assemblies. This is the second in a series of reports covering the 57th United Malays National Organization's (UMNO) General Assembly which was held in Kuala Lumpur, November 13 - 17. End Summary. The Malay Agenda: UMNO's main task 2. (U) In his November 13 speech opening the General Assembly for UMNO's Wanita (Women), Puteri (Young Women) and Pemuda (Youth) wings, Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak began a discussion on the Malay Agenda that would reverberate throughout the week in nearly every speech from every delegate. Najib began, "The Malay Agenda is UMNO's main task in uplifting the status of the Malays. In the course of history, from 1511 to 1957, we were under the rule of foreigners. After those 446 years of oppression, it is impossible that what is owed to the Malays can be repaid in a mere 20 or 30 years. In this struggle for the Malays, it must be firmly said that there is no time limit. . . " Najib's statement echoed Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi's remarks to Parliament issued the same day. Abdullah had declared that Malaysia will always need a policy and agenda on wealth distribution so long as economic disparity among the races exists. "The effort to correct the economic disparity involves several steps or affirmative actions to raise the economic and education achievement among the races, particularly the bumiputras, so that they are comparable with non-bumiputras," declared Abdullah. "This includes," Abdullah continued, "reviving the New Economic Policy (NEP). . ." 3. (U) In his presidential address to the UMNO assembly, Abdullah expounded on the same topic: "the twenty years allocated to achieve the objectives of the NEP (1970-90) was too short a period; an unrealistic time frame to successfully restructure society and eradicate poverty. . .The objectives of the NEP . . . are larger than equity targets. The government will focus on reducing the income gap between races. True balance is a prerequisite for sustainable development." Strong words, sleepy presentation 4. (C) Cast with the fanfare of an American president's State of the Union Address, Abdullah's key-note address should have been the highlight of the party. Instead, it was a rather monotonous monologue with very little enthusiasm either from Abdullah or from the audience. One journalist told emboff, "In Mahathir's time, we (the journalists) would sit with baited breath waiting to see what he would say next. With Abdullah, no one wanted to sit through it all. We could hardly stay awake. No one wanted to be in there." Unlike the charismatic Mahathir who delivered his speeches using teleprompters so that he could always look at the audience, Abdullah read his 90 minute speech from a printed copy. Head down, reading from the text, observers faulted Abdullah for reading on when he should have paused for applause, and pausing at awkward moments when there was no cause for cheer. 5. (C) Publicly, only the Mahathir family dared comment that the speech was "nothing new" (ref. A) or that the assembly lacked the "rah, rah" of previous UMNO assemblies. But privately many people commented that the presidential address was little more than a rehash of previous speeches promoting the twelve pillars Abdullah addressed when inaugurated three years ago, renewed somewhat with the 9th Malaysia Plan. Perhaps an UMNO-linked newspaper (New Straits Times) editorial phrased it most politely: "His delivery was typically Abdullah-ish -- no shouting, no threats, no playing to the gallery. . . (but) when he finished. . .no one had any doubts about the message." As dull as some accused it of being, there was no doubt that Abdullah had a message to deliver concerning his vision for Malaysia. Hidden in the pages and pages of text were some strong words from a soft spoken leader. He championed education, rural economic development, the rule of law, anti-corruption efforts, openness and democracy, freedom of the press and religious tolerance. Freedom of the Press - Malaysian style 6. (SBU) With a country awash in recent controversy ranging from Mahathir to economics to religious expression, Abdullah did not shy away from his desire for a more open press. Abdullah applauded constructive criticism and reminded politicians that they would not be immune from the scrutiny of a more open press. "The truth is that I would rather see heated exchanges in the pages of the press than to see raging riots on the streets," said Abdullah. If Malaysia was to become a truly advanced society, openness was a prerequisite. "It is meaningless," he said, "to develop infrastructure for information technology if the leadership flinches from a culture that is more open to and accepting of the media." In typical style, Abdullah then threatened the press regarding his "sensitive issues." "Freedom has its limits," he warned. "We cannot and will not compromise when it comes to the unity and harmony of our multi-racial and multi-cultural society. We will continue to be vigilant when it comes to national security and public safety. I would like to warn those who abuse this freedom that I will not for a moment hesitate to use the law against them." "Democracy does not mean absolute freedom to raise sensitive issues relating to religion, race, culture and language," Abdullah reminded. Islam Hadhari versus the ultra-conservatives 7. (SBU) Like many of the issues debated throughout the assembly, Abdullah's address focused heavily on religious issues. Returning to his religious philosophy launched three years ago, Abdullah declared: "Islam Hadhari. . .is a philosophy that reminds Muslims that our faith unequivocally requires us to succeed in the world. We perpetuate a great disservice to Islam if we reject development, if we are obsessed with conflict and if we live in ignorance." Abdullah lamented that some people had misinterpreted Islam Hadhari as an excuse to become more conservative and radical. Lamenting that some clerics had condemned Muslims for wishing their neighbors a Merry Christmas or Happy Deepavali, Abdullah asked, "How can we have reached such a level of intolerance? . . .When did we become ultra-conservative? This is not Islam Hadhari." 8. (SBU) "It is these same groups who make such proclamations (condemning other religious celebrations)," continued Abdullah, "that are conjuring imaginary threats aimed at inciting Muslims, hoping that they (Muslims) will become more intolerant of others. Their agenda is to see Malaysia torn apart, for us to fail as a multi-racial, multi-religious nation. This is not Islam. . .Let me be clear-- Islam Hadhari is not a blank cheque to bring about conservative revivalism in this country. . .While I will protect Islam's position and the role of the Shariah courts from being undermined, I will also ensure that no one tries to hijack Islam in Malaysia in order to breed intolerance and hatred." UMNO Youth lash out at other BN parties 9. (SBU) In the midst of all the rhetoric championing Islam and the rights of Malays, UMNO Youth chief Hishamuddin Tun Hussein delivered his speech to the UMNO Youth and without a thought to hypocrisy in his words, threatened politicians of other races: "We must remember that creating a Malaysian nation will not be possible on narrow thinking and chauvinism. Don't gamble the future by championing race politics. We know them, we know who they are and we know what they are saying. We are not afraid to face the opportunist leaders and we will not compromise with them." Hishamuddin also declared, "Do not make fun, question and challenge the position of Malays and Islam in the country. Any movement in the name of freedom of religion, freedom of speech or freedom of the media will not be allowed to challenge our rights. If such negative efforts are not curbed, they will have a huge implication on our harmony." 10. (SBU) Taking a cue from their leader, members of UMNO Youth lashed out at other race based parties, including their Barisan Nasional coalition partners. "When we, the Malays, are weak, the Chinese will take advantage. If it is the DAP (opposition Democratic Action Party), it is ok. But when our 'roommates' are doing this to us, we can't accept it," cried a Selangor delegate, later unleashing his tirade on leaders of the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), Malaysia Chinese Association (MCA) and the Peoples Movement Party (Gerakan). "The special rights of the Malays and the position of Islam as the official religion are enshrined in the Federal Constitution. UMNO should stand firm on these issues and not back down for the sake of the Malay race. We should defend it to the last drop of our blood," said the Youth chief from Ledang. As one editorial stated, there was no denying the message to BN component parties: Don't question the position of Malays and Islam. 11. (SBU) UMNO Youth information chief, Azimi Daim, continued the rhetoric claiming he could not understand why BN component parties were becoming braver and braver in questioning sensitive issues (meaning religions preferences for Islam and bumiputra economic preferences). "When tension rises, the blood of Malay warriors will run in our veins," he warned. 