Malaysia Today - Your Source of Independent News
Malaysia Today - Your Source of Independent News |
- Will Pakatan tighten its grip on Penang?
- ‘My Side of History’ by Chin Peng
- Malay Nationalism Before Umno: The Memoirs of Mustapha Hussain
- RPK: For God, King and Racism
- Human Rights Watch Report: Malaysia
- Fact File: The Selangor water crisis
| Will Pakatan tighten its grip on Penang? Posted: 04 Feb 2013 02:59 AM PST
The Pakatan-led government may have managed to keep Penangites happy over the past five years, and the state may be considered a "sure win", but there have been several issues that have sparked heated debates and may reduce their majority in the state. Kristina Mariswamy, fz.com AS FAR as the consensus goes, Pakatan Rakyat is likely to retain power in Penang in the impending general election, riding on its dramatic sweep to victory in the 2008 polls. In 2008, Pakatan won 29 of the 40 state seats mainly on the wave of Chinese votes cast by an electorate that was resentful of what they said was weak Barisan Nasional (BN) leadership in the state. Despite the fact that the BN may be fighting a losing battle, its Penang chief, Teng Chang Yeow, insists that the coalition has no plans of giving the state up without a fight. It's all about strategy While Teng admits that the BN may not win the state back this round, he is confident that they have a fighting chance to regain some territory. "We could garner 15% to 20% of the lost ground," he tells fz.com in a recent interview. While he agrees that it was a conservative number, the Gerakan secretary-general maintains that when he was appointed the state BN chief by the prime minister barely a year ago, he was not given a set date to win back the state. He was given a task, which Teng describes as rejuvenation. "My task is to build up the morale and the team to face the general election. There is no specific date set for me, but there is a specific task given to me," he says. According to political analyst Khoo Kay Peng, BN's chances of winning back a few seats all depends on their strategy. "They will have to come up with a smart strategy in trying to take away some seats, work their way to convince some middle ground voters and swing voters to support their candidate," says Khoo. He points out nevertheless, that it will be no easy feat, as even some of the seats the BN currently holds may be difficult for the coalition to retain. "If you were to trace back to the 2008 election, Umno may have won 11 of the state seats, but they won 6 of the seats with very, very slim majorities, including a majority of below 800 votes. These seats are Sungai Dua, Seberang Jaya, Sungai Acheh, Bayan Lepas, Pulau Betong and Telok Bahang. Civil society and swing voters can make or break parties But there are factors that both coalitions could use to garner more votes, Khoo opines. They include civil society and swing voters. "There are a few tricks in Penang that political parties may want to recognise. One, of course, is the very active civil society movement; there have always been activists in Penang. "They provide a counter-balance to the (political) power. So these coalitions need to find out what issues these activists are concerned about," he says. As for swing voters, Khoo says that compared with most states, their proportion in Penang is substantial, coming close to 40%. "If you are able to put forth an argument that could bring back the swing voters, that could help you gain some seats," he says. 'Pendulum-like' Penang voters While many believe that Penangites never fail to "surprise" when it comes to elections, according to Khoo there is a voting trend in the northern state. "Somehow, sentiment and perception change very quickly for voters in the state. People actually do vote according to such trends," he says, pointing out the surprise turns in 1995 and 2008. In the 1990 general election, DAP won 14 seats in the state legislative assembly, but they were almost wiped out in the next election in 1995, barely winning one seat, Batu Lanchang, with a 100-odd vote majority. Subsequent general elections saw the DAP maintaining only that seat while PAS joined DAP on the opposition bench with one seat in 1999 and 2004. The Pakatan-led government may have managed to keep Penangites happy over the past five years, and the state may be considered a "sure win", but there have been several issues that have sparked heated debates and may reduce their majority in the state. These include housing problems, traffic problems as well as Penang Chief Minister Lim Guan Eng's leadership style. Since taking over, the state government has been accused time and time again by the opposition of not heeding the needs of the poor in the state. DAP secretary-general Lim Guan Eng, who leads the Pakatan coalition in the state, has also been accused numerous times of being "arrogant" and "cocky". Something both the opposition and analysts feel could work against the party. "They look at the