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Posted: 03 Nov 2012 10:35 AM PDT

Kita tahu UMNO cukup kuat di Johor dan orang Melayu Johor cukup tebal dengan semangat keUMNOan mereka. Bacaan harian mereka selepas Subuh selain Yasiin, ialah Utusan Malaysia dan tontonan mereka ialah TV3. Kita semua tahu jenis orang Melayu yang membaca dan menonton dua jenis media ini. Itulah yang menerangkan mengapa Melayu Johor sokong UMNO.

Namun, terdapat juga kelompok Melayu yang sedar bahawa sokongan membabi buta kepada UMNO adalah merugikan. Sokongan kepada manusia adalah sokongan bersyarat yakni qualified support bukannya absolute support. Kita menyokong kerajaan dan pemerintah selagi mereka bersikap adil.

Atas dasar itu, untuk negeri Johor cukup setakat 9-12 kerusi parlimen jatuh ketangan PR. Bila PR pegang Kerajaan Persekutuan, kita akan tahu asal usul MP dan ADUN UMNO. Belum sempat teh tarik segelas habis, mereka akan lompat masuk PR.

Biarlah mereka berada dalam alam mimpi mereka. Mereka tidak terbayang bahawa UMNO akan tewas. Tapi 2008 membuktikan bahawa UMNO tidaklah sekuat yang mereka sangkakan. Calon UMNO pun hanya memperolehi 2 juta undi orang Melayu. Majority Melayu sudah menolah UMNO. Ertinya, bumi di atas mana mereka berpijak sudah berganjak dan beralih. Profail pengundi telah berubah. Rakyat memiliki kesedaran social yang kian meningkat.

Pemerintah dan kerajaan tidak lagi di lihat sebagai sesuatu yang memaksa ke atas mereka; kerajaan dan pemerintah ada suatu wadah yang melaluinya, rakyat mencapai matlamat dan objektif-objektif tertentu. Ertinya, rakyat mulai sedar, bahawa baik atau jahat sebuah kerajaan bergantung kepada mereka yang membentuknya. Bila mereka sedar meraka yang sebenarnya berkuasa, maka kuasa untuk membetulkan keadaan pun ada dalam tangan mereka.

Maka hari ini, kesedaran sosial yang paling bernilai ialah kesedaran bahawa pemerintah yang adil adalah pemerintah yang disembah, pemerintah yang tidak adil adalah pemerintah yang disanggah. Sementara pemimpin UMNO korap dan bongkak, orang Melayu sudah bertambah yakin kepada diri mereka sendiri.

Tanda-tanda UMNO kalah sudah menjadi nyata. Orang UMNO tidak pernah sasau melakukan kekasaran, membuang poster lawan, menyimbah cat dan membaling batu, mengacau ceramah parti lawan, membuat ugutan fisikal, menyekat pergerakan pihak lawan dan sebagainya. UMNO Dato Onn sehingga UMNO Hussein Onn tidak pernah melakukan perkara ini.

Hari ini semua perkara ini suatu kebiasaan kepada ahli UMNO seolah olah pemimpin UMNO mengajar anak buah nya tidak disiplin. Ini semua menandakan UMNO sudah berada dalam keadaan cemas. UMNO sanggup mencetuskan kacau bilau apabila melihat zaman pemerintahannya akan berakhir.

Kalau UMNO mempunyai rekod yang baik seperti yang dipekikkan oleh Dato Najib, apakah yang hendak ditakutkan? Bukankah kita hanya perlu menunjukkan satu jari, semua masalah akan selesai?

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Splits in the Singapore elite

Posted: 02 Nov 2012 06:07 PM PDT

I contend that this is a most unlikely development in Singapore for three distinct reasons.

The first and main reason for this logic is that the Singapore elite is much more risk averse than the Taiwan elite ever was. Singapore is so much smaller than Taiwan; its economy is so much more fragile and vulnerable to the mood swings of international finance and markets, that such a split is unlikely unless the country itself is nearly on its last legs. Dissidents in Cabinet would be, in their minds, putting at risk the fundamentals that give the international financial and investment markets confidence in Singapore, and I do not believe that they would take such a risk.

The second reason I doubt the likelihood of such a scenario is a little counter-intuitive: Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has used the PAP's electoral setbacks in 2011 to consolidate his stature within in the elite. By effectively shifting the blame for the parliamentary losses onto others – most notably his own father – and by ensuring that he has been given credit for the result not being any worse than it was, he has now, for the first time, stepped out of his father's shadow and clearly established himself as the master of the situation. His party lost a significant amount of electoral ground in 2011, but Lee successfully stage-managed the narrative of the election after the event, beginning on election night itself, during which the Elections Department actively cooperated to allow him to mount the podium and claim victory as the government's white knight and saviour. He is now fully in charge of Cabinet and has used his new power ruthlessly to push aside the deadwood and the duds who had been pulling the party down.

