Khamis, 18 Ogos 2011

Malaysia Today - Your Source of Independent News

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Malaysia Today - Your Source of Independent News


Now the picture becomes clearer

Posted: 17 Aug 2011 03:55 PM PDT

The BBC researches many different stories, it is the normal process of news and current affairs throughout the media that not all make it to air for a variety of editorial reasons. The suggestion that the item was dropped due to political pressure is untrue. All BBC programmes adhere to the same strict editorial guidelines which ensure complete editorial independence and impartiality. -- BBC, 1st September 2010

NO HOLDS BARRED

Raja Petra Kamarudin

Fraudulent PR campaign blows up in M'sia's face

(Free Malaysia Today) - British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) has suspended all programming from the London-based FBC Media after it was 'confirmed' that the TV production company had received payment to produce and air, as genuine content, at least four documentaries on Malaysia's palm oil industry and its 'treatment of the rainforest and indigenous people'.

BBC in a statement to UK's prestigious daily The Independent yesterday said that "FBC has now admitted to the BBC that it has worked for the Malaysian government".

"That information was not disclosed to the BBC as we believe it should have been when the BBC contracted programming from FBC.

"Given this, the BBC has decided to transmit no more programming from FBC while it reviews its relationship with the company."

READ MORE HERE

***************************************************


The BBC researches many different stories, it is the normal process of news and current affairs throughout the media that not all make it to air for a variety of editorial reasons.

In this case, it became clear in our research that any comprehensive interview with former Malaysia Today Editor Raja Petra Kamarudin would prominently feature issues that are currently the subject of a current court case in Malaysia, which raise issues of defamation.

The suggestion that the item was dropped due to political pressure is untrue. All BBC programmes adhere to the same strict editorial guidelines which ensure complete editorial independence and impartiality.

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Malaysia Today - Your Source of Independent News

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WIKILEAKS: MALAYSIA’S CHINESE MINORITY: THE POLITICS OF MARGINALIZATION

Posted: 18 Aug 2011 01:00 AM PDT

Nevertheless, Chinese voters have poor alternatives. DAP and KeADILan are not sufficiently organized to provide a real alternative to BN, particularly given the disproportionate powers wielded by the UMNO-led coalition. The Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party (PAS), the strongest Malay-based opposition party, holds no appeal for the Chinese electorate. Without better alternatives, MCA and Gerakan will not lose their dominance of the Chinese vote.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KUALA LUMPUR 001975

 

SIPDIS

 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2016

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, MY

SUBJECT: MALAYSIA'S CHINESE MINORITY:  THE POLITICS OF MARGINALIZATION

 

REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 942

     B. KUALA LUMPUR 1935

     C. KUALA LUMPUR 1942

     D. KUALA LUMPUR 1913

 

Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

 

Summary

1.  (C) Malaysia's Chinese minority struggles to find new footing in national politics.  In September Singapore's Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew ignited a nation-wide debate on the marginalization of Malaysia's Chinese minority. 

Leaders from across the Chinese political spectrum agreed, at least privately, with LKY's conclusion and confided that most Chinese Malaysians feel marginalized by the United Malays National Organization (UMNO)'s race-based, Bumiputera policies. 

As the Chinese community grows restless, Chinese parties of the UMNO-led National Coalition (Barisan Nasional, BN) fear losses to opposition parties in the next general election.  The People's Movement Party (Gerakan) faces change at the top and candidates have begun to vie for the coveted chief minister's job in Penang. 

Many Chinese have questioned their own leaders after Prime Minister Abdullah humiliated current Penang Chief Minister and claimed the Gerakan-led state government is marginalizing ethnic Malays in Penang.

The Democratic Action Party (DAP) stands to gain Chinese votes, but remains unorganized and ill-prepared to capitalize on Chinese discontent.  Opposition parties in general fail to present a valid alternative to the BN.  A think tank report on Bumiputeras' economic share created another rallying point for the Chinese community's expressions of marginalization.

While post-Mahathir political openings allow Chinese political discontent to bubble to the surface, ethnic Chinese voters appear to have no realistic alternatives.  End Summary.

Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew Ignites a Fire

2.  (SBU) In September, Singapore's Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew ignited a political firestorm when he commented during a seminar that Singapore's neighbors, Malaysia and Indonesia, systematically marginalized their Chinese minorities.  Cries of outrage were heard from Malaysia's ethnic Malay leaders.

Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi publicly demanded an apology from Lee, and the two exchanged highly-publicized letters demanding and feigning apology.  Dozens of senior Malay officials derided Lee for his comments and a few Chinese members of the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition government came to the defense of GoM and denied there was any systematic marginalization of Malaysia's minorities. 

But most Chinese Malaysians agreed with Lee, and Chinese politicians that denied the accusation are now viewed with growing disdain.

MCA admits marginalization and fears backlash

3.  (C) Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) Vice President Ong Tee Keat, who also serves as the Deputy Minister of Higher Education, was one of the few ministerial level Chinese politicians who refused to deny publicly or privately the fact that Chinese Malaysians are marginalized. 

In a private meeting with poloff Ong commented that although Chinese leaders from MCA and the People's Movement Party (Gerakan) were bound to support government (i.e. UMNO) positions, their Chinese constituents were not satisfied with their responses.  Ong commented that in cases such as this, "silence is sometimes our only valid response."  But he acknowledged, "of course we are marginalized, big business to small stall owners know that -- but MCA cannot admit it." 

So when pressed by reporters for a public response to Lee's accusation, Ong related an old Chinese proverb -- "Whether the water in the tea cup is hot or cold, he who drinks it knows best."

4.  (C) According to Ong, MCA will face its greatest electoral challenge ever in the next two years.  In his opinion, there was great dissatisfaction with the status quo in the Chinese community that was only partially seen in the Sarawak elections when the opposition Democratic Action Party (DAP) won six seats (Ref A).

"Sarawak was a wake-up call for all Chinese parties," Ong told poloff.  MCA and Gerakan have studied the results of the Sarawak elections, but are not sure they can counter the growing discontent in their communities.  The Chinese component parties of BN no longer have community focused development projects to show their constituents, as these have all been redirected to Malay communities. 

"There was once a day in Malaysia when MCA would get the left-overs, but now we are just hoping to get some crumbs from the UMNO table," said Ong.  Ong admitted that an example of only getting the crumbs could be seen in the Ninth Malaysia plan wherein the government planned for the construction of 180 new elementary and secondary schools, none of which would be vernacular schools for either the Chinese or Indian communities. 

Only after loud outcries from the Chinese community did the Ministry of Education "cave in" and announce that two of the 180 schools would be designated as Chinese vernacular schools.  Again, MCA could not provide a proportional voice for the Chinese minority, and Ong believed the community took note.

Prime Minister claims Malays marginalized in Penang

5.  (C) In an ironic exercise in hypocrisy and political expediency prior to the UMNO district meetings in September, Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi echoed the earlier remarks of his son in law, Khairy Jamaluddin, and publicly charged Penang's Chief Minister Dr. Koh Tsu Koon, with systematically marginalizing the ethnic Malays of Penang. 

Penang is Malaysia's only Chinese majority state (but only by a razor thin margin) and is led by BN coalition partner Gerakan.

Despite the conflict resolution principles touted by the Barisan Nasional, at an UMNO divisional meeting in Penang, Abdullah publicly chided Koh and demanded immediate action to address the needs of the marginalized Malay community.

Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak later called for the Penang Chief Minister to more equally divide his executive powers with the Malay deputy chief minister, while federal Education Minister Hishamuddin Tun Hussein demanded Koh take unconditional immediate action to address the needs of the Malay community in Penang.  According to sources who attended the meeting, Koh was dumbfounded and unprepared to respond to the Prime Minister's accusations. 

Penang State Executive Councillor Dr. Toh Kin Woon later admitted in a private meeting with poloff that the PM thoroughly humiliated Koh, and although Malays in Penang have a higher per capita income than Malays in many other states, Koh was unprepared and unable to respond. 

Gerakan Central Committee member, Lee Kah Choon, stated to poloff that Koh was viewed by the whole Chinese community as weak:  "it is just his personality, and everyone comes to expect it."  It was this type of weakness, opined Toh, that places BN's Chinese component parties in danger of losing ground to DAP or the People's Justice Party (KeADILan) in more mixed districts. 

(Comment:  Chief Minister Koh is an intellectual, who holds a doctorate in physics from Princeton.  His technocratic style makes him popular with corporate leaders, who appreciate his business friendly approach to governing, but is ill-suited to the cut-and-thrust of party politics.  End Comment.)

Gerakan plans for leadership change

6.  (SBU) Koh, who in addition to duties as the Chief Minister of Penang is also Deputy President of Gerakan, is expected to become the Gerakan president in April 2007 when current president Dr. Lim Keng Yaik steps down.  Koh's elevation to party head will likely mean he will move from state politics to a federal ministerial position, and several Gerakan politicians are already jockeying for the anticipated vacancy as Penang Chief Minister. 

The three front runners for the job in Penang are currently Lee Kah Choon, Gerakan Deputy Secretary General and Parliamentary Secretary for the Ministry of Health; Dr. Teng Hock Nan, Gerakan Vice President; and Chia Kwang Chye, Gerakan Party Secretary General.

7.  (C) In a separate meeting with poloff, Lee Kah Choon admitted that, like MCA, Gerakan too would face a strong political challenge in the next general election, as they have not been able to overcome the perception that the Chinese community is continually discriminated against by the Malay majority government. 

Lee's only hope was that DAP "would continue to run dishwashers and truck drivers" for state and federal parliamentary seats, and thus would remain uncompetitive in the general elections in Penang. 

In another meeting, Dr. Toh Kin Woon lamented that UMNO was resorting to "blatant racist tactics that Malaysia has not seen since the late 1980s."  He attributed the rise in UMNO's racist rhetoric to PM Abdullah's weakness as a leader. 

"Malaysians need a strong leader who knows when to be ruthless.  Mahathir knew how to be ruthless, but he became cruel, and that's when he lost respect.  Abdullah is not cruel, but neither is he ruthless when he needs to be.  He is just weak; so he resorts to racist tactics to hold on to the majority Malays." 

He faulted Koh for not standing up to Abdullah regarding his accusations of the Chinese marginalizing ethnic Malays in Penang, and opined that such weakness in the party opened the door for the opposition to make significant gains in then next general election.

The Democratic Action Party lacks a national strategy

8.  (C) Notwithstanding their successes in the Sarawak elections (ref A), DAP has not yet formulated a national campaign strategy aimed at capitalizing on the growing discontent in the Chinese community (also see ref B). 

In Penang, Member of Parliament Chow Kon Yeow (DAP - Tanjong) admitted to poloff that his party traditionally has had very little success in recruiting high caliber candidates for parliamentary elections.  Such past failures have influenced the party's motivation to recruit more viable and electable candidates. 

According to Chow, DAP often struggled with supporting issues germane to the Chinese community, such as promoting vernacular schools, and therefore, at times seems to alienate itself from its natural voting base.  Chow indicated that DAP's current plan was to continue to run young party activists who had previously contested elections in Penang and hope that discontent with BN policies would draw voters to vote merely for the party rather than the quality of the candidate. 

Since many of the seats in Penang currently are held by third term parliamentarians, term limit laws prevent the incumbents from seeking re-election.  DAP hoped for a more level playing field if their candidates were not battling incumbents, Chow said, and thus anticipated better electoral results in Penang and other metropolitan areas of the country where Chinese voters are concentrated.

