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Posted: 02 Nov 2012 06:07 PM PDT

I contend that this is a most unlikely development in Singapore for three distinct reasons.

The first and main reason for this logic is that the Singapore elite is much more risk averse than the Taiwan elite ever was. Singapore is so much smaller than Taiwan; its economy is so much more fragile and vulnerable to the mood swings of international finance and markets, that such a split is unlikely unless the country itself is nearly on its last legs. Dissidents in Cabinet would be, in their minds, putting at risk the fundamentals that give the international financial and investment markets confidence in Singapore, and I do not believe that they would take such a risk.

The second reason I doubt the likelihood of such a scenario is a little counter-intuitive: Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has used the PAP's electoral setbacks in 2011 to consolidate his stature within in the elite. By effectively shifting the blame for the parliamentary losses onto others – most notably his own father – and by ensuring that he has been given credit for the result not being any worse than it was, he has now, for the first time, stepped out of his father's shadow and clearly established himself as the master of the situation. His party lost a significant amount of electoral ground in 2011, but Lee successfully stage-managed the narrative of the election after the event, beginning on election night itself, during which the Elections Department actively cooperated to allow him to mount the podium and claim victory as the government's white knight and saviour. He is now fully in charge of Cabinet and has used his new power ruthlessly to push aside the deadwood and the duds who had been pulling the party down.

Before the 2011 results there had been some dissident rumblings in Cabinet, but even then this did not amount to very much. Former Nominated MP Viswa Sadasivan told in interview in January 2011 that he had become used to government MPs and even one or two Cabinet members congratulating him for his forthright and highly critical speeches in Parliament – but they would not speak out themselves, nor even associate themselves with dissenting voices. This is decidedly not the stuff of which Cabinet splits are made!

The third reason I doubt the likelihood of a split in the elite is that the best chance for such a split came and went in the mid-1990s when Goh Chok Tong was prime minister. Goh tried to use his position as PM and his control of the Ministry of Finance through his close ally, Finance Minister Richard Hu, to wrest the reins of power from the Lee family – father and son. He was doing this through a deliberate campaign of supplanting the Lee family's patronage in the civil service and in the huge and powerful government-linked company (GLC) sector. The campaign promised to be particularly effective in the GLC sector.

The key instrument of patronage in this campaign was the secretive Directorship and Consultancy Appointments Council (DCAC) which at the time was responsible for the appointment of boards and executive positions across the whole of the GLC sector, and which operated under the authority of the Finance Minister Hu.

DAP's ham & eggs

Posted: 01 Nov 2012 04:22 PM PDT

Hardly surprising as the prerogative for "recommending" to HM The Agong to dissolve parliament (and thus initiating fresh elections) belongs to the current PM - a legitimate process sanctioned by the Constitution, a process no different to any Westminster styled constitutional democracy - who as we know (and he too knows) hasn't enjoyed the confidence of the majority of the people to call for one as yet. Yes, why rush to commit political suicide.

When you're as politically as f* up as poor Najib, and you have the constitutional rights to hold off for a wee while longer, why not, as the time until the final moments will permit you to:

a. work out some salvaging policies and programs (though I don't see any),

b. device some politically nefarious schemes, wakakaka,

c. hope the opposition will balls up through fighting among themselves or shooting themselves in their own feet (Hudud vs Secularism),

d. etc.

Regarding subpara 'c' above, the DAP is currently showing its internal division over the Karpal Singh's proposal of 'one person, one seat only at either federal or state level'.

DAP's loose cannon M Manoharan supports Karpal Singh's proposal

I both agree and disagree with Karpal's proposal.

I agree with Karpal because I opine that the DAP has grown exponentially in membership numbers where, as different from yesteryears, it now has more than adequate numbers of good and capable pollies to take on its share of state and federal seats with a different individual representative in each constituency.

If a senior DAP pollie hangs on to both a state and a federal seat, such an approach will deny and frustrate another capable party member who wants to make direct contributions as a people's representative. Frustration among party members in politics will ensure the DAP remains a small player.