12. (SBU) Racist rhetoric, however, was not restricted to the Youth wings. A delegate from Malacca bluntly stated, "UMNO is willing to risk lives and bathe in blood in defense of race and religion. Don't play with fire. If they (non-Malays) mess with our rights, we will mess with theirs," he declared. "Since the tragic racial riots in 1969, UMNO and the Malays have been too patient and tolerant," he said. "UMNO faces challenges from DAP who are Chinese chauvinists, the ignorant PAS (opposition conservative Islamic party) and threats from overseas. Friends in Barisan Nasional, too, have questioned us." Even old party veterans joined the assault on other racial groups. As one former BN Secretary General remarked, "Please don't test the Malays; they know 'amok'. We don't want to reach that level. . .but efforts to enhance the Malays' economy need to be intensified." The Malays's sacrifices, he said, must be paid back with sacrifices of the same magnitude by the non-Malays, particularly in questions involving the economy. Abdullah tries to soften the blow 13. (SBU) The deleterious effects of the harsh rhetoric and racism was not lost on UMNO leadership. This was the first year the UMNO general assembly had been televised in its entirety, and though the rhetoric was perhaps no worse than usual, public exposure seemed to certainly raise awareness. After a week of race-based politics, it was evident that many of UMNO's coalition partners were stinging from the blows they had taken. In his closing speech to the assembly on Friday evening, Abdullah focused on mending UMNO's ties to the other BN parties. He tried to soften the effect of the assembly by explaining, "Don't be frightened by the speeches made. We do things openly. When others get hit, there will be some reaction, but the situation remains under control. The heat does not burn, the anger does not lead to quarrels. We are rational, fair and want the interest of all races taken care of." 14. (C) Gerakan Vice President Vijayaretnam admitted to poloffs that there were concerns at the Gerakan grassroots over the speeches made at the assembly. However, party leaders have urged the members to look "at the bigger picture." Vijayaretnam jokingly added that people in general and Gerakan members in particular were jolted by the speeches "because of the live telecast of the conference. In normal circumstances, no one would have bothered about the assembly." 15. (SBU) Just days after the assembly concluded Deputy Prime Minister Najib announced that UMNO was considering whether to continue having live telecasts of future assemblies. Najib said it could not be denied that some of the speeches "had gone overboard." Forgetting that some of the harshest rhetoric came from senior UMNO officials, Najib conceded that "sometimes inexperienced speakers tend to get carried away by the occasion. They were playing to the gallery, but they should realize that when they speak, the others outside the party are also listening. Abdullah's son-in-law and UMNO Youth Deputy, Khairy Jamaluddin, also commented that the events at this year's assembly were not necessarily out of the ordinary, but that "those who have never seen the assembly before (were) shocked by the no holds barred debates when delegates spoke on religion and race." "While the debates were hot," he said, "the spirit of consensus in the BN will not be affected, as we are committed to it. MCA, MIC and others understand this." Comment 16. (C) The single greatest effect of this year's assembly may not be felt for over a year when Malaysians go to the polls. The racist nature of politics is nothing new to Malaysia, but unfiltered, live television brought public awareness of UMNO's internal chauvinistic rhetoric to a new height. Some ten days after UMNO's assembly, the national media continues to carry Malaysian politicians weighing in on the racial politics raised during the UMNO assembly. Even before the assembly, Chinese component parties of the Barisan Nasional coalition feared a public backlash (ref C) at the election booth. These same parties now must face their constituents and explain to a more skeptical electorate that aligning with Malay racism and a patent anti-Chinese domestic policy remains their best option. 17. (C) Despite his lack of charisma as a leader, Abdullah offered a breath of reason and moderation throughout the assembly. He reiterated the importance of tolerance and racial harmony, themes missing from so many other speeches. Softly but clearly, he criticized the Islamic ultraconservatives and warned them that their brand of Islam was out of step with his vision of Islam Hadari and incongruous with a successful multi-religious Malaysia. Although the assembly reiterated UMNO's rejection of inter-faith councils and its support for ever-expanding shariah courts, Abdullah attempted to reassure his fellow Malaysians that the country would stay on a path of moderation and harmony with its non-Muslim citizens. LAFLEUR (November 2006) |
WIKILEAKS: Anwar tells the US he has documentary evidence of Najib's corruption Posted: 23 Nov 2011 05:09 PM PST
Anwar raised as examples the alleged cover-up in the Altantuya murder case and kick-backs paid to fronts for DPM Najib Tun Razak for the procurement of French submarines and the 2003 purchase of Sukhoi aircraft. He felt emboldened to raise these matters in recent press conferences because he possessed solid information, including documentary evidence in the case of the Sukhoi deal. Much of the information about the latter cases came directly from senior officials who met with Anwar, including the Director General of at least one ministry and a senior officer at the Central Bank. THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin ![](http://img863.imageshack.us/img863/8673/wikileaksmtoday.jpg)
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHRISTOPHER J. LAFLEUR, REASON 1.4 (B AND D). Summary 1. (S) Former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, speaking with polchief January 18, amplified his recent attacks on Deputy Prime Minister Najib, alleging official cover-up of Najib's connection with the Altantuya murder case and Najib's involvement in corrupt military procurements. Anwar (protect) asserted that DPM Najib's aide-de-camp ordered the killing of Altantuya and that Anwar possessed firm evidence of the 2003 Sukhoi kick-back scheme. A January 19 court affidavit by jailed Najib confidante Razak Baginda revealed a link to Najib's ADC, allowing Anwar to sharpen his public calls for police to question the Deputy Prime Minister. Anwar expressed hope that PM Abdullah's "weakness" could allow for a somewhat fairer playing field for Malaysian opposition parties in the next national elections and asserted that opportunities for democratic reform would end if and when DPM Najib took over. Anwar now is attempting to shift his political opposition role into higher gear. At this point, however, it is not clear that Anwar has a winning game plan and his expressed electoral hopes are very modest at best. End Summary. Najib-Linked Scandals Damage Malaysia's Integrity 2. (C) Former Deputy Prime Minister and opposition politician Anwar Ibrahim, accompanied by his wife Wan Azizah, told polchief during their January 18 meeting at Anwar's Damansara home that high-level corruption had reached dangerous levels and had damaged the nation's integrity. Anwar raised as examples the alleged cover-up in the Altantuya murder case and kick-backs paid to fronts for DPM Najib Tun Razak for the procurement of French submarines and the 2003 purchase of Sukhoi aircraft. He felt emboldened to raise these matters in recent press conferences (picked up mainly by internet news services) because he possessed solid information, including documentary evidence in the case of the Sukhoi deal. Much of the information about the latter cases came directly from senior officials who met with Anwar, including the Director General of at least one ministry and a senior officer at the Central Bank. 3. (S) On the Altantuya Shaariibuu murder (see below), Anwar (protect in this paragraph) claimed that Najib had been romantically involved with the Mongolian woman prior to her relationship with Abdul Razak Baginda (Najib's confidante accused of abetting the woman's murder), and implied that Altantuya had intended to incriminate Najib as well as Razak Baginda. Leaning forward and in a hushed voice, Anwar asserted that he had firm information that Najib's aide-de-camp ordered the two members of Najib's security detail (who are charged with murder) to kill Altantuya. Based on his information, Anwar said he had called publicly for the police to question Najib. (Comment: In December we heard from one of Anwar's lawyers that Razak Baginda's wife was in contact with Anwar and Wan Azizah, suggesting one possible source for Anwar's information. End Comment.) Background on Altantuya Murder Case 4. (C) Note: In November 2006, Malaysian police arrested urbane think tank analyst Razak Baginda, a close confidante of DPM/Defense Minister Najib and a beneficiary of an enormous broker's fee for the Defense Ministry's purchase of French submarines. Police charged Razak with abetting the October 19, 2006, murder of a young Mongolian woman, Altantuya Shaariibuu, with whom he reportedly had an affair. Police also brought murder charges against two police officers assigned to the Special Operations Force that protects the Deputy Prime Minister. Publicly the case has attracted sensationalist media coverage, while privately the rumor mill has gone into overdrive fueled by speculation of Najib's possible connection to Altantuya and her murder. Perceived irregularities on the part of prosecutors and the court, and