9.  (U) DAP Secretary General Lim Guan Eng has completed his term of exclusion following his conviction under the publications act, and DAP insiders expected him to contest for another seat in parliament in the next election. 

Lim and his wife have fallen out of favor with party members in Melaka, so Lim likely would challenge a seat in Penang or in Kuala Lumpur.  Such mobility is common among Chinese candidates, and due to his relative popularity, party officials were quite optimistic of Lim's election and ability to join his father Lim Kit Siang as a leader in the opposition.

Bumiputera Equity:  Chinese cry foul

10.  (SBU) The GOM's negative reaction to the recent public release of the Asian Strategy and Leadership Institute (ASLI)'s analysis of bumiputera equity in the marketplace has stoked the fires of Chinese discontent (Ref C).  With characteristic cries of sedition for daring to challenge government statistics, ethnic Malay politicians, including PM Abdullah and DPM Najib have done all in their power to discredit the ASLI report. 

Despite pressuring the Malay president of ASLI, Mirzan Mahathir, to retract the report, the Prime Minister and UMNO have not been able to quiet the discussion of bumiputera equity and their race-based policies aimed at perpetually increasing Malay market share.

(Comment:  Mirzan Mahathir is the son of former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad.  Ironically, the elder Mahathir and his two sons, Mirzan and Mukhriz, continue to publicly champion bumiputera set-asides, leading one to question the possible political maneuvers behind the release of the ASLI report.  End Comment.)

11. (SBU) Perhaps emboldened by his announcement that he will retire as Gerakan president in April 2007, Dr. Lim Keng Yaik, Minister of Energy, Water and Communications, stepped forward to challenge the government to release its statistics and explain how Bumiputera equity is only 18.9 percent rather than the 45 percent ASLI found. 

DPM Najib replied that the GoM can certainly release its methodology for its more "exhaustive study" and that Lim should not imply that the government is not transparent.  Despite Najib's remarks, the GoM has not released its methodology, and UMNO continues to hope that this issue will die a quick and quiet death.

Chinese politicians and activists, however, do not yet seem willing to let the issue die, and although the study reiterates what many Chinese have long believed, it now gives quantifiable evidence to support their feelings of discrimination.

Comment

12.  (C) The increasingly strong Islamic identity of the dominant Malay population has a natural corollary -- an increase in race based politics.  As Chinese sensitivities heighten regarding Malay-centric policies, discontent with the status quo grows.  Of note, political openings in the post-Mahathir era have allowed greater public airing of such discontent, albeit with limits. 

Abdullah's inability to shut down the divisive debate stands in stark contrast to Mahathir's firm control.  Comprising 25 percent of the total population, ethnic Chinese Malaysians have the most to lose of all the minority groups from the Bumiputera policies aimed at ever increasing Malay equity in the marketplace, often at the expense of Chinese equity.

While no one is yet predicting the collapse of the coalition Barisan Nasional, growing discontent in the Chinese community has led many political pundits to forecast that many Chinese will abandon MCA and Gerakan and vote for DAP in the next election.  We anticipate the next general election will be held in the fourth quarter of 2007 or first quarter of 2008, and although UMNO is not in danger of losing significant numbers of votes, Chinese component parties fear they will take a hit.

Nevertheless, Chinese voters have poor alternatives.  DAP and KeADILan are not sufficiently organized to provide a real alternative to BN, particularly given the disproportionate powers wielded by the UMNO-led coalition.  The Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party (PAS), the strongest Malay-based opposition party, holds no appeal for the Chinese electorate.  Without better alternatives, MCA and Gerakan will not lose their dominance of the Chinese vote.

LAFLEUR

 

Do you know what we are fighting for?

Posted: 17 Aug 2011 06:14 PM PDT

Those are just some of the issues from my end. I am sure the committee will come out with more. One more issue that could be considered would be, just like for Senators, you can only serve a maximum of TWO terms. If Senators can only serve for two terms then why can't Members of Parliament and State Assemblypersons also do the same? Why do Members of Parliament and State Assemblypersons serve for life while Senators can only serve for two terms?

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

(New Straits Times) - The parliamentary select committee on electoral reforms will be headed by a minister with eight members of parliament, including from the opposition and an independent.

Minister in the Prime Minister's Department, Datuk Seri Mohd Nazri Abdul Aziz, said the formation of the committee was approved by the cabinet yesterday and a motion on it would be tabled at the next parliamentary session in October.

The committee will have five representatives from Barisan Nasional, three from the opposition and one independent.

Nazri said the cabinet also agreed to meet with the Election Commission soon to discuss the framework of the committee.

Read more: 9 to sit on polls panel http://www.nst.com.my/articles/9tositonpollspanel/Article/

*************************************

Probably 50,000 or so Malaysians came out for the BERSIH march on 9th July 2011. There were marches simultaneously organised all over the world in more than 30 cities. And the reason you marched is because you want to see electoral reforms.

But are you clear on exactly what type of reforms you would like to see? If you were asked to deliver a talk on electoral reforms would you know what to say? Well, maybe we can discuss that matter today.

1. The first issue would be regarding disenfranchised voters.

About one million or so Malaysians live outside Malaysia, according to what the Minister told Parliament. But most of these one million Malaysians can't vote during the general elections.

If you were to look at Article 119 of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia (below), you can see that there is a provision in the Constitution for overseas Malaysians to vote (or, if not so resident, is an absent voter). These overseas Malaysians would be regarded as 'absent voter'. 

So this is the first reform we need: to ensure the right of overseas Malaysians to vote.

2. Next would be the variance between seats.

Currently, the differential between Parliament seats is as low as 5,000 voters to as high as 125,000. This variance is too large. The variance should be not more than 20% plus-minus (or even 15% if possible, which would be better).

That means we need to set the 'benchmark' for each Parliament seat. For example, if the benchmark is fixed at 50,000 voters, then each Parliament seat should be between 40,000 to 60,000 voters (to achieve the 20% plus-minus variance).

For state seats the benchmark would, of course, be lower. If it is going to be 50,000 voters for Parliament seats, then for state seats it can be 20,000-25,000 voters.

Now, assuming we have a total of 15 million registered voters and the benchmark for Parliament seats is 50,000, this would mean we would have 300 Members of Parliament. If this is too many then the benchmark can be increased to 60,000 voters. Then the number of Members of Parliament would be reduced to 250 (from the current 222) -- or 65,000 voters if you want it to be reduced further to 230 Members of Parliament.

Anyway, this is for the committee to decide. The important thing, however, is that there must be a variance of 20% to 25%, plus-minus, between the Parliament seats. We can't have one seat as low as 5,000 voters and another as high as 125,000 voters. This is just not on.

And if the state seats are half the number of voters for Parliament seats, then we will have two state seats in one Parliament constituency and twice the number of State Assemblypersons as there are Parliamentarians.

3. Third would be the voting age.

Currently, you can own a gun, get married, drive a car, work, get hanged for the crime of murder/drugs, etc., at 18 (and ride a bike at 16). But you can't vote at 18.

Imagine that! The government treats you like an adult and takes your life at 18. But the government will not allow you to vote. The government trusts you enough to drive a car and raise a family at 18. But the government does not trust you to vote.

The voting age needs to be 18 and not 21. If you can hang an 18-year old Malaysian, then he or she certainly has a right to vote at that age. If an 18-year old is old enough to have a wife/husband and children, then he or she is certainly old enough to vote.

4. The other issues, of course, involve gerrymandering (which will be addressed once we address the issue of the variance between seats), fraud (which needs to be addressed through some detection method so that people can't vote more than once), postal votes (postal voting should be your choice like in the UK and not by compulsion like in Malaysia), etc.

5. Another issue I would like to see addressed is compulsory voting.

A law should be passed to make it compulsory for all citizens to vote. If you do not vote then the government should impose a RM1,000 fine on these people.

Australia has this system.

Furthermore, when you apply for a loan, credit card, hire purchase finance, electricity/water supply, telephone/internet, and so on, two documents need to be produced. One would be your identity card and the other your voter registration slip.

In short, if you do not have BOTH an identity card and a voter registration slip then you do not exist. You are a 'ghost'. You can't get a loan, credit card, electricity/water supply, telephone/internet, and so on.

Your proof of address and your proof of existence will be in both your identity card and voter registration slip. If you do not have an identity card PLUS a voter registration slip then you are not a Malaysian. In fact, you are not even a person. You just do not exist.

6. Those are just some of the issues from my end. I am sure the committee will come out with more. One more issue that could be considered would be, just like for Senators, you can only serve a maximum of TWO terms. If Senators can only serve for two terms then why can't Members of Parliament and State Assemblypersons also do the same? Why do Members of Parliament and State Assemblypersons serve for life while Senators can only serve for two terms?

If we impose a two-term rule for Members of Parliament and State Assemblypersons, this will ensure that the old cocks and old hags will be retired to make way for fresh meat.

7. Oh, and one last thing, are we brave enough to follow the example of some other countries and make it law that not less than 30% of the candidates contesting the election must be women?

Yes, in some countries this is law (I think Sweden is one such country). And since more than 52% of Malaysian voters are women (yes, only 48% men vote) why should the candidates not, by law, be not less than 30% women? 

*************************************

Article 119 of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia

 (1) Every citizen who -

 (a) has attained the age of twenty-one years on the qualifying date; and

 (b) is resident in a constituency on such qualifying date or, if not so resident, is an absent voter,

is entitled to vote in that constituency in any election to the House of Representatives or the Legislative Assembly unless he is disqualified under Clause (3) or under any law relating to offences committed in connection with elections; but no person shall in the same election vote in more than one constituency.

 

WIKILEAKS: SABAH: POROUS BORDERS; PROBLEMS WITH FOREIGNERS; UNHAPPY UMNO COALITION PARTNER ...

Posted: 16 Aug 2011 01:00 AM PDT

Two PBS state assemblymen, Ching Eng Leong and Samson Chin Chee Tsu, told us on October 4 that former PM Mahathir began the initiative prior to the 1994 state assembly election, in order to ensure UMNO's political takeover of Sabah. UMNO's control was further solidified during the 1999 state election, as UMNO granted more foreigners citizenship and voting rights under what came to be known as "Project Mahathir." 

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUALA LUMPUR 001948

SIPDIS

 

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, DS/ATA AND DS/IP/ITA

 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2016

TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PGOV, PINR, KDEM, KISL, SMIG, ASEC, MY

 

SUBJECT: SABAH: POROUS BORDERS; PROBLEMS WITH FOREIGNERS; UNHAPPY UMNO COALITION PARTNER

 

REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 1862

     B. KUALA LUMPUR 1935

 

Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b , d).

 

Summary

1. (C) The police, political leaders, a human rights official in the East Malaysia state of Sabah recently expressed their concerns to us about rising crime and the security impact from the high number of foreigners - both legal and illegal - residing in the state.  Sabah's Acting Police Commissioner said illegal migrants and other foreigners committed three out of four violent crimes in the state, but he did not address terrorist threats or transnational crime syndicates.

On other issues, a Sabah state minister from Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi's political party, UMNO, criticized the PM's intellectual capacity and said the PM's inner circle gives him "bad advice."  The minister predicted the UMNO national assembly in November would be "a timid affair."  One of the 16 commissioners from Malaysia's government-funded national human rights commission (Suhakam) told us the government views Suhakam as "a pest." 