current leadership and people find that the current one, as described by the current deputy chief minister, is cocky, arrogant and has a 'tokong-like leadership' style (behaves like a deity). That is not going down well with a lot of people. "People want to see a strong but humble leader. They do not want to see a cocky kind. Especially Penangites, they are very particular about this," added Teng. While Khoo agrees that leadership style is very pertinent to Penangnites, he points out that at the end of the day, the question still is, how effective one is as a leader. State make-up and the odds While the state is made up of the island and part of the mainland under one ruling state government, there are clear differences between the two. Out of the 40 seats in the state, 23 are Chinese-majority constituencies, 14 of which are located on the island. Another 15 have a majority of Malay voters, with 11 of these seats being on the mainland. In 2008, PR won 29 out of the 40 state seats (21 on the mainland, 19 on the island) leaving the BN with only 11 seats, a stark difference compared with 2004 when BN held 38 seats. Of the 21 seats on the mainland, BN won eight while Pakatan won 13, mostly through DAP. As for the island, Pakatan won 16 of the 19 seats. On the Parliamentary level, BN only managed to win two out of the 13 seats in the state in 2008, compared with the eight they held in 2004. Both the seats won were contested by big names in the party, including former prime minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi for the Kepala Batas constituency. Chinese voters may form a large part of the electorate, hence the bigger battle for the state will be in the Malay-majority areas on the mainland. While winning all the Chinese majority seats may keep the DAP-led state government in power, political observers think that winning the Malay seats is also an important factor for Pakatan in this election as it will give them legitimacy in the state in view of the fact that the party has always been branded by its critics as a Chinese-based party. Leadership style, swing votes and several other factors may come into play as Penangites decide the fate of both coalitions in the upcoming election. It is almost certain that Penang will remain in Pakatan's hands, but will the hold be as strong? That question can only be answered when the last ballot is counted. AS FAR as the consensus goes, Pakatan Rakyat is likely to retain power in Penang in the impending general election, riding on its dramatic sweep to victory in the 2008 polls. In 2008, Pakatan won 29 of the 40 state seats mainly on the wave of Chinese votes cast by an electorate that was resentful of what they said was weak Barisan Nasional (BN) leadership in the state. Despite the fact that the BN may be fighting a losing battle, its Penang chief, Teng Chang Yeow, insists that the coalition has no plans of giving the state up without a fight. It's all about strategy While Teng admits that the BN may not win the state back this round, he is confident that they have a fighting chance to regain some territory. "We could garner 15% to 20% of the lost ground," he tells fz.com in a recent interview. While he agrees that it was a conservative number, the Gerakan secretary-general maintains that when he was appointed the state BN chief by the prime minister barely a year ago, he was not given a set date to win back the state. He was given a task, which Teng describes as rejuvenation. "My task is to build up the morale and the team to face the general election. There is no specific date set for me, but there is a specific task given to me," he says. According to political analyst Khoo Kay Peng, BN's chances of winning back a few seats all depends on their strategy. "They will have to come up with a smart strategy in trying to take away some seats, work their way to convince some middle ground voters and swing voters to support their candidate," says Khoo. He points out nevertheless, that it will be no easy feat, as even some of the seats the BN currently holds may be difficult for the coalition to retain. "If you were to trace back to the 2008 election, Umno may have won 11 of the state seats, but they won 6 of the seats with very, very slim majorities, including a majority of below 800 votes. These seats are Sungai Dua, Seberang Jaya, Sungai Acheh, Bayan Lepas, Pulau Betong and Telok Bahang. Civil society and swing voters can make or break parties But there are factors that both coalitions could use to garner more votes, Khoo opines. They include civil society and swing voters. "There are a few tricks in Penang that political parties may want to recognise. One, of course, is the very active civil society movement; there have always been activists in Penang. "They provide a counter-balance to the (political) power. So these coalitions need to find out what issues these activists are concerned about," he says. As for swing voters, Khoo says that compared with most states, their proportion in Penang is substantial, coming close to 40%. "If you are able to put forth an argument that could bring back the swing voters, that could help you gain some seats," he says. 