Malaysia Today - Your Source of Independent News
Malaysia Today - Your Source of Independent News |
- WIKILEAKS: IRAN SANCTIONS ACT: EMBASSY EXPRESSES CONCERN OVER REPORTED IRAN/MALAYSIA GAS DEAL
- What are the Tans up to? (UPDATED with Chinese Translation)
- WIKILEAKS: FIGHTING, NOT TALKING - SOUTH THAI MILITANTS NO LONGER INTERESTED IN DIALOGUE, SAY ...
- Now let’s see what the MACC is going to do (UPDATED with Chinese Translation)
- WIKILEAKS: NAJIB FIGHTS BACK; WEEKEND PROTEST FAILS TO IMPRESS
- WIKILEAKS: MALAYSIA’S CHINESE MINORITY: THE POLITICS OF MARGINALIZATION (UPDATED with Chinese ...
- Do you know what we are fighting for?
- WIKILEAKS: SABAH: POROUS BORDERS; PROBLEMS WITH FOREIGNERS; UNHAPPY UMNO COALITION PARTNER ...
- WIKILEAKS: MALAYSIA REACTS TO CEASEFIRE
- Ahah! Did we not say so?
| WIKILEAKS: IRAN SANCTIONS ACT: EMBASSY EXPRESSES CONCERN OVER REPORTED IRAN/MALAYSIA GAS DEAL Posted: 25 Aug 2011 01:00 AM PDT
Observers attribute his later rise to Syed's close connections with former Prime Minister Mahathir. Syed's business interests include plantations, property development, construction, engineering, power generation, mining, seaport construction and operation, airport management, railways, hotels, manufacturing, retail, and defense technologies. Syed Mokhtar has been the recipient of countless Malaysian government contracts and coveted licenses. According to press reports, in 2006 Saudi Arabia awarded a $30 billion contract to one of Syed's companies for development and management of "Jizan economic city," together with the Bin Laden Group. THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KUALA LUMPUR 000061
SIPDIS SENSITIVE FOR EB/ESC AND EAP/MTS
E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL, ENRG, EPET, ETTC, EFIN, IR, MY SUBJECT: IRAN SANCTIONS ACT: EMBASSY EXPRESSES CONCERN OVER REPORTED IRAN/MALAYSIA GAS DEAL REF: EB-ESC AND EAP-MTS EMAILS OF 8 JAN 07 1. (SBU) Summary: Embassy raised concerns with the Malaysian Government regarding a reported $16 billion gas development deal between a Malaysian firm, SKS Ventures, and Iran, noting possible implications under the Iran Sanctions Act and pointing out the particularly poor timing given recent UN sanctions against Iran. Foreign Ministry officers highlighted Malaysia's more benign view of Iran, growing trade relations with Teheran, and the difficulty of acting against a private firm based on another country's law. They reiterated, however, Malaysia's intention to abide by UNSCR 1737 sanctions against Iran. A representative from the Ministry of International Trade and Industryresponded that he only knew what he had read in the press about the deal. SKS Ventures is owned by Syed Moktar Al-Bukhary, one of the country's wealthiest ethnic Malay businessmen with connections to former Prime Minister Mahathir. End Summary. 2. (SBU) A/DCM called on desk officers in the Malaysian Foreign Ministry's Americas and Multilateral Affairs divisions on January 10 to express concern over press reports of the signing of a $16 billion Memorandum of Understanding between Malaysia's SKS Ventures and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). According to press accounts, SKS Ventures' upstream project would help to develop the Golshan and Ferdos gas fields, including building LNG production units, based on a buyback contract. NOIC expects this to be followed by another contract for downstream cooperation over a period of 25 years. The volume of the Golshan and Ferdows gas fields is estimated at 50 trillion and ten trillion cubic feet, respectively, making them the largest gas fields outside of Russia. Production is expected to yield 70 million and 25 million cubic meters daily from the Golshan and Ferdows fields. 3. (SBU) A/DCM noted that the US continues to have deep concerns about Iranian policies and actions, in particular, at this time, Iran's nuclear activities, which we believe are aimed at establishing a nuclear weapons capability. In light of Iran's policies and actions, we have long opposed investment in Iran's petroleum sector, and our Iran Sanctions Act, with provisions that were recently reauthorized by Congress, provides for sanctions for certain such investments. Against the backdrop of recently-imposed UNSC sanctions on Iran, this was a particularly unfortunate time to be entering into agreements for gas development projects in Iran, even if these were not directly related to Iran's nuclear and missile programs. A/DCM urged the Malaysian Government to weigh in with SKSV to reconsider plans to move forward with its reported agreement on the Ferdos and Golshan gas fields, particularly at this sensitive time. 4. (SBU) Foreign Ministry desk officers, unfamiliar with the reported SKSV deal, expressed appreciation for the information and the background on the Iran Sanctions Act. They explained that Malaysia had a different perception of Iran's nuclear development program and did not share the U.S. view of Iran's program as a security threat. Malaysia and Iran enjoyed a strengthening trade relationship. The Malaysian Government, even if it were so inclined, would have a difficult time restricting private Malaysian investment in Iran on the basis of another country's law. UNSC sanctions on Iran's nuclear and missile programs, however, constituted another matter. The GOM would respect and implement UNSCR 1737 sanctions. The desk officers note that the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) would play an important role in such issues. The desk officers said they would share our concerns with senior Ministry officials, who were unavailable to meet at short notice. 5. (SBU) EconOff contacted Dato Ooi Say Chuan at MITI who responded that he only knew what he had read in the press, but that the Ministry would look into the matter. 6. (SBU) SKS Ventures is owned by Tan Sri Syed Mokhtar Al-Bukhary, a Malaysian businessman considered to be one of the richest ethnic Malay corporate figures. Syed built his original fortune through rice trading, land deals and state government contracts. Observers attribute his later rise to Syed's close connections with former Prime Minister Mahathir. Syed's business interests include plantations, property development, construction, engineering, power generation, mining, seaport construction and operation, airport management, railways, hotels, manufacturing, retail, and defense technologies. Syed Mokhtar has been the recipient of countless Malaysian government contracts and coveted licenses. According to press reports, in 2006 Saudi Arabia awarded a $30 billion contract to one of Syed's companies for development and management of "Jizan economic city," together with the Bin Laden Group. 7. (U) Press reports quote an unnamed source close to Syed Mokhtar as saying, "We don't worry about the sanctions. There's so much liquidity, you don't have to go to New York," and pointing out that funds can be raised in the Middle East or in Iran itself. 8. (SBU) Comment: In light of Malaysia's friendly relations with Iran and its strong opposition to sanctions in general, we should not expect a supportive response from the GOM. Also, with Syed Mokhtar's broad holdings both within and outside of Malaysia, it is not clear to us that U.S. sanctions against SKS Ventures would have significant impact on his bottom line. SHEAR
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| What are the Tans up to? (UPDATED with Chinese Translation) Posted: 24 Aug 2011 05:02 AM PDT
According to those close to Umno, this 'vote of confidence' by the Tan Brothers is proof that MCA is finished. The Tans, because of their very close association with Dr Mahathir, must know that MCA is going to be completely wiped out come November. So they can discount MCA and start working with Pakatan Rakyat, which is going to be the government in Selangor and Penang for some time to come. THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin It is interesting to note that Danny Tan is making inroads in Selangor while Vincent Tan is returning to Penang after a 20-year absence from the state. And what is even more interesting is to see the Tans praise the Pakatan Rakyat state governments of Selangor and Penang. ***************************************** Dijaya to develop RM2.5b worth of projects in Subang **************************************** Berjaya Land returns to Penang Translated into Chinese at: http://ccliew.blogspot.com/2011/08/blog-post_25.html
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| WIKILEAKS: FIGHTING, NOT TALKING - SOUTH THAI MILITANTS NO LONGER INTERESTED IN DIALOGUE, SAY ... Posted: 23 Aug 2011 01:00 AM PDT
Eskay carried out the meeting with the knowledge of the Malaysian government, but without the participation of Malaysian officials, and recorded the encounter. In a departure from previous meetings, the young leaders rejected any possibility of political dialogue. Instead, they declared they had taken a vow to establish an independent Muslim Malay state, Pattani Darussalam, and would continue to carry out violence to achieve their aims. THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KUALA LUMPUR 000447
SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP AND DS/ITA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2032 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINR, MOPS, ASEC, TH, MY
SUBJECT: FIGHTING, NOT TALKING - SOUTH THAI MILITANTS NO LONGER INTERESTED IN DIALOGUE, SAY FORMER MEDIATORS
REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 263 - MALAYSIA SAFE HAVEN FOR INSURGENTS B. KUALA LUMPUR 318 - CONCERNED BUT NOT ALARMED BY VIOLENCE