Seconding other comments from the Suhakam commissioner about the large influx of foreigners into Sabah, two state assemblymen expressed trepidation about the state's security situation.  The pending U.S. Border Control Assessment Initiative (ref A) will assist our efforts to better understand the security ramifications of Sabah's porous borders and identify ways the U.S. can assist.  End Summary.

Police Face Challenges from Criminals - And Parliament

2. (C) Sabah's Acting Police Commissioner, Mohd Bakri Zinin, told us on October 4 that "illegal migrants and other foreigners" account for about three-fourths of violent crimes committed in the state.  He said almost all the crime was locally based and that transnational crime syndicates were "not much of a problem" in Sabah.  Zinin notably did not address the issue of terrorists either located in or transiting Sabah.  When asked about the potential for human trafficking into the Malaysian federal territory island of Labuan, near Sabah's western coast, Zinin stated flatly, "There is no trafficking problem in Labuan.  Those women are all volunteers who claim to be victims when caught."  (Note: Septel addresses prostitution on Labuan.  End Note.)

3. (C) Zinin criticized a recently enacted amendment to the criminal procedure code that eliminated prosecutors' usage of police-obtained confessions in trying criminal defendants. Confessions are now only admissible if done in front of a magistrate. 

Zinin said the amendment "will hurt our ability to get convictions."  He stated, "As a result, we'll likely make greater use of (Malaysia's four preventative detention laws), even though we know this will bring criticism from Suhakam and the NGOs." 

(Note: The laws he referenced are the Internal Security Act, Restricted Residence Act, Dangerous Drugs Act, and Emergency Ordinance.  They allow the police and the internal security ministry to jointly incarcerate individuals for extended periods without trial, in cases where police lack sufficient evidence to obtain a criminal conviction.  From our local sources, we believe 700 - 1,000 Malaysians suspected of criminal activity are currently jailed under the Emergency Ordinance alone.  End Note.)

UMNO Minister Swipes at Prime Minister Abdullah...

4. (C) While making unsolicited comments about Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi's public image and job performance, Sabah's Minister of Youth and Sports, Masidi Manjun, told us, "Abdullah is not an intellectual and is a bit slow in his thinking."  He said the PM is "getting bad advice from his inner circle" regarding both the content and "scripted shouting" of some of his latest speeches to his ethnic Malay political base. 

Manjun, who formally headed Sabah's primary government-funded think tank (the Institute of Development Studies), told us of a private comment made by former PM Mahathir during a recent trip to Japan.  Mahathir reportedly told a senior Japanese politician, "Japan is the home of the rising sun, and Malaysia is home to the rising son-in-law."

This was a reference to PM Abdullah's son-in-law Khairy Jamaluddin, who serves as the deputy president of UMNO Youth.

With Mahathir's recent failure to be elected as an UMNO delegate at the party's national assembly in November, Manjun predicted the assembly will be "a timid affair," with no major pronouncements or surprises.

...And Foreigners in His State

5. (C) Manjun complained that Sabah was "flooded with foreigners."  He singled out Filipino Muslims from Mindanao as "especially troublesome."  He said, "They are not as devout as us."  He told us the state's Filipinos were "using our social services and not integrating into society," and that "vagrancy and violence" were rampant within Sabah's Filipino community.  He called Sabah's maritime and land borders "very porous" and expressed concern that Sabah's foreign residents were starting to become politically active.

He acknowledged, however, the economic importance of Sabah's foreign population.  With regard to Sabah's large number of illegal foreign workers, estimated to total over 750,000, Manjun said, "We need them here, or our economy would collapse."

Fallout from UMNO-Fueled Population Boom in Sabah

6. (C)  UMNO's main Sabah-based partner party, PBS, remains publicly indignant about UMNO grants of citizenship and related voting rights during the 1990s to over 600,000 foreigners (predominantly Muslims from Indonesia and Mindanao), in return for those individuals' votes in Sabah's state assembly elections. 

Two PBS state assemblymen, Ching Eng Leong and Samson Chin Chee Tsu, told us on October 4 that former PM Mahathir began the initiative prior to the 1994 state assembly election, in order to ensure UMNO's political takeover of Sabah.  UMNO's control was further solidified during the 1999 state election, as UMNO granted more foreigners citizenship and voting rights under what came to be known as "Project Mahathir." 

According to Samson, PBS switched from its opposition party status in 2000 and allied itself with UMNO.  Ching said, "UMNO had completely taken over by that time.  They paid off our party leaders and several assemblymen in cash, and threatened to freeze our constituencies out of federal and state funding if we didn't join them." 

Since 2000, the state assembly has remained 100 percent controlled by the UMNO-led coalition; opposition parties in Sabah have no elected representatives.

7. (C) Suhakam recently researched the allegations surrounding Project Mahathir and concurred with PBS' findings.  According to Suhakam, Sabah's legal resident population increased 362 percent to 2.6 million from 1970 to 2000, compared to a population increase of only 135 percent over the same time period in the neighboring state of Sarawak. 

This substantial increase in Sabah's legal residents excludes an influx of over 750,000 foreigners holding invalid identity cards and visas - or no documents at all - according to Suhakam.  According to Samson, a UK-educated lawyer whose electoral district encompasses Tawau on the east coast near the Indonesian border, Filipinos and Indonesians outnumber Malaysians 3 to 1 along Sabah's east coast from Sandakan to Tawau. 

He said, "The security situation in the area is not good."  He also claimed that corruption in Tawau is rampant among police and immigration officers.  He said it had "tripled over the last 30 years."

He and his wife recently refused to attend an event that gathered public and private sector leaders on the resort island of Mabul, off the east coast of Sabah, as he feared an attack on the gathering by Mindanao-based Muslim extremists. The event took place without incident.

Government Ignores Suhakam

8. (C) With regard to the plight of Malaysia's largely impoverished rural indigenous persons in Borneo, Suhakam's Vice Chairman and resident Commissioner in Sabah, Simon Sipaun, echoed the sentiments expressed to us by his fellow Suhakam commissioner in Sarawak (ref B). 

He said he spends most of his time on indigenous persons' issues and lamented the government's lack of support for Suhakam.  He said, "We're viewed as a pest." 

Sipuan told us that prisons in the state are "50 percent to 75 percent overcrowded" and that about three-fourths of all prisoners are illegal migrants and other foreigners.  He described conditions in the state's three illegal migrant detention centers as "overcrowded and generally poor." 

Sipuan felt the large number of Filipinos on the state's east coast represented a potential security threat "if they decide to become more politically active, or if parts of Mindanao become more autonomous."

Comment

9. (C) Among all Malaysian states, Sabah faces uniquely severe border control and related security pressures. Filipinos and Indonesians move easily - and often illegally - between Sabah and their respective home countries. 

UMNO leaders in Sabah and Kuala Lumpur will likely continue to remain silent with regard to the deleterious effects of Project Mahathir, as this initiative achieved its primary goal (UMNO political dominance) many years ago; they consider it "old news."  In any case, a significant reduction in Sabah's foreign-born population could only be reversed in the near term through an UMNO-led effort to round up and deport the very workers that drive Sabah's natural resource-based economy. 

While Malaysia periodically launches campaigns to expel illegal workers, even PBS' leaders concede this is highly unlikely to be carried out to the point of seriously harming the state's economy.  The U.S.  Border Control Assessment Initiative (BCAI) focused on the Sulu and Sulawesi sea areas of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines will enhance our understanding of the security challenges facing Sabah and ways we can assist.  We currently are working to obtain GOM approval for the Sabah field portion.

SHEAR

 

Translated into Chinese at: http://ccliew.blogspot.com/2011/08/blog-post_17.html

 

WIKILEAKS: MALAYSIA REACTS TO CEASEFIRE

Posted: 14 Aug 2011 01:00 AM PDT

Khairy Jamaluddin's antics provided a sometimes entertaining, sometimes maddening diversion throughout the Lebanon crisis. He organized a large and noisy but non-violent July 21 rally in front of the Embassy during which he was pictured by the press at the Embassy's gate, haranguing marchers with a bull horn. Khairy led a July 28 demonstration on the Kuala Lumpur Convention Center during Secretary Rice's participation in the ARF, demanding unsuccessfully to deliver a harshly worded petition to the Secretary, and his appearances often seemed to direct more attention to himself than to his cause.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

C O N F I D E N T I A L KUALA LUMPUR 001587

 

SIPDIS

 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2016

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, IS, LE, MY

SUBJECT: MALAYSIA REACTS TO CEASEFIRE

 

REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 1559

     B. KUALA LUMPUR 1354

     C. KUALA LUMPUR 1397

     D. KUALA LUMPUR 1377

 

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David B. Shear for reasons 1.4 (b, d)

 

1.  (C)  Summary:   Malaysian officials have welcomed the passage of United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1701, and the Malaysian media's preoccupation with the Middle East crisis has quickly diminished.  GOM officials reaffirmed their commitment to a lasting peace in the Middle East and reiterated their commitment to send peacekeeping troops to support the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

Despite some rhetoric and political posturing, Malaysia seems willing to work with the UN in determining what, if any, Malaysian forces would appropriately augment UNIFIL.

Until they were corrected by the Prime Minister, leaders of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) Youth movement called for boycotts of American products and for a cessation of Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations. UMNO Youth leaders admit they are making concessions to their conservative base, but have generally returned their focus to the domestic agenda.  Calls for a boycott of American products largely fell on deaf ears, but the demand that the GOM terminate the FTA talks reflects the extent to which the GOM will have to work in order to generate domestic support for an FTA.  End Summary.

GOM Supports UNSCR 1701

2.  (C)  Senior Malaysian officials including Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi and Foreign Minister Hamid have strongly supported the ceasefire in Lebanon.  Notwithstanding recent reports that Israel may object to peacekeeping forces from nations that do not have diplomatic relations with Israel, Abdullah, Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak and FM Hamid have all declared publicly that Malaysia will send troops to support UNIFIL over Israel's objections. 

However, privately, Malaysia's Under Secretary for Multilateral Affairs Shahrul Ikram has told us that Malaysia will naturally allow the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations to decide if Malaysia should send troops and what their composition would be.  He also reported that Malaysia wants to help, but will naturally work through the UN to ensure UNIFIL has the appropriate composition to complete the mission.

And the Negative Public Rhetoric Cools

3.  (C)  The Malaysian public and media reacted strongly to the Lebanon crisis, and, in addition to sustained criticism of the U.S. in the local press, the Embassy experienced demonstrations on several Friday afternoons at the end of July that were larger and noisier than usual.  But the passage of UNSCR 1701 and the August 14 implementation of the ceasefire in Lebanon quickly deflated much of the negative political rhetoric prevalent in Malaysia after the start of hostilities. 

Politicians and reporters have largely returned their attention to domestic politics: a new budget session in parliament scheduled to begin on September 1, preparations for the November UMNO General Assembly, and former Prime Minister Mahathir's jabs at the government.  Despite overwhelming coverage of the war prior to the ceasefire, most newspapers did not headline the implementation of the ceasefire, nor did they give front-page billing to the return of displaced Lebanese families back to southern Lebanon.

Malaysian officials have continued calls for comprehensive peace and reaffirmed their commitment to send peacekeeping troops to Lebanon (ref A).