Before the 2011 results there had been some dissident rumblings in Cabinet, but even then this did not amount to very much. Former Nominated MP Viswa Sadasivan told in interview in January 2011 that he had become used to government MPs and even one or two Cabinet members congratulating him for his forthright and highly critical speeches in Parliament – but they would not speak out themselves, nor even associate themselves with dissenting voices. This is decidedly not the stuff of which Cabinet splits are made!

The third reason I doubt the likelihood of a split in the elite is that the best chance for such a split came and went in the mid-1990s when Goh Chok Tong was prime minister. Goh tried to use his position as PM and his control of the Ministry of Finance through his close ally, Finance Minister Richard Hu, to wrest the reins of power from the Lee family – father and son. He was doing this through a deliberate campaign of supplanting the Lee family's patronage in the civil service and in the huge and powerful government-linked company (GLC) sector. The campaign promised to be particularly effective in the GLC sector.

The key instrument of patronage in this campaign was the secretive Directorship and Consultancy Appointments Council (DCAC) which at the time was responsible for the appointment of boards and executive positions across the whole of the GLC sector, and which operated under the authority of the Finance Minister Hu.

DAP's ham & eggs

Posted: 01 Nov 2012 04:22 PM PDT

Hardly surprising as the prerogative for "recommending" to HM The Agong to dissolve parliament (and thus initiating fresh elections) belongs to the current PM - a legitimate process sanctioned by the Constitution, a process no different to any Westminster styled constitutional democracy - who as we know (and he too knows) hasn't enjoyed the confidence of the majority of the people to call for one as yet. Yes, why rush to commit political suicide.

When you're as politically as f* up as poor Najib, and you have the constitutional rights to hold off for a wee while longer, why not, as the time until the final moments will permit you to:

a. work out some salvaging policies and programs (though I don't see any),

b. device some politically nefarious schemes, wakakaka,

c. hope the opposition will balls up through fighting among themselves or shooting themselves in their own feet (Hudud vs Secularism),

d. etc.

Regarding subpara 'c' above, the DAP is currently showing its internal division over the Karpal Singh's proposal of 'one person, one seat only at either federal or state level'.

DAP's loose cannon M Manoharan supports Karpal Singh's proposal

I both agree and disagree with Karpal's proposal.

I agree with Karpal because I opine that the DAP has grown exponentially in membership numbers where, as different from yesteryears, it now has more than adequate numbers of good and capable pollies to take on its share of state and federal seats with a different individual representative in each constituency.

If a senior DAP pollie hangs on to both a state and a federal seat, such an approach will deny and frustrate another capable party member who wants to make direct contributions as a people's representative. Frustration among party members in politics will ensure the DAP remains a small player.

OK, some new jump-on-wagon-ers to the party, having rushed to join the party since March 2008, may not be desirable (being seen as opportunists) while some new wannabes may also be moles. The DAP is notorious in its apprehension about such a possibility (of moles) which has been why its vetting process for pre-selection candidates is as tight as Midas' fist.

But look, there is no 100% guarantee in politics as demonstrated by the remarkable Madam Hee, who despite DAP's over-accommodation of and for her, went on to betray the party. Win some, lose some, and preferably win more than lose ... but in the end, there cannot be any watertight assurance of a party member's indivisible party loyalty.

But being apprehensive about some dodgy members like Madam Hee or another remarkable erstwhile (former-UMNO) member in Jelutong(?) doesn't mean there's no one else in a great party to call upon to take up a state of federal seat to be vacated by an existing MP-ADUN. The DAP should, nay, must increase its represenatives' gene pool.

However, I disagree with Karpal on his proposed sole exception, that Lim Guan Eng be allowed to stand at both state and federal levels. WTF for when Lim GE will again be the CM of Penang which automatically rules him out from federal ministership.

According to Article 43 of the Malaysian Constitution, ADUNs who are also MP cannot have it both ways, that is, by continuing to be ADUNs (and thus possibly MBs or CMs or State Exco members) while becoming federal ministers or deputy ministers. They have to choose between being a federal minister (or deputy minister) or an ADUN.

Thus, if Lim Guan Eng wants to continue being CM of Penang (thus has to an ADUN first), and most Penangites want him to, and I am confident he will be re-elected in the next state election to be an ADUN and consequentially the CM, then he can't be appointed as a federal minister (assuming Pakatan takes Putrajaya), though he may be an ordinary MP.

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In the shadow of strongmen

Posted: 01 Nov 2012 04:09 PM PDT

In the last few years, both Malaysia and Singapore have been undergoing political liberalisation, evident from the increasing parliamentary representation of the opposition and more open political discussion. Yet, with this opening, the challenges the two neighbours face in liberalising are becoming clearer. One of the main obstacles involves dealing with the legacies of Lee Kuan Yew and Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, as their imprint on politics continues to overshadow current transformations. How do the legacies of the two strongmen constrain contemporary political change?

Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir Mohamad were successful leaders, delivering economic progress and giving their countries international prominence. However, views of these leaders remain divided, with some lauding them as political strongmen who delivered development and stability and others highlighting their excesses. This debate will continue, and likely intensify over time. Still, few dispute the fact that the two leaders profoundly shaped the countries they led. In order to understand contemporary politics in both countries, we need to look beyond these leaders as individuals or their tenures and appreciate how the strongmen continue to shape the two societies.

The Strongmen Psyche

Lee Kuan Yew governed for 31 years, Mahathir 22. Both former leaders continue to play roles in politics, despite stepping down from office. Given their prominence, it is understandable that elements of their style of leadership have become deeply ingrained into the public consciousness. The most evident of these is fear. Fear is defined as an emotion induced by perceived threats and is part-and-parcel of the political landscape of strongman rule. It is not just about the fear caused by the use of the state apparatus through draconian laws for arbitrary arrest or the penalties for breaching the boundaries of what is deemed as unspeakable, it is also the routinisation of warnings and demonisation of the other.

For decades Malaysians and Singaporeans were encouraged to conform to set patterns of political behavior – to not question their leaders and follow. They were expected to fall in line, as the system was deemed the best for them. They were warned repeatedly to behave. Red lines – ubiquitously known as OB (out-of-bounds) markers in Singapore – were clearly drawn – not to criticise leaders, not to discuss 'sensitive' issues, or not to express alternative views openly. The end result was possible penalties, which ranged from outright arrest to quiet marginalisation. The actual number of arrests was low relative to other regimes, but such instances took on symbolic importance, especially given the relatively low populations of both countries. While fear has sharply dissipated in the post-strongman eras, it still permeates political life, especially among the generations that lived though these periods.

Fear of the state is just part of the story. During the strongman era, fear was used to buttress power. Threats from outside were a constant refrain. In Malaysia, these threats came from enemies in the form of George Soros, Jews or unknown forces of instability that could not be controlled. The threats also came from within. Mahathir was perhaps the most explicit on this in his book Malay Dilemma, which used sharp ethnic divisions as a source of internal instability. The push for Malay unity was used to fend off the other. In Singapore, the ethnic rubric was one of multiculturalism, but memories of the turbulent ethnic tensions of the 1950s and 1960s remained. Events such as 1969 in Malaysia or 1964 in Singapore continued as part of the political discourse, and still do today. There is unease, anxiety and concern about a return to the ethnic turbulence of the past that meshes with the subtle and sometimes not so subtle dimensions of fear.

Political liberalisation in both countries is constrained by fear and the baggage it brings. A key element of this baggage is mistrust. On an interpersonal level, race relations in both countries are strong – and this is despite a number of high profile and controversial racial comments that have recently received public attention, notably in Singapore. Yet, deep-down the niggling uncertainties of the 'other' so prominent in the strongman era remain.

Strongman Control Mode

This strongman legacy is not just about fear – it is also about control. The focus on a specific order was a feature of the strongman eras. The structure of this order varied in both societies, but the pattern of establishing the order was the same – it was to be defined by those in power. Space for alternative conceptualisations was minimised, as leaders set out the course for the country to follow. In many of these decisions, there was wisdom, while in others, less so. But the mode of engagement was the same – the 'government – a.k.a. leader – knows best'.

The strongman eras in Singapore and Malaysia's placed the state in a dominant position as the driver of society. In the economic realm, the state was to be the agent of change, usually in alliance with international business. This has meant that the space for domestic private business interests, especially small and medium-sized businesses, as an alternative engine of growth has been minimised. For multiple decades, public spending, allocations and priorities were set by those in power. This provided a powerful economic base for the control of society.

Dominance over the economic levers of power reinforced the strongmen's position politically. To challenge political power under strongman rule had the potential to undermine your economic fortunes. This dynamic is deeply rooted, as challenges to the status quo are seen to both backfire on those who engage in them and come at a high price. The legacy of this pattern continues, as those who speak out face marginalisation, and in some cases, outright demonisation. The attacks are particularly harsh on those who come from within the system and are seen to betray the incumbent's political base. The response to Anwar Ibrahim is illustrative.

Politically, the strongman mode of control was also characterised by a 'divide and rule' strategy of engaging opponents. As a result, civil societies in both countries are fragmented, wracked by internal suspicion. Those that were co-opted are distrusted by others who are seen as more confrontational. The strategy of division reinforced the position of the strongman leader, a feudal structure of personalised power around one man. Even today, centralised leadership is expected, with heavy burdens placed on the post-strongman leaders to perform and to 'be strong'. Today's leaders are constantly compared to the past. Power continues to be personalised, although in Singapore this is less about personality than persona.

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Kredit: www.malaysia-today.net

Ahad, 4 November 2012

Malaysia Today - Your Source of Independent News

Malaysia Today - Your Source of Independent News

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