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Kuat tidak semestinya menang, lemah tidak semestinya tewas
M’sia’s electoral system: Govt of the people? (2)
Najib, is your AG anti-Islam? Does your administration condone the vilification of Islam?

Kuat tidak semestinya menang, lemah tidak semestinya tewas

Posted: 02 Jul 2011 09:09 PM PDT

Ada pihak yang memberitahu yang kerajaan akan meneruskan penangkapan secara besar-besaran terhadap mereka yang bersimpati dengan Bersih semasa Najib tiada di dalam negara dan tidak tahulah samada berita itu benar atau sebaliknya. Apa yang dihasratkan oleh Bersih untuk meminta semua pihak bersama termasuk UMNO dan BN mengadakan rally itu telah dimomokan oleh pihak kerajaan sebagai perusuh dan pengancam keamanan dan tindakan memomokan itu semata-mata kerana takut kehilangan kuasa yang sangat besar nikmatnya itu.

Akhirnya tujuan untuk mengadakan rally secara aman itu telah menjadi isu anti establishment yang dicipta oleh pihak politik kerajaan itu. Hasilnya pihak kementerian dalam negeri telah mengharamkan pertubuhan Bersih ini dan itu mengusik banyak pihak dan rakyat. Penangkapan yang sebegitu ramai oleh pihak Polis itu telah menggunakan ordinan dharurat 1969 dan tidaklah diketahui apa kesudahan yang akan kita hadapi.

Hanya kita berdoa dan sentiasa berfikir secara rasioanl bagaimana rakyat untuk menghadapi tindakan pihak Polis yang dianggap dari segi moralnya sebagai 'high handed' ini. Jika Bersih di haramkan maka rally itu akan mudah digagalkan oleh pihak Polis dan saya tidak mahu ramai rakan-rakan yang menjadi mangsa oleh tangkapan pihak berkuasa.

Itulah sebabnya di dalam posting saya yang lepas saya mencadangkan supaya jika seseorang itu masih mahu menyokong Bersih elok diberikan sokongan itu dirumah sahaja. Banyak cara boleh kita lakukan. Oleh kerana pihak kerajaan telah menjadikan isu ini sebagai isu politik, dan sengaja meletakan rally ini sebagai rally anti kerajaan, maka sekali gus ianya menjadikan perhimpunan ini sebagai perhimpunan yang menyemarakan perasaan penentangan terhadap kita dan ini benar-benar menyebabkan kita kehilangan sokongan yang bertambah ketara dari orang ramai.

Segala usaha untuk mengembalikan sokongan ramai terhadap UMNO kembali gagal kerana tindakan negatif kita sendiri. Saya menganggap tindakan ini sebagai tindakan yang tidak berhidayah dan satu lagi yang nyata kekurangan yang ada kepada kita ialah 'wisdom'm sebagai pihak yang memerintah manusia yang berbagai macam ragam.

Pihak pemimpin-pemimpin UMNO khususnya tidak berupaya menghadapi krisis yang kecil, jauh sekali untuk menghadap krisis yang besar. UMNO telah menggalakan Perkasa untuk melakukan rally untuk menentang rally Bersih yang dari awalnya telah berterus terang untuk melakukannya secara aman. Apa yang dilakukan ini seolah-olah sengaja untuk menjadikan rally pada 9hb Julai ini untuk mengambil kesempatan bagi mengambil tindakan undang-undang terhadap mereka yang mereka (UMNO) tidak sebulu dengan mereka.

Apa yang mengganggu pemikiran kita ialah apabila memikirkan apalah 'consequence' buruk yang pihak kita sendiri akan hadapi. Jika ianya menghasilkan perasaan tidak senang kepada orang ramai rakyat tidak akan memberikan sokongan kepada kita lagi. Dari segi psikoloji nya tidak ada rakyat yang akan memberikan dukongan kepada pemerintah yang tidak tahu mengawal perasaan ramai. Tetapi apabila rakyat tidak berkeyakinan kita selalunya akan melakukan bermacam-macam perkara yang lebih tidak di sukai ramai.

Itulah sebabnya saya berulang kali menyatakan yang untung di dalam isu ini ialah parti-parti pembangkang. Kita tidak sedar parti-parti pembangkang mendapat sokongan orang ramai kerana sikap dan kelakuan kita sendiri. Parti-parti pembangkang tidak lagi payah berusaha kuat untuk memenangi hati rakyat kerana kerja itu semua telah dilakukan oleh pihak kita sendiri. Kita yang memperkuatkan parti pembangkang sebenarnya.