the alleged destruction of some evidence, suggested to many that the case was subject to strong political pressure intended to protect Najib. The trial phase will begin in March 2008. Razak's Affidavit Supports Anwar's Public Calls 5. (SBU) Note continued: Anwar used his January 10 press conference to urge police to question Najib, while clarifying that, "we are not inferring that (Najib) is in the know or gave the instructions (to murder Altantuya)." On January 19, Abdul Razak Baginda presented a court affidavit in support of his unsuccessful bail application. According to press accounts, Abdul Razak Baginda's affidavit confirmed that he sought the help of Musa Safri, later identified by reporters as Najib's ADC. On January 20, Anwar told a political rally, "It was clearly stated that Abdul Razak had gone to the deputy premier's office to meet with the head of Najib's bodyguards. Why can't we question this? Why can't we investigate?" Mainstream media subsequently carried articles citing the Altantuya family's lawyer asking for prosecutors to reopen the case based on new information in the affidavit. End Note. Abdullah's Weakness Creates (Limited) Political Opening 6. (C) Anwar confided to polchief that Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi's "weakness" and his inability to control fully the government, police and party apparatus could allow for a somewhat fairer playing field during the next national elections. PM Abdullah, however, had already shut down discussion of significant electoral reforms, which the Electoral Commission chairman had urged in public comments made in early January. Anwar expected the government would continue to shut off his access to the mainstream media. (Comment: There has not been a complete black-out on mainstream press coverage of Anwar; however, his activities and public remarks find rare mention in major papers, and none that we have noticed on television. End Comment.) Democratic openings and prospects for reform would end, Anwar argued, if and when the DPM replaced Abdullah, given Najib's character and his inner circle of supporters. 7. (C) Anwar's Malaysian People's Justice Party (Keadilan) and the Democratic Action Party (DAP) identified opportunities to make some electoral gains in Penang, Sabah and Selangor states in the next national election. Anwar noted that he spent a large amount of time brokering meetings between DAP and the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) in order to foster a better working relationship among these opposition parties. Given limited access to the media, Anwar stated that he had difficulties reaching rural Malay voters to explain his positions, particularly his opposition to the current Malay set-aside programs, which he believes should be based on need, not race. Polchief raised 2006 polling data that indicated a strong racial divide among young Malaysians and, when asked, Anwar did not identify any trend away from race-based politics. 8. (C) Anwar stated that he was encouraging foreign democracy NGOs to initiate activities in Malaysia in hopes their programs and presence would contribute to a freer political climate. He was reaching out to organizations from the U.S. (NDI, IRI), Europe, Turkey and Indonesia. Anwar noted, in particular, the importance of non-American groups taking up issues of democracy in Malaysia, and indicated his own desire not to become closely identified with the U.S. out of concern his opponents would use this against him. Anwar noted he would continue to engage in international meetings, but would curtail or resign from official roles in some overseas organizations to better position himself for politics in Malaysia. Expressing disappointment with the limited influence of MAFREL, an election monitoring NGO, Anwar supported efforts to stand up a more high-powered, independent election watchdog, possibly headed by noted lawyer and former UN special envoy Param Cumaraswamy (who is part of Anwar's legal team in his suit against former Prime Minister Mahathir). 9. (C) Anwar, surrounded by boxes in his home, told polchief he had sold the house in the elite Damansara neighborhood and purchased a large home in a poorer neighborhood further from the city. He implied that the reasons for the move were financial. Comment 10. (C) Due to his conviction in April 1999 for misuse of his official position, Anwar remains barred from seeking political office until April 2008. However, he now is clearly back in Malaysian politics and attempting to shift his political opposition role into higher gear after spending much of his time overseas following his 2004 prison release. Using press conferences to lob bombshells focused on Najib-linked corruption and the sensationalistic Altantuya murder case is a tactic whose impact is limited by Anwar's modest coverage in the government-dominated mainstream media but which is in keeping with the gadfly function traditionally played by the weaker Malaysian opposition parties. 11. (C) Political gossip is Malaysia's favorite indoor sport, and some here speculate that Anwar nurses bigger ambitions. Najib personifies the privileged UMNO elite into which he was born and lacks Anwar's Islamic activist credentials or personal magnetism. However, after Abdullah, UMNO currently has no serious alternative to Najib. By chipping away at Najib's reputation, Anwar could be looking to raise doubts inside UMNO about the wisdom of that succession and perhaps weaken resistance to Anwar's eventual return to the fold and perhaps even to leadership. Some speculate, too, that Abdullah is well aware of this dynamic and intends to use Anwar to keep Najib in check. However, as Anwar also continues to take pot shots as well at Abdullah, there remains uncertainty about the likelihood of real reconciliation with the PM. 12. (C) At this point, it is not clear to us that Anwar in fact has a winning game plan and his expressed electoral hopes seem very modest at best. In 2006, former Prime Minister Mahathir's challenge to PM Abdullah ironically stole much of the opposition's thunder, or at least the public's attention. With the Mahathir threat largely diffused for the time being, the field may be more open for Anwar to stake out a position as Malaysia's primary opposition voice in the year ahead. LAFLEUR (2007) |
WIKILEAKS: SCENESETTER FOR ADMIRAL ANWAR'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON Posted: 16 Nov 2011 06:12 PM PST
Another of many subjects on which Mahathir has criticized Abdullah is the growing mil-mil cooperation between the United States and Malaysia, particularly with regard to the greater frequency of high-visibility ship visits. We have been pleased by the overwhelmingly positive media coverage our ship visits have received, in contrast to the quiet arrivals of past years. The flip side to this is that our visits are getting increased attention from ideological foes on the Islamic right, and from Mahahtir's opportunistic criticism. Deputy Prime Minister Najib has stoutly defended our cooperation before Parliament, and we do not see that our engagement is under threat. However, we do need to be cognizant of our increased military visibility and sensitive to GOM concerns, particularly with high tensions in the Middle East. THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin ![](http://img863.imageshack.us/img863/8673/wikileaksmtoday.jpg)
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David B. Shear for reasons 1.4 b and d. 1. (C) Admiral Mohd Anwar Mohd Nor, Chief of Malaysian Defense Forces, will visit the U.S. from September 30 -October 12. Admiral Anwar's visit provides us with an excellent opportunity to strengthen our efforts for mil-mil cooperation, influence Malaysia's military equipment acquisitions and strengthen our overall ties with a moderate Muslim nation and economic force in Southeast Asia. 2. (C) Malaysia has been a difficult partner in the past. Malaysians nurse strong anti-colonial sentiments and (among the Malay majority) resentment over perceived ill treatment of Islam by the West. Former Prime Minister Mahathir played on these sentiments to generate political support for himself and his ambitious economic agenda. When he relinquished his post in 2003, he left behind a new economic power but also strained relations with much of the West. Today, however, Malaysia presents us with important transformational opportunities. In terms of its economic development, educational achievement, public welfare, and political stability, Malaysia stands out among Muslim-majority nations. The Malaysians project a moderate version of Islam, and, over the longer term, could lend additional support to democratic forces in the Middle East and Iraq. We also share strong common East Asian regional interests in stability and prosperity. Malaysian counter-terrorism cooperation is indispensable in defeating Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in the region. Malaysia's economy is one of the most open, diverse and well-developed economies in the Islamic world and in ASEAN. Malaysia is our tenth largest trading partner, and economic ties could strengthen further if ongoing free trade agreement talks succeed. Malaysia's Moderate Islam 3. (C) Malaysia, with its entrenched majority coalition, is hardly an ideal democracy, but it can still serve as a useful model for evolving Islamic societies elsewhere. The Malay people, long known for their tolerance, have become more conservative in recent years, but Prime Minister Abdullah has enshrined the Malay political elite's continued preference for moderation in his "Islam Hadhari" or "Civilizational Islam" policy. Abdullah's key message is that Islam can become a leading world civilization again only if it embraces economic development, education, innovation and tolerance. Malaysian Foreign Policy and US--A Mixed Bag 4. (S) Abdullah champions his vision--albeit with limited impact to date--within the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which Malaysia currently chairs. Malaysia supports Abbas, the Palestinian Authority, the MEPP roadmap, and Iraqi reconstruction. However, the Malaysian public remains highly critical of our Middle East policies, and the GOM is consistently critical of Israel, with which it has no diplomatic relations. As chairman of the OIC, Malaysia recently volunteered 1,000 troops to participate in UNIFIL. After more than a month of lobbying, and apparently without the consent of Israel, UN SYG Annan agreed to allow Malaysia to send a force of 376 soldiers to support UNIFIL. At the time of this writing, it is unclear how this issue will be resolved. 