KUALA LUMP 00000447 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b and d). Summary 1. (S) Southern Thai militants recently asserted they will pursue more violence and reject talks, according to two Malaysian mediators from the defunct Mahathir peace process. The Honorary Thai Consul in Langkawi, Shazryl Eskay Abdullah (protect throughout), joined by retired head of the Malaysian Royal Police, Norian Mai (protect throughout), told A/DCM he met with a group of seven young Thai Malay militant leaders in late February and they explicitly ruled out dialogue with the Thai government. Instead, in a hardening of their position, the insurgents explained their intention to carry out further violence in pursuit of their goal of secession under the banner of Pattani Darussalam. Norian, who also served as Malaysia's internal intelligence chief under Mahathir, stated the Thai Malay insurgents were better organized than previously thought. The militants were benefiting from some Middle East funding, via Singapore and Malaysia, possibly money solicited under false pretenses or diverted from humanitarian projects. Eskay, fresh from meetings with senior Malaysian officials, described a joint Malaysian-Thailand decision to stand up respective committees to work on the insurgency issue, with Malaysia's group headed by retired military intelligence chief Lt. General Wan Abu Bakar. Eskay and Norian appeared pessimistic the Malaysian committee would be effective, while noting GOM doubts about the longevity of the current Thai government. End Summary. GOM Consults Former Mediators 2. (S) A/DCM and poloff met in Kuala Lumpur on March 6 with the Honorary Thai Consul in Langkawi, Shazryl Eskay Abdullah, and retired head of the Malaysian Royal Police, Norian Mai, as a follow-up to our initial meeting with Eskay in early February (ref A) that focused on the southern Thailand insurgency. Both Malaysians had served as lead mediators in the now defunct 2004-2006 peace process carried out under former Prime Minister Mahathir's name. The two men explained that the Malaysian government had not included them in a formal way in the GOM's current approach to the southern Thailand issue because of their association with Mahathir (a frequent critic of PM Abdullah). Nevertheless, the GOM consulted them, in particular because of their past experience and their continued contacts with Thai Malay militants, as well as old guard leaders. Eskay explained he had completed two days of consultations in Putrajaya, which included a March 6 meeting with the deputy chief of the external intelligence agency, MEIO. Eskay said he was scheduled to meet MEIO chief Fauzi on March 7. Insurgents Will Fight for Malay/Muslim State 3. (S) Eskay and Norian stated that there had been a clear hardening of position by the southern militants this year. Eskay explained he had met in late February with a contact group of seven young militant leaders somewhere along the Kelantan state border with Thailand (an eighth member of this group could not travel, while a ninth had been killed in fighting earlier in February). Eskay carried out the meeting with the knowledge of the Malaysian government, but without the participation of Malaysian officials, and recorded the encounter. In a departure from previous meetings, the young leaders rejected any possibility of political dialogue. Instead, they declared they had taken a vow to establish an independent Muslim Malay state, Pattani Darussalam, and would continue to carry out violence to achieve their aims. The militants believed they could not trust Thai authorities and that in any event the Thai security services and civil authorities were so fractured that they had no confidence in those who might sit across the table. Any major, seemingly positive gestures by Bangkok to reach out to ethnic Malays likely would be followed by fresh attacks by the militants in order to destroy any good will. Given their disinterest in dialogue, the militants might become increasingly difficult to contact, Eskay stated. 4. (S) Eskay complained that the Thai government had widely circulated in the Thai Malay communities the February 2006 "Peace Proposal for Southern Thailand" that resulted from the Mahathir peace process (ref A). Bangkok had not responded to the proposal. Thai authorities, however, employed this as part of their psychological operations campaign to undermine the insurgency with a document that implied a peace deal - carrying the signatures of the old guard leaders - had been agreed to, but was being undermined by the militants. This further hurt Thai government credibility, in Eskay's view. Militants Better Organized 5. (S) Norian commented that the militants employed a more sophisticated organization than most observers realized. The seven members of Eskay's contact group operated in concert, but in different areas. Bombers and shooters who carried out attacks seemed to come from a central pool, relying on local cells to set up and guard the scenes of the attacks. Brokers carried out a linkage role by conveying instructions and money to the cells, with a standard fee schedule in place for assisting in bombings and drive-by shootings. As if on cue, women and children quickly gathered to protest arrests of suspects by Thai authorities. Eskay believed it likely the southern insurgents would try to destroy targets of more economic importance in the south, as the militants sought to create a situation of chaos and dependence upon the insurgents themselves. Norian added that the violence is very localized, and not as widespread as some media reports suggest. Militants Move Through Kelantan 6. (S) Eskay described Kelantan state as the primary Malaysian transit and sanctuary area for southern Thai militants (ref A). In response to our direct question, Eskay and Norian said they had not seen indications of foreign militants in southern Thailand or Kelantan. Alleged Foreign Funding Takes Another Route 7. (S) The insurgents did benefit from some foreign funding, Eskay and Norian noted while also suggesting that at least some of the funds were collected for humanitarian purposes and diverted to the insurgents. This funding generally did not pass through Kelantan but rather through the states of Perlis and Kedah. Building on remarks from early February (ref A), Eskay said militants received some money via a Singapore bank and he promised to supply us with more information on the bank in subsequent communications. The money reached southern Thailand through the informal, traditional banking networks operated by money changers at the border points of Padang Besar (Perlis) and Bukit Kayu Hitam (Kedah). Some of the money went to ethnic Malay political figures in southern Thailand, who then dispersed it to militants. Eskay named Yala province political leader Arifin (NFI) as one recipient who used the funding to support the insurgency. As to the origin of foreign funding, Eskay said some of the money came from the Middle East in response to Thai Malay appeals to support humanitarian projects for fellow Muslims. He pointed out that a number of the militants had studied or visited the Middle East in past years. Regarding foreign travel, several old guard leaders based in Malaysia traveled overseas on Malaysian passports, he explained. 8. (S) Note: An international journalist told us that Eskay had informed him of a December 2006 visit to Dubai by old guard separatists from the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), during which they collected Arab donations. In early February Eskay told us he did not believe the Thai insurgents had linked up with external terrorist groups. End Note. Ending Dual Citizenship Threatens Militants 9. (S) Norian and Eskay noted that a decision by Malaysia and Thailand to end the practice of dual citizenship (by employing biometric identification and requiring individuals to choose one nationality) appeared to threaten the Thai militants, who were angry at this decision by Malaysia. Eskay said the GOM had not thought through the consequences of this approach, which might spark a large influx of southern Thais into Malaysia because many Thai Malays would opt to leave for their southern neighbor if forced and able to choose. Abdullah in Bangkok Not Offered Mediation Role 10. (S) Norian and Eskay, speaking as private citizens but coming out of meetings with senior GOM officials, said the Malaysian government recognized its clear interest in seeing an end to the violence in southern Thailand. While there were sympathies for the plight of fellow Malays, secession was a non-starter. Prime Minister Abdullah's mid-February meeting in Bangkok, however, did not result in Thailand offering any mediation role to Malaysia. In private conversation with Eskay, Deputy Prime Minister Najib insisted that Malaysia would need something official and in writing from Thailand in order to engage in any process. Uncertainty about the durability of the current Thai government factored into Malaysia's interactions with Bangkok at this stage, making Malaysians less enthusiastic for working on southern Thailand issues, outside of border security. Malaysia and Thailand Stand Up Security/Intel Committees 11. (S) On the margins of Abdullah's Bangkok visit, Malaysia and Thailand did agree to stand up security-focused committees tasked with examining bilateral approaches to ending the insurgency, Eskay explained. Lt General (retired) Wan Abu Bakar, former Chief of Defense Intelligence, headed the Malaysian side, which included representatives from four agencies: military intelligence, Police Special Branch, the external intelligence agency (MEIO), and the National Security Division of the Prime Minister's Office. General Vaipot Srinual headed the Thai counterpart committee. Norian and Eskay said the Malaysia committee had yet to meet and they were not sure it would become an effective body. Comment and Biographic Notes 12. (S) Eskay and Norian do not speak for the Malaysian government and are "outsiders" to some extent by virtue of their close association with Mahathir. Nevertheless, they have significant interaction with Malaysia's most senior officials dealing with southern Thailand. Their pessimistic outlook on southern Thailand, and the likelihood the violence will continue or escalate, tracks with the views of many Malaysians in and out of government (ref B). Eskay credibly appears to have met with hundreds of Thai insurgents and sympathizers since 2004, and claims to have audio and video recordings of many encounters. Eskay travels frequently to southern Thailand, while Norian said he rarely crosses the border. Eskay explained that to maintain the trust of Thai militants he does not provide their full information (e.g., cell phone numbers, exact physical locations of militants) to the GOM or Thai government. 13. (S) Though describing themselves as part of Mahathir's inner circle of friends, Eskay and Norian claimed they are not involved in party politics. They readily admitted to being wealthy by virtue of their businesses. Eskay said he sells diesel fuel to China and owns a large ranch in Kedah state. Eskay and Norian are partners in some ventures, including a fertilizer plant in southern Thailand. As the child of a Malay-Thai marriage, Eskay speaks Thai and Malay, as well as fluent English. He spent some 10 years studying and working in Oklahoma and Texas, and speaks fondly of the United States. According to the Royal Malaysian Police website, Norian Mai served as Police Special Branch chief from 1994 to 1997, and as Inspector General of Police from 1999 to 2002. We believe Washington possesses substantial biographic information on Norian. SHEAR