'Pendulum-like' Penang voters While many believe that Penangites never fail to "surprise" when it comes to elections, according to Khoo there is a voting trend in the northern state. "Somehow, sentiment and perception change very quickly for voters in the state. People actually do vote according to such trends," he says, pointing out the surprise turns in 1995 and 2008. In the 1990 general election, DAP won 14 seats in the state legislative assembly, but they were almost wiped out in the next election in 1995, barely winning one seat, Batu Lanchang, with a 100-odd vote majority. Subsequent general elections saw the DAP maintaining only that seat while PAS joined DAP on the opposition bench with one seat in 1999 and 2004. The Pakatan-led government may have managed to keep Penangites happy over the past five years, and the state may be considered a "sure win", but there have been several issues that have sparked heated debates and may reduce their majority in the state. These include housing problems, traffic problems as well as Penang Chief Minister Lim Guan Eng's leadership style. Since taking over, the state government has been accused time and time again by the opposition of not heeding the needs of the poor in the state. DAP secretary-general Lim Guan Eng, who leads the Pakatan coalition in the state, has also been accused numerous times of being "arrogant" and "cocky". Something both the opposition and analysts feel could work against the party. "They look at the current leadership and people find that the current one, as described by the current deputy chief minister, is cocky, arrogant and has a 'tokong-like leadership' style (behaves like a deity). That is not going down well with a lot of people. "People want to see a strong but humble leader. They do not want to see a cocky kind. Especially Penangites, they are very particular about this," added Teng. While Khoo agrees that leadership style is very pertinent to Penangnites, he points out that at the end of the day, the question still is, how effective one is as a leader. State make-up and the odds While the state is made up of the island and part of the mainland under one ruling state government, there are clear differences between the two. Out of the 40 seats in the state, 23 are Chinese-majority constituencies, 14 of which are located on the island. Another 15 have a majority of Malay voters, with 11 of these seats being on the mainland. In 2008, PR won 29 out of the 40 state seats (21 on the mainland, 19 on the island) leaving the BN with only 11 seats, a stark difference compared with 2004 when BN held 38 seats. Of the 21 seats on the mainland, BN won eight while Pakatan won 13, mostly through DAP. As for the island, Pakatan won 16 of the 19 seats. On the Parliamentary level, BN only managed to win two out of the 13 seats in the state in 2008, compared with the eight they held in 2004. Both the seats won were contested by big names in the party, including former prime minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi for the Kepala Batas constituency. Chinese voters may form a large part of the electorate, hence the bigger battle for the state will be in the Malay-majority areas on the mainland. While winning all the Chinese majority seats may keep the DAP-led state government in power, political observers think that winning the Malay seats is also an important factor for Pakatan in this election as it will give them legitimacy in the state in view of the fact that the party has always been branded by its critics as a Chinese-based party. Leadership style, swing votes and several other factors may come into play as Penangites decide the fate of both coalitions in the upcoming election. It is almost certain that Penang will remain in Pakatan's hands, but will the hold be as strong? That question can only be answered when the last ballot is counted.  The polls result breakdown from the 2008 General Election. |
| ‘My Side of History’ by Chin Peng Posted: 01 Feb 2013 05:14 PM PST
Memoirs of Malaysian communist guerrilla leader holds many lessons for today Peter Taaffe, cwi This book is important from a number of points of view. The author was the leader of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), which he joined as a 15-year old schoolboy, and which played an important role in two guerrilla struggles - in the Second World War and in the post-war 12-year 'Emergency', in reality a war against British colonial rule in Malaya (now Malaysia). It therefore provides important insights into guerrilla war, in general, and in the struggle for national liberation in the colonial world. The book is also important because of the lessons of Malaya in the post-1945 struggle of imperialism, against what was then the colonial revolution