5. (S) In early September, Malaysia surrendered the chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement, and as past chair remains a member of the leadership troika. During Malaysia's tenure it championed policies which supported the NAM stance on the Iranian nuclear program, and engaged, often on overly friendly terms, with such problematic international players as Zimbabwe, Cuba and Venezuela. Abdullah hosted Hugo Chavez for a visit to Malaysia in August, and assured Venezuela of his support for election to the Latin American chair on the UN Security Council. 6. (C) As last year's ASEAN Chairman, Malaysia took great pride in hosting the first East Asia Summit last December. This summer Malaysia hosted the ASEAN Regional Forum and Ministerial Conference, attended by Secretary Rice and among others, LTG Frazier of the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The GOM backs the six-party DPRK nuclear talks and has criticized North Korea's truculence. The Malaysian government is publicly supportive of China's "peaceful rise", welcoming in particular China's growing imports of Malaysian products, despite lingering suspicions among some officials of China's long-term intentions. 7. (C) In Southeast Asia, Malaysia has played an important and constructive role. In August Malaysia completed its peacekeeping mission to East Timor following the armed uprising that led to deployment of Australian, Malaysian and Portuguese forces. The GOM has also taken the lead in the southern Philippines peace process, hosting negotiations and contributing observers to the International Monitoring Team in the southern Philippine. The Malaysians have urged the Thai government to resolve peacefully the unrest in Southern Thailand and are hopeful that the new junta will take a more conciliatory role in calming their northern border. Malaysia's recent success initiating regional aerial monitoring of the Straits of Malacca (the "Eyes in the Sky" program), has helped reduce piracy in the Straits. Malaysia is especially chagrined by Burma's intransigence because it championed Burma's entry into ASEAN. Having publicly criticized the Burmese regime, though, FM Hamid appears to be at a loss as to what to do next. Since the ASEAN Regional Forum, Malaysia has generally taken a hands-off approach. Bilateral Ties--Improving the Substance 8. (S) In our bilateral relations, the GOM has begun matching improvements in tone with improvements in substance. PM Abdullah has openly espoused improved relations with the U.S., and values the good rapport he established in his meetings with the President. In late May, A/S Hill conducted our first-ever Senior-Level Dialogue with Foreign Ministry Secretary General Rastam. In July, Secretary Rice also met with PM Abdullah, FM Hamid, and most recently, President Bush met with PM Abdullah on the sidelines of the UNGA in September. Last year the GOM acceded to our long-standing urging and signed the IAEA Additional Protocol; the Malaysians have also recently started sending observers to recent PSI exercises; and the GOM is preparing to implement an export control regime. An opening round in the FTA talks in June went well, but the second round in Washington in July was not nearly as successful. The third round has been postponed, and we are waiting for more positive overtures from the newly installed Secretary General for the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. It remains unclear if the two parties can meet the negotiation deadlines and agree to an FTA. 9. (C) Although they keep the details closely held, the GOM has been a key regional partner on counterterrorism. Early round-ups in 2001-2002 of scores of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) suspects helped ensure there have been no terrorist attacks here. However, Malaysian extremists, as illustrated by a series of recent arrests in Malaysia's Borneo states, still have the capability to support JI operations elsewhere. We and our colleagues in Manila, Jakarta and other Southeast Asian posts have embarked on a regional effort to strengthen these countries' border controls. In 2003, Malaysia established the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counterterrorism (SEARCCT), which runs a full schedule of multilateral training courses, many conducted with U.S. support. PM Abdullah's Challenges 10. (C) Prime Minister Abdullah's main priorities are sustaining growth in Malaysia's increasingly developed economy, fighting corruption and encouraging more open, collegial government. No one doubts his sincerity but his mild-mannered and cautious approach has led critics to question his leadership. Now two and one-half years into his five-year term, Abdullah has appealed to the public for patience in delivering reform. 11. (C) PM Abdullah currently faces a new problem: in April, former PM Mahathir began openly attacking his successor for failing to follow through with many of the former PM's initiatives. These attacks continued throughout the summer and will likely not subside any time soon. Mahathir can no longer dictate policy (unlike Singapore's Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew), but the old brawler continues to revel in public controversy. Abdullah has so far maintained an "elegant silence" and tasked others in the Cabinet to explain his decisions. At this point, Abdullah's still high popularity and the economy's continued solid growth should help ensure Mahathir's campaign fails. However, Mahathir's public insinuations that the PM and his supporters are "not Malay enough" may constrain the PM's public statements on foreign policy issues. 12. (C) Another of many subjects on which Mahathir has criticized Abdullah is the growing mil-mil cooperation between the United States and Malaysia, particularly with regard to the greater frequency of high-visibility ship visits. We have been pleased by the overwhelmingly positive media coverage our ship visits have received, in contrast to the quiet arrivals of past years. The flip side to this is that our visits are getting increased attention from ideological foes on the Islamic right, and from Mahahtir's opportunistic criticism. Deputy Prime Minister Najib has stoutly defended our cooperation before Parliament, and we do not see that our engagement is under threat. However, we do need to be cognizant of our increased military visibility and sensitive to GOM concerns, particularly with high tensions in the Middle East. LAFLEUR (September 2008) |
WIKILEAKS: DOWNGRADE MALAYSIA'S HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION? Posted: 15 Nov 2011 12:00 AM PST
During an accreditation review July 25, the ICC, whose secretariat is the United Nations' Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, found Malaysia's Human Rights Commission (SUHAKAM) did not comply with the Paris Principles. The Paris Principles define the international standards for an independent and effective national human rights institution. The announcement occurred as SUHAKAM prepared to host the 13th Asia Pacific Forum (APF) of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRI) from July 28 - 31. THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin ![](http://img863.imageshack.us/img863/8673/wikileaksmtoday.jpg)