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| Now let’s see what the MACC is going to do (UPDATED with Chinese Translation) Posted: 22 Aug 2011 01:07 AM PDT
After that, Ho Hup's auditors discovered that Gani Patail's assistance to Vincent Lye went beyond just friendship. Vincent Lye had also bribed Gani Patail. But Vincent Lye was a cheapskate and he used Ho Hup's funds to pay for various renovation works for Gani Patail's second wife's house in Seremban. THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin The Unholy Trinity of Gani Patail, Shahidan Shafee and Tajudin Ramli Translated into Chinese at: http://ccliew.blogspot.com/2011/08/blog-post_9628.html
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| WIKILEAKS: NAJIB FIGHTS BACK; WEEKEND PROTEST FAILS TO IMPRESS Posted: 21 Aug 2011 01:00 AM PDT
Speaking with reporters, Najib explicitly denied ever meeting Altantuya, and suggested Anwar's public revelations were an attempt to distract the public from the sodomy allegations against the Opposition leader. Najib, however, admitted that he had met Anwar's accuser, Saiful Bukhari Azlan, who had come to Najib's home several days before filing a police complaint, but this did not reflect a conspiracy. THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KUALA LUMPUR 000575
SIPDIS FOR EAP AND INR E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2028 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, KDEM, MY SUBJECT: NAJIB FIGHTS BACK; WEEKEND PROTEST FAILS TO IMPRESS
REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 572 - NAJIB IMPLICATED IN MURDER B. KUALA LUMPUR 570 - GOM DELIVERS PROTEST TO USG C. KUALA LUMPUR 563 - ANWAR ON OFFENSIVE D. KUALA LUMPUR 557 - ANWAR TAKES REFUGE E. KUALA LUMPUR 73 - PROSECUTOR DOWNBEAT ON MURDER CASE F. 07 KUALA LUMPUR 291 - ALTANTUYA MURDER
Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark, reason 1.4 (b and d).
Summary 1. (C) As de facto Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim went on the offensive last week, Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak wasted no time in denying any link to the Altantuya murder case, while diffusing another bombshell by admitting he previously had met the man accusing Anwar of sodomy. On July 4, the private investigator who had implicated Najib in the murder case sat by silently as a lawyer read out a retraction of his statement publicized only 24 hours earlier. The rising political boil led to rumors of potential arrest for Anwar the night of July 3. A major Opposition political rally in the Kuala Lumpur vicinity failed to attract critical mass, as some supporters took heed of police warnings and talk of using the military to ensure order. U.S. remarks related to the allegations against Anwar continued to generate opportunistic GOM criticism, including a letter from Foreign Minister Rais Yatim to the Secretary. Prime Minister Abdullah felt it necessary to announce that his government is stable, in the face of rumors to the contrary, while UMNO leaders prepared themselves for party elections. A key lieutenant for Anwar Ibrahim assessed that PM Abdullah did not support use of emergency measures against the Opposition at this time, and said Anwar would continue with public rallies. End Summary. Najib: I Met Anwar's Accuser, But Not Altantuya 2. (C) DPM Najib wasted little time in defending himself publicly following Anwar's July 3 press conference featuring private investigator Balasubramaniam and his explosive sworn statement linking Najib to the murder of Mongolian national Altantuya. Speaking with reporters, Najib explicitly denied ever meeting Altantuya, and suggested Anwar's public revelations were an attempt to distract the public from the sodomy allegations against the Opposition leader. Najib, however, admitted that he had met Anwar's accuser, Saiful Bukhari Azlan, who had come to Najib's home several days before filing a police complaint, but this did not reflect a conspiracy. In a July 30 interview, Najib had insisted he was not involved in the case at all, while Opposition sources told us they had evidence and witnesses to the contrary (suggesting to us that Najib corrected the public record in order to preempt another disclosure by Anwar). ISA Fears 3. (C) In the immediate aftermath of the private investigator's statement tying Najib to the Mongolian murder victim, swirling rumors regarding Opposition protests, and public statements by the police alluding to a possible role for the military in maintaining order, Opposition sources told us Anwar feared he could be arrested under the Internal Security Act (ISA) as early as the evening of July 3. As a precaution, Anwar completed a number of legal declarations with his lawyer during the July 3 afternoon. To mitigate risks that the planned July 6 anti-government rally could provide a pretext for a security crackdown, the Opposition decided to shift the venue from an open park to an enclosed stadium in Shah Alam in line with a request from police. Investigator's 24-Hour Turn-Around 4. (C) Najib's camp appeared to conduct a major counterstrike on July 4, as Balasubramaniam sat in a hastily arranged press conference beside a lawyer who read out a retraction of the private investigator's statement that he publicized only 24 hours earlier. The PI's new statutory declaration refutes all allegations connected to Najib, explicitly repeating each of the statements now declared false, and states that the earlier affidavit was completed under duress. Balasubramaniam remained silent and glum in the quick press encounter, in contrast to his open demeanor the previous day. His about-face occurred after being called to a police station on July 3, shortly after the Anwar press conference. Following his retraction, Balasubramaniam with his immediate family disappeared from public view, with some rumors that he is abroad. Tepid Turnout for Key Rally 5. (C) Rumored plans by the Opposition to stage a protest march in Kuala Lumpur on July 4 after Friday Muslim prayers failed to materialize, though police briefing detained two activists at the National Mosque. Anwar traveled to Opposition-held Penang on Saturday, July 5, to preside over an Opposition rally there which drew an estimated 30,000 supporters. The big Opposition event, however, was slated for Sunday, July 6, in Shah Alam in Selangor state, also in Opposition hands. Police issued warnings regarding the illegal nature of the July 6 rally, and set up road-blocks in the vicinity, actions that deterred attendance; however, police did not otherwise attempt to stop the event. The all-day affair, at one time billed as a "million-man" rally, attracted only a modest turnout of some 20,000, less than the 50,000 capacity of the stadium. Anwar exhorted the crowd to throw out PM Abdullah's National Front (BN), but did not mention his earlier deadline of September 16 to bring down the government through the defection of BN members of parliament. The greatest stir of the rally came earlier in the day when a rock band singer flashed his buttocks to the audience during a performance, outraging the crowd and causing some conservative Muslim participants from the Islamist PAS party to abandon the stadium. U.S. Remarks in the Mix 6. (SBU) GOM and UMNO party officials continued to criticize both the U.S. and Anwar over the State Department Spokesman's June 30 remarks affirming our support for rule of law in light of the sodomy allegations against the Opposition leader. Foreign Minister Rais Yatim over the weekend confirmed that he had sent a letter of protest to Secretary Rice over U.S. interference in Malaysia's internal affairs. Home Minister Syed Hamid Albar called Anwar America's "snitch." Education Minister and UMNO Youth leader Hishammuddin said the UMNO Youth wing would protest at the U.S. Embassy, as well as at the Turkish embassy (for sheltering Anwar June 29-30) and the Singapore high commission (for articles published in Singapore critical of DPM Najib's wife, Rosmah). Some 40-50 persons, purportedly from the Muslim Consumers Association, demonstrated briefly and peacefully at the U.S. Embassy on July 4; some carried signs equating the U.S. and Anwar with Zionism. (Note: We forwarded the Foreign Minister's July 4 letter to EAP/MTS. Despite the high-level criticism, we enjoyed good Malaysian official turnout at our Independence Day reception, held on July 3. End Note.) Prime Minister: Everything Under Control 7. (SBU) With the political scene buffeted by the Anwar-Najib maelstrom, and respected international media beginning to remark on Malaysia's "turmoil," as did the Asian Wall Street Journal, Prime