Khairy Jamaluddin: Criticizes the FTA Talks; Calls for Boycott of U.S. Goods

4.  (C) UMNO Youth deputy chairman and Prime Ministerial son-in-law Khairy Jamaluddin's antics provided a sometimes entertaining, sometimes maddening diversion throughout the Lebanon crisis.   Khairy's influence on his father-in-law and some of his recent financial dealings have been the target of former Prime Minister Mahathir's ire for several months, and, no doubt sensing that political opportunity knocked, he decided to lead a highly visible UMNO Youth effort to flay the U.S. for its support of Israel.  He organized a large and noisy but non-violent July 21 rally in front of the Embassy during which he was pictured by the press at the Embassy's gate, haranguing marchers with a bull horn. 

Khairy led a July 28 demonstration on the Kuala Lumpur Convention Center during Secretary Rice's participation in the ARF, demanding unsuccessfully to deliver a harshly worded petition to the Secretary, and his appearances often seemed to direct more attention to himself than to his cause.  The frenetic Khairy also called for a stop to U.S.- Malaysia FTA talks and for a boycott of the "American" brands Coca-Cola and Starbucks, statements that were rebuffed by the Prime Minister.

5. (C)  Khairy has been less vocal since the cease fire went into effect.  Our subsequent meetings with UMNO Youth executive committee leaders confirmed that UMNO Youth rhetoric over the past two months was intended to appeal to UMNO's more conservative base.  They have told us that it was also aimed at preventing the Islamic opposition party PAS from gaining momentum given the recent clashes between Abdullah and former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed (ref D).

Having achieved those ends, UMNO Youth has returned to its preparations for the UMNO General Assembly in November and the general elections anticipated for next year.  We expect the occasional jab from Khairy and his UMNO buddies as preparatory meetings for the November UMNO General Assembly continue, but we doubt the drumbeat will reach the decibel levels heard through late-July and early August.

Calls for Boycott Not Threatening

6.  (C)  Khairy's call for the GOM to boycott the US seems to have gained little traction publicly and politically. U.S. firms operating in Malaysia are watchful, but not overly concerned by Khairy's calls for a boycott.  The local Coca-Cola bottler recalled that a similar boycott call in 2002 following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan had no impact on sales. 

Both the Coke and Starbucks franchisees (the local operations actually are owned by Malaysian companies) plan to take no action, believing the best approach is not to draw further attention to the issue. 

At the monthly meeting of the board of governors of the American-Malaysian Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) August 16, members expected that the boycott would fade quickly, so long as the situation in Lebanon remains under control.  The board also agreed to take no action in response to the call for a boycott at this time.

Effect on FTA Remains To Be Seen

7.  (C) We doubt that the Lebanon crisis itself had a lasting negative effect on GOM support for the FTA talks.  But Khairy's opportunistic attack on the talks underscores the extent to which the negotiation may be vulnerable to Malaysian domestic politics.  At a minimum, it also demonstrates the extent to which the GOM will have to work to convince even the ruling party's rank-and-file of the benefits of a FTA with the U.S.

LAFLEUR

 

Ahah! Did we not say so?

Posted: 11 Aug 2011 05:48 PM PDT

According to Tajudin Ramli: "At all material times, I was acting as a nominee and agent of the Government and in the performance of a public duty and I was bound to act under the instructions and directions from the government."

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

Do you remember these series of articles of two years ago?

 

1. The untold MAS story: part 1 (http://malaysia-today.net/archives/23997-the-untold-mas-story-part-1)

2. The untold MAS story: part 2 (http://www.malaysia-today.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24040:the-untold-mas-story-part-2&catid=71:archives-2009&Itemid=100106)

3. The untold MAS story: part 3 (http://www.malaysia-today.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24085:the-untold-mas-story-part-3&catid=71:archives-2009&Itemid=100106)

4. The untold MAS story: part 4 (http://www.malaysia-today.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24137:the-untold-mas-story-part-4&catid=71:archives-2009&Itemid=100106)

5. The untold MAS story: part 5 (http://www.malaysia-today.net/archives/24183-the-untold-mas-story-part-5)

6. The untold MAS story: part 6 (http://www.malaysia-today.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24190:the-untold-mas-story-part-6&catid=71:archives-2009&Itemid=100106)

7. The untold MAS story: part 7 (http://mt.m2day.org/2008/content/view/24191/84/)

8. The untold MAS story: part 8 (http://www.malaysia-today.net/archives/24192-the-untold-mas-story-part-8)

9. The billions that MAS lost: the shit is finally hitting the fan (http://www.malaysia-today.net/mtcolumns/29091-the-billions-that-mas-lost-the-shit-is-finally-hitting-the-fan)

10. UMNO's Corporate Cornucopia (http://malaysia-today.net/mtcolumns/special-reports/35228-umnos-corporate-cornucopia-)

 

Okay, that is certainly a lot of reading so you can read those ten reports above in your spare time (actually there are many more but suffice you read just those ten).

For the benefit of those who would like to cut to the chase or get straight to the bottom line, as they would say, this is what the issue is all about:

1. When Tajudin Ramli took over MAS, the national airline company had RM600 million in cash reserves. When he left MAS seven years later, the national airline company had a hole of RM8 billion, a gap of about RM9 billion. This was revealed in the letter to Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi dated 26 March 2007 (see item 8 above).

2. The police investigation led by CCID chief, Ramli Yusuff, revealed a high level of fraudulent transactions, breaches of fiduciary duties, and breaches of various statutory duties. He then recommended that action be taken against Tajudin Ramli.

3. The basis for launching this investigation were the two police reports that MAS made -- Dang Wangi Report No. 347/02 dated 4 January 2002 and Dang Wangi Report No. 12532/05 dated 4 May 2005.

It appears like this was an airtight case against Tajudin Ramli. So why would the government want to drop its case against him?

Well, probably this article would explain why (http://malaysia-today.net/mtcolumns/34253-umnos-hands-in-every-pie).

According to Tajudin Ramli: "At all material times, I was acting as a nominee and agent of the Government and in the performance of a public duty and I was bound to act under the instructions and directions from the government."

Yes, that was what he signed in his Affidavit of 18 April 2006.

So can you see why the government has to drop its case against Tajudin Ramli? If they proceed with the case and this matter is argued in court, then the whole world will know that Tajudin Ramli is just the 'Ali Baba' front for some hidden hands who have thus far managed to remain hidden. However, once the hearing starts, then the 'hidden hands' would no longer remain hidden, just like the 'hidden hands' behind Anwar Ibrahim's Sodomy 2 matter who are slowly being brought to the surface.

Hmm…I remember many saying that these untold stories on MAS are a figment of my imagination and pure fantasy. Do you still think this is a fantasy story and a product of my imagination going into overdrive?

Yes, justice may be delayed, but it can never be denied. As I have always said, in Malaysia, 90% of rumours are always finally proven as fact in the end. And that is why Malaysians believe in rumours.

I suppose when Anwar is subjected to the 'guilty unless you can prove your innocence' rule, we too can apply the same rule and say that: you are guilty unless you can prove your innocence.

The evidence points to a verdict of guilty. Let the government now prove that it is not guilty but innocent. Until then, I stand by what I said two years ago. And the fact that the government wants to drop this case and sweep everything under the rug just enhances the suspicion of guilt.

Over to you, Nazri, and let truth be told. After all, we are not supposed to lie during the fasting month, isn't it? Or can we?

 

WIKILEAKS: PM ABDULLAH REGROUPS, REAFFIRMS UMNO ELECTION PLAN

Posted: 11 Aug 2011 01:00 AM PDT

Beginning September 22, Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim's camp circulated two streams of rumor in what - in the absence of more information - appears to be a continuation of psychological warfare against UMNO and the National Front (BN) government. On September 22, Anwar advisor Khalid Jaafar whispered to us during a reception at the Ambassador's Residence that Anwar would meet the King on September 23 to discuss the parliamentary majority that Anwar alleges he now has and the formation of a new government.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUALA LUMPUR 000847

 

SIPDIS

 

FOR EAP, EAP/MTS AND INR

 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2028

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, MARR, KDEM, MY

SUBJECT: PM ABDULLAH REGROUPS, REAFFIRMS UMNO ELECTION PLAN

 

REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 833 - SEPT 18 SETBACK

     B. KUALA LUMPUR 821 - ABDULLAH TAKES DEFENSE MINISTRY

     C. KUALA LUMPUR 815 - SEPT 16 ANTI-CLIMAX

     D. KUALA LUMPUR 810 - UPROAR OVER ISA

 

Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark, reason 1.4 (b and d).

 

Summary and Comment

1.  (C) Embattled Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi claimed support from state-level officials of his ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO) for his re-nomination as party president, in an effort to bounce back after some national UMNO leaders on September 18 urged the PM not to contest in the December party poll.  Subsequently, Abdullah again affirmed his commitment to seek reelection together with Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak, while other senior UMNO leaders reiterated calls for Abdullah to step down. 

On September 22, Anwar's camp spread news that the Opposition leader would meet the King the following day; we have no information to suggest such a meeting took place.  PM Abdullah said reports that he was in indirect talks with Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim over a transfer of power were "rubbish;" Anwar also issued a public denial and advocated caution.

2.  (C) Comment:  Rapidly approaching the Muslim holiday period beginning October 1-2, and the October 9 start of the party's divisional meetings, the UMNO leadership crisis remains critical and unresolved.  Reports of Anwar Ibrahim meeting the King or opening up a third-party channel to negotiate with PM Abdullah do not appear credible. 

Anwar's most recent pronouncements sound a cautious tone and avoid setting deadlines for bringing down Abdullah's government, and it is unclear how far Anwar Ibrahim can push his agenda before the end of September.  End Summary and Comment.

Abdullah Claims State-Level Backing

3.  (SBU) PM Abdullah traveled to Perak and Kelantan states and held meetings with some UMNO state-level leaders over the September 20-21 weekend in an attempt to regroup support for his re-nomination as UMNO president following his setback in the heated UMNO Supreme Council meeting on September 18.

(Note:  Some prominent UMNO national leaders during the September 18 meeting reportedly warned Abdullah he would not get sufficient nominations from the UMNO party divisions and urged him not to seek reelection in the December party polls, ref A.  End Note.

On September 23, Abdullah held a late night meeting with the UMNO liaison chiefs from nine states, with Johor, Sabah and Teraengganu not represented (along with Sarawak, which does not have an UMNO branch). 

Following the meeting, a senior aide to Abdullah told reporters that the Prime Minister had received the strong endorsement of the party's state chiefs for his transition plan, which involves PM Abdullah and DPM Najib's reelection in December, and transfer of power from Abdullah to Najib by June 2010.  Other UMNO participants in the meeting noted a "unanimous" decision in favor of the 2010 transition plan.

4.  (C) Comment:  By going to the state level, and reporting strong endorsement from state leaders, Abdullah sought to counter criticism from national leaders that he would not receive sufficient backing for his reelection.  State liaison chiefs are appointed by the party president -- Abdullah -- and thus largely beholden to him, but they also exercise important political power among their respective state's party divisions.  End Comment.

5.  (SBU) After remaining awkwardly quiet on September 19, the Prime Minister's spin machine operating through the mainstream media and some on-line news portals, like The Malaysian Insider, started up again on September 20.

Reporting from government sources and associated commentary reaffirmed that Abdullah was moving ahead with the joint ticket with Najib, and that the transition plan remained on track and was not likely to be derailed.

Open UMNO Split Continues

6.  (SBU) As Abdullah reaffirmed his transition plan and intention to seek reelection, senior UMNO leaders Muhyiddin Yassin and Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah adamantly stuck to their positions that Abdullah should step down by December.  On September 23, Razaleigh issued a lengthy condemnation of UMNO's undemocratic power politics and the party's failure to reform:  "We cannot afford to allow these disturbing trends to play out their destructive course while we suffer a de facto leadership vacuum..." (full text forwarded to EAP/MTS).