Kita tidak mampu untuk membuatkan orang ramai sayang kepada kita, sebaliknya kita hanya membuatkan rakyat takut kepada kita. Kalau kita berterusan menakutkan rakyat, kita mesti mengakui yang ketakutan itu tidak akan kekal lama. Rakyat akan memberontak di dalam jiwa masing-masing dan itu akan diterjemahkan kepada penolakan di dalam peti undi nanti.

Tetapi oleh kerana pandangan seperti ini tidak mendapat pertimbangan maka jika terbukti kebenaran kepada pandangan ini nanti, ianya mungkin sudah terlambat untuk membetulkan keadaannya.

Posted: 02 Jul 2011 04:07 PM PDT

IV. The apportionment and delimitation of constituencies – Gerrymandering as norm

The Federal Constitution places the responsibility of delimiting constituencies⁶⁸ on the Election Commission.⁶⁹The delimitation of constituencies ought to be done according to clear guidelines by a neutral and independent Election Commission because electoral results can differ greatly according to how the lines are drawn. There are broadly two ways in which the power to delimit may be abused: firstly, mal-apportionment (where the size of the constituencies delimited are grossly disproportionate) and, secondly, gerrymandering (where a delimitation is made with a view to unfairly favouring a particular political party).⁷⁰

Unfortunately, the Federal Constitution does not adequately spell out the guiding principles under which the Election Commission should carry out its duty in delimitation exercises.⁷¹ Vague and general guidelines give rise to inherent ambiguities that could work unfairly against contesting candidates. The vague usage of expressions such as "regard ought to be had", "inconveniences attendant on alterations of constituencies", and "maintenance of local ties"⁷² without further elaboration leaves much to be desired in assuring consistent and fair delimitation practices.

It would hence not come as a surprise that the electoral process is susceptible to abuse through arbitrary and capricious definitions adopted by the Election Commission of the day. For instance, nothing in the guidelines obliges the Election Commission to strictly adhere to the equal-sized constituency doctrine in the delineation process. This gives rise to mal-apportionment where disproportionately-sized constituencies can be delineated to favour a particular political party.

The Malaysian electoral system fails to adhere to the one-vote-one-value principle in its elections. A rural weightage principle is constitutionally provided for in the Thirteenth Schedule of the Federal Constitution,⁷³ thereby augmenting the value of rural electors' votes and, as a result, diluting the perceived advantage (in terms of accessibility, connectivity and communication) their urban counterparts carry over them.⁷⁴

However, the Federal Constitution does not define "rural" and "urban" for the purposes of constituency delineation.⁷⁵Not once has the Election Commission attempted to define what "rural" and "urban" areas actually mean in the course of the delineation exercises.

The problem is made worse by the removal of the limitation on the maximum allowable difference in the number of electorates between the rural and the urban constituencies.⁷⁶

Prior to 1957, the maximum allowable difference between the number of electorates in a rural and an urban district was 33 per cent.⁷⁷ Following the Reid Commission's recommendations in 1957, the limitation was reduced to 15 per cent. This produced a closer adherence to an equal-sized constituency doctrine. However, this limitation was relaxed to 50 per cent in 1962 ⁷⁸ and eventually entirely removed in 1973,⁷⁹ resulting in Malay-based parties being given an electoral advantage.⁸⁰

Some empirical analysis on electoral trends between 1960 and 1999 is sufficient to illustrate the Malay electoral advantage. The Malay population in Peninsular Malaysia was relatively stable, measuring to an average of around 55 per cent of the entire Peninsular Malaysian population.⁸¹ One would have expected that this would be proportionally mirrored in the corresponding percentage of Malay-majority constituencies. However, it was observed that notwithstanding the relatively constant percentage of the Malay population, the percentage of Malay-majority constituencies has seen a consistent increase over the years from the 1959 election to the 1999 election.⁸² This trend holds true at the Federal level as well.⁸³