Minister Abdullah tried to publicly reassure citizens and the international community alike. On July 3, Abdullah publicly stressed, "this government is a stable government, please believe that.... Don't panic about what is happening." On July 6, the PM's comments turned more defense and emotional, as he hit out at "rampant" "slandering" and Opposition protests. "I don't see the rationale for the continued demonstrations, or to play politics purely to create instability that could jeopardize the people's safety and it is also aimed at toppling the government elected by the people," Abdullah told reporters. UMNO in Election Mode 8. (SBU) Meanwhile, PM Abdullah's dominant UMNO party officially begins its election cycle in 10 days time, with the first phase, party branch elections, scheduled July 17-August 24. Most senior UMNO leaders are devoting increasing time, particularly their weekends, to contact work with their respective party branches and divisions. While elections for the presidency, deputy presidency and other national leadership positions do not take place until December, successful candidates must lay the ground work now to ensure their nominations later in the process. For example, internet journalists reported on July 7 that all 13 UMNO division leaders in Abdullah's home state of Penang had already decided to nominate Abdullah for reelection as party president, a move supposedly intended to forestall a push by Najib's supporters. Down from the Boiling Point, for Now 9. (C) Polchief met on July 7 with Sivarasa Rasiah, vice president in Anwar's Peoples Justice Party (PKR) and one of Anwar's lawyers. Sivarasa said last week's political scene was volatile and "boiling," but the situation now had calmed down to a "simmer." He downplayed the immediate risk of the GOM employing emergency measures, such as ISA detention for Anwar and other opposition leaders, in large part because he believed PM Abdullah was not supportive of such measures at this stage. Even though the police could arrest and hold Anwar for a period of 60 days, Abdullah would need to be on board with the decision. Second, Sivarasa argued that use of ISA against Anwar also entailed a willingness to declare a state of emergency to contain and tamp down street protests that would erupt, a step that again Abdullah, but also the King and fellow traditional rulers and perhaps the security forces were not backing at this time. 10. (C) Sivarasa said Anwar would continue holding rallies, particularly in Opposition-held states, but would be careful to minimize the risk of these getting out of hand and creating a pretext for harsh government action. Sivarasa acknowledged that in the July 6 rally Anwar had not mentioned his now famous September 16 deadline for bringing down the BN government, and Sivarasa appeared to imply that this date did not reflect a particular plan, at least not one that he was privy to. Sivarasa downplayed the possibility of Anwar contesting in a by-election in the near future. 11. (C) The PKR VP and lawyer thought that the police investigation into the sodomy allegations against Anwar had failed to turn up enough information for prosecutors to justify an actual indictment, though the police would never speak up to clear Anwar's name and the allegations, or an open investigation, would linger. Sivarasa stated that private investigator Balasubramaniam had confided in him, along with a number of others, some two months ago regarding information linking Najib to the Altantuya murder case. Anwar would bring forward these witnesses to Balasubramaniam's remarks when needed. Comment 12. (C) Last week's palatable political tension, stoked by Anwar's offensive in face of the sodomy investigation and GOM counterattacks, has receded somewhat as of today. The under-attended Opposition rally of July 6, considered by itself, failed to impress or convey a sense of popular momentum. BN leaders, Najib in particular, have been quick to conclude that the rally's failure to attract a packed crowd reflects a lack of support for Anwar. Police warnings and reference to bringing in the military to ensure order no doubt dampened enthusiasm among Opposition supporters. The political status quo threatens Anwar and plays into Najib's hands, however, suggesting that the Opposition leader will come out with fresh challenges to the BN government. 13. (C) Najib and UMNO may have suffered longer term blows to their public credibility in the exchange of allegations with Anwar. Detailed revelations about Najib, even retracted the next day, will tend confirm the widespread public belief that the DPM is linked to the Altantuya murder. The allegations against Anwar, however, appear as a repeat of the politically-motivated charges of 1998, even to those who put some stock in the reports. For Najib this comes at the inopportune time with the start of the UMNO election cycle, and will dampen the possibility his camp can generate enough grassroots backing for a Najib bid to replace Abdullah as party leader come December. KEITH
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| WIKILEAKS: MALAYSIA’S CHINESE MINORITY: THE POLITICS OF MARGINALIZATION (UPDATED with Chinese ... Posted: 18 Aug 2011 01:00 AM PDT
Nevertheless, Chinese voters have poor alternatives. DAP and KeADILan are not sufficiently organized to provide a real alternative to BN, particularly given the disproportionate powers wielded by the UMNO-led coalition. The Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party (PAS), the strongest Malay-based opposition party, holds no appeal for the Chinese electorate. Without better alternatives, MCA and Gerakan will not lose their dominance of the Chinese vote. THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KUALA LUMPUR 001975
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2016 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, MY SUBJECT: MALAYSIA'S CHINESE MINORITY: THE POLITICS OF MARGINALIZATION
REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 942 B. KUALA LUMPUR 1935 C. KUALA LUMPUR 1942 D. KUALA LUMPUR 1913
Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b, d).
Summary 1. (C) Malaysia's Chinese minority struggles to find new footing in national politics. In September Singapore's Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew ignited a nation-wide debate on the marginalization of Malaysia's Chinese minority. Leaders from across the Chinese political spectrum agreed, at least privately, with LKY's conclusion and confided that most Chinese Malaysians feel marginalized by the United Malays National Organization (UMNO)'s race-based, Bumiputera policies. As the Chinese community grows restless, Chinese parties of the UMNO-led National Coalition (Barisan Nasional, BN) fear losses to opposition parties in the next general election. The People's Movement Party (Gerakan) faces change at the top and candidates have begun to vie for the coveted chief minister's job in Penang. Many Chinese have questioned their own leaders after Prime Minister Abdullah humiliated current Penang Chief Minister and claimed the Gerakan-led state government is marginalizing ethnic Malays in Penang. The Democratic Action Party (DAP) stands to gain Chinese votes, but remains unorganized and ill-prepared to capitalize on Chinese discontent. Opposition parties in general fail to present a valid alternative to the BN. A think tank report on Bumiputeras' economic share created another rallying point for the Chinese community's expressions of marginalization. While post-Mahathir political openings allow Chinese political discontent to bubble to the surface, ethnic Chinese voters appear to have no realistic alternatives. End Summary. Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew Ignites a Fire 2. (SBU) In September, Singapore's Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew ignited a political firestorm when he commented during a seminar that Singapore's neighbors, Malaysia and Indonesia, systematically marginalized their Chinese minorities. Cries of outrage were heard from Malaysia's ethnic Malay leaders. Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi publicly demanded an apology from Lee, and the two exchanged highly-publicized letters demanding and feigning apology. Dozens of senior Malay officials derided Lee for his comments and a few Chinese members of the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition government came to the defense of GoM and denied there was any systematic marginalization of Malaysia's minorities. But most Chinese Malaysians agreed with Lee, and Chinese politicians that denied the accusation are now viewed with growing disdain. MCA admits marginalization and fears backlash 3. (C) Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) Vice President Ong Tee Keat, who also serves as the Deputy Minister of Higher Education, was one of the few ministerial level Chinese politicians who refused to deny publicly or privately the fact that Chinese Malaysians are marginalized. In a private meeting with poloff Ong commented that although Chinese leaders from MCA and the People's Movement Party (Gerakan) were bound to support government (i.e. UMNO) positions, their Chinese constituents were not satisfied with their responses. Ong commented that in cases such as this, "silence is sometimes our only valid response." But he acknowledged, "of course we are marginalized, big business to small stall owners know that -- but MCA cannot admit it." So when pressed by reporters for a public response to Lee's accusation, Ong related an old Chinese proverb -- "Whether the water in the tea cup is hot or cold, he who drinks it knows best." 4. (C) According to Ong, MCA will face its greatest electoral challenge ever in the next two years. In his opinion, there was great dissatisfaction with the status quo in the Chinese community that was only partially seen in the Sarawak elections when the opposition Democratic Action Party (DAP) won six seats (Ref A). "Sarawak was a wake-up call for all Chinese parties," Ong told poloff. MCA and Gerakan have studied the results of the Sarawak elections, but are not sure they can counter the growing discontent in their communities. The Chinese component parties of BN no longer have community focused development projects to show their constituents, as these have all been redirected to Malay communities. "There was once a day in Malaysia when MCA would get the left-overs, but now we are just hoping to get some crumbs from the UMNO table," said Ong. Ong admitted that an example of only getting the crumbs could be seen in the Ninth Malaysia plan wherein the government planned for the construction of 180 new elementary and secondary schools, none of which would be vernacular schools for either the Chinese or Indian communities. Only after loud outcries from the Chinese community did the Ministry of Education "cave in" and announce that two of the 180 schools would be designated as Chinese vernacular schools. Again, MCA could not provide a proportional voice for the Chinese minority, and Ong believed the community took note. Prime Minister claims Malays marginalized in Penang 5. (C) In an ironic exercise in hypocrisy and political expediency prior to the UMNO district meetings in September, Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi echoed the earlier remarks of his son in law, Khairy Jamaluddin, and publicly charged Penang's Chief Minister Dr. Koh Tsu Koon, with systematically marginalizing the ethnic Malays of Penang. Penang is Malaysia's only Chinese majority state (but only by a razor thin margin) and is led by BN coalition partner Gerakan. Despite the conflict resolution principles touted by the Barisan Nasional, at an UMNO divisional meeting in Penang, Abdullah publicly chided Koh and demanded immediate action to address the needs of the marginalized Malay community. Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak later called for the Penang Chief Minister to more equally divide his executive powers with the Malay deputy chief minister, while federal Education Minister Hishamuddin Tun Hussein demanded Koh take unconditional immediate action to address the needs of the Malay community in Penang. According to sources who attended the meeting, Koh was dumbfounded and unprepared to respond to the Prime Minister's accusations. Penang State Executive Councillor Dr. Toh Kin Woon later admitted in a private meeting with poloff that the PM thoroughly humiliated Koh, and although Malays in Penang have a higher per capita income than Malays in many other states, Koh was unprepared and unable to respond. Gerakan Central Committee member, Lee Kah Choon, stated to poloff that Koh was viewed by the whole Chinese community as weak: "it is just his personality, and everyone comes to expect it." It was this type of weakness, opined Toh, that places BN's Chinese component parties in danger of losing ground to DAP or the People's Justice Party (KeADILan) in more mixed districts. (Comment: Chief Minister Koh is an intellectual, who holds a doctorate in physics from Princeton. His technocratic style makes him popular with corporate leaders, who appreciate his business friendly approach to governing, but is ill-suited to the cut-and-thrust of party politics. End Comment.) Gerakan plans for leadership change 6. (SBU) Koh, who in addition to duties as the Chief Minister of Penang is also Deputy President of Gerakan, is expected to become the Gerakan president in April 2007 when current president Dr. Lim Keng Yaik steps down. Koh's elevation to party head will likely mean he will move from state politics to a federal ministerial position, and several Gerakan politicians are already jockeying for the anticipated vacancy as Penang Chief Minister. The three front runners for the job in Penang are currently Lee Kah Choon, Gerakan Deputy Secretary General and Parliamentary Secretary for the Ministry of Health; Dr. Teng Hock Nan, Gerakan Vice President; and Chia Kwang Chye, Gerakan Party Secretary General. 7. (C) In a separate meeting with poloff, Lee Kah Choon admitted that, like MCA, Gerakan too would face a strong political challenge in the next general election, as they have not been able to overcome the perception that the Chinese community is continually discriminated against by the Malay majority government. Lee's only hope was that DAP "would continue to run dishwashers and truck drivers" for state and federal parliamentary seats, and thus would remain uncompetitive in the general elections in Penang. In another meeting, Dr. Toh Kin Woon lamented that UMNO was resorting to "blatant racist tactics that Malaysia has not seen since the late 1980s." He attributed the rise in UMNO's racist rhetoric to PM Abdullah's weakness as a leader. "Malaysians need a strong leader who knows when to be ruthless. Mahathir knew how to be ruthless, but he became cruel, and that's when he lost respect. Abdullah is not cruel, but neither is he ruthless when he needs to be. He is just weak; so he resorts to racist tactics to hold on to the majority Malays." He faulted Koh for not standing up to Abdullah regarding his accusations of the Chinese marginalizing ethnic Malays in Penang, and opined that such weakness in the party opened the door for the opposition to make significant gains in then next general election. The Democratic Action Party lacks a national strategy 8. (C) Notwithstanding their successes in the Sarawak elections (ref A), DAP has not yet formulated a national campaign strategy aimed at capitalizing on the growing discontent in the Chinese community (also see ref B). In Penang, Member of Parliament Chow Kon Yeow (DAP - Tanjong) admitted to poloff that his party traditionally has had very little success in recruiting high caliber candidates for parliamentary elections. Such past failures have influenced the party's motivation to recruit more viable and electable candidates. According to Chow, DAP often struggled with supporting issues germane to the Chinese community, such as promoting vernacular schools, and therefore, at times seems to alienate itself from its natural voting base. Chow indicated that DAP's current plan was to continue to run young party activists who had previously contested elections in Penang and hope that discontent with BN policies would draw voters to vote merely for the party rather than the quality of the candidate. Since many of the seats in Penang currently are held by third term parliamentarians, term limit laws prevent the incumbents from seeking re-election. DAP hoped for a more level playing field if their candidates were not battling incumbents, Chow said, and thus anticipated better electoral results in Penang and other metropolitan areas of the country where Chinese voters are concentrated. 9. (U) DAP Secretary General Lim Guan Eng has completed his term of exclusion following his conviction under the publications act, and DAP insiders expected him to contest for another seat in parliament in the next election. Lim and his wife have fallen out of favor with party members in Melaka, so Lim likely would challenge a seat in Penang or in Kuala Lumpur. Such mobility is common among Chinese candidates, and due to his relative popularity, party officials were quite optimistic of Lim's election and ability to join his father Lim Kit Siang as a leader in the opposition. Bumiputera Equity: Chinese cry foul 10. (SBU) The GOM's negative reaction to the recent public release of the Asian Strategy and Leadership Institute (ASLI)'s analysis of bumiputera equity in the marketplace has stoked the fires of Chinese discontent (Ref C). With characteristic cries of sedition for daring to challenge government statistics, ethnic Malay politicians, including PM Abdullah and DPM Najib have done all in their power to discredit the ASLI report. Despite pressuring the Malay president of ASLI, Mirzan Mahathir, to retract the report, the Prime Minister and UMNO have not been able to quiet the discussion of bumiputera equity and their race-based policies aimed at perpetually increasing Malay market share. (Comment: Mirzan Mahathir is the son of former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad. Ironically, the elder Mahathir and his two sons, Mirzan and Mukhriz, continue to publicly champion bumiputera set-asides, leading one to question the possible political maneuvers behind the release of the ASLI report. End Comment.) 11. (SBU) Perhaps emboldened by his announcement that he will retire as Gerakan president in April 2007, Dr. Lim Keng Yaik, Minister of Energy, Water and Communications, stepped forward to challenge the government to release its statistics and explain how Bumiputera equity is only 18.9 percent rather than the 45 percent ASLI found. DPM Najib replied that the GoM can certainly release its methodology for its more "exhaustive study" and that Lim should not imply that the government is not transparent. Despite Najib's remarks, the GoM has not released its methodology, and UMNO continues to hope that this issue will die a quick and quiet death. Chinese politicians and activists, however, do not yet seem willing to let the issue die, and although the study reiterates what many Chinese have long believed, it now gives quantifiable evidence to support their feelings of discrimination. Comment 12. (C) The increasingly strong Islamic identity of the dominant Malay population has a natural corollary -- an increase in race based politics. As Chinese sensitivities heighten regarding Malay-centric policies, discontent with the status quo grows. Of note, political openings in the post-Mahathir era have allowed greater public airing of such discontent, albeit with limits. Abdullah's inability to shut down the divisive debate stands in stark contrast to Mahathir's firm control. Comprising 25 percent of the total population, ethnic Chinese Malaysians have the most to lose of all the minority groups from the Bumiputera policies aimed at ever increasing Malay equity in the marketplace, often at the expense of Chinese equity. While no one is yet predicting the collapse of the coalition Barisan Nasional, growing discontent in the Chinese community has led many political pundits to forecast that many Chinese will abandon MCA and Gerakan and vote for DAP in the next election. We anticipate the next general election will be held in the fourth quarter of 2007 or first quarter of 2008, and although UMNO is not in danger of losing significant numbers of votes, Chinese component parties fear they will take a hit. Nevertheless, Chinese voters have poor alternatives. DAP and KeADILan are not sufficiently organized to provide a real alternative to BN, particularly given the disproportionate powers wielded by the UMNO-led coalition. The Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party (PAS), the strongest Malay-based opposition party, holds no appeal for the Chinese electorate. Without better alternatives, MCA and Gerakan will not lose their dominance of the Chinese vote. LAFLEUR
