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Posted: 08 Sep 2011 09:57 PM PDT

With their sights locked on Putrajaya, the opposition parties are hustling to contest more seats in the next general election, writes ZUBAIDAH ABU BAKAR

Azmin has come out in defence of his party's decision to field candidates in seats that slipped from its hands due to defections, insisting that PKR could assure its allies that the candidates identified to contest those seats were credible, having gone through strict screening to avoid a recurrence of "jumping ship".

Zubaidah Abu Bakar, New Straits Times

AT the Pas annual assembly in June, a delegate from Terengganu called on the Islamist party to ensure a fair allocation of parliamentary and state seats according to the relative strengths of the opposition coalition's components.

It was to secure victory in the 13th general election, said Kuala Nerus Pas division chief Shukrimun Samsuddin when debating Datuk Seri Abdul Hadi Awang's presidential address at the 57th muktamar.

Fielding candidates in the impending national polls, which opposition leaders believe will be called this year, has increasingly become a concern among the three component parties, given the changing political scenario.

Seat negotiations in several states, including Penang, Johor and Perak, have moved at a snail's pace as each party stakes out its claims.

The coalition had wanted to wrap up negotiations last month to allow the election machinery to get into gear.

A circular containing guidelines on negotiations, signed by Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) secretary-general Saifuddin Nasution Ismail, his Pas counterpart Datuk Mustaffa Ali and DAP Socialist Youth chief Anthony Loke for the DAP, was issued to state chiefs of the three parties.

Negotiations should not include seats that were won in the last election, distinguished seats like Permatang Pauh, Marang or Ipoh Timur, and marginal seats which were won or lost by the contesting party. It has not been smooth sailing.

In Penang, for instance, DAP veteran Zulkifli Mohd Noor has called on the party to retake several seats allotted to Parti Keadilan Rakyat in the last general election for Malay party members to contest.

Penang Pas deputy commissioner II Dr Mujahid Yusof also expressed the hope of seeing his party contest in more than the two parliamentary and five state seats it was handed in 2008, angering Penang PKR information chief Johari Kassim.

Johari told DAP to allocate more seats for Malays from its quota and Pas to focus on strengthening its support base.

In Johor, PKR eyes several mixed seats which were given to Pas in 2008 when it could not muster suitable candidates.

Claims have overlapped in the open bidding for the seats that were lost, as each party vies to offer the best bet.

A Pas official said negotiations would be settled at state level, and only moved up to federal level in the event of a deadlock.

No deadline had been set and negotiations continue.

The official said negotiations should also be based on an understanding that no party is to claim seats won by another component party in 2008, citing Kuantan and Gombak as examples.

Kuantan is a traditional DAP seat which was won by PKR's Fuziah Salleh while PKR deputy president Azmin Ali won Gombak, a Pas seat.

Opposition leader Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim, whose party PKR, lost credibility due to the defection of several of its lawmakers, said last week that individual announcements should not be made until the allocation of seats had been amicably decided.

His remark has been seen as a move to play down the jostling for seats.

Tensions arising from the bargaining would be detrimental to the opposition alliance as sources say about 30 seats are being fought over and the national leadership would have to intervene to resolve the issue.

Pas is said to be aiming to contest around 80 parliamentary seats. The additional seats the party is seeking are mostly where PKR elected representatives had defected; their main argument is that its ally had lost credibility in these constituencies.

Moreover, four of those PKR lawmakers who defected -- Mohsin Fadzli Samsuri (Bagan Serai), Datuk Zulkifli Noordin (Kulim-Bandar Baharu), Datuk Seri Zahrain Mohamed Hashim (Bayan Baru) -- had won in seats that had customarily been contested by Pas.

Azmin has come out in defence of his party's decision to field candidates in seats that slipped from its hands due to defections, insisting that PKR could assure its allies that the candidates identified to contest those seats were credible, having gone through strict screening to avoid a recurrence of "jumping ship".

But Pas' special committee on the 13th general election, called "Road to Putrajaya", headed by vice-president Datuk Husam Musa, has set its sights on winning 60 parliamentary seats, which means that Pas would have to contest more than its 2008 total.

The committee had also proposed to DAP secretary-general Lim Guan Eng to set aside a parliamentary seat in Penang for the party's deputy president, Mohamad Sabu to contest.

Prior to 2008, Pas had the lion's share of seats among the opposition parties mainly because it was largest in terms of membership. Today, Pas has the smallest representation in Parliament with only 23 MPs.

Pas contested 66 parliamentary seats in the 2008 general election; the party had allowed its allies to contest in its traditional seats because it did not have suitable candidates.