One possible explanation for such an electoral pattern is the increasingly liberal franchise rules flowing from the Federation's gradual move towards liberalisation of citizenship requirements over the decades.⁸⁴ This invariably resulted in decreasing the enfranchisement advantage that the Malays had over other minority ethnic groups. The ruling coalition saw the need to counterbalance this effect by adjusting the scale to maintain its electoral advantage over other opposition parties representing the minority non-Malay electorate. This could only be brought about through carefully engineered constituency re-delineations in a way that would enhance the political control of Malay-based political parties.⁸⁵

With respect to Sabah and Sarawak, political competition is heavily skewed in favour of the Muslim bumiputras (including the Malays) vis-à-vis non-Muslim bumiputras and other ethnic groups. This has been made possible through a grossly disproportionate advantage given to the former that devalues the latter's votes more drastically than the rural weightage imposed in Peninsular Malaysia.

In both states, no electorally advantaged community constituted the majority in their state constituencies.⁸⁶ Malay-based political parties had the most to gain from this. Again, the success of Malay-based political parties in Sabah and Sarawak⁸⁷ would not have been possible without biased re-delineation practices.

The rural weightage principle would have become the Umno-led coalition's absolute trump card were it not for the opposition PAS (Parti Islam SeMalaysia). PAS is a predominantly pro-Islam Malay political party which primarily aims to attract Malay-Muslim votes. As such, the rural weightage principle becomes a double-edged sword in PAS-contested constituencies.

Umno runs a considerable risk of losing out to PAS, as evidenced by PAS's historical success in diluting Umno dominance in the 1999 and 2008 elections. In the 1999 election, PAS secured a total of 98 out of 394 seats in both the Federal and State legislatures in Peninsular Malaysia, posing a real threat to the BN.⁸⁸

In 2004, Umno's apparent stratagem against the PAS came in the form of mal-apportionment and gerrymandering in the 2003 constituency re-delineation.⁸⁹ The opposition charged, inter alia, that the effect of the constituency review was to diversify the ethnic composition in PAS-held constituencies so as to reduce PAS's chances of securing victory in the 2004 election.⁹⁰ True enough, it turned out that PAS suffered a huge setback, losing control over the state of Terengganu and securing only a marginal victory in Kelantan with a narrow majority of 24 out of 45 seats.⁹¹

With respect to one of the most contentious states,⁹²Kedah,⁹³ it was shown that "[t[he 2002 delimitation process involved moving 'safe areas' in traditional Umno strongholds and non-Malays seats into constituencies that were vulnerable to the opposition and changing boundaries beyond the usual administrative areas in order to create constituencies that would strengthen the BN's electoral position."⁹⁴

Again, the 2002 re-delimitation exercise demonstrated how Umno became the beneficiary of a tactical dilution-through-diversification approach against PAS-held state constituencies in Kedah. Non-Malay wards deemed to be the BN's "safe state seats" were fused with PAS-held constituencies in the redrawing of boundaries.⁹⁵ For instance, the cross-administrative district transplantation of the Gurun state seat to the parliamentary state seat of Yan (renamed Jerai) was cited as a particularly egregious case of gerrymandering, the intention of which was to defeat PAS which previously won the seat in Yan by a slim majority of 0.7 per cent of the votes cast.⁹⁶ The political impact of importing the "safe votes" from Gurun to Yan essentially boosted the BN's electoral strength by an estimated 5,233 ⁹⁷ votes.⁹⁸

A similar pattern was observed in the parliamentary seats of Pokok Sena, Kuala Kedah and Baling.⁹⁹ The parliamentary seat of Alor Setar (which previously gave the BN an overwhelming victory of 14,384 votes) was employed as a buffer to absorb the state seat of Telok Kechai, neutralising the electoral disadvantage it provided the BN (in the parliamentary seat of Kuala Kedah) in the 1999 election.¹⁰⁰ The result of the 2004 election, as one might have expected, was a crushing defeat for PAS.¹⁰¹

A revival of the limitation on the variation in the numbers of electorates between rural and urban constituencies has to be the primary focus of reform. It is not logical to assume that rural areas invariably remain rural in light of the relentless pace of urbanisation in Malaysia. This is sufficient to justify imposing a limitation – with the prospect of increasing equalisation – on the variation in electorate size between rural and urban areas.