DPM Najib, who departs the evening of September 24 for the UN General Assembly, largely avoided comment, feeding local perceptions that he is attempting to keep some room open to receive party nominations for president, possibly with Muhyiddin as his number two. 

Former Prime Minister Mahathir continued his attacks against Abdullah, and heaped blame on Najib for facilitating Abdullah's continuation in office.

Opposition Rumors; Anwar's Caution

7.  (C) Beginning September 22, Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim's camp circulated two streams of rumor in what - in the absence of more information - appears to be a continuation of psychological warfare against UMNO and the National Front (BN) government.  On September 22, Anwar advisor Khalid Jaafar whispered to us during a reception at the Ambassador's Residence that Anwar would meet the King on September 23 to discuss the parliamentary majority that Anwar alleges he now has and the formation of a new government.

Other rumors of Anwar meeting with the King and other Royals persist in Kuala Lumpur.

8.  (C) On September 23, Tian Chua, Anwar's information chief, publicly announced that the Opposition had opened negotiations with Prime Minister Abdullah through a third-party channel.  PM Abdullah immediately dismissed this claim, calling it "rubbish." 

Anwar later issued a statement referring to Tian Chua's remarks as "misinformed."  Avoiding setting any new deadlines for toppling the government, Anwar in his statement said, "We will proceed cautiously towards our goals and we agree neither to be provoked into hasty action nor to take an irresponsible approach that would lead to instability and greater uncertainty in the country."

(Comment:  Earlier on September 23, the GOM confirmed two years detention without trial under the Internal Security Act for controversial blogger Raja Petra, septel.  Opposition leaders continue to tell us that they seek to avoid creating a pretext for the government to arrest them under the ISA. End Comment.)

RAPSON

 

WIKILEAKS: ANWAR IBRAHIM'S SODOMY TRIAL II - A PRIMER

Posted: 09 Aug 2011 01:00 AM PDT

Most observers conclude that a conviction in Anwar's case, one upheld on appeal, would essentially end Anwar's political career given the legal penalties and Anwar's age (62). According to the Federal Constitution, a member of Parliament will be disqualified from holding his seat if he is convicted of an offense and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than one year or to a fine of not less than US $570 (RM 2,000) and has not received a free pardon.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 KUALA LUMPUR 000529

 

SIPDIS

 

FOR EAP/MTS

 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2019

TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, KJUS, MY

SUBJECT: ANWAR IBRAHIM'S SODOMY TRIAL II - A PRIMER

 

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR MARK D. CLARK, REASON 1.4 (B AND D).

 

Summary and Comment

1.    (C) Malaysian Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim will go on trial beginning July 8 on charges of sodomy -- a criminal offense in Malaysia -- with a former aide.  Anwar was previously tried and convicted of sodomy in 2000 in a heavily manipulated trial that the U.S. concluded "was marred by deep flaws in the judicial process."  The verdict was overturned on appeal in 2004. 

Senior Malaysian authorities were very aggressive in handling the present case during the initial period of June-September 2008, but, coinciding with the passing of Anwar's deadline to bring down the government through Parliamentary cross-overs, have since taken a more measured "rule-of-law" approach in public.  Authorities have not taken all the legal and extra-legal measures available to them, for example, to challenge Anwar's bail provisions or resolve an earlier impasse regarding the court venue.

Anwar's conviction in this trial, which may last many months, could end his political career; the judge would decide whether Anwar would remain free pending an appeal.  This cable provides a primer for the Department's reference, including background on the 2000 conviction and the present case, a synopsis of the specific legal charges and penalties, a summary of likely evidence to be presented in court, and three possible scenarios for the trial.

2.  (C) Comment:  The issue of the specific actions between Anwar and his aide will play out in court and, we suspect, in a very sensationalistic fashion.  The facts surrounding the case, however, make a compelling argument that the government's prosecution of the case is foremost a political act against the Opposition leader. 

Whether the incident in question was wholly concocted or has some basis in fact, the case is not part of a morals campaign or a normal criminal matter and has been the subject of extensive political interference and manipulation.  As one consequence, much of the Malaysian public remains deeply sceptical about the government's prosecution of Anwar Ibrahim. 

Anwar's flawed trials in 1998-2000 produced a public uproar and attracted international condemnation; in today's information-intensive environment, such effects may be exacerbated depending on events in court.  Embassy will provide draft press guidance for the Department's consideration prior to the July 8 trial date.  End Summary and Comment.

Sodomy Case I, 1998-2000

3.  (SBU) Under the government of former Prime Minister Mahathir, Anwar Ibrahim was charged and convicted of sodomy (and abuse of power) in a sensationalistic trials in 1998-2000, directed and heavily manipulated by Mahathir against his former deputy.  Anwar was charged with sodomizing his wife's driver. 

During his pre-trial detention, Anwar was beaten by the then Inspector General of Police.  The High Court convicted Anwar of sodomy in August 2000 and sentenced him to nine years imprisonment. 

The U.S. expressed deep concern with the first sodomy trial, noting "that the trial and (Anwar's) resulting conviction and nine-year jail sentence were marred by deep flaws in the judicial process."

After Mahathir stepped down in favor of Abdullah Badawi, the Federal Court overturned the conviction in September 2004 and released Anwar from prison (Anwar's separate conviction for abuse of power remained in place).  The Federal Court found there were "many unusual things that happened regarding the arrest and confession" of certain prosecution witnesses, including the fact that Anwar's driver stated that he was paid to make the allegations against Anwar. 

In an unusual move and possible political compromise, the Federal Court judges included in their judgment the conclusion that there was evidence to confirm "the appellants were involved in homosexual activities," but added that the prosecution failed to prove the alleged offenses beyond reasonable doubt.

Because Anwar's conviction on the separate charge of abuse of power was not overturned, he was barred from political office until April 2008.

Sodomy Case II, 2008

4.  (SBU) Less than four months after Anwar Ibrahim's People's Justice Party (PKR) and its opposition partners made significant advances in the March 2008 national elections, and three months after Anwar became eligible for political office, an aide to Anwar, Mohd Saiful Bukhari Azlan, filed a police report on June 28, 2008, alleging that he had been forcibly sodomized by Anwar on several occasions. 

The following day, Anwar took refuge in the Turkish ambassador's residence, claiming that he feared a repetition of his 1998 arrest and for his personal safety.  He remained with the Turkish ambassador for only one day, departing after public assurances of his safety from the Foreign Minister and Home Minister. 

In the midst of a highly charged political atmosphere, which included Anwar's claims that he could bring down the government through Parliamentary defections by September 16, 2008, and new allegations linking then DPM Najib with the Altantuya murder case, the police investigation proceeded. 

It came to light that Saiful had had contact with the office of then DPM Najib prior to working with Anwar, and more significantly Saiful had met with Najib (and allegedly his wife Rosmah) at Najib's home just prior to filing his police complaint. 

Najib first denied publicly he had any connection with the case, and then acknowledged meeting Saiful, an admission that preempted internet reports about to be released by blogger Raja Petra (who is now a fugitive from sedition charges).

5.  (SBU) As authorities made known their intention to arrest and charge Anwar for sodomy, Anwar's lawyers arranged for his voluntary appearance before police for questioning and charging.  Contrary to the agreement, on July 16, police in commando-style outfits waylaid Anwar's convoy en route to the police station and arrested him on the street.  Police questioned Anwar, took him to a hospital to provide a DNA sample (which Anwar refused, citing lawyers' advice and fear of "manipulation"), and held him overnight.  Anwar was released on police bail by a magistrate on July 17.

The Charges

6.  (SBU) On August 7, 2008, prosecutors charged Anwar Ibrahim before a Sessions Court under Section 377B of the Penal Code, which reads:  "Whoever voluntarily commits carnal intercourse against the order of nature shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to twenty years and shall be liable to whipping."  Section 377A of the Penal Code defines "carnal intercourse against the order of nature" as including sodomy. 

Prosecutors specifically charged Anwar with the sodomizing of Saiful Bukhari Azlan at a Kuala Lumpur condominium (owned by Anwar's friend) on June 26, 2008.

Although Saiful originally claimed he was forcibly sodomized on several occasions, the prosecutors chose not to pursue charges against Anwar under a separate Penal Code section (377C), which pertains to non-consensual sodomy (with a higher burden of proof), and also to focus on only one alleged incident. 

It is important to note that under Malaysia's legal system, prosecutors may amend the charges during the course of the trial.  Saiful himself does not face charges for the alleged acts.  The Court ordered Anwar to remain free on a personal bond of US $5,700 RM 20,000 and did not impose other restrictions (for example, Anwar has been free to travel abroad and has done so on many occasions since August 2008).  The government did not attempt to dispute or revoke the bail provisions.

Wrangle and Delay over Court Venue

7.  (SBU) Following Anwar's formal charging, and with Anwar's 9/16 deadline looming in the background, prosecutors quickly moved to transfer the case from the Sessions Court to the High Court. 

The prosecution argued on September 10, 2008, that such an important case with possibly complicated legal issues should be dealt with at the High Court and produced a certificate signed by the Attorney General to move the case, which under normal circumstances automatically results in a transfer. 

However, Anwar's lawyers objected to the transfer out of concern that the more politicized High Court level would result in a pro-prosecution judge hearing the case, as happened during the first sodomy trial in 1999-2000. 

In November 2008, independent-minded Sessions Court judge Komathy Suppiah rejected the certificate of transfer, noting that Attorney General Gani Patail faced allegations of evidence tampering in Anwar's 1998 case and the transfer order signed by the AG would "undermine the public perception of the judiciary."

8.  (C) Judge Komathy was overruled in March 2009 by High Court judge Mohamad Zabidin Md Diah who decided the Sessions Court has no authority to refuse the Attorney General's transfer order; Zabidin himself was then assigned to preside over the sodomy trial. 

Anwar's lawyers filed an appeal against the transfer; the Court of Appeals only began to hear the appeal on June 30; based on precedent, Anwar's camp admits the appeal has little chance of success.  Zabidin initially attempted to schedule the trial to begin in May 2009; defense lawyers argued they needed more time and hoped their appeal would be heard prior to the trial. 

(Note:  The High Court often takes one to two years before setting trial dates in normal criminal cases.  End Note.

Zabidin subsequently set the trial to begin on July 1.  Anwar's lawyers filed an application to compel the prosecution to provide them with full documentation and evidence that will be introduced at the trial, which the prosecution has thus far failed to do in apparent violation of the Criminal Procedure Code. 

With the hearing on the disclosure of evidence set for July 1 (now pushed back to July 3), Judge Zabidin postponed the trial start to July 8.  The judge originally specified a three-week duration for the trial, but lawyers assume that the trial will take many months to conclude.

The High Court Judge

9.  (C) High Court Judge Mohamad Zabidin Md Diah is a lawyer by training.  After private law practice, he joined the judicial service as a Sessions Court judge and was elevated to judicial commissioner in 2004.  After two years on contract, Zabidin was promoted to become a permanent High Court judge in 2006. 

Zabidin is not a well-known judge and is not associated with high profile or controversial judgments, according to our senior legal contacts.  Anwar's lawyers allege that Zabidin is beholden to the government and will favor the prosecution; the judge's unusual rush to bring the case to trial is viewed by the defense as an early indication of his bias.