in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The seemingly successful defeat of the CPM guerrillas in Malaya in the 1950s has been invoked, in the past and to some extent today still, as a 'model' of how counter-terrorist measures in the neo-colonial world can succeed. But former British Defence Secretary Denis Healey - once deputy leader of the Labour Party - commented on this in relation to the Vietnam War in the 1960s: "In fact the analogy with the Malayan emergency was misguided. In Malaya the communists belonged almost wholly to the Chinese minority; they were easily identifiable… The Viet Cong, on the other hand, were drawn from Vietnamese in the [Mekong] Delta; they had a long history of struggle against foreign domination, in which the Communist Party had played a leading role since the Japanese occupation in 1944." Chin Peng is also quite clearly a striking character with an extraordinary story of self-sacrifice to tell. He became the CPM's leader at the ripe old age of 23. Between 4,000-5,000 CPM fighters lost their lives in the struggle against British imperialism, while some 200 members of the party were hanged by the British. A similar tale of repression has come to light recently in a very detailed account about the methods of 'democratic' British imperialism in the suppression of the Kikuyu uprising in Kenya. There, the British established huge concentration camps, employed torture and mutilation of Kenyans, and hanged more than 1,000 Kikuyu anti-colonial fighters. World War Two British imperialism in Malaya had, before the Japanese invasion in 1941, pursued a policy of jailing or banishing to China every suspected communist, ethnic Chinese "they could lay their hands on". A similar fate awaited those communists of Indian extraction who were summarily despatched to the 'homeland'. Notwithstanding this, following Britain's capitulation in 1941 - when the Japanese themselves, according to Chin Peng, were preparing to retreat - a war of national resistance was conducted with the CPM as its backbone. The British at first tried to find a counterweight to the CPM - because of the distrust of the social and class base of the party - but the attempt to find a sufficient number of Chinese who leant towards Chiang Kai-Shek's Kuo Min-Tang (KMT) failed to materialise. Once it was clear that the CPM was the only major force resisting Japanese occupation, the British threw in their lot, for the time being, with them. The guerrillas initially were very weak but according to the author "could count on the particularly strong following the CPM enjoyed amongst Chinese villages throughout the coastal flatlands". This is a significant remark, indicating that, at this stage, the CPM drew most of its support from the ethnic Chinese. Although it was widened later to involve sections of the Malay and Indian population, this nevertheless indicates the Achilles heel of the CPM, which was to prove quite fatal in the struggle against the British - but more of that later. Up to 1947, the leader of the CPM was an ethnic Vietnamese who, as Chin Peng comments, commanded "an essentially ethnic Chinese movement…Amazingly, it never became an issue in the day-to-day running of the party in those days." This may have something to do with the fact that one of the central figures, as a Comintern [Stalinilst Communist International] representative, at the formation of the CPM in 1930, was Nguyen Ai Quoc, none other than Ho Chi Minh, who was destined to play a pivotal role in the Vietnamese revolution. However, Lai Te, the leader of the CPM from the late 1930s, was actually a 'triple agent'; first of the British, then the Japanese during the Second World War, and then of the British, once more, in the aftermath of that war! The author makes a significant remark in view of the essentially rural guerrilla struggle that was to be pursued later on, when referring to the early period of the CPM's activity in the 1930s: "The party's initial operations centred, naturally, on Singapore as there was a far greater concentration of union movements on the island than anywhere else on the Malayan peninsula." The arrest and banishment of indigenous Malayans, albeit most of them were of Chinese origin, left a space for an immigrant from Vietnam, Lai Te, to emerge as a leader of the CPM in 1938. Membership of the CPM at this stage, the early 1940s, numbered just over 3,000. At the same time as having a firm industrial base, the party had also begun to dig roots amongst the peasant population. This became useful once the offer of Lai Te to the British to help them in resistance against the Japanese occupation was taken up. The first detachments of the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) were in action against the Japanese occupying forces from 1 January 1942. Within a few weeks of imposing military rule in Singapore, the Japanese had targeted the CPM leadership. A number of key figures were arrested, including Huang Chen, "the CPM's top