Translated into Chinese at: http://ccliew.blogspot.com/2011/08/blog-post_2158.html
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| Do you know what we are fighting for? Posted: 17 Aug 2011 06:14 PM PDT
Those are just some of the issues from my end. I am sure the committee will come out with more. One more issue that could be considered would be, just like for Senators, you can only serve a maximum of TWO terms. If Senators can only serve for two terms then why can't Members of Parliament and State Assemblypersons also do the same? Why do Members of Parliament and State Assemblypersons serve for life while Senators can only serve for two terms? THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin
(New Straits Times) - The parliamentary select committee on electoral reforms will be headed by a minister with eight members of parliament, including from the opposition and an independent. Minister in the Prime Minister's Department, Datuk Seri Mohd Nazri Abdul Aziz, said the formation of the committee was approved by the cabinet yesterday and a motion on it would be tabled at the next parliamentary session in October. The committee will have five representatives from Barisan Nasional, three from the opposition and one independent. Nazri said the cabinet also agreed to meet with the Election Commission soon to discuss the framework of the committee. Read more: 9 to sit on polls panel http://www.nst.com.my/articles/9tositonpollspanel/Article/ ************************************* Probably 50,000 or so Malaysians came out for the BERSIH march on 9th July 2011. There were marches simultaneously organised all over the world in more than 30 cities. And the reason you marched is because you want to see electoral reforms. But are you clear on exactly what type of reforms you would like to see? If you were asked to deliver a talk on electoral reforms would you know what to say? Well, maybe we can discuss that matter today. 1. The first issue would be regarding disenfranchised voters. About one million or so Malaysians live outside Malaysia, according to what the Minister told Parliament. But most of these one million Malaysians can't vote during the general elections. If you were to look at Article 119 of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia (below), you can see that there is a provision in the Constitution for overseas Malaysians to vote (or, if not so resident, is an absent voter). These overseas Malaysians would be regarded as 'absent voter'. So this is the first reform we need: to ensure the right of overseas Malaysians to vote. 2. Next would be the variance between seats. Currently, the differential between Parliament seats is as low as 5,000 voters to as high as 125,000. This variance is too large. The variance should be not more than 20% plus-minus (or even 15% if possible, which would be better). That means we need to set the 'benchmark' for each Parliament seat. For example, if the benchmark is fixed at 50,000 voters, then each Parliament seat should be between 40,000 to 60,000 voters (to achieve the 20% plus-minus variance). For state seats the benchmark would, of course, be lower. If it is going to be 50,000 voters for Parliament seats, then for state seats it can be 20,000-25,000 voters. Now, assuming we have a total of 15 million registered voters and the benchmark for Parliament seats is 50,000, this would mean we would have 300 Members of Parliament. If this is too many then the benchmark can be increased to 60,000 voters. Then the number of Members of Parliament would be reduced to 250 (from the current 222) -- or 65,000 voters if you want it to be reduced further to 230 Members of Parliament. Anyway, this is for the committee to decide. The important thing, however, is that there must be a variance of 20% to 25%, plus-minus, between the Parliament seats. We can't have one seat as low as 5,000 voters and another as high as 125,000 voters. This is just not on. And if the state seats are half the number of voters for Parliament seats, then we will have two state seats in one Parliament constituency and twice the number of State Assemblypersons as there are Parliamentarians. 3. Third would be the voting age. Currently, you can own a gun, get married, drive a car, work, get hanged for the crime of murder/drugs, etc., at 18 (and ride a bike at 16). But you can't vote at 18. Imagine that! The government treats you like an adult and takes your life at 18. But the government will not allow you to vote. The government trusts you enough to drive a car and raise a family at 18. But the government does not trust you to vote. The voting age needs to be 18 and not 21. If you can hang an 18-year old Malaysian, then he or she certainly has a right to vote at that age. If an 18-year old is old enough to have a wife/husband and children, then he or she is certainly old enough to vote. 4. The other issues, of course, involve gerrymandering (which will be addressed once we address the issue of the variance between seats), fraud (which needs to be addressed through some detection method so that people can't vote more than once), postal votes (postal voting should be your choice like in the UK and not by compulsion like in Malaysia), etc. 5. Another issue I would like to see addressed is compulsory voting. A law should be passed to make it compulsory for all citizens to vote. If you do not vote then the government should impose a RM1,000 fine on these people. Australia has this system. Furthermore, when you apply for a loan, credit card, hire purchase finance, electricity/water supply, telephone/internet, and so on, two documents need to be produced. One would be your identity card and the other your voter registration slip. In short, if you do not have BOTH an identity card and a voter registration slip then you do not exist. You are a 'ghost'. You can't get a loan, credit card, electricity/water supply, telephone/internet, and so on. Your proof of address and your proof of existence will be in both your identity card and voter registration slip. If you do not have an identity card PLUS a voter registration slip then you are not a Malaysian. In fact, you are not even a person. You just do not exist. 6. Those are just some of the issues from my end. I am sure the committee will come out with more. One more issue that could be considered would be, just like for Senators, you can only serve a maximum of TWO terms. If Senators can only serve for two terms then why can't Members of Parliament and State Assemblypersons also do the same? Why do Members of Parliament and State Assemblypersons serve for life while Senators can only serve for two terms? If we impose a two-term rule for Members of Parliament and State Assemblypersons, this will ensure that the old cocks and old hags will be retired to make way for fresh meat. 7. Oh, and one last thing, are we brave enough to follow the example of some other countries and make it law that not less than 30% of the candidates contesting the election must be women? Yes, in some countries this is law (I think Sweden is one such country). And since more than 52% of Malaysian voters are women (yes, only 48% men vote) why should the candidates not, by law, be not less than 30% women? ************************************* Article 119 of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia (1) Every citizen who - (a) has attained the age of twenty-one years on the qualifying date; and (b) is resident in a constituency on such qualifying date or, if not so resident, is an absent voter, is entitled to vote in that constituency in any election to the House of Representatives or the Legislative Assembly unless he is disqualified under Clause (3) or under any law relating to offences committed in connection with elections; but no person shall in the same election vote in more than one constituency. |
| WIKILEAKS: SABAH: POROUS BORDERS; PROBLEMS WITH FOREIGNERS; UNHAPPY UMNO COALITION PARTNER ... Posted: 16 Aug 2011 01:00 AM PDT
Two PBS state assemblymen, Ching Eng Leong and Samson Chin Chee Tsu, told us on October 4 that former PM Mahathir began the initiative prior to the 1994 state assembly election, in order to ensure UMNO's political takeover of Sabah. UMNO's control was further solidified during the 1999 state election, as UMNO granted more foreigners citizenship and voting rights under what came to be known as "Project Mahathir." THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUALA LUMPUR 001948 SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, DS/ATA AND DS/IP/ITA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2016 TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PGOV, PINR, KDEM, KISL, SMIG, ASEC, MY
SUBJECT: SABAH: POROUS BORDERS; PROBLEMS WITH FOREIGNERS; UNHAPPY UMNO COALITION PARTNER
REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 1862 B. KUALA LUMPUR 1935
Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b , d).