Government Switches Gears

10.  (C) Senior government and UMNO party officials adopted a very aggressive public and private approach to the Anwar case during the June-September 2008 period.  This included frequent, prejudicial statements in public, and strong claims in private to other politicians and diplomats regarding Anwar's guilt. 

This intensive phase encompassed the initial news of the allegations and Anwar's formal charging, but also Anwar's own aggressive political posturing and claims that he could bring down the government by September 2008 through Parliamentary crossovers. 

After Anwar's deadline passed in September, and after resolution of the UMNO leadership battle in favor of Najib's succession in October 2008, we observed a definite toning down of the Government's approach, and a shifting to a lower gear.  For example, we did not hear reports of government intervention to quickly resolve the matter of the court venue, which effectively delayed the prosecution by some seven months. 

Anwar's bail provisions remained in place and unchallenged.  Public statements by senior government officials, outside of by-election campaigns, became infrequent.  This toned down approach has continued through the present; it would fit within a hypothetical decision to demonstrate that the trial is a law enforcement matter, rather than a political battle. Regardless, it is clear that the government has not taken all the legal and extra-legal steps against Anwar that it could have since September 2008.

GOM Confidence:  Waning or Recalculating?

11.  (C) Many of our government and UMNO contacts have insisted to us, emphatically so in the early months of the case, that the evidence against Anwar is very conclusive, often hinting at video footage and physical evidence like DNA (see below). 

Recently, some contacts sympathetic to Anwar but not part of his team claimed the government over time had become less certain it had sufficient evidence to convict Anwar. 

According to one unconfirmed account, in June several key aides to PM Najib advised him to drop the case against Anwar because the evidence was not strong enough for an easy conviction and the political cost of forcing through a guilty verdict would be too high.  It is also possible that the toned down rhetoric from the government has been misinterpreted as uncertainty on the authorities' part.

Evidence at the Trial  

12.  (C) Based on available information, we believe the following evidentiary aspects will feature in Anwar's trial:

Saiful's complaint:  The testimony of Saiful is central to the government's case, and he is expected to take the stand. Saiful has continued to assert that he was forcibly sodomized, although the charges under Section 377B do not require proof of a non-consensual act; given his youth (age 23) and physical size, Saiful will need to explain specific circumstances of the incident to support his assertion of rape.

Medical reports:  As publicly revealed by defense lawyers, Saiful underwent two medical examinations on June 28, 2008, just prior to lodging a police report.  The first examination by a Burmese doctor at a local hospital concluded there was "no conclusive clinical findings" suggestive of sodomy, and the doctor recommended he be examined at a government hospital in line with police procedures in such cases.

(Note:  The Burmese doctor briefly left Malaysia after being held for questioning by police.  End Note.

The second examination at the police-approved government hospital also failed to uncover medical evidence of sodomy, according to copies of hospital reports released by the defense.

DNA:  The defense team believes prosecutors will introduce DNA evidence, based on DNA samples held by the police since 1998, and are preparing expert witnesses.  The government's hurried passage in Parliament of a DNA bill, approved by the lower house on June 23, is widely seen as tied to the Anwar trial and will permit the government to utilize the 11-year old samples.  The defense could claim the samples were planted, as is widely believed to be the case in Anwar's earlier prosecution.

Anwar's alibi:  Anwar's lawyers claim that five persons will testify that Anwar was with them at the time of the alleged incident.  They also claim that police attempted but failed to intimidate some of these defense witnesses to change their accounts.

CCTV:  The prosecution may use CCTV footage from the condominium where the alleged incident took place to confirm Anwar's presence at a specific date and time.

Character witnesses:  As happened in the 1999 case, it is very possible that prosecutors introduce witnesses to attack Anwar's character and actions aside from the alleged 2008 sodomy incident.  There are unconfirmed reports that the prosecution will call 30 witnesses to the stand.

Defense witnesses (PM Najib and wife Rosmah?):  In an effort to demonstrate the political motivation in the government's case, defense lawyers could call PM Najib, his wife Rosmah, and other senior officials such as Najib's aide Khairil Anas Yusof who appear connected to the case (Najib and Rosmah because they met Saiful and discussed his reporting to the police).  While this will make for momentary drama, we expect the judge to disallow such moves.

Bail and other Conditions during the Trial

13.  (C) Anwar's legal team has expressed concern that the prosecution may apply to revoke the personal bond that allows Anwar to be free pending the trial or seek to impose other conditions, such as impounding his passport or restricting his movement to within Kuala Lumpur. 

The lawyers acknowledge that there is not a strong precedent for overturning the existing bail decision.  In several recent politically-charged court cases, however, Malaysian judges have ignored precedent decisions.

(Note:  We have no information on the prosecution's intentions in this matter. End Note.)

What if Anwar is Convicted?

14.  (C) Most observers conclude that a conviction in Anwar's case, one upheld on appeal, would essentially end Anwar's political career given the legal penalties and Anwar's age (62).  According to the Federal Constitution, a member of Parliament will be disqualified from holding his seat if he is convicted of an offense and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than one year or to a fine of not less than US $570 (RM 2,000) and has not received a free pardon.

This stipulation comes into effect after all appeals are exhausted (at the Court of Appeals and Federal Court).  The constitution also provides that a convicted person can only be active in politics after five years from the date of his release from prison.  At age 62, a second conviction could effectively bar Anwar permanently from political life.  In the event of a conviction, Anwar will certainly appeal. 

The judge will decide whether Anwar remains free pending appeal or immediately goes to jail.  While officially remaining a Member of Parliament pending the final outcome, he would be unable to operate from prison as the Opposition leader.

Political Interference and Manipulation

15.  (C) The issue of the alleged actions between Anwar and Saiful will play out in court, and sodomy, even a consensual act, is a crime under Malaysian law.  The facts surrounding the case, however, make it clear that the government's prosecution of the case is foremost a political act against the Opposition leader. 

The Malaysian government does not aggressively prosecute cases of sodomy; we find record of some 55 cases since 1991, or an average of 3 per year.  The vast majority of such cases involve adults assaulting minors.

Anwar's prosecution is not part of a morals campaign.  The GOM does not aggressively target non-heterosexual behavior; if it did so, a recent cabinet minister, senior staff associated with PM Najib and other prominent citizens linked to the government also would find themselves under investigation.

16.  (C) Aside from the immediate comparison with Anwar's previous prosecution for sodomy, which was grossly manipulated by former Prime Minister Mahathir, the indications of political interference and manipulation in the present case are compelling; much of the information is in the public realm.  Collateral reporting, not addressed here, provides further substantiation.

Najib connection:  Keeping in mind that Najib and Anwar remain bitter enemies, it is striking that Najib met personally with the complainant Saiful prior to the police report, and allegedly arranged for Saiful to have intensive contact with senior police officials in the days before he filed the complaint.

Senior officials' involvement:  From the very early stages, the senior-most officials in the government, including then PM Abdullah, current PM Najib, cabinet ministers, the AGO and national police chief (the latter two having played important roles in Anwar's 1998-1999 flawed trials) and officials of the ruling UMNO party have been intimately involved in decisions regarding the case, according to Embassy contacts and publicly available sources. 

Despite the current toned-down government approach, and emphasis that the Anwar trial is a normal law enforcement matter, senior-most executive and UMNO party officials continue such a directing role.

Leakage of information:  Senior government leaders provided law enforcement information on the case to leaders of Anwar's coalition partner, the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), in an unsuccessful attempt to split PAS from the opposition.  A recent internet report claims that the government has provided some government-directed press editors with a "sneak preview" of evidence against Anwar.

Public statements:  From the initial public reports of the complaint against Anwar in June 2008 to Anwar's election to Parliament in August 2008, PM Abdullah and other senior leaders spoke publicly and frequently about Anwar's alleged crime and the need for justice, and the case featured prominently in the parliamentary campaign against Anwar.

There have been far fewer statements since September 2008, except during by-election campaigns.

Press:  The Government-directed mainstream press, which includes all major dailies and all TV stations, provided extensive coverage of Saiful's allegations while severely limiting reporting on Anwar's response during the heated period of June-August 2008.

Alleged intimidation:  The police detained for questioning the doctor who first examined Saiful, causing him to leave Malaysia temporarily out of concern for his safety.  Police also pressured the hospital in question to hold a press conference to state that the doctor was not qualified to conduct such an examination, according to our sources.

According to defence lawyers, several of their witnesses have been threatened by police in an effort to change their testimony.  The Imam for the Federal Territories (including Kuala Lumpur and the administrative capital Putra Jaya) claimed publicly that he was forced to witness an "improper" Islamic oath taken by Saiful; he was subsequently sacked by the Prime Minister's Department.

Customized Legislation, the DNA bill:  The government hurriedly prepared a bill on DNA evidence, following shortly after Anwar's refusal to provide a DNA sample at the time of his arrest, which compels suspects to provide samples and allows authorities to utilize previously stored samples in new criminal cases.  The government originally introduced the bill in August 2008 and voted it through the lower house only on June 23, 2009; several steps remain before it becomes law.

Public Scepticism

17.  (C) In the run-up to Anwar's August 2008 arraignment, public opinion polling conducted by the Merdeka Center, Malaysia's most respected opinion survey group, revealed that a preponderance of Malaysians believed the charges against Anwar were unjust, indicating a deep public scepticism regarding the government's case. 

We understand that new polling on this question will be released before the July 8 trial date.  Pollsters have informed us that the new data continues to reflect widespread public suspicions.

Reportedly, only 15 percent of ethnic Malays and 10 percent of Malaysians overall believe Anwar's prosecution to be justified.  Outside of government circles, many Embassy contacts, including those who give credence to rumors of Anwar's personal life, take it as a matter of fact that the government is prosecuting Anwar for political reasons. 

In a public statement made on June 24, former Bar Council president (and U.S. Woman of Courage awardee in 2009) Ambiga Sreenvasan urged the government to drop the charges against Anwar in order to restore credibility to PM Najib's ruling coalition.

Scenarios

18.  (C) When viewed as a political matter, a number of potential scenarios for the Anwar prosecution present themselves; below we review three that are most apparent.  In these scenarios we assume that Najib will exercise the deciding voice on how and whether to proceed, though he also will need to weigh the opinions of other UMNO ruling party elites.

-- Conviction at all costs:  Based on an assessment that Anwar is a threat to UMNO's continued rule at least at the time of the next national elections, Najib and UMNO elites decide that the political costs of prosecuting Anwar are acceptable and pursue the matter aggressively inside and outside the courtroom with the overriding goal of convicting Anwar and removing him permanently from politics. 

While asserting that this is purely a law enforcement matter, the government exerts political pressure as necessary, accepting reputational risks in the process, and achieves a conviction after months of high-profile drama in the courtroom.  The courts hear and reject Anwar's appeals in an expedited manner, well ahead of the next national elections in 2012 or 2013. 

This scenario appeared to be in play during the initial months of the case and in the lead up to Anwar's September 2008 deadline to overturn the ruling coalition's majority; it has been less apparent since then.  Recalling the deep personal animosity between Najib and Anwar, and the singular importance of Anwar to the opposition coalition, this scenario remains plausible, even though Anwar's immediate threat to UMNO's rule has passed.

-- Merits of the case, reputational damage:  In a second scenario, the government proceeds with the prosecution but refrains from exerting undue pressure to achieve conviction, believing that the evidence presented and/or the court proceedings themselves will sufficiently damage Anwar's reputation and this will outweigh harm to the Najib administration's credibility. 