It had instead focused on winning state seats, particularly in Kedah, which has now become Pas' new power base, and on continuing its 20-year rule in Kelantan.

Pas contested 232 state seats, winning 83, in the last general election.

"Now Pas is confident it can increase its seat tally at the federal and state levels and of the opposition's chances of winning Putrajaya. Naturally, we want to see all three parties have almost equal representation in Parliament for a more stable federal government," the Pas official said.

DAP contested 47 parliamentary seats in 2008 and won 28; it is likely to contest around the same number again.

PKR contested 97 and won 31 to become the biggest opposition party in Parliament after the election.

PKR has since identified 65 parliamentary seats it thinks it can win, some of which were contested by Pas in 2008.

Six PKR MPs and five assemblymen have so far left the party. Two assemblymen from DAP have also become friendly to Barisan Nasional.

Re-examining the 1948 revolt of the MCP in Malaya

Posted: 07 Sep 2011 03:39 PM PDT

C.C. Chin, CPI

Yesterday's introduction to this article by CPI and Richard Mason of UKM's Institute of Occidental Studies can be read here.

This paper brings forward the idea of Malayan Communist Party's (MCP) plan for the revolt by examining various MCP documents at that time and oral history records of several important senior MCP cadres in order to determine its rationale.

The MCP original document, especially those resolutions passed during the Central Committee Meetings suggest that the MCP did have a plan for revolt. An analytical approach of the MCP documents will help to determine whether the action taken by the MCP was simply an inevitable action against British repression rather than an act that took place because of external forces.

Within the MCP, there were also arguments and debates regarding the revolt. Was the revolt necessary and were constitutional means completely exhausted? Could lack of alertness and adventurism be blamed for the ill-prepared revolt?

The paper also examines if the Cold War setting in Asia was intentional on the part of the British. By examining British and Australian archival sources and CIA reports, we can determine to what extent the British in collaboration with the Australians and Americans, acted intentionally to extend the Cold War to Asia and create a confrontational situation in order to contain Southeast Asian communism. In short, were the imperialists responsible for the armed revolts in Southeast Asia?

Introduction

There are different schools of thought¹ as to whether the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) revolt in 1948 was engaged in upon advice from Moscow obtained through the Calcutta Conference in February 1948, whether it was simply the local situation whereby the British engaged in severe repression of the MCP labour movement and other actions that had triggered the revolt, or whether the MCP had been planning for a revolt?

This paper, on the basis of various MCP contemporary documents and the oral history accounts of several important senior MCP cadres at that time, suggests that the MCP had their own plans for revolt. The original MCP documents, especially those resolutions passed during the Central Committee meetings of the crucial period, does suggest that the MCP did have a plan for revolt.

By analysing the MCP documents, we can see why the MCP took the actions it did. The armed revolt was an inevitable action in response to British repression in accordance with essentially local conditions rather than in response to external forces. However, it is obvious that the Zhdanov doctrine issued at the inauguration of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in late 1947 did influence the MCP. The victorious of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Chinese civil war also encouraged the MCP to a certain extent.

There is no doubt, however, that the MCP over-estimated its own strength vis-à-vis the British, on the basis of their experiences during the guerrilla warfare against the Japanese during the Second World War.

Within the MCP itself, there were also arguments and debates as to whether revolt was necessary and whether the constitutional avenue had been completely exhausted. There were also accusations that they were ill-prepared for a revolt due to lack of vigilance and errors of "Left adventurism". The argument reflects the MCP critical review of their democratic endeavour during the Peace period.

The MCP revolt in Malaya cannot be looked at in isolation as the entire Southeast Asia region was in turmoil at that time. How the regional revolutions affect the MCP especially when the MCP had looked upon its own disbandment of the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) was indeed an act of right deviationist capitulationism. This right capitulationist political line was condemned few months later after the abscondence of Loi Teck. There was also question that whether Chin Peng a radical leader who, after being elected as the Secretary-General in May 1947, forced the MCP to take the route of armed revolt?

It is also important to examine British, CIA and Australian report to determine if the Cold War situation in Southeast Asia was created intentionally by the British. By examining the British records and other newly-released archival materials, we can examine whether the British in collaboration with the Australians and Americans, acted intentionally to extend the Cold War to Asia and create a confrontational situation in order to contain Southeast Asian Communism.

Were the imperialists responsible for the armed revolts in Southeast Asia? This is a question for others to examine. This paper will rather concentrate on the role of the MCP itself.

How did the Emergency start in Malaya?

How did the emergency start in Malaya?