Classified By: Classified By: Acting Political Section Chief William G. Gray for reasons 1.4 (b and d). SUMMARY 1. (C) Malaysia's Human Rights Commission (SUHAKAM) faces potential downgrading by the International Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (ICC) for non-compliance with the Paris Principles. If downgraded, SUHAKAM will be banned from attending the United Nations Human Rights Council Session and stripped of its full membership in the Asia Pacific Forum, the leading regional human rights organization in the Asia Pacific. The Malaysian government responded by questioning the validity of ICC's accreditation review but some local NGOs welcome the move as a wake-up call for the government to make SUHAKAM more independent and effective. Most observers believe, however, that the government is unlikely to make substantive changes to SUHAKAM, however. Post continues to engage the government and promote proactive human rights monitoring with SUHAKAM. End Summary. SUHAKAM faces downgrade by ICC 2. (U) During an accreditation review July 25, the ICC, whose secretariat is the United Nations' Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, found Malaysia's Human Rights Commission (SUHAKAM) did not comply with the Paris Principles. The Paris Principles define the international standards for an independent and effective national human rights institution. The announcement occurred as SUHAKAM prepared to host the 13th Asia Pacific Forum (APF) of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRI) from July 28 - 31. ICC Recommendations to SUHAKAM 3. (U) The ICC provided SUHAKAM with recommendations on how to comply with the Paris Principles and gave the organization one year to meet the standards. ICC recommended establishing a clear and transparent appointment and dismissal process for commissioners and increasing commissioners' tenures from the current two years. Another deficiency noted was the lack of genuine "pluralism" in the composition of SUHAKAM's commissioners. The ICC also expects SUHAKAM to increase engagement with other human rights bodies and the UN Human Rights Council. The Downgrade's Impact 4. (U) SUHAKAM's failure to comply with the ICC's recommendations will result in the ICC downgrading SUHAKAM from its current "A" status to "B." If downgraded, SUHAKAM loses its right to participate in the regular sessions of the United Nations Human Rights Council, is stripped of its full membership in the APF of NHRIs and relegated to a candidate or associate member without voting rights in the APF's decision-making body, the Forum Council. SUHAKAM and Local NGOs react 5. (U) SUHAKAM Chairman Abu Talib dismissed the ICC's view and stated the committee seems to be developing "new rules of interpretation" of the Paris Principles. He further lamented the ICC was just "relying on one Malaysian NGO's observation" in initiating the accreditation review and stressed that the Commission considers itself fully compliant with the Principles. Other SUHAKAM Commissioners followed Abu Talib's lead, but acknowledged that the nine-year-old SUHAKAM Act, which established SUHAKAM, should be amended to reflect current circumstances and provide the Commission more bite, especially for enforcing its recommendations. On July 29, Deputy Prime Minister Najib stated that any change in the SUHAKAM act giving the organization greater independence and power needed "to be studied carefully." 6. (SBU) In an immediate reaction to the ICC's review, 44 NGOs including Education and Research Association for Consumers Malaysia (ERA Consumer), the Malaysian Peoples Voice (SUARAM) (the two NGO's providing the ICC information for its report on SUHAKAM), and the Malaysian Bar Council released a joint statement urging the Malaysian government to adopt the ICC's recommendations and strengthen SUHAKAM. N. Marimuthu, President of ERA Consumer, told us the ICC's review was a "wake-up call" for SUHAKAM and the government and will embarrass the Government if SUHAKAM's status is downgraded. The NGOs found an ally when de facto Law Minister Zaid Ibrahim, one of the few voices for reform in the cabinet, advised SUHAKAM to "develop a spine." Presenting a paper at the NHRI on July 29, the Minister said SUHAKAM must be proactive, more aggressive, take a vigorous stand on issues, and not hide behind the SUHAKAM Act. (Note: SUHAKAM's Chairman sometime uses the limiting statutes of the act to justify not/not investigating alleged human rights violations in high profile cases.) The Minister also supported the ICC's recommendations, adding that the government can no longer continue to be in denial (about its responsibility to safeguard human rights). Comments 7. (C) While the ICC's announcement of SUHAKAM's possible downgrade set off alarms within the Malaysian government, the substantial reforms required to strengthen SUHAKAM's independence or broaden its jurisdiction are unlikely. When first established, the government purposely undermined SUHAKAM's ability to investigate abuses by inserting legislated limitations. For example, SUHAKAM cannot legally investigate alleged abuses if a police report is filed. Post continues to engage the government on human rights and encourage proactive human rights monitoring within SUHAKAM. KEITH (August 2008) |
WIKILEAKS: INDICTMENT OF FOUR MALAYSIAN ENTITIES AND THE ADDITION OF NINE COMPANIES AND FIVE ... Posted: 14 Nov 2011 06:22 PM PST
We believe these companies and individuals are associated with the Mayrow General Trading network and have been engaged in acquiring electronic components and devices capable of being used to construct Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), as well as other items for use in proliferation-related activities. THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin ![](http://img863.imageshack.us/img863/8673/wikileaksmtoday.jpg)
1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 5. 2. (SBU) BACKGROUND: On September 17, a federal grand jury in Miami, Florida returned a superseding indictment charging eight individuals and eight corporations, including two individuals and two corporations in Malaysia, in connection with their participation in conspiracies to export U.S. manufactured commodities to prohibited entities and to Iran. Information on this indictment was passed Septel. Additionally, on Wednesday September 17, 2008, the U.S. announced the transfer of all the existing parties on the Mayrow General Order No. 3 to the Department of Commerce Entity List. This transfer will improve the ability of exporters to screen potential recipients of items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). Also on that date, the Department of Commerce announced that a significant number of new entities identified through its Mayrow investigation will be added to the Entity List. While some of these entities and individuals are located in Iran, a number of entities are located in Malaysia. Overall, entities and individuals in 13 locations will be affected. Consistent with our nonproliferation cooperation, we seek to notify Malaysia about the details of this action, and urge Malaysia to share information with us regarding these companies/ individuals. 3. (SBU) On September 17, Acting Assistant Secretary McNerney notified Charge d'Affaires Ilango Karuppannan at the Malaysian Embassy in Washington of Commerce's actions and indicated that we would send a non-paper with additional details, which is provided in para 6. The conversation was positive, and the GOM committed to look into the matter. The Charge requested a copy of the list of companies, which ISN passed to the Malaysian Embassy. (EAP/MTS emailed this list to Embassy KL on September 17 and the same list is included in the non-paper below.) 4. (SBU) On June 5, 2006, the Department of Commerce published Mayrow General Order No. 3 imposing licensing requirements on most exports and re-exports of dual-use items to named entities. The entities named in Mayrow General Order No. 3 were all affiliated with the Mayrow Trading Network (Mayrow) in Dubai, UAE and play a vital role in buying, funding, and supplying parts and knowledge to build IEDs and other explosive devices for use in Iraq and Afghanistan. The General Order was expanded on September 6, 2006 and June 8, 2007 to cover additional entities affiliated with Mayrow Trading Inc., including two Malaysian entities. 5. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post is requested to approach appropriate host government officials to deliver the non-paper in para 6. In doing so, posts should pursue the following objectives: -- Follow-up with Malaysian officials on the publication of additional Malaysian entities (companies and individuals) affiliated with Mayrow General Trading on the Department of Commerce Entity List. -- Urge Malaysia to share any information it has with us regarding these companies/ individuals. 6. (U) Begin U.S. non-paper: -- On September 17, a federal grand jury in Miami, Florida returned an indictment charging eight individuals and eight corporations, including two individuals resident in Malaysia and two corporations in Malaysia, in connection with their participation in conspiracies to export U.S. manufactured commodities to prohibited entities and to Iran. -- In addition, on Wednesday September 17, the U.S. Department of Commerce transferred the parties currently on General Order 3 (the 'Mayrow General Order') to the Entity List. -- Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation Patricia McNerney informed your Charge, in Washington of this action. -- The Entity List is a public list of end-users that the U.S. believes pose a risk of diverting U.S.-origin goods to activities detrimental to U.S. foreign or national security interests, such as supporting terrorism or engaging in WMD-related activities. -- This list informs the public about the export license requirements to export or reexport most items subject to the Department of Commerce,s export controls to the listed entities and therefore simplifies exporter,s screening of potential customers. -- We previously informed Malaysia in 2007 that Malaysian entities, Vast Solution Sdn Bhd and Majid Seif, were added to the General Order on June 8, 2007. They will now be transferred to the Entity List. -- Also on Wednesday September 17, the United States imposed strict export licensing requirements on eight additional companies and four additional individuals in Malaysia. As a result, a U.S. license is required for the export or re-export of any U.S. origin dual-use item to these listed persons. -- We believe these companies and individuals are associated with the Mayrow General Trading network and have been engaged in acquiring electronic components and devices capable of being used to construct Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), as well as other items for use in proliferation-related activities. -- We are taking these actions because these commodities have been, and may continue to be, employed in IEDs or other explosive devices used against Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. -- U.S.