OK, some new jump-on-wagon-ers to the party, having rushed to join the party since March 2008, may not be desirable (being seen as opportunists) while some new wannabes may also be moles. The DAP is notorious in its apprehension about such a possibility (of moles) which has been why its vetting process for pre-selection candidates is as tight as Midas' fist.

But look, there is no 100% guarantee in politics as demonstrated by the remarkable Madam Hee, who despite DAP's over-accommodation of and for her, went on to betray the party. Win some, lose some, and preferably win more than lose ... but in the end, there cannot be any watertight assurance of a party member's indivisible party loyalty.

But being apprehensive about some dodgy members like Madam Hee or another remarkable erstwhile (former-UMNO) member in Jelutong(?) doesn't mean there's no one else in a great party to call upon to take up a state of federal seat to be vacated by an existing MP-ADUN. The DAP should, nay, must increase its represenatives' gene pool.

However, I disagree with Karpal on his proposed sole exception, that Lim Guan Eng be allowed to stand at both state and federal levels. WTF for when Lim GE will again be the CM of Penang which automatically rules him out from federal ministership.

According to Article 43 of the Malaysian Constitution, ADUNs who are also MP cannot have it both ways, that is, by continuing to be ADUNs (and thus possibly MBs or CMs or State Exco members) while becoming federal ministers or deputy ministers. They have to choose between being a federal minister (or deputy minister) or an ADUN.

Thus, if Lim Guan Eng wants to continue being CM of Penang (thus has to an ADUN first), and most Penangites want him to, and I am confident he will be re-elected in the next state election to be an ADUN and consequentially the CM, then he can't be appointed as a federal minister (assuming Pakatan takes Putrajaya), though he may be an ordinary MP.

READ MORE HERE

In the shadow of strongmen

Posted: 01 Nov 2012 04:09 PM PDT

In the last few years, both Malaysia and Singapore have been undergoing political liberalisation, evident from the increasing parliamentary representation of the opposition and more open political discussion. Yet, with this opening, the challenges the two neighbours face in liberalising are becoming clearer. One of the main obstacles involves dealing with the legacies of Lee Kuan Yew and Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, as their imprint on politics continues to overshadow current transformations. How do the legacies of the two strongmen constrain contemporary political change?

Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir Mohamad were successful leaders, delivering economic progress and giving their countries international prominence. However, views of these leaders remain divided, with some lauding them as political strongmen who delivered development and stability and others highlighting their excesses. This debate will continue, and likely intensify over time. Still, few dispute the fact that the two leaders profoundly shaped the countries they led. In order to understand contemporary politics in both countries, we need to look beyond these leaders as individuals or their tenures and appreciate how the strongmen continue to shape the two societies.

The Strongmen Psyche

Lee Kuan Yew governed for 31 years, Mahathir 22. Both former leaders continue to play roles in politics, despite stepping down from office. Given their prominence, it is understandable that elements of their style of leadership have become deeply ingrained into the public consciousness. The most evident of these is fear. Fear is defined as an emotion induced by perceived threats and is part-and-parcel of the political landscape of strongman rule. It is not just about the fear caused by the use of the state apparatus through draconian laws for arbitrary arrest or the penalties for breaching the boundaries of what is deemed as unspeakable, it is also the routinisation of warnings and demonisation of the other.

For decades Malaysians and Singaporeans were encouraged to conform to set patterns of political behavior – to not question their leaders and follow. They were expected to fall in line, as the system was deemed the best for them. They were warned repeatedly to behave. Red lines – ubiquitously known as OB (out-of-bounds) markers in Singapore – were clearly drawn – not to criticise leaders, not to discuss 'sensitive' issues, or not to express alternative views openly. The end result was possible penalties, which ranged from outright arrest to quiet marginalisation. The actual number of arrests was low relative to other regimes, but such instances took on symbolic importance, especially given the relatively low populations of both countries. While fear has sharply dissipated in the post-strongman eras, it still permeates political life, especially among the generations that lived though these periods.