Summary 1. (C) The police, political leaders, a human rights official in the East Malaysia state of Sabah recently expressed their concerns to us about rising crime and the security impact from the high number of foreigners - both legal and illegal - residing in the state. Sabah's Acting Police Commissioner said illegal migrants and other foreigners committed three out of four violent crimes in the state, but he did not address terrorist threats or transnational crime syndicates. On other issues, a Sabah state minister from Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi's political party, UMNO, criticized the PM's intellectual capacity and said the PM's inner circle gives him "bad advice." The minister predicted the UMNO national assembly in November would be "a timid affair." One of the 16 commissioners from Malaysia's government-funded national human rights commission (Suhakam) told us the government views Suhakam as "a pest." Seconding other comments from the Suhakam commissioner about the large influx of foreigners into Sabah, two state assemblymen expressed trepidation about the state's security situation. The pending U.S. Border Control Assessment Initiative (ref A) will assist our efforts to better understand the security ramifications of Sabah's porous borders and identify ways the U.S. can assist. End Summary. Police Face Challenges from Criminals - And Parliament 2. (C) Sabah's Acting Police Commissioner, Mohd Bakri Zinin, told us on October 4 that "illegal migrants and other foreigners" account for about three-fourths of violent crimes committed in the state. He said almost all the crime was locally based and that transnational crime syndicates were "not much of a problem" in Sabah. Zinin notably did not address the issue of terrorists either located in or transiting Sabah. When asked about the potential for human trafficking into the Malaysian federal territory island of Labuan, near Sabah's western coast, Zinin stated flatly, "There is no trafficking problem in Labuan. Those women are all volunteers who claim to be victims when caught." (Note: Septel addresses prostitution on Labuan. End Note.) 3. (C) Zinin criticized a recently enacted amendment to the criminal procedure code that eliminated prosecutors' usage of police-obtained confessions in trying criminal defendants. Confessions are now only admissible if done in front of a magistrate. Zinin said the amendment "will hurt our ability to get convictions." He stated, "As a result, we'll likely make greater use of (Malaysia's four preventative detention laws), even though we know this will bring criticism from Suhakam and the NGOs." (Note: The laws he referenced are the Internal Security Act, Restricted Residence Act, Dangerous Drugs Act, and Emergency Ordinance. They allow the police and the internal security ministry to jointly incarcerate individuals for extended periods without trial, in cases where police lack sufficient evidence to obtain a criminal conviction. From our local sources, we believe 700 - 1,000 Malaysians suspected of criminal activity are currently jailed under the Emergency Ordinance alone. End Note.) UMNO Minister Swipes at Prime Minister Abdullah... 4. (C) While making unsolicited comments about Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi's public image and job performance, Sabah's Minister of Youth and Sports, Masidi Manjun, told us, "Abdullah is not an intellectual and is a bit slow in his thinking." He said the PM is "getting bad advice from his inner circle" regarding both the content and "scripted shouting" of some of his latest speeches to his ethnic Malay political base. Manjun, who formally headed Sabah's primary government-funded think tank (the Institute of Development Studies), told us of a private comment made by former PM Mahathir during a recent trip to Japan. Mahathir reportedly told a senior Japanese politician, "Japan is the home of the rising sun, and Malaysia is home to the rising son-in-law." This was a reference to PM Abdullah's son-in-law Khairy Jamaluddin, who serves as the deputy president of UMNO Youth. With Mahathir's recent failure to be elected as an UMNO delegate at the party's national assembly in November, Manjun predicted the assembly will be "a timid affair," with no major pronouncements or surprises. ...And Foreigners in His State 5. (C) Manjun complained that Sabah was "flooded with foreigners." He singled out Filipino Muslims from Mindanao as "especially troublesome." He said, "They are not as devout as us." He told us the state's Filipinos were "using our social services and not integrating into society," and that "vagrancy and violence" were rampant within Sabah's Filipino community. He called Sabah's maritime and land borders "very porous" and expressed concern that Sabah's foreign residents were starting to become politically active. He acknowledged, however, the economic importance of Sabah's foreign population. With regard to Sabah's large number of illegal foreign workers, estimated to total over 750,000, Manjun said, "We need them here, or our economy would collapse." Fallout from UMNO-Fueled Population Boom in Sabah 6. (C) UMNO's main Sabah-based partner party, PBS, remains publicly indignant about UMNO grants of citizenship and related voting rights during the 1990s to over 600,000 foreigners (predominantly Muslims from Indonesia and Mindanao), in return for those individuals' votes in Sabah's state assembly elections. Two PBS state assemblymen, Ching Eng Leong and Samson Chin Chee Tsu, told us on October 4 that former PM Mahathir began the initiative prior to the 1994 state assembly election, in order to ensure UMNO's political takeover of Sabah. UMNO's control was further solidified during the 1999 state election, as UMNO granted more foreigners citizenship and voting rights under what came to be known as "Project Mahathir." According to Samson, PBS switched from its opposition party status in 2000 and allied itself with UMNO. Ching said, "UMNO had completely taken over by that time. They paid off our party leaders and several assemblymen in cash, and threatened to freeze our constituencies out of federal and state funding if we didn't join them." Since 2000, the state assembly has remained 100 percent controlled by the UMNO-led coalition; opposition parties in Sabah have no elected representatives. 7. (C) Suhakam recently researched the allegations surrounding Project Mahathir and concurred with PBS' findings. According to Suhakam, Sabah's legal resident population increased 362 percent to 2.6 million from 1970 to 2000, compared to a population increase of only 135 percent over the same time period in the neighboring state of Sarawak. This substantial increase in Sabah's legal residents excludes an influx of over 750,000 foreigners holding invalid identity cards and visas - or no documents at all - according to Suhakam. According to Samson, a UK-educated lawyer whose electoral district encompasses Tawau on the east coast near the Indonesian border, Filipinos and Indonesians outnumber Malaysians 3 to 1 along Sabah's east coast from Sandakan to Tawau. He said, "The security situation in the area is not good." He also claimed that corruption in Tawau is rampant among police and immigration officers. He said it had "tripled over the last 30 years." He and his wife recently refused to attend an event that gathered public and private sector leaders on the resort island of Mabul, off the east coast of Sabah, as he feared an attack on the gathering by Mindanao-based Muslim extremists. The event took place without incident. Government Ignores Suhakam 8. (C) With regard to the plight of Malaysia's largely impoverished rural indigenous persons in Borneo, Suhakam's Vice Chairman and resident Commissioner in Sabah, Simon Sipaun, echoed the sentiments expressed to us by his fellow Suhakam commissioner in Sarawak (ref B). He said he spends most of his time on indigenous persons' issues and lamented the government's lack of support for Suhakam. He said, "We're viewed as a pest." Sipuan told us that prisons in the state are "50 percent to 75 percent overcrowded" and that about three-fourths of all prisoners are illegal migrants and other foreigners. He described conditions in the state's three illegal migrant detention centers as "overcrowded and generally poor." Sipuan felt the large number of Filipinos on the state's east coast represented a potential security threat "if they decide to become more politically active, or if parts of Mindanao become more autonomous." Comment 9. (C) Among all Malaysian states, Sabah faces uniquely severe border control and related security pressures. Filipinos and Indonesians move easily - and often illegally - between Sabah and their respective home countries. UMNO leaders in Sabah and Kuala Lumpur will likely continue to remain silent with regard to the deleterious effects of Project Mahathir, as this initiative achieved its primary goal (UMNO political dominance) many years ago; they consider it "old news." In any case, a significant reduction in Sabah's foreign-born population could only be reversed in the near term through an UMNO-led effort to round up and deport the very workers that drive Sabah's natural resource-based economy. While Malaysia periodically launches campaigns to expel illegal workers, even PBS' leaders concede this is highly unlikely to be carried out to the point of seriously harming the state's economy. The U.S. Border Control Assessment Initiative (BCAI) focused on the Sulu and Sulawesi sea areas of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines will enhance our understanding of the security challenges facing Sabah and ways we can assist. We currently are working to obtain GOM approval for the Sabah field portion. SHEAR
Translated into Chinese at: http://ccliew.blogspot.com/2011/08/blog-post_17.html
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| WIKILEAKS: MALAYSIA REACTS TO CEASEFIRE Posted: 14 Aug 2011 01:00 AM PDT
Khairy Jamaluddin's antics provided a sometimes entertaining, sometimes maddening diversion throughout the Lebanon crisis. He organized a large and noisy but non-violent July 21 rally in front of the Embassy during which he was pictured by the press at the Embassy's gate, haranguing marchers with a bull horn. Khairy led a July 28 demonstration on the Kuala Lumpur Convention Center during Secretary Rice's participation in the ARF, demanding unsuccessfully to deliver a harshly worded petition to the Secretary, and his appearances often seemed to direct more attention to himself than to his cause. THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin
C O N F I D E N T I A L KUALA LUMPUR 001587
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2016 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, IS, LE, MY SUBJECT: MALAYSIA REACTS TO CEASEFIRE
REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 1559 B. KUALA LUMPUR 1354 C. KUALA LUMPUR 1397 D. KUALA LUMPUR 1377
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David B. Shear for reasons 1.4 (b, d)