Conviction remains the desired outcome, supported by sufficient evidence, but the government accepts some risk of a final verdict of innocence after all appeals are heard.  This scenario rests on the assumption of sufficiently clear evidence against Anwar that will swing public opinion in favor of the government even in the event of an eventual acquittal.  Absent greater information on the government's evidence against Anwar, it is difficult to judge the prospects for this scenario.

-- Withdrawal:  In a third scenario, Najib and UMNO elites decide that the government's case is not strong enough to pursue, entails unacceptable political costs, or is no longer necessary because of the diminished threat from Anwar.  The government withdraws the charges prior to the trial start of July 8, or shortly after the trial begins, possibly under conditions of "discharge not amounting to acquittal."

(Lawyers tell us that such a discharge in theory would allow the government to reactivate the case at a future time, thus maintaining this as a lever over Anwar.) 

Najib, confident that he can beat back an opposition challenge in the next election, attributes the original decision to prosecute to the previous administration of Abdullah Badawi and takes credit for respecting the rule of law in this high profile case involving his determined political nemesis. 

In contrast to 2008, Najib's currently secure position as UMNO leader and Prime Minister, along with Anwar's diminished threat, make this scenario a political possibility, though some UMNO elites and perhaps Najib himself may not want to give up the opportunity to remove Anwar Ibrahim from politics once and for all.

KEITH

 

WIKILEAKS: PROMINENT BLOGGER FLEES SEDITION TRIAL

Posted: 07 Aug 2011 01:00 AM PDT

Poloff met with one of Raja Petra's lead lawyers on April 23. The lawyer disclosed that following Raja Petra's last appearance in court in February Raja Petra's legal team concluded their client would be found guilty and imprisoned under the sedition charges, and informed Raja Petra accordingly. The lawyer claimed that the ruling coalition's political influence over the court proceedings precluded a fair trail. 

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

C O N F I D E N T I A L KUALA LUMPUR 000323

 

SIPDIS

 

FOR EAP/MTS AND DRL

 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2019

TAGS: PHUM, PINS, PGOV, KJUS, KDEM, UK, MY

SUBJECT: PROMINENT BLOGGER FLEES SEDITION TRIAL

 

REF: A. 08 KL 990 - RAJA PETRA RELEASED FROM ISA

     B. 08 KL 846 - UPDATE ON RAJA PETRA DETENTION

     C. 08 KL 806 - JOURNALIST DETAINED UNDER ISA

 

Classified By: Political Counselor Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b and d).

 

Summary and Comment

1.  (C) Prominent blogger and government critic Raja Petra Kamarudin, who was jailed for two months in 2008 under the Internal Security Act (ISA), failed to appear for his sedition trail on April 23, and the court subsequently issued a warrant for his arrest.  A member of his defense team informed poloff that Raja Petra, along with his wife, fled to the United Kingdom about two months ago on the belief that he would face eventual imprisonment for sedition.

2.  (SBU) Comment: Raja Petra, Malaysia's most controversial on-line voice, will continue to be a nuisance to Prime Minister Najib's administration.  Not expecting to return to Malaysia anytime soon, we can expect Raja Petra to ratchet up his criticism and purported exposes during his self-imposed exile.  End Summary and Comment.

Where is Raja Petra?

3.  (SBU) Raja Petra Kamarudin, an outspoken blogger and member of the Selangor state royal family failed to appear at Sessions Court for the continuation of his sedition trial on April 23.  The court subsequently issued a warrant for his arrest.  Raja Petra faced charges under the Sedition Act for articles he posted on his website, Malaysia Today, regarding the high-profile Altantuya murder case and the victim's alleged ties to Prime Minister Najib and his wife.  If convicted of sedition, he faces a maximum sentence of three years in jail.

4.  (U) On April 23, Raja Petra posted on his website his reasons for not appearing in court.  He claimed Malaysian authorities intended to detain him under the ISA, as the Government had done in September 2008 (ref A-C).  He also stated the courts were unable to provide him with a fair trial and noted the government was using sedition charges and criminal defamation charges, in addition to detaining him under ISA, for linking the Prime Minister to the murdered Mongolian national Altantuya. 

Raja Petra also mentioned that he had angered the Selangor royal family with his criticism of the Sultan of Perak related to the ruling coalition's takeover of Perak state government from the opposition, and therefore could not return to Selangor.

Lawyer Confirms Departure for UK

5.  (C) Poloff met with one of Raja Petra's lead lawyers on April 23.  The lawyer disclosed that following Raja Petra's last appearance in court in February Raja Petra's legal team concluded their client would be found guilty and imprisoned under the sedition charges, and informed Raja Petra accordingly.  The lawyer claimed that the ruling coalition's political influence over the court proceedings precluded a fair trail. 

He said that Raja Petra, who holds both Malaysian and British passports, along with his wife had left for the UK some two months ago and remained there.  His departure was kept closely guarded with Raja Petra's closest friends remaining in the dark. 

The lawyer said it was unclear if the Attorney General's Office realized Raja Petra had left Malaysia, as the prosecutor's public statements indicated he was still in the country.  After the court's issuance of an arrest warrant for Raja Petra, and a "show cause notice" for his wife as bail guarantor, some on-line articles suggested Raja Petra was in the UK.

KEITH

 

Now do you understand the difference?

Posted: 06 Aug 2011 07:30 PM PDT

More than 1,000 Malaysians have lost their lives in extra-judicial killings over the last decade or so. Only one man is shot dead by the police and London erupts and transforms into chaos. Yes, it is not so easy for police to take people's lives here in the UK compared to in Malaysia. And this is why we need a civil society movement -- to teach Malaysians not to accept shit from their government.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

Riot hits London after police shoot father of four

(Associated Press) -- The gritty north London neighbourhood of Tottenham exploded in anger Saturday night after a young man was shot to death by police.

Two patrol cars, a building and a double-decker bus were torched as rioters clashed with officers in front of the Tottenham Police Station, where people had gathered to demand "justice" for the death of a 29-year-old killed in an apparent gunfight.

"It's really bad," said local resident David Akinsanya, 46. "There are two police cars on fire. I'm feeling unsafe."

Sirens could be heard across the city as authorities rushed reinforcements to the scene. In Tottenham shop windows were smashed as residents looted the stores, pushing shopping carts full of stolen goods down the street.

Officers in riot gear and on horseback pushed up against the demonstrators. Akinsanya put the number of demonstrators at between 400 and 500. Police said there were about 300 people gathered.

Miles from the tourist hotspots of central London, Tottenham is one of the most deprived areas in all of England, with nearly half of all children living in poverty, according to campaigners.

In 1985, Tottenham was the scene of a deadly riot after a local woman suffered heart failure when her home was raided by the police. The Tottenham riots were among the most violent in the country's history, with one officer stabbed to death as he tried to protect firefighters and nearly 60 others were hospitalized.

*******************************

London rioters battle police after shooting protest 

(REUTERS) -- Rioters throwing petrol bombs battled police in a economically deprived district of London overnight, setting patrol cars, buildings and a double-decker bus on fire in some of the worst disorder seen in the British capital for recent years.

About 200 people rained missiles and bottles on riot officers near Tottenham district police station after a street protest over the fatal shooting of a man by armed officers earlier in the week turned violent.

Mounted police and riot officers on foot in turn charged the crowd to push them back.

Eight officers were taken to hospital, one with head injuries, as rioters smashed windows and looted buildings including banks, shops and a supermarket and torched three police cars in the main road near the local police station.

The trouble broke out on Saturday night following a peaceful demonstration over the shooting of Mark Duggan, 29, who was killed after an exchange of gunfire with police on Thursday.

Duggan had been in a taxi when it was stopped by armed officers as part of a pre-planned operation. One policeman escaped unhurt after a bullet struck his radio. Duggan's death is being investigated by the independent police watchdog.

Although there have been riots in other European countries linked to austerity measures to tackle large national debts, London police and local community leaders said anger at Duggan's shooting was the cause of the riot.

Tottenham has a large number of ethnic minorities and includes areas with the highest unemployment rates in London. It also has a history of racial tension with local young people, especially blacks, resenting police behaviour including the use of stop and search powers.

NOTORIOUS RACE RIOT IN 1985

The disorder was very close to where one of Britain's most notorious race riots occurred just over 25 years ago.

In 1985, police officer Keith Blakelock was hacked to death on the deprived Broadwater Farm housing estate during rioting in which around 500 mainly black youths rampaged through the streets, assaulting police, looting and setting fires.

Classford Stirling, a youth worker from Broadwater Farm, said there had been growing anger recently over stop and search practices by police. "It wasn't just black kids. It was the youth in general who are frustrated at the way the police are treating them," he told BBC TV.

"Everybody's now thinking of the way Mr Duggan was shot and they want answers. It's very difficult to turn round and say to them this is the wrong way because they believe this is the only way that they're going to get attention."

Television pictures showed a blazing bus surrounded by rioters and hooded youths pelting an abandoned police car with rocks and missiles. Media reported some locals had to flee their homes to escape the violence. 

While the bulk of the disturbance had been brought under control early on Sunday, pockets of trouble were still erupting nearby. Buildings were smouldering with plumes of smoke billowing across the skyline. 

"The rioting in Tottenham last night was utterly unacceptable," a spokesman for Prime Minister David Cameron said. "There is no justification for the aggression the police and the public faced, or for the damage to property."

Police Commander Stephen Watson said the scenes were "very distressing" for Londoners and perpetrators would be brought to justice. "Our intention ... is to bring things to as swift a conclusion as we can. Our absolute aim is to restore normality."

Local member of parliament David Lammy said: "The Tottenham community and Mark Duggan's family and friends need to understand what happened on Thursday evening when Mark lost his life. To understand those facts, we must have calm."

London also saw riots at the end of last year when protests against government plans to raise tuition fees for university students in the centre of London turned violent with police and government buildings attacked.

During the most serious disturbances last December, rioters targeted the limousine belonging to heir-to-the-throne Prince Charles and his wife Camilla, kicking its doors, cracking a window and reportedly jabbing Camilla with a stick.


 

WIKILEAKS: PRESSURE MOUNTS AGAINST INTERNAL SECURITY ACT (ISA)

Posted: 04 Aug 2011 01:00 AM PDT

The ISA also is subject to misuse for political ends and is an important insurance policy for maintaining UMNO in power. For both CT and political reasons, the GOM will not readily give up the ISA. We doubt that the increased political pressure and seeming swing in public opinion against the ISA, due in part to its misuse in September, will result in the ISA's amendment or revocation in the near future, absent the Opposition coming to power.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KUALA LUMPUR 001114

 

SIPDIS

 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2028

TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, KJUS, KDEM

SUBJECT: PRESSURE MOUNTS AGAINST INTERNAL SECURITY ACT (ISA)

 

REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 1026 - DPM NAJIB DISCUSSES ISA

     B. KUALA LUMPUR 990 - RAJA PETRA RELEASED

     C. KUALA LUMPUR 944 - MCA AND GERAKAN CRITICIZE UMNO

     D. KUALA LUMPUR 846 - UPDATE ON RAJA PETRA

     E. KUALA LUMPUR 834 - KOK RELEASED FROM ISA

     F. KUALA LUMPUR 810 - UPROAR OVER ISA

     G. KUALA LUMPUR 806 - JOURNALIST DETAINED UNDER ISA

     H. 07 KUALA LUMPUR 902 - BEYOND ISA

 

Classified By: Political Counselor Mark D. Clark, reason 1.4 (b, c and d).