-origin goods diverted to Iran via this network have included those controlled by the Commerce Department for missile technology, national security and anti-terrorism reasons, as well as those controlled under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. -- This action will affect companies and individuals in thirteen countries, not just Malaysia. We anticipate that these new requirements will have little or no bilateral trade impact. -- We encourage you to share any information you have on these companies/ individuals with us. -- We are providing you details on each of these companies and individuals for your information. -- We will provide additional information, as it becomes available. We hope that your government will take appropriate actions to curtail these proliferation activities. -- We note that having a comprehensive export control system would allow your government to better control these activities. -- Our Congress is considering draft legislation which would require that trans-shipment countries without sufficient export controls be placed in the Department of Commerce's Country Group C as a 'country of diversion concern'. This would mean more restricted high technology trade. -- We urge Malaysia to quickly enact and fully implement a comprehensive export control system. We are ready to work with you and to provide any necessary assistance. -- The following companies and individuals now appear on the revised Entity List: Entities: 1. Ace Hub System: Address: No. 15, Jalan PJS 11/16, Taman Bandar Sunway, 46150 Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia 2. Analytical Solutions: Address: #GB (Ground Floor), Pearl Tower, O.G. Heights, Jalan Awan Cina, 58200, Kuala LUmpur, Malaysia 3. Antcorp System: Address: 5-02 Wisma Pantai, Jalan Wisma Pantai, 12200 Butterworth, Penang, Malaysia 4. East Tech: Malaysia (no address available) 5. Eco Biochem SDN BHD: Address: No. 15, Jalan PJS 11/16, Taman Bandar Sunway, 46150 Petaling Jaya, Selangor D.E., Malaysia 6. Fetsco Marketing SDN BHD: Address: 97C, Jalan Kenari 23, Puchong Jaya, Puchong, Selangor, Malaysia; and Suite D23, Tkt. 2, Plaza Pekeliling, Jalan Tun Razak, Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekkutuan, Malaysia 7. Nexus Empire, a.k.a., Vast Solution: Address: 27-06, Amcorp Bldg, Jalan Persiaran Barat, Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia 8. Vast Solution Sdn Bhd: Address: 27-06 Amcorp Building, Jalan 18, Persiaran Barat, 46050 Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia 9. VTE Industrial Automation SDN BHD: Address: 97C, Jalan Kenari 23, Puchong Jaya, Puchong, Selangor, Malaysia Individuals 1. Ahmed Rahzad, a.k.a. Saeb Karim: Address: 27-06 Amcorp Building, Jalan 18, Persiaran Barat, Petaling Jaya, 46050 Selangor, Malaysia Ahmed Rahzad may be associated with Vast Solutions in Malaysia. 2. Ann Teck Tong: Address: 97C, Jalan Kenari 23, Puchong Jaya, Puchong, Selangor, Malaysia; and Suite D23, Tkt. 2, Plaza Pekeliling, Jalan Tun Razak, Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah, Persekkutuan, Malaysia Ann Teck Tong serves on the board of directors for Fetsco Marketing in Malaysia. 3. Brian Kaam, a.k.a., Keem Chee Mun: Address: No. 15, Jalan PJS 11/16, Taman Bandar Sunway, 46150 Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia Brian Kaam, a.k.a., Mr. Kaam Chee Mun, works for Ace Hub System SDN BHD and Eco Biochem SDN BHD in Malaysia. 4. Majid Seif, a.k.a., Mark Ong and Matti Chong: Address: 27-06 Amcorp Building, Jalan 18, Persiaran Barat 46050 Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia Seif was added to EAR General Order Number 3 on June 8, 2007. 5. Mohd Ansari: Address: #GB (Ground Floor), Pearl Tower, O.G. Heights, Jalan Awan Cina, 58200, Kuala Lampur, Malaysia Mohd Ansari has been identified as working for Antcorp System in Malaysia. -------------------------- REPORTING DEADLINE AND POC -------------------------- 6. (U) Post is requested to report any substantive responses within seven (7) days of receipt of this cable. Lisa Meyers (ISN/CPI, 202-736-7939 MeyersLA@state.sgov.gov) and Daniel Bischof (EAP/MTS, 202-647-4932 bischofdr@state.gov) are the Department's POCs for this activity. RICE (September 2008) |
WIKILEAKS: UMNO AND ITS COALITION IN DISARRAY AHEAD OF ANWAR'S SEPTEMBER 16 DEADLINE Posted: 13 Nov 2011 07:15 PM PST
On September 7, word leaked out that BN suddenly had organized a "compulsory" overseas study tour for all 81 parliamentary backbenchers (those who do not serve as ministers or deputy ministers) that would corral the MPs overseas from September 8 until September 17, a day after Anwar's deadline. (As of September 9, 41 MPs had departed; some MPs have refused to go citing fasting month activities with constituents.) UMNO leaders' explanations that the trip was essential for the MPs to learn about the latest agricultural techniques in Taiwan failed to convince; instead, this has appeared to most observers as a measure of desperation by a government unsure of its support. THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin ![](http://img863.imageshack.us/img863/8673/wikileaksmtoday.jpg)
Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark, reason 1.4 (b and d) Summary 1. (C) Prime Minister Abdullah and top leaders of his United Malays National Organization (UMNO) appear unnerved as they approach the September 16 deadline set by opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim for toppling Abdullah's National Front (BN) government. UMNO's disarray and the weakness of the BN coalition have been exposed in the run-up to the 16th. The strongest indications that Anwar could make good on his promise emanate from UMNO itself, including the party's public preoccupation with the question of crossovers and the seemingly desperate decision to corral BN MP's abroad so that they would be out of the country for Anwar's deadline. UMNO's lack of self-confidence reflects the party's ongoing leadership crisis and lack of faith in Abdullah, absence of a viable new vision for the party, and the further erosion of support, particularly among non-Malays, for the ruling coalition since the March election set-back. BN has frayed further along racial lines following caustic remarks about Malaysian Chinese by an UMNO division leader, who has refused Abdullah's instructions to apologize, a situation prompting an unusual warning from the Armed Force chief. The government has not stopped Anwar with charges of sodomy, while Anwar received a strong boost through his successful election to parliament last month, bringing him one step closer to his goal of becoming the next Prime Minister. 2. (C) UMNO's disarray and the exposed weakness of the BN multi-racial coalition, rather than the unlikely prospect of 30-plus crossovers by September 16, appear to be the most important story at this juncture. Along with this come renewed doubts about Prime Minister Abdullah's longevity in office and his ability to see himself through December and the UMNO elections. End Summary. Uncertain Prospects for September 16 Crossovers 3. (C) Prime Minister Abdullah and top leaders of his ruling UMNO party appear unnerved as they approach the September 16 deadline set by opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim for toppling Abdullah's National Front (BN) government. With only one week to go before the 16th (which marks the formation of modern Malaysia through the incorporation of Sabah and Sarawak, appealing to would-be defectors in those states), no MPs have confirmed publicly their intentions to switch sides, nor do we or our close partner embassies have private confirmation of defections. Anwar, who also leads the People's Justice Party (PKR), continues to intimate that crossovers will happen by September 16, or thereabouts, but his lieutenants and the leaders of his coalition parties, PAS and DAP, have hedged their comments to us and to the media. UMNO Jittery, Corrals MPs Abroad 4. (C) In the absence of concrete evidence of imminent crossovers, the strongest indications that Anwar could make good on his promise emanate from UMNO itself which seems gripped by doubt bordering on panic. PM Abdullah, Deputy PM Najib, and other top UMNO leaders have issued repeated public denials that the government would lose its parliamentary majority, or that Anwar was a verge of presenting the King (who plays a crucial constitutional role in change-of-government scenarios) with a list of cross-over supporters. On September 7, word leaked out that BN suddenly had organized a "compulsory" overseas study tour for all 81 parliamentary backbenchers (those who do not serve as ministers or deputy ministers) that would corral the MPs overseas from September 8 until September 17, a day after Anwar's deadline. (As of September 9, 41 MPs had departed; some MPs have refused to go citing fasting month activities with constituents.) UMNO leaders' explanations that the trip was essential for the MPs to learn about the latest agricultural techniques in Taiwan failed to convince; instead, this has appeared to most observers as a measure of desperation by a government unsure of its support. 