Fear of the state is just part of the story. During the strongman era, fear was used to buttress power. Threats from outside were a constant refrain. In Malaysia, these threats came from enemies in the form of George Soros, Jews or unknown forces of instability that could not be controlled. The threats also came from within. Mahathir was perhaps the most explicit on this in his book Malay Dilemma, which used sharp ethnic divisions as a source of internal instability. The push for Malay unity was used to fend off the other. In Singapore, the ethnic rubric was one of multiculturalism, but memories of the turbulent ethnic tensions of the 1950s and 1960s remained. Events such as 1969 in Malaysia or 1964 in Singapore continued as part of the political discourse, and still do today. There is unease, anxiety and concern about a return to the ethnic turbulence of the past that meshes with the subtle and sometimes not so subtle dimensions of fear.

Political liberalisation in both countries is constrained by fear and the baggage it brings. A key element of this baggage is mistrust. On an interpersonal level, race relations in both countries are strong – and this is despite a number of high profile and controversial racial comments that have recently received public attention, notably in Singapore. Yet, deep-down the niggling uncertainties of the 'other' so prominent in the strongman era remain.

Strongman Control Mode

This strongman legacy is not just about fear – it is also about control. The focus on a specific order was a feature of the strongman eras. The structure of this order varied in both societies, but the pattern of establishing the order was the same – it was to be defined by those in power. Space for alternative conceptualisations was minimised, as leaders set out the course for the country to follow. In many of these decisions, there was wisdom, while in others, less so. But the mode of engagement was the same – the 'government – a.k.a. leader – knows best'.

The strongman eras in Singapore and Malaysia's placed the state in a dominant position as the driver of society. In the economic realm, the state was to be the agent of change, usually in alliance with international business. This has meant that the space for domestic private business interests, especially small and medium-sized businesses, as an alternative engine of growth has been minimised. For multiple decades, public spending, allocations and priorities were set by those in power. This provided a powerful economic base for the control of society.

Dominance over the economic levers of power reinforced the strongmen's position politically. To challenge political power under strongman rule had the potential to undermine your economic fortunes. This dynamic is deeply rooted, as challenges to the status quo are seen to both backfire on those who engage in them and come at a high price. The legacy of this pattern continues, as those who speak out face marginalisation, and in some cases, outright demonisation. The attacks are particularly harsh on those who come from within the system and are seen to betray the incumbent's political base. The response to Anwar Ibrahim is illustrative.

Politically, the strongman mode of control was also characterised by a 'divide and rule' strategy of engaging opponents. As a result, civil societies in both countries are fragmented, wracked by internal suspicion. Those that were co-opted are distrusted by others who are seen as more confrontational. The strategy of division reinforced the position of the strongman leader, a feudal structure of personalised power around one man. Even today, centralised leadership is expected, with heavy burdens placed on the post-strongman leaders to perform and to 'be strong'. Today's leaders are constantly compared to the past. Power continues to be personalised, although in Singapore this is less about personality than persona.

READ MORE HERE

Najib the Delayer

Posted: 31 Oct 2012 03:57 PM PDT

Let us understand Fabius before we return to Najib's political strategy.

Between the years 218 to 201 BC Rome and the north African city-state of Carthage were engaged in the Second Punic War for control over the Mediterranean.The great Carthaginian general Hannibal rampaged across the Italian peninsula for over 15 years, inflicting crushing military defeats upon Rome and causing political upheaval by plundering the countryside and turning Rome's provincial Italian allies against her.

Hannibal's tactical prowess was so formidable that Fabius reasoned that direct military engagement with him was foolhardy. Instead, Fabius opted for a form of guerrilla warfare by refusing pitched battles, settling instead on sniping at Hannibal's stragglers and supply lines.

While Fabius' strategy denied Hannibal the political glory of military victories, he in turn was criticised in the Roman senate for such a 'cowardly' approach. His rivals named him 'Cunctator', which sounds ruder than it is, for it merely means 'Delayer' in Latin.