intellectual", who was eventually executed. This and other betrayals were quite clearly the work of the leader of the party itself, Lai Te, who quickly transferred his allegiances to the Japanese occupation force. This, however, was only discovered much later. Circumstances during the war compelled the CPM to organise what was essentially a rural guerrilla struggle because industrial activity had collapsed throughout Malaya and Singapore due to the war and Japanese occupation. The CPM, therefore, set up jungle bases from which to harass and confront the Japanese, with incredible success, given the presence of a traitor in its ranks, moreover, one leading the party itself! This was not without cost to the CPM, as a number of its jungle bases were betrayed, obviously by Lai Te, to the Japanese, which led to the execution of many of its leaders. While the CPM developed its base amongst the rural population, at the same time, it did not neglect the working class: "In Sitiawan we had 40 to 50 members. Among the Kinta Valley mining workers we were soon baosting more than 500 members." At this stage Chin Peng, already a 'mature' 19-year old, found himself appointed acting chief of the CPM in the Perak region of Malaya. In one area, the resistance troops operated from within a colony of a few hundred lepers. The Japanese feared going near the settlement and the police and troops happily gave the area a wide berth. The collaboration of the Malayan national resistance forces, under the leadership of the CPM, with the British - from whom they received material support - worked successfully but it was always an arm's length collaboration. In 1943, Lai Te suddenly began to sanction more military activity against the Japanese, obviously expecting them to be defeated by the British forces, which were massing for an attack on Malaya. At the same time, clearly expecting a future conflict with the British, the CPM had prepared an underground army which stashed away 5,000 weapons in jungle caches, many of them previously supplied by the British for the war against the Japanese. But, rather than preparing for a serious struggle against the British, the programme outlined by the CPM, under the pressure of the traitor Lai Te, was one which mollified them. The CPM received arms and military training but, at the same time, it led the party to water down its programme, from a Democratic Republic of Malaya, which would involve independence from the British, to "self governance". Imprisoned by 'stages' theory Chin Peng and his comrades were imprisoned by the Stalinist theory of "stages"; first bourgeois democracy and independence and only later could the social issues, and particularly socialism, be posed. However, only by linking the struggle of Malayan workers and peasants for independence with the social issues - freedom, especially from imperialism, land, peace and bread - would the possibility of real national liberation be posed. The Russian Revolution had demonstrated at the beginning of the twentieth century that in "backward countries" the struggle to carry through completely the bourgeois-democratic revolution is only possible by linking this to the changing of society, eliminating both landlordism and capitalism. Chin Peng seems to recognise this belatedly when he states that their main demand was for a "democratic government through elections from an electorate drawn from all the races". Chin Peng states: "I realised the programme amounted to nothing more than a vapid move to appease the incoming British… [It] made no mention of the goal of self-determination for the nation." Lai Te, the secretary-general, was against the militant struggle by the CPM. He preferred a "political posture" involving "co-operation with the British coupled with a concentrated effort on the organisation of labour and the infiltration of the unions". The latter point was correct tactically and was carried out to some extent. But it was not a question of posing either/or, military struggle or "the organisation of the working class". Both tactics should have been pursued in the struggle against the re-occupation of the British. In fact, the possibility was there for a short period in 1945, following the capitulation of the Japanese and before the arrival of substantial British forces, for the CPM to mobilise the working class and the rural masses to take power and carry through a social revolution. However, to achieve this, the CPM would have had to cut across the ethnic divisions cultivated before the war by the British and carried on by the Japanese. It seems that the majority of the Malay population - particularly in the rural areas - tended to be conservative and swayed by the Malay princes and landlords. But the working class movement in the cities under the banner of the CPM - and including the setting up of democratic committees of action - could have split the Malay workers and peasants away from the Malay grandees. This would have involved