Why did the MCP begin its armed revolt in June 1948? Who initiated the armed conflict? Was it the British colonial regime or the MCP which fired the first shot?

Did the Calcutta International Youth Conference convened in February 1948 allow the transmission of instructions from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) which instigated the communist uprisings in Southeast Asia? Was the Malayan case different from the rest?

Was the revolt a product of the MCP's own initiatives in response to the British repression of the MCP, its trade unions and its united front activities?

The so-called orthodoxy was that the MCP acted in response to the CPSU instructions issued at the Calcutta conference and for a long period of time this was the official propaganda of the British imperialists and their local agents in Malaya. It was in fact the dominant western Cold War interpretative orthodoxy that the communist parties in Southeast Asia were instigated by a CPSU directive to extend the Cold War to Asia. This was based mainly on the "Two-camp" theory put forward in Zhdanov's famous speech made during the inauguration of Cominform in September 1947.

This interpretation was widely accepted, especially by various government administrations. A different school of thought was put forward by some academics suggesting that the Calcutta Conference played an insignificant role in the revolts which occurred in Southeast Asia, and particularly in respect of the MCP uprising in June 1948. This school considered that the local social and political situations were much more significant.

The international factors

There is no doubt that MCP activities were part of the world communist movement coordinated in Asia by the Far East Bureau of the Communist International (Comintern) based in Shanghai. In the early stage, the MCP looked toward the guidance of the CCP and the CPSU, particularly in reference to the style and method of the CCP struggle in China. In examining the MCP documents, it is very clear that the Zhdanov speech did influence the MCP in its doctrine.²

The characteristics of the MCP were determined by the fact that it evolved from the CCP's Nanyang Branch.³Thus, the MCP was greatly under the influence of the CCP and followed the CCP tactics in its political struggle. It is most unlikely that the MCP would simply act in accordance with CPSU instructions, as the MCP followed Mao's teaching that each individual party had to observe closely its own situation and decide its own course of action.

Confrontational situation and the MCP own initiative

In view of the intensified British repression of the MCP, its trade unions and united front activities during the period of peace prior to the 1948 revolt, the MCP feared that the British would eventually ban the party and terminate the constitutional avenues means of the MCP.

The radical faction of the Party suggested the resumption of armed struggle.⁴ Chin Peng was in Hong Kong during June 1947 and in contact with the CCP Southern Bureau. There were discussions as to whether the MCP should engage in armed struggle. The answer later received from Zhou Enlai was that the MCP should make the decision based upon the local conditions.⁵

The British, on the basis of international intelligence reports and analysis no doubt believed that the Russians were moving the Cold War toward Asia by provoking armed insurgencies in Southeast Asia. Therefore they prepared through large-scale repression.

The MCP thereby found no hope in its constitutional endeavours, when appeared doomed by British repression. They instead came to see armed revolt as the inevitable solution.⁶

Conflict was inevitable by 1948. Any serious provocation such as the Sungei Siput incident,⁷ could have triggered off the war and both sides were prepared for conflict. As such it is immaterial who fired the first shot, as rivalry and potential military contention was already well entrenched.

One key omission of most studies is the lack of MCP documents evidence. This is perhaps due to the inaccessibility of the MCP documents and language barriers.

Did the MCP have a plan for armed revolt?

Right after the Japanese surrender, in the name of the MCP Central Committee, Loi Teck instructed the MPAJA to surrender their weaponry and hand them over to the British for marginal compensation of USD300 each person.

However, almost all of the MCP State Secretaries and the rank and file were unwilling to comply with the order. Loi Teck finally agreed to a compromise of surrendering half of the less-efficient weaponry to seen as preparation for an armed revolt should there be such a necessity. This can be considered as an element of an indefinite MCP plan for an armed revolt against the British. Loi Teck asked the MCP State Secretaries to submit to him the maps of the weaponry dumps but this request was refused by them.

In view of the increased suppression by the British imperialists, in early April 1948 the MCP convened a Politburo Meeting in Saleng, Johor. This was a follow up to the MCP Enlarged Central Committee Meeting held in March 1948 when a statement was issued declaring that the people's war was inevitable. ⁸

The Politburo meeting was intended to discuss in detail the action plan for the revolt. Subsequently, an order requiring the digging up of the weaponry kept secret following the Japanese surrender was issued and the ex-MPAJA rank and file was to be summoned in preparation of the uprising planned for September 1948. The formation of the MPABA⁹ was then formalised; certain units in Johor and Perak organised Min-Yuan operations and began collecting subscriptions and making food storage arrangements. However, no official order was issued requiring provocation.