As mentioned earlier, constitutional amendments over the years have gradually eroded the Election Commission's status as an independent administrator of the electoral process. For instance, the dissatisfaction by the Alliance over the Election Commission's Report of 1960 to re-delineate constituencies and reduce the number of seats in the House of Representatives from 104 to 100 was reversed by a constitutional amendment passed in Parliament.¹⁰²

This showed how easily the Election Commission's actions in delimitation could be reversed by dissatisfied political parties in power. This 'thwarting mechanism' makes a convenient tool for the ruling party to fine-tune any changes brought by the Election Commission to its own political advantage. The Election Commission's powers to delimit constituencies were also seriously constrained with the addition of the Thirteenth Schedule to the Federal Constitution, which effectively confined the Election Commission to reviewing only the division of the Federation and states into constituencies and recommending necessary changes.¹⁰³

Also, the Election Commission's recommendations are now required to be submitted to the Prime Minister who reserves the right to alter the recommendations even before they are submitted to the House of Representatives.¹⁰⁴ If the House of Representatives does not accept the recommendations, the Prime Minister may amend it "after such consultation with the Election Commission as he may consider necessary".¹⁰⁵ The recommendations for delimitation need only be objected to by one-half of the members in the House of Representatives, and neither the Senate nor the Upper House (Dewan Negara) need to be consulted.¹⁰⁶

Even though the public may under appropriate conditions submit its objection to any recommendations proposed, thereby obliging the Election Commission to conduct a local enquiry in respect of the relevant constituencies,¹⁰⁷ the Election Commission may not conduct more than two such local enquiries.¹⁰⁸

Other later changes¹⁰⁹ include a prescriptive approach undertaken by Parliament as a prerogative to apportion the seats amongst the states of Peninsular Malaysia,¹¹⁰ as well as the removal of the limitation in the variation in electorate numbers between the rural and urban constituencies.¹¹¹ The exercise of the Election Commission's powers has since been relegated to the residual task of delineating constituencies within every state. The more important macro prerogative of apportioning seats in the House of Representatives is acquired by Parliament.

More recent changes¹¹² have further relaxed the rules regarding periodic review of constituencies by allowing a special review of constituencies to be undertaken for any state, or part of a state, whenever the House of Representatives or any state assembly varies the number of its seats.¹¹³ Additionally, the upper limit for mandatory periodic review of constituencies has been removed, giving rise to the possibility that constituencies may turn static should the Election Commission decline to initiate a review. The consequence of these changes is to enable the ruling party to effect any change to the constituencies at practically any time.

This substantial whittling down of the constitutional role of the Election Commission and the considerable transfer of constitutional power to Parliament runs counter to the notion of an independent and effective Election Commission, capable of discharging the independent and neutral administration of elections.¹¹⁴

Posted: 02 Jul 2011 08:21 AM PDT

No elaboration on when and how she is supposed to have made the threat.

A vile and unsubstantiated allegation.

I've known Ambiga for over a decade now and have known her to always be most respectful of all faiths and beliefs, without exception.

I'm not alone. Many members of the Bar will bear testimony to this.

Perhaps Najib should desist in unsubstantiated attacks against Ambiga and explain why charges of sedition for a most vile and filthy attack on the faith of the Malays in this country by Syeditious Akbar ali were dropped by the Attorney General's chambers.

The charge sheet, in PDF, is linked below again for your ease of reference.

Charge Sheet against Seditious Akbar Ali

You will note that it is dated 6th May, 2008 and signed by DPP Mohamed Hanafiah bin Zakaria, the same day, according to Syeditious post dated 18th October, 2010, that he was charged in court.

It is fair to assume that someone in the AG's chambers had, before Syeditious was charged, scrutinized the investigation papers submitted by the police authorities and had formed the view that Syeditious comments were indeed seditious and warranted the preferring of charges.

Hence the charges in court on 6th May, 2008 upon the terms as appear in the charge sheet.

And I cannot imagine that anyone who has since read the full tenor of Syeditious comments, however much they disliked the sedition laws, would argue that he did not deserve to be charged for such an insensitive and hateful attack.

In my related post yesterday, I had shared how, after Syeditious had received advise of legal counsel, he had asked that no moves be made to raise techncal objections until he gave further instructions, and when those instructions finally came, it was that no such technical objections were to be taken as the case against him would be dropped.

As Syeditious had predicted, the charges were subsequently dropped.

READ MORE HERE

Kredit: www.malaysia-today.net

Ahad, 3 Julai 2011

Malaysia Today - Your Source of Independent News

Malaysia Today - Your Source of Independent News

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