Whilst strategically cunning, Fabius' approach was politically flawed because it ran against the highly aggressive Roman mindset. In 217 BC, after his six-month term as dictator expired, Fabius' strategy was not renewed. Instead, the new consul Gaius Terentius Varro rallied popular support for a head on clash of arms with Hannibal.

The result was the battle of Cannae, which has gone down in history as one of the most perfect examples of battlefield tactics. Some 86,000 Romans and their allies faced off against a smaller Carthaginian force of 50,000 men.

The course of the battle illustrates the prudence of Fabius' decision to avoid a direct clash with Hannibal.

The more numerous Roman army was completely encircled by the Carthaginian forces. The result was an absolute slaughter. Nearly 78,000 Romans – one-fifth of the men of military age – may have died that day against only 6,000 to 8,000 of Hannibal's men who perished.

It was a crushing defeat for Rome, but for reasons which remain debated to this day, Hannibal decided not to lay siege to Rome and instead focused on weakening her alliances with the various Italian tribes.

Roman defeat at Cannae was followed by a return to the Fabian strategy. Rome's military comeback would only occur under the generalship of Publius Cornelius Scipio in 210 BC. Scipio was Hannibal's greatest student for he had learned his military lessons by surviving several of Hannibal's triumphs, including Cannae.

Hannibal's grand strategy was to carry the war against Rome to Italy, wreak military havoc and use that to politically fracture Rome's system of alliances with the Italian tribes that kept her dominant and supplied much of her military power.

Scipio applied the same strategy to the Carthaginian empire. Carthage's main military strength came from allies in Spain and Numidia (a Berber kingdom in western Tunisia). Despite opposition from the cautious Fabius, Scipio took the war first to Spain and then to Africa. The Spanish forces were defeated and the Numidians, with their crack cavalry, induced to defect from Carthage.

When Hannibal and Scipio finally faced off in the plains of Zama south of Carthage (near modern Tunis), the Carthaginian forces lacked their former strength. Scipio now brought his learning of Hannibal to bear and successfully anticipated many of the latter's tactics. The result was Hannibal's first defeat and the end of the war.

When faced with a superior foe Fabius' strategy of delaying made sense as long as Rome was unable to produce a decisive military answer to Hannibal. Ironically, it was Hannibal's very success that forged his nemesis, Scipio.

Both relied on a mix of direct confrontation and indirect disruption of their opponent's alliance networks. Only Scipio was able to produce decisive victory by combining both military and political strategy. The difference was due, in part, to the contrasting psychologies of the Roman and Carthaginian senates.

The historian Polybius argued that Rome's determination outweighed that of Carthage because the Romans personally fought for their empire and freedom whilst Carthage employed mercenaries to achieve the same. The Romans had the fortitude to withstand defeats far beyond conventional expectation – witness Cannae – whereas Carthaginian resolve was not as strong.

In Malaysia today Prime Minister Najib Razak, by delaying elections for the last three years, has employed a Fabian strategy of avoiding decisive confrontation with a strong foe.

Whilst the twelfth general election of 2008 was not a decisive loss for the UMNO-dominated Barisan Nasional (BN), it denied them a two-thirds majority in Parliament, left several of UMNO's allies severely weakened, and was treated by UMNO as a moral defeat.

Somewhat like Hannibal, Anwar Ibrahim has focused on sapping BN's other allies away. The abortive 'September 16^th' plan of 2009 – to win government via defections of BN lawmakers to Anwar's Pakatan Rakyat (PR) – was nipped in the bud, but the basic strategy has continued alongside efforts to woo the general voter.

Like Scipio's mirroring strategy, Najib's response was the fall of the PR-led state government of Perak, which ensued from the defection of several state lawmakers to a 'BN-friendly' stance. Similar moves were played at the Parliamentary level.

The many by-elections since 2008 and political surveys have shown that Malaysia is almost evenly divided between the Pakatan Rakyat and Barisan Nasional coalitions, with the balance towards BN.

In the impending thirteenth general elections (GE13) much will rest on electoral technicalities (rural weighting, gerrymandering, phantom voters, etc.) and the favour of new voters.