While the MCP Politburo meeting initiated the action plan for the revolt, the British were also, on the basis of reports received, preparing for a major offensive. But it was to be the local MCP units that took the initiative in provocation. The actions were not those of armed revolt but were simply an act of intimidation against the British planters. Nevertheless, the British took the incidents seriously and capitalised on the opportunity to immediately carry out a major offensive against the MCP, initiating well-planned mass arrests and declaring an Emergency.¹⁰

In fact, the British had cultivated the situation and had been expecting an armed revolt. Since late 1947, the success of the AMCJA-Putera Hartal ¹¹ believed to be organised and backed by the MCP, had induced tremendous concern amongst the colonial officers. The British responded with a two-pronged strategy: they stamped over the democracy that they always claimed for but instead ignoring the Malayan people's demand for a rightful independence and denying the proposed People's Constitution, and secondly, against the Malayan People's will installed the Federation Constitution that was negotiated with the feudalistic sultans and their representative party Umno.

In order to corner and cut off the MCP from the various fronts of open and constitutional struggle, the British had escalated their repression by means of arrests, banishment and implementing a new Society Ordinance aimed at eliminating and controlling trade unions and other left-wing cultural societies and organisations. These measures were aimed at driving the MCP toward a more radical reaction. In retrospect, the author sees the intensified hostile repression was, in fact, a well-planned tactic by the British to provoke the MCP to resort to armed struggle.

Did the MCP have a plan for the revolt? The answer is yes. In response to the growing repression by the British, the MCP had analysed the situation as reflected in its documents during this period.

Listed below are the MCP documents issued between December 1947 and February 1948 that relate to the objective and plan of an armed revolt. In some texts, the theme is relatively subdued and carefully worded in such a way that the constitutional struggle might still be seen as the key element. These documents reflected the critical review process taking place within the Party, specifically condemning the Loi Teck political line and reassessing the political situation and the Party's leadership in the overall political movement of the time.

Posted: 05 Sep 2011 01:20 PM PDT

It's OK if Mat Sabu has done something wrong. But the awful truth is that he has done nothing wrong. Mat Sabu has only exposed the myth that Umno is the only one who fought and gained Malaya's independence from the clutches of the colonial power.

By Kim Quek

If you do not believe that Umno has already passed its expiry date as a potent political party, all you need to do is to watch how its entire leadership as well as its entire propaganda machineries have been fully engaged in the past week to indulge in an orgy of attacks against Mat Sabu – PAS' deputy president.

It's OK if Mat Sabu has done something wrong. But the awful truth is that he has done nothing wrong.

Mat Sabu has only exposed the myth that Umno is the only one who fought and gained Malaya's independence from the clutches of the colonial power.

His illustrative mention of Muhammad Indera (fondly known as Mat Indera) as an independence fighter was only in the context of lambasting Umno for ritualistically twisting the Bukit Kepong assault incident on every Merdeka Day for Umno's self-glorification – as if it is the only body accountable for the country's independence.

MAT SABU BASHING

Pouncing on Mat Sabu's positive mention of Mat Indera, Umno bays for Mat Sabu's blood. It accuses Mat Sabu – and by extension PAS – of praising communists and glorifying communism and wanting to turn the country into a republic.

While the entire might of Umno has been unleashed on a non-stop assault on Mat Sabu's alleged advocacy of communism, has any one of them paused to reflect that the word "communist" or "communism" was never mentioned by Mat Sabu in his entire speech?

For the sake of truth, let us recapture the relevant part of Mat Sabu's speech, delivered in a ceremah at Tasek Gelugor, Penang, on Aug 21:

"When it's near Merdeka Day (television programmes) on Bukit Kepong will be aired. The police who died in Bukit Kepong are police who belonged to the British.

"Those who attacked Bukit Kepong were the ones fighting for independence. The one who attacked Bukit Kepong was Mat Indera (Muhammad Indera). He is a Malay, but this is not in the history books.

"Jins Shamsudin made a film (about this). Jins Shamsudin is from Umno. (His film on) Bukit Kepong criticised (the attackers) as the villains.

"The police are British police. Before independence, our country was ruled by the British. But in the film, the heroes were the British and the (insurgents) were terrorists."

Mat Sabu also criticised in his speech how Umno had perverted the essence of Merdeka Day into self-glorification and ignored non-Umno elements that had also contributed to the country's independence.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

For a better understanding of the issues, let me put the Bukit Kepong incident in its proper historical perspective.