5. (C) We have had private indications as well of UMNO's lack of self confidence. The British High Commissioner (protect) informed the Ambassador that he recently received a telephone call from a cabinet minister. The minister asked the British envoy whether Anwar really had sufficient numbers of MPs prepared to cross-over and bring down the government. A senior leader within the UMNO Youth division contacted us to ask what the U.S. position would be when Anwar takes over the government through "undemocratic" means. UMNO Youth subsequently called on the Bar Council and NGOs, organizations UMNO has derided in the past, to speak out against Anwar's plans. Lack of Confidence; UMNO Leadership Unresolved 6. (C) UMNO's lack of self-confidence in the face of Anwar's threats reflects the party's lack of consolidation since the March election debacle and unresolved, fundamental challenges to the party's future. First, UMNO had not yet emerged from its leadership crisis. Abdullah Badawi has remained Prime Minister and party president, not because he has rallied the confidence of UMNO leaders and the public -- he has not. By and large, UMNO members continue to view Abdullah as inadequate and weak-willed, and have provided only tepid support for Abdullah's plan to hand over power to DPM Najib in mid-2010. Abdullah essentially has remained in place because Najib, his main potential challenger, has so far been too politically vulnerable to make a move. Top-down party control mechanisms allow Abdullah to smother or shut off other challengers, and circumstances have not yet forced UMNO elites to take drastic action to force Abdullah's resignation. UMNO anxiety over Abdullah's weak leadership remains, however, and is in a large part a function of the threat to UMNO posed by Anwar, as witnessed during the immediate aftershock of the March electoral setback. The greater Anwar's threat, the more UMNO leaders are willing to consider replacing Abdullah with a stronger, more competent defender of the party. UMNO public rhetoric in early September, such as UMNO Selangor warlord Khir Toyo's public suggestion Abdullah could be eased out like Malaysia's first Prime Minister Abdul Rahman in the midst of race riots in 1969, has begun to take on the ominous tones we heard in the weeks following the March 8 election. UMNO Yet to Find Viable Model for Renewal 7. (C) UMNO's lack of confidence also grows out of its failure to reform or arrive at a viable vision for its political future. Some UMNO leaders flirted with democratic reform and good governance concepts to revive the party's image and appeal to the public, skirting closer to the Opposition platform. Such internal party consideration died out by early May, as UMNO saw that it could operate the levers of power even with a robust number of opposition seats in Parliament. PM Abdullah's announcement of a populist budget in late August also failed to give UMNO a boost or make up for politically unpopular fuel price hikes earlier in the year. To the extent that UMNO leaders have embraced a model for consolidating and energizing the party, they have fallen back on the old model of Malay chauvinism, utilizing the UMNO controlled Malay language media to warn of the Opposition's threats to the primacy of Islam and Malay privileges. Absent gross missteps by Anwar's non-Malay allies, such calls so far have had limited resonance among today's better-educated, less rural Malay population. Appeals for Malay Muslim solidarity to date also have failed to woo support from conservative PAS voters, who broadly rejected UMNO's behind the scenes overtures to select PAS leaders when these talks came to light. Increased Stress on BN's Multi-Racial Coalition 8. (C) UMNO's unresolved leadership crisis, lack of reform and resort to Malay chauvinism have had a clear negative impact on UMNO's non-Malay partners in the National Front coalition, already weakened by the exodus of non-Malay voters in the March polls. Chinese and Indian support for BN has eroded further since March, as indicated by limited polling and escalating flare-ups between UMNO hardliners and Chinese leaders in the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Gerakan party. The recent remarks by Penang UMNO division leader Ahmad Ismail, referring to Chinese citizens as "squatters", has touched off the most serious inter-racial feuding within BN, with MCA and Gerakan raising questions about their future within UMNO. Abdullah Struggles to Contain Inter-Racial Feud 9. (C) Abdullah thus far has not succeeded in controlling the Ahmad Ismail situation; Abdullah delegated an apology via DPM Najib, but Ahmad Ismail refused the party president's instructions to back down, providing a rebuke to Abdullah's leadership. MCA and Gerakan announced on September 8 they had broken relations with UMNO within Penang state. Abdullah reportedly will use the BN's September 9 leadership to try to end BN's current inter-racial feud and repair relations with MCA in particular. Prior to the meeting, Armed Force Chief Abdul Aziz remarked to an UMNO gathering that the government must act sternly against those who could provoke racial conflict, an unusual statement from the military that normally refrains from such comments and which in the local context may be taken as a warning to non-Malays. While UMNO could succeed in patching up this immediate issue, UMNO's continued emphasis on ultra-Malay rhetoric guarantees growing strains with MCA and other BN partners, including those in East Malaysia. Anwar Buoyed by Election 10. (C) While UMNO and BN struggle internally, Anwar Ibrahim received a major boost with his late August election to Parliament which made him Opposition leader in Parliament and brought him one necessary step closer to becoming the next Prime Minister (only MPs may become Prime Minister). Anwar's victory in the Penang by-election in his home district was never in serious doubt, but the huge margin of his victory, exceeding that of his wife in March, was grim news to Abdullah and UMNO, setting off renewed calls within UMNO for Abdullah to step down quickly. Since then, Anwar and his PKR lieutenants have tried to press their advantage by reaffirming that they have over 30 MPs ready to cross over, even while some have downplayed the significance of the September 16 deadline. Anwar countered Abdullah's populist budget with his own economic vision. As BN's racial problems deepened, he Opposition alliance (Pakatan) on September 8 sought political advantage by issuing a statement condemning UMNO's Ahmad Ismail and other UMNO leaders for racially charged rhetoric while affirming Pakatan's adherence to the Constitution's provisions for Islam and Malay prerogatives. Sodomy Trial Pending; the Temptation to Deny Bail 11. (C) The government's pursuit of sodomy charges against Anwar has not derailed the Opposition leader, but conversely has generated some sympathy for Anwar as a victim of persecution among the majority of the population who view the charges as politically motivated. Anwar's continued bail and freedom of movement, pending the outcome of the trial which may consume many months, is a critical matter for the Opposition; Anwar in jail could not hope to negotiate crossovers and the formation of a new government, a role that only he can play at this juncture. Although the government so far has not pressed for Anwar's detention during the trial, and has made arguments for revocation of bail less credible by granting police bail in July and not challenging bail when Anwar was charged with the crime in August, UMNO leaders could be sorely tempted to revisit the question. Detaining Anwar would be one way to try to put an end the cross-over threat, though such a move would entail costs including in the realm of public opinion. (Note: Anwar will appear in court tomorrow, September 10; PKR supporters currently are speaking about the possible denial of bail, while the authorities are warning against disruptions at the court venue. End Note.) Comment 12. (C) We believe the odds are against Anwar getting the necessary 30 or more crossovers to bring down the government in one week's time, despite UMNO's evident insecurity. Many MPs will want to be assured they are joining the winning side and not exposing themselves to excessive risk; the crossing over of parties, rather than individuals, would provide more security in this regard. Parties also bring with them more bargaining power to a new coalition. Aside from a few micro-parties, like SAPP in Sabah, there is little indication Anwar has sealed such party deals. The Opposition also recognizes a risk if too many non-Malays join their ranks without a number of Malays in the mix, as this would feed immediately into UMNO's claims that the Opposition threatens Malay interests and Islam. 13. (C) It is plausible that Anwar arranges for some MPs to crossover on or by September 16, preserving the credibility of his threat and giving him a basis for arguing that it is only a matter of time. If no one jumps by September 16, Anwar's arguments will be harder to make, and he may lose the momentum he currently enjoys from his recent election to Parliament. Nevertheless, Anwar has committed himself to the project of bringing down the UMNO/BN government through crossovers, rather than waiting for another national election in three or four years time. September 16 will not be the end of Anwar's push. 14. (C) UMNO's disarray and the exposed weakness of the BN multi-racial coalition, rather than the prospect of September 16 crossovers, appears to be the most important story at this specific juncture. Crossover panic represents a symptom of UMNO's predicament more so than a reflection of Anwar's strength. Along with this come renewed doubts about Prime Minister Abdullah's longevity in office and his ability to see himself through December and the UMNO elections. As collateral damage from UMNO's leadership struggle and preoccupation with warding off Anwar, we can expect government policy-making to continue at best in an ad hoc fashion when it is not paralyzed altogether. Attention to foreign policy will take a distant back seat unless it is linked to political survival at home. KEITH (September 2008) |