1. (C) Summary: Malaysian officials have welcomed the passage of United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1701, and the Malaysian media's preoccupation with the Middle East crisis has quickly diminished. GOM officials reaffirmed their commitment to a lasting peace in the Middle East and reiterated their commitment to send peacekeeping troops to support the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Despite some rhetoric and political posturing, Malaysia seems willing to work with the UN in determining what, if any, Malaysian forces would appropriately augment UNIFIL. Until they were corrected by the Prime Minister, leaders of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) Youth movement called for boycotts of American products and for a cessation of Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations. UMNO Youth leaders admit they are making concessions to their conservative base, but have generally returned their focus to the domestic agenda. Calls for a boycott of American products largely fell on deaf ears, but the demand that the GOM terminate the FTA talks reflects the extent to which the GOM will have to work in order to generate domestic support for an FTA. End Summary. GOM Supports UNSCR 1701 2. (C) Senior Malaysian officials including Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi and Foreign Minister Hamid have strongly supported the ceasefire in Lebanon. Notwithstanding recent reports that Israel may object to peacekeeping forces from nations that do not have diplomatic relations with Israel, Abdullah, Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak and FM Hamid have all declared publicly that Malaysia will send troops to support UNIFIL over Israel's objections. However, privately, Malaysia's Under Secretary for Multilateral Affairs Shahrul Ikram has told us that Malaysia will naturally allow the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations to decide if Malaysia should send troops and what their composition would be. He also reported that Malaysia wants to help, but will naturally work through the UN to ensure UNIFIL has the appropriate composition to complete the mission. And the Negative Public Rhetoric Cools 3. (C) The Malaysian public and media reacted strongly to the Lebanon crisis, and, in addition to sustained criticism of the U.S. in the local press, the Embassy experienced demonstrations on several Friday afternoons at the end of July that were larger and noisier than usual. But the passage of UNSCR 1701 and the August 14 implementation of the ceasefire in Lebanon quickly deflated much of the negative political rhetoric prevalent in Malaysia after the start of hostilities. Politicians and reporters have largely returned their attention to domestic politics: a new budget session in parliament scheduled to begin on September 1, preparations for the November UMNO General Assembly, and former Prime Minister Mahathir's jabs at the government. Despite overwhelming coverage of the war prior to the ceasefire, most newspapers did not headline the implementation of the ceasefire, nor did they give front-page billing to the return of displaced Lebanese families back to southern Lebanon. Malaysian officials have continued calls for comprehensive peace and reaffirmed their commitment to send peacekeeping troops to Lebanon (ref A). Khairy Jamaluddin: Criticizes the FTA Talks; Calls for Boycott of U.S. Goods 4. (C) UMNO Youth deputy chairman and Prime Ministerial son-in-law Khairy Jamaluddin's antics provided a sometimes entertaining, sometimes maddening diversion throughout the Lebanon crisis. Khairy's influence on his father-in-law and some of his recent financial dealings have been the target of former Prime Minister Mahathir's ire for several months, and, no doubt sensing that political opportunity knocked, he decided to lead a highly visible UMNO Youth effort to flay the U.S. for its support of Israel. He organized a large and noisy but non-violent July 21 rally in front of the Embassy during which he was pictured by the press at the Embassy's gate, haranguing marchers with a bull horn. Khairy led a July 28 demonstration on the Kuala Lumpur Convention Center during Secretary Rice's participation in the ARF, demanding unsuccessfully to deliver a harshly worded petition to the Secretary, and his appearances often seemed to direct more attention to himself than to his cause. The frenetic Khairy also called for a stop to U.S.- Malaysia FTA talks and for a boycott of the "American" brands Coca-Cola and Starbucks, statements that were rebuffed by the Prime Minister. 5. (C) Khairy has been less vocal since the cease fire went into effect. Our subsequent meetings with UMNO Youth executive committee leaders confirmed that UMNO Youth rhetoric over the past two months was intended to appeal to UMNO's more conservative base. They have told us that it was also aimed at preventing the Islamic opposition party PAS from gaining momentum given the recent clashes between Abdullah and former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed (ref D). Having achieved those ends, UMNO Youth has returned to its preparations for the UMNO General Assembly in November and the general elections anticipated for next year. We expect the occasional jab from Khairy and his UMNO buddies as preparatory meetings for the November UMNO General Assembly continue, but we doubt the drumbeat will reach the decibel levels heard through late-July and early August. Calls for Boycott Not Threatening 6. (C) Khairy's call for the GOM to boycott the US seems to have gained little traction publicly and politically. U.S. firms operating in Malaysia are watchful, but not overly concerned by Khairy's calls for a boycott. The local Coca-Cola bottler recalled that a similar boycott call in 2002 following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan had no impact on sales. Both the Coke and Starbucks franchisees (the local operations actually are owned by Malaysian companies) plan to take no action, believing the best approach is not to draw further attention to the issue. At the monthly meeting of the board of governors of the American-Malaysian Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) August 16, members expected that the boycott would fade quickly, so long as the situation in Lebanon remains under control. The board also agreed to take no action in response to the call for a boycott at this time. Effect on FTA Remains To Be Seen 7. (C) We doubt that the Lebanon crisis itself had a lasting negative effect on GOM support for the FTA talks. But Khairy's opportunistic attack on the talks underscores the extent to which the negotiation may be vulnerable to Malaysian domestic politics. At a minimum, it also demonstrates the extent to which the GOM will have to work to convince even the ruling party's rank-and-file of the benefits of a FTA with the U.S. LAFLEUR
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| Posted: 11 Aug 2011 05:48 PM PDT
According to Tajudin Ramli: "At all material times, I was acting as a nominee and agent of the Government and in the performance of a public duty and I was bound to act under the instructions and directions from the government." THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin
Do you remember these series of articles of two years ago?
1. The untold MAS story: part 1 (http://malaysia-today.net/archives/23997-the-untold-mas-story-part-1) 2. The untold MAS story: part 2 (http://www.malaysia-today.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24040:the-untold-mas-story-part-2&catid=71:archives-2009&Itemid=100106) 3. The untold MAS story: part 3 (http://www.malaysia-today.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24085:the-untold-mas-story-part-3&catid=71:archives-2009&Itemid=100106) 4. The untold MAS story: part 4 (http://www.malaysia-today.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24137:the-untold-mas-story-part-4&catid=71:archives-2009&Itemid=100106) 5. The untold MAS story: part 5 (http://www.malaysia-today.net/archives/24183-the-untold-mas-story-part-5) 6. The untold MAS story: part 6 (http://www.malaysia-today.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24190:the-untold-mas-story-part-6&catid=71:archives-2009&Itemid=100106) 7. The untold MAS story: part 7 (http://mt.m2day.org/2008/content/view/24191/84/) 8. The untold MAS story: part 8 (http://www.malaysia-today.net/archives/24192-the-untold-mas-story-part-8) 9. The billions that MAS lost: the shit is finally hitting the fan (http://www.malaysia-today.net/mtcolumns/29091-the-billions-that-mas-lost-the-shit-is-finally-hitting-the-fan) 10. UMNO's Corporate Cornucopia (http://malaysia-today.net/mtcolumns/special-reports/35228-umnos-corporate-cornucopia-)
Okay, that is certainly a lot of reading so you can read those ten reports above in your spare time (actually there are many more but suffice you read just those ten). For the benefit of those who would like to cut to the chase or get straight to the bottom line, as they would say, this is what the issue is all about: 1. When Tajudin Ramli took over MAS, the national airline company had RM600 million in cash reserves. When he left MAS seven years later, the national airline company had a hole of RM8 billion, a gap of about RM9 billion. This was revealed in the letter to Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi dated 26 March 2007 (see item 8 above). 2. The police investigation led by CCID chief, Ramli Yusuff, revealed a high level of fraudulent transactions, breaches of fiduciary duties, and breaches of various statutory duties. He then recommended that action be taken against Tajudin Ramli. 3. The basis for launching this investigation were the two police reports that MAS made -- Dang Wangi Report No. 347/02 dated 4 January 2002 and Dang Wangi Report No. 12532/05 dated 4 May 2005. It appears like this was an airtight case against Tajudin Ramli. So why would the government want to drop its case against him? Well, probably this article would explain why (http://malaysia-today.net/mtcolumns/34253-umnos-hands-in-every-pie). According to Tajudin Ramli: "At all material times, I was acting as a nominee and agent of the Government and in the performance of a public duty and I was bound to act under the instructions and directions from the government." Yes, that was what he signed in his Affidavit of 18 April 2006. So can you see why the government has to drop its case against Tajudin Ramli? If they proceed with the case and this matter is argued in court, then the whole world will know that Tajudin Ramli is just the 'Ali Baba' front for some hidden hands who have thus far managed to remain hidden. However, once the hearing starts, then the 'hidden hands' would no longer remain hidden, just like the 'hidden hands' behind Anwar Ibrahim's Sodomy 2 matter who are slowly being brought to the surface. Hmm…I remember many saying that these untold stories on MAS are a figment of my imagination and pure fantasy. Do you still think this is a fantasy story and a product of my imagination going into overdrive? Yes, justice may be delayed, but it can never be denied. As I have always said, in Malaysia, 90% of rumours are always finally proven as fact in the end. And that is why Malaysians believe in rumours. I suppose when Anwar is subjected to the 'guilty unless you can prove your innocence' rule, we too can apply the same rule and say that: you are guilty unless you can prove your innocence. The evidence points to a verdict of guilty. Let the government now prove that it is not guilty but innocent. Until then, I stand by what I said two years ago. And the fact that the government wants to drop this case and sweep everything under the rug just enhances the suspicion of guilt. Over to you, Nazri, and let truth be told. After all, we are not supposed to lie during the fasting month, isn't it? Or can we? |
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