Both PR and BN have been fighting on similar ground. When the hot air about ethno-racial politics clears, the main arguments are about who is fit to govern and who will deliver the most wealth into Malaysians' pockets.

It is rumoured that Najib's Fabian approach has earned him criticism from UMNO's conservative warlords. It has also generated frustration amongst voters, who are now weary of a three-year long election season.

It is here that the analogy between Fabius and Najib breaks down. Fabius was willing to champion an unpopular strategy to save his city from defeat even though his career suffered.

Elections are also different from battles in that elections cannot be indefinitely deferred, short of suspending the democratic process and installing a dictatorship via a state of emergency. Najib Razak's father, Tun Razak effectively did so following UMNO's last major loss in 1969.

However, BN has been capable of winning GE13 for some time now. The question has more been whether Najib could deliver a decisive enough victory that would secure his own political career from challenge. After all, this was the pretext that Najib employed to depose Abdullah Badawi in 2009.

The uncertainty of winning back the symbolically potent two-thirds majority in Parliament has surely been weighing heavily on Najib's mind. Voters have left BN because they want better governance, less wastage, and more justice.

BN can at best deliver these demands to a limited degree, and then only inconsistently. The newer Pakatan state governments have largely proven that such gains can be made provided internal political inertia is minimal and political will is present.

Yet the popular vote is not enough. In order to form a new federal government, a coalition needs to secure the majority of seats in Parliament, which is not the same thing as a majority of voters. PR faces a struggle to break into the so-called 'fixed deposits' of Sabah and Sarawak, but enough headway has been made that Najib may continue to delay. There is lately even a sense that victory could tip Pakatan's way.

It now seems likely that elections will happen in 2013 if decisive, rather than mere, victory is Najib's goal, and his faith in cash handouts to voters, and perhaps other undisclosed measures, is strong. Or else, with the opportunities for decisive victory slipping away with time, he may simply be reconciled to enjoy high office until his term runs out.

READ MORE HERE

I Just Met A Very Racist Chinese!

Posted: 30 Oct 2012 04:39 PM PDT

Yesterday, I arrived KLIA from KK and my wife from Phnom Penh, after visiting our daughter and grandchildren there.My wife's plane arrived 20 minutes earlier but she said she would wait for me so we can take the same taxi to our hotel.

I bought a ticket for a limousine at the airport. More often than not, most limousines that I can remember taking before have had Malay drivers, but for today, we have a Chinese driver.

On our way to the city I noticed the driver constantly talking in Chinese to his friend over the VHF radio. Half way to the city it started to rain heavily and my wife started talking to the taxi driver in Cantonese. There was a moment of silence and a slow response from the driver and I can't help noticing that blood have rust to his head, he was red-faced and shocked.

I asked my wife what she said that have made him blushed so badly, not that his colour is much brighter than pale. She said she asked him whether it is always raining in KL and told him to drive carefully as the road might be slippery. I asked why he looked shocked and almost speechless?

My wife said "I will tell you when we get to the hotel."

Here go the story.

While this guy was talking to his friend on the VHF radio his friend asked him whether he is taking passengers to Genting and he said no, that he is going to the city and that his fare are two lalat (flies), husband and wife going to a five-star hotel. He didn't realise my wife fully understands the exchanges in Cantonese all this while.

My wife is half Malay and half Chinese and speaks fluent Cantonese, Hakka and Mandarin. I scowled her for not telling me while we were still in the car and she told me what she did was more appropriate than me picking a fight with a low-life taxi driver.

She told me she purposely spoke to him in Cantonese to embarrasse him, which she did well to impound his rudeness without being rude herself and probably taught this low-life a good lesson that there are non-Chinese looking people who understand and speak Chinese.

This brings us back to the subject of stereotyping all Chinese as being racist, which I believe is more cultural than actual racism.

To the Chinese, anything they find repulsive will constitute name-calling, which bring us to Chinese against Chinese.

READ MORE HERE

Kredit: www.malaysia-today.net

Sabtu, 3 November 2012

Malaysia Today - Your Source of Independent News

Malaysia Today - Your Source of Independent News

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