a call for the peasants to take the land and drive out the landlords. In other words, the CPM would have had to put themselves at the head of an uprising of the working class in the cities, supplemented by a peasant uprising in the rural areas - uniting Chinese, Malays and Indians - on class lines, with the goal of an independent socialist Malaya, linked to similar struggles throughout the region. Would such an uprising have succeeded? Of course, nothing is certain in a deep, revolutionary struggle but such a movement had every chance of success. The British had not arrived and were, in any case, stretched militarily. The whole of Asia was in ferment. One thing is certain: the course followed by the CPM, both then and later, led to a defeat. The British bided their time and prepared for a showdown with the CPM, profiting from the mistakes they made. The weakness of the democratic structures of the CPM - a hallmark of those parties based upon Stalinism - is underlined by Chin Peng. The unquestioning acceptance of the authority of the leadership, facilitated betrayals like those carried out by Lai Te. Incredibly, the "liberation forces" of the CPM and the MPAJA were transformed by the British into a "three-star army", with Chin Peng appointed as a number two officer of what was in effect a force under the control of the British. Chin Peng comments: "Once again, nobody questioned the wisdom of our Secretary General's views. He was the Comintern man and this aura had not left him despite the fact we knew the Comintern had been disbanded in 1943." According to Chin Peng and contrary to popular understanding, fostered by British imperialism, the CPM was not in the pay at this stage of either the Russian or the Chinese 'communists'. Its funds in the 1930s, during the battle against the Japanese and in the subsequent struggle against British imperialism were raised due to its own efforts and by its own resources. And yet, the "aura" of the Comintern and the methods of Stalinism compelled an unquestioning obedience, which in turn prepared the ground for betrayals and defeats. One consequence of these developments was the feelers put out by some Japanese military commanders and troops to the CPM for a bloc of "Asians" against the colonial white invader. This was rejected by the CPM leaders despite the fact that the "revolutionary spirit within the party had never run so high. The greater majority of our guerrilla units had, for seven days, been preparing for continuing armed struggle that now would switch to target the returning colonial power." However, the stand of Lai Te and the CPM leadership could not prevent 400 individual Japanese joining the ranks of the guerrillas. This could have become the starting point for agitation amongst the Japanese forces throughout Asia, by a conscious, particularly working-class, force. Unfortunately, the CPM was still in the grip of Stalinist methods and approach. This led subsequently, through orders handed down by Lai Te, to the tragic execution of most of the Japanese who had joined the CPM's guerrilla ranks. Instead of this being the starting point for class solidarity across ethnic lines, the opposite took place. Even before this, the Japanese fomented clashes between Malay Muslims and local Chinese villagers. The CPM was drawn in to defend these villages from attacks by Malays, resulting in substantial deaths of Malays, not disguised by Chin Peng in his book. These events undoubtedly played into hands of the British, who subsequently fomented divisions between the different ethnic groups in Malaya. Chin Peng, however, stresses the attempts of the CPM to draw Malays into their ranks, which enjoyed some success even in the struggle against the Japanese, with the recruitment and training of some Malays. However, because of the temporising of the CPM leadership, the British were able to begin to reconsolidate their rule with the establishment of a "temporary form of government" for the Malaya-Singapore region, to be known as the British Military Administration (BMA). Seeking to appease the CPM, some of its representatives were drawn onto the BMA, a just reward for not conducting a struggle against British re-occupation. The guerrillas' intentions were to demobilise with 4,000 weapons handed over while more were secretly buried in jungle caches for future use. British occupation, however, came together with economic blunders by the British administration. The Japanese occupation currency was declared valueless, which reduced the vast majority of the labouring population to paupers. Food supplies dwindled, prices soared, and the crime rate surged. An embittered population became increasingly hostile to the returning colonials and Malaya became a "cauldron of simmering discontent". The CPM, rather than using this to organise national resistance against the British, "moved to impose a moderating effect and respect for order by encouraging the formation of Peoples Committees". At the