WIKILEAKS: SABAH DEPORTATIONS A POLITICAL BAND-AID Posted: 09 Nov 2011 12:00 AM PST
A retired senior intelligence official frankly admitted to us earlier this year that the previous government of Mahathir also facilitated illegal immigration from Indonesia and the Philippines in order to better balance the state's ethnic and religious equation as a measure to ward off any future separatist sentiments in Sabah, in addition to attracting UMNO votes needed to control the state. A Royal Commission, operated properly, would likely expose the depth of UMNO and BN's political corruption and vote manipulation, further inciting Sabahans. THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin ![](http://img863.imageshack.us/img863/8673/wikileaksmtoday.jpg)
Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark Clark for reasons 1.4 (b and d). Summary 1. (C) Residents of Malaysia's Sabah state, in northeast Borneo, are dismissive of the Government's latest "crackdown" against illegal immigrants. The federal government launched the campaign as a measure to meet demands by Sabah politicians who are being wooed to shift their support to the opposition led by Anwar Ibrahim. The deportation campaign, which has by-passed factories and plantations that depend on migrant workers, is widely perceived as "lip service" and a "political exercise" not meant to solve the problem. Most observers believe that any truly effective operation to expel illegals would damage the state's economy, which is highly dependent on cheap migrant labor. Local politicians are critical of the crackdown and questioned the federal government's motives. A call for a Royal Commission of Inquiry to probe the causes of the massive illegal migration is unlikely to gain traction as such a commission could expose current and Mahathir-era politicians' efforts to manipulate votes and change the state's ethnic balance by illegitimately providing Malaysian papers to illegal immigrants. End Summary. Deportations a "Political Band-aid" 2. (C) The Government of Malaysia (GOM) announced in July it would undertake a campaign of mass deportations of illegal immigrants in the East Malaysian state of Sabah, the latest in a series of such campaigns launched every three or four years. The embattled government of Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi took this decision against the backdrop of possible defections by Sabah MPs to the opposition led by Anwar Ibrahim. Many Sabah politicians, and the indigenous population, rate illegal immigration as the state's foremost problem and blame the federal government for both facilitating illegal migrants and failing to take corrective action. Using their new-found role as possible swing votes in the national Parliament, Sabah politicians have put immigration enforcement high on their list of demands. 3. (C) Simon Sipaun, Vice-chairman of Malaysia's Human Rights Commission (SUHAKAM) told Emboff he estimates 1.9 million illegal and/or undocumented people live in Sabah, higher than the GOM's official number of 240,000. The GOM announced plans to deport 100,000 - 150,000 persons, and allocated 50 million ringgit (an estimated 15,625,000 USD) to fund the operation. Local observers in Sabah told Poloff that the crackdown's accomplishments were minimal as of mid-August. Authorities screened 19,686 persons from August 1-17 of which only 2,697 were detained and sent to immigration detention centers. The government also instituted a three-month grace period to allow local businesses in Sabah to register and by doing so legalize their undocumented employees. 4. (C) Muhammad Radzi Jamaludin, Principal Assistant Secretary in the MFA Southeast Asia Division, conceded to Poloff recently that many Filipinos were returning only a couple weeks after their deportations. He said some stay an additional week in the Philippines "on vacation" in their home villages prior to returning. According to Radzi, another unexpected wrinkle was that some Malaysians (all women) are falsely claiming Filipino citizenship and upon reaching the Philippines announced their Malaysian citizenship and said they desired to stay with their spouses, who were being deported. He added that the majority of Filipinos in Sabah entered legally, but overstay their visas. Malaysia's Immigration Department is reportedly recording biometrics of deportees to identify those who attempt to re-enter. On August 29, Ramlan Ibrahim, Undersecretary for Southeast Asia in the Foreign Affairs Ministry told poloff and Staffdel Luse that all deportations were being conducted humanely and were targeting only the able-bodied. Public and Observers not Impressed 5. (C) New Straits Times journalist Jaswendar Kaur told Poloff that authorities were selective in rounding up illegal immigrants. The focus of the sweeps centered on shantytowns and bypassed plantations and factories, whose owners are politically well-connected. Manufacturing associations dependent upon foreign labor were approaching the government, arguing that mass deportations would adversely affect factory operations. Kaur saw little difference in current deportation efforts from prior crackdowns. Emboff was in Sabah from August 18-22 and discussed the deportation operation in casual conversations with local Sabahans. No one expressed any particular excitement about the operation. Such government efforts occur every four-five years and most Sabahans had a "we've seen it all before" attitude. Sabah BN Politicians Skeptical 6. (C) Yong Tek Lee, former Chief Minister and President of the Sabah Progressive Party (SAPP) who has called for the Prime Minister's resignation (ref B), met with Emboff on August 21. In his view, if the government were serious about tackling the illegal immigrant issue, it would commit more than 50 million ringgit. He viewed the deportations as little more than lip service to the concerns of Sabahans. He maintained that the ruling National Front (BN) government spent more on the recent Permatang Pauh by-election (ref A) than in trying to control illegal immigration in Sabah. Several Sabahans interviewed by Emboff expressed similar opinions. Bernard Dompok, Minister in the Prime Minister's Office, told us he wanted a Royal Commission of Inquiry to investigate who is supplying illegal immigrants in Sabah with Malaysian documents such as identity cards. Otherwise, he believes, any crackdown will be ineffective. COMMENT 7. (C) Sabahans consider illegal immigration a major concern, even though important segments of the state's economy are highly dependent on cheap migrant labor. Many view illegal immigrants, especially Filipino Muslims, as upsetting the political balance in Sabah, whose native majority is Catholic. The lack of enthusiasm among Sabahans for the current illegal immigrant crackdown illustrates the overall mistrust of the BN government and its peninsula-centric policies. The crackdown to date is selective and explicitly avoids raids on key areas of migrant employment, such as manufacturing, logging, palm oil plantations, and service industries, which could be forced to curtail operations without their illegal migrant workers. Sabahans see the immigrants being deported as "low hanging fruit," enabling authorities to demonstrate that they are "doing something" about the problem. According to Jaswendar, a previous short-lived crackdown that proved too effective in detaining illegal immigrants was stopped after local business leaders complained and the police official who planned the operation was punished and transferred. 8. (C) Dompok's desire for a Royal Commission is likely to remain unfulfilled. The central government and the leading UMNO party for many years facilitated issuance of Malaysian documents to illegal immigrants in exchange for their political support. A retired senior intelligence official frankly admitted to us earlier this year that the previous government of Mahathir also facilitated illegal immigration from Indonesia and the Philippines in order to better balance the state's ethnic and religious equation as a measure to ward off any future separatist sentiments in Sabah, in addition to attracting UMNO votes needed to control the state. A Royal Commission, operated properly, would likely expose the depth of UMNO and BN's political corruption and vote manipulation, further inciting Sabahans. KEITH (September 2008) |