The time was 1950, two years after the declaration of Emergency (to deal with the armed insurgency by the Malayan Communist Party) and seven years before the country gained its independence. It was at the height of the guerilla war waged by the MCP to seek independence from the colonial master Britain.

One night, on 23rd Feb 1950, a band of guerilla fighters attacked a remote police station at Bukit Kepong, Johor, and killed 25 persons who were mainly policemen and their family.

The attack was led by Mat Indera, a Malay, and the policemen were also Malays, serving the British colonial government.

This incident was only one of numerous skirmishes within in a larger war staged between the independence fighters led by the MCP on the one side, and the British colonial government determined to protect its colonial rule on the other side.

NO FACTUAL BASIS

The question we want to put to Umno is: since this is a guerilla war for independence, in what way was Mat Sabu wrong when he said Mat Indera was fighting for independence?

And also, in what way Mat Sabu was wrong when he said the policemen who died belonged to the British? Weren't they serving the colonial government? Didn't they fight to protect the colonial power?

Since no "communist" or "communism" was ever mentioned, how did Umno come to the conclusion that Mat Sabu was praising communists or glorifying communism? Haven't Umno leaders and Umno propangandists been taking a big flight of fantasy to conjure up the PAS – Communist nexus?

Isn't it true that all Mat Sabu was saying was simply that Umno had used the wrong analogy to self-glorify on a false claim – that it alone has brought Merdeka?

What Mat Sabu has uttered has nothing to do with communism. Neither was such uttering intended to downplay the contribution of Malay leaders to the country's independence movement – as wrongly accused by Umno leaders.

With regards to the role of MCP in our independence struggles, we have to say this. While we might not like communists or agree to the communist ideology, there is no denying the fact that the MCP fought for Malaya's independence. In fact, it was the high toll caused by the MCP armed insurrection that had prompted Her Majesty's Government (Queen Elizabeth) to shorten the transition of power to its hand-picked successors to ensure continuity of its legacy. In that sense, the MCP struggle had hastened Merdeka.

And even under the canopy of the MCP, not everyone was a communist, as many had joined the guerilla warfare not to serve the ideology of communism, but to fight to get rid of colonial rule.

CONFLUENCE OF FORCES

As for Umno's claim as the sole power that has brought this country independence, this is a far cry from the truth.

Apart from MCP, other nationalist forces had been at work right after World War II (even before Umno was formed) to struggle for an independent Malaya. These were grouped under two umbrella bodies, namely, PUTERA (Pusat Tenaga Rakyat) comprising Malay-based organisations, and AMCJA (All-Malayan Council of Joint Action), a coalition of multi-racial bodies and unions, which included the MCP. These two umbrella bodies quickly joined forces then to press the British colonial government to grant independence to the then Malaya, for which even a draft People's Constitution was proposed in 1947. But the British rejected this proposition.

In the subsequent crackdown on this joint political movement, during which many leaders were arrested, some Malay nationalist leaders, including Mat Indera, joined forces with MCP to continue their independence struggles through armed insurgency. As mentioned earlier, it is this armed struggle, which began in 1948 when Emergency was declared, that had served as the constant prod that pushed the British into a speedy hand-over of power.

Thus, it was the confluence of forces that had brought Merdeka in 1957. Admittedly, the Alliance – a coalition consisting of Umno, MCA and MIC – as the political group favoured by the British, had played a major role in the negotiation that led to independence. But for Umno to claim sole credit for this independence achievement, as it has done in the country's official version of history, to the exclusion of even its own coalition partners MCA and MIC, would be to do a great injustice to all non-Umno Malayans who have contributed. Other nationalist movements, including those led by prominent leaders like Burhanuddin al-Helmy and Ahmad Boestaman, as well as the MCP, had also made significant contribution towards the speedy realization of Merdeka.

From this perspective, Mat Sabu in raising the Bukit Kepong example has done the nation a great service in awakening the country from the great distortion of history perpetrated by Umno.

A DESPERATE UMNO

As for Umno's current campaign to vilify Mat Sabu, it is sheer vulgar propaganda aimed at critically damaging the electoral support for of PAS and through it, the entire opposition alliance of Pakatan Rakyat, as Umno's accusation is nothing but concoction of twisted accounts, unsupported by facts or logic.

That Umno has to resort to such childish and untenable strategy to salvage its precarious political fortune clearly indicates that it has already lost its potency as a political force – it has neither the substance nor the confidence to compete on a legitimate political platform.

Kredit: www.malaysia-today.net

Jumaat, 9 September 2011

Malaysia Today - Your Source of Independent News

Malaysia Today - Your Source of Independent News

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