same time, clubs and unions and workers' organisations, as well as those for women and young people, sprouted. The actions of the British authorities provoked massive working-class opposition, with the first dock strike in Singapore, followed by wharf labourers coming out on strike. These strikes were for increased pay but also in protest against handling ships carrying arms for Dutch troops who were then fighting nationalist forces in the neighbouring Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia). The BMA used Japanese prisoners of war and certain British military units as strike breakers. This upsurge in working class opposition resulted in the formation of the Singapore General Labour Union (SGLU) with a claimed strength of 200,000 members. Women paraded through the streets demanding rice and a government subsidy of $20 to rescue families from destitution. The British authorities met this with force, shooting down demonstrators. Chin Peng comments: "For British troops to be called out to fire on white unarmed demonstrators demanding better living conditions in, say, Yorkshire or Cornwall, would , of course, have been unthinkable." Of course, British troops had shot down Welsh miners in 1911, under the orders of Churchill, whose government pursued a similar policy on a wider scale against Malayan workers then. Now, it was the 'Labour' government of Prime Minister Clement Attlee that was carryout the repression in Malaya. It was in 1946, probably through the pressure exerted by the traitor Lai Te, when mass executions of Japanese prisoners of war were carried out by the CPM. Chin Peng states: "I was stunned by the callousness of Lai Te's orders." He points out that some of the Japanese "joined our guerrillas and became fighters once again, only this time not for the emperor but for world communism." Lai Te was later 'eliminated' by the CPM in collaboration with the Vietnamese Communist Party, but not before he had absconded with $1 million of the CPM's funds. In the midst of all of this, Chin Peng received British accolades and awards. First came the Burma Star, then the 1939/45 Star, and, a little later, he was awarded an even higher accolade. When he arrived at his mother-in-law's house one day, he was informed, "'You have been given a very high British honour. The King has granted you an OBE'… 'The King has given me what?' I blurted, believing my brother was surely joking. I had no idea what an OBE - Order of the British Empire - might be." But the attempt to placate the leaders of the CPM failed, as this holder of the OBE was not long after confronting the forces of the British Empire that had bestowed this honour on him in the first place.
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| Malay Nationalism Before Umno: The Memoirs of Mustapha Hussain Posted: 01 Feb 2013 03:34 PM PST
Translated by Insun Mustapha DOWNLOAD THE FREE PDF VERSION HERE (10MB) http://www.malaysia-today.net/files/MH/THE-MEMOIRS-OF-MUSTAPHA-HUSSAIN.pdf DOWNLOAD THE KINDLE VERSION HERE (3MB) http://www.malaysia-today.net/files/MH/THE-MEMOIRS-OF-MUSTAPHA-HUSSAIN.mobi Foreign Distributor: Singapore University Press Pte Ltd
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| Posted: 31 Jan 2013 04:21 PM PST
Malaysia Today editor blasts Umno for its distorted version of the country's history and debunks its claim of having fought for independence To a stunned audience, Raja Petra claimed that the Malay nationalists and the Japanese had decided that the date for Merdeka would be Aug 17, 1945. This failed to materialise because of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the eventual Japanese surrender on Aug 15, 1945. Mariam Mokhtar, FMT CAMBRIDGE: Raja Petra Kamarudin debunked Umno's version of Malaysian history and detailed Tunku Abdul Rahman's sorrow at the destruction of his vision of a multiracial Malaysia, when he spoke at Cambridge University South East Asia Forum (CUSEAF), first Lent term event on Wednesday evening. Within a stone's throw of the Tunku's alma mater, St Catherine's College Cambridge, Raja Petra told the audience of 90 people, comprising mainly students in their 20s that, "the Tunku used to say he was the happiest PM in the world, but in a later interview, said, 'I wish I had died earlier…living to this age and seeing my fellow Malayans killing one another. It saddens me. This is not what I planned for my country.'" According to the Malaysia Today editor, the Tunku died a heartbroken man and neither spoke to, nor forgave the person whom he blamed as the architect of the mess – Dr Mahathir Mohamad. He drew a sharp contrast between the rallying call of "God, King and Country" used during the English Civil War, with Malaysia's version, which encompasses Ketuanan Melayu, "God, King and Racism". Charting the birth of the nation and the route taken, as well as the real fighters for Merdeka, he criticised the version of history being taught in Malaysian schools which he called Umno propaganda