 

NOTE:  THIS CABLE TRANSMITS AN EDITED VERSION OF KUALA LUMPUR 1102 SENT ON 12/18/08 IN MORE RESTRICTED CHANNELS.  END NOTE.

 

1.  (S) Summary:  The Malaysian government's use of the Internal Security Act (ISA), which allows for detention without trial and is central to the GOM's intelligence-driven CT effort, has come under increasing political pressure over the past three months. 

The GOM's employment of the ISA in September to carry out three politically-motivated ISA detentions unrelated to terrorism sparked unprecedented public criticism.  At least eight component parties from the governing National Front (BN) coalition have since broken ranks with the leading United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and called for amending or abolishing the ISA. 

The opposition party alliance led by Anwar Ibrahim has made the revocation of ISA one of its highest profile policy goals.

In November, a High Court judge delivered a legal blow to the GOM's wide discretion in using the ISA in a ruling that freed blogger Raja Petra, and the GOM is appealing the decision. Prime Minister Abdullah, his deputy and successor Najib and Home Minister Syed Hamid have defended the ISA as essential to national security, while Najib told the Ambassador privately ISA should be retained but used more judiciously.

The GOM released 17 ISA detainees, among them 10 previously linked to terrorist groups, including Yazid Sufaat, from November 5 to December 4.

2.  (S) Comment:  The ISA is the cornerstone of Malaysia's CT effort and has allowed Special Branch to take successful preemptive action against suspected terrorists and their supporters.  Given the GOM's exclusive reliance on the ISA "crutch" and on Special Branch's role, police and prosecutors remain ill-prepared to investigate and bring to trial terrorist suspects (or prosecute other complex criminal conspiracies). 

The ISA also is subject to misuse for political ends and is an important insurance policy for maintaining UMNO in power.  For both CT and political reasons, the GOM will not readily give up the ISA.  We doubt that the increased political pressure and seeming swing in public opinion against the ISA, due in part to its misuse in September, will result in the ISA's amendment or revocation in the near future, absent the Opposition coming to power.

These developments, however, reinforce the conclusion (ref H) that Malaysia cannot take for granted the availability of the ISA as a CT tool in the long run.  It remains in the U.S. interest to encourage and assist Malaysia to develop an approach centered on prosecutions and convictions before an independent judiciary to combat terrorism.

3.  (C) Comment continued:  It is unclear to what extent outside political pressures played a direct role in the GOM's latest release of ISA detainees.  The decisions may have more to do with Syed Hamid's personal exercise of authority as Home Minister.  Syed Hamid has taken a more proactive role as Home Minister, compared to PM Abdullah who held the position through March 2008 and tended not to become involved in details.  End Summary and Comment.

4.  (C) The Malaysian government's use of the Internal Security Act (ISA), central to the GOM's intelligence-driven counterterrorism efforts, has come under increasing political pressure since the September ISA arrests of three persons based on political rather security considerations. 

The September 12 ISA detentions of an ethnic Chinese journalist, an ethnic Chinese Opposition MP (Teresa Kok), and a prominent blogger (Raja Petra Kamarudin) served the ruling UMNO party's immediate political purpose of sending a warning to opposition politicians and those considering defecting from BN, as some UMNO politicians have told us.  This came at a time when Anwar Ibrahim was publicly threatening to bring down the BN government via parliamentary crossovers by September 16. 

The arrests, however, also sparked unprecedented public criticism of the ISA, including from UMNO's ethnic minority partners within BN.  The Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), the key ethnic Chinese BN component party, reportedly threatened to leave BN unless the GOM released the Chinese journalist; the GOM complied within less than 24 hours (ref F).  Authorities freed MP Teresa Kok after seven days.  Home Minister Syed Hamid ordered a two-year ISA detention period for Raja Petra, who was freed on appeal in November in a surprise court ruling (see below).

5.  (C) Comment:  Unlike his predecessor Mahathir, PM Abdullah refrained from using the ISA for political purposes until December 2007 when police detained five leaders of the ethnic Indian activist group HINDRAF that organized large street protests.  The public viewed the GOM's September 2008 ISA arrests as more transparently political, in part because of the lack of public order concerns.  End Comment.

6.  (C) Political pressure against the ISA did not dissipate following the release of the first two of the three recent ISA detainees.  At least eight component parties from the governing BN coalition of 14 parties have since broken ranks with UMNO and called for amending or reviewing the grounds for the ISA, while several have supported the law's abolition. 

In late September MCA, BN's second largest party, called for "a comprehensive review of the ISA so that it will apply strictly to cases relating to terrorism and subversive elements," and also argued for the introduction of "checks and balances in the use of ISA." 

The leader of the Gerakan party, Koh Tsu Koon, called on the GOM to "abolish the ISA once and for all," and rely on the judicial system instead.

The leader of the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) also initially called for ISA to be abolished, and on December 1 said PPP would withdraw from BN unless if the ISA were not amended before the next election. 

In response, Prime Minister Abdullah called PPP's bluff and said the small party, which holds no seats in Parliament, could leave BN if it wished. 

BN MPs so far have not backed up their criticism of ISA with action.  In response to a petition circulated in Parliament for the review or repeal of ISA, only one BN MP signed his name.

7.  (C) The opposition party alliance (Pakatan Rakyat, or Pakatan) led by Anwar Ibrahim has vocally condemned ISA as undemocratic and unjust, and made the abolishment of ISA one of its highest profile policy goals.  A number of senior officials from Pakatan's three parties, Anwar's Peoples Justice Party (PKR), the Democratic Action Party (DAP), and the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) were detained under ISA during the era of former Prime Minister Mahathir. 

Not surprisingly, the three parties have vowed to revoke ISA if they come to power. 

"Abolish ISA" was the most prominent theme at PKR's annual party conference on November 29, which Polcouns observed.  The keynote event concluded with a focus on ISA and featured large screens that scrolled through the list of all 60-plus ISA detainees with the several thousand attendees reciting the detainees' names as they appeared.

Well-known blogger Raja Petra, released from ISA detention only days before, mounted the stage as the surprise guest of the grand finale.

8.  (SBU) On November 7, a High Court judge delivered an unanticipated legal blow to the GOM's wide discretion in using the ISA in a habeas corpus ruling that freed blogger Raja Petra. 

The Embassy obtained the full text of the judge's 22-page ruling.  ISA Section 8.B states "there shall be no judicial review in any court" of the Home Minister's exercise of "discretionary powers in accordance with this Act," except for compliance with procedural requirements.

The judge ruled, however, that the Home Minister decisions could not be "unfettered and arbitrary," allowing for the court to consider whether the Minister's ISA detention order was "in accordance with the Act," and its focus on threats to national security, including the national economy; threats to maintenance of essential services; and threats to the public emanating from a "substantial body of persons" who intend to change the government through unlawful means. In the case of Raja Petra, the judge concluded that the grounds for his detention did not fall within the purview of the ISA. 

The government has appealed the ruling and as of mid-December the appeal remains pending.

9.  (C) Many civil society groups took the opportunity over the past three months to highlight their standing opposition to the ISA, as well as other emergency ordinances that allow for detention without trial.  Both conservative and liberal Muslim NGOs called on the GOM to abolish the ISA, as did the inter-faith Consultative Forum that groups the leaders of all major religions except Islam. 

The National Human Rights Commission (SUHAKAM) chairman Abu Talib restated the commission's existing position, namely "detention without trial is against human rights principles; that's why we advised the Government years ago to repeal the ISA."

10.  (C) As questions over the ISA have mounted, Prime Minister Abdullah, his deputy and successor Najib, and other senior UMNO leaders defended the ISA as essential to national security.  In the wake of public criticism over the September ISA arrests, Home Minister Syed Hamid, who has authority under the ISA to approve detention orders, defended the Act as essential and stated clearly that "we have no plans to do away with ISA." 

In early December, Syed Hamid waved off criticisms, arguing that the ISA "has never been abused or used for politics."  He also commented that, "Malaysians sometimes don't know how lucky we are in that we have not experienced what is happening in Mumbai (the terrorist attack) and Bangkok (political unrest) now." 

He said the fact that there have been no post 9/11 terrors attacks in Malaysia was in part due to the ISA.  On December 15, Syed Hamid again publicly defended use of the ISA, stating, "More apt, faster and better to use the ISA... detention under the act is early action to prevent the security of the country from being adversely affected."

11.  (C) DPM Najib, who is anticipated to become Prime Minister in late March 2009, told the Ambassador privately on November 11 that the government continued to need the ISA, "even though there are civil liberty concerns," but should reserve ISA only for those who pose "serious threats, like terrorists" (ref A).  On December 8, PM Abdullah publicly rejected calls for amendments to the ISA.

12.  (SBU) In early December, local and international press reported that the GOM had released 17 ISA detainees from November 5 through December 4.  Of those released, 10 had been held for suspected links to Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, and/or the Darul Islam terrorist groups. 

The released terrorist suspects included Yazid Sufaat, who played an important role in Al Qaeda's anthrax development program, according to the 9/11 Commission.  The remaining seven persons released consisted of suspected foreign agents (2 persons), southern Thailand separatists (2), document forgers (2), and prominent blogger Raja Petra, according to an NGO that consistently and accurately monitors ISA detentions.

In his public remarks, Syed Hamid said those recently released ISA detainees had been rehabilitated and no longer posed a security threat to Malaysia.

13.  (S) Note:  Authorities had detained the terrorist suspects for periods between two and (in the case of Yazid Sufaat) seven years, for an average detention period of four years for the ten individuals.  Special Branch relies on a process for rehabilitating ISA detainees, and eventually releasing them under restricted and monitored conditions when judged necessary. 

The GOM has never attempted to prosecute any terrorist suspects, including those held under the ISA. This is due in large part to the fact that the GOM pursues almost exclusively an intelligence approach to CT, as opposed to a law enforcement approach that would involve criminal investigations, collection of legally admissible evidence, and development of cases for prosecution in the courts. 

In 2007, Malaysia amended anti-terrorism provisions in its penal code and criminal procedures code, but authorities have not yet utilized these provisions.  Malaysia also has a poor track record of prosecuting other complex criminal conspiracies, including drug trafficking cases, preferring instead to utilize the ISA and other emergency ordinances to detain suspects without trial.  End Note.

14.  (S) A well-known journalist contacted us in early December and said that officers of the Police Special Branch had complained to him that Home Minister Syed Hamid had ordered the recent releases of terrorist suspects without adequate consultation and in some cases against the recommendation of Special Branch. 

Australian and British diplomats, speaking with Polcouns December 16, stated that Syed Hamid, who is a lawyer by training, personally reviewed the dossiers of ISA detainees and was inclined to approve releases absent compelling justification from the Special Branch.

15.  (C) The Thai embassy contacted Poloff on December 15 to express concern over the release of two ISA detainees (Abdul Rahman bin Ahmad and Mat Tarmizi bin Shamsudin, who apparently are dual-citizens of Malaysia and Thailand) who had been held for their connection to the insurgency in southern Thailand. 

The Thai diplomat said Bangkok considered Abdul Rahman in particular to be a major player in the insurgency.  He noted that those released are required to remain in Malaysia and check in periodically with the police.

The Thai diplomat said he believed the GOM released the detainees in order to diffuse criticism of the ISA.  We learned that the Thai embassy also has contacted other Western embassies (UK, France, Australia) to express concern over the recent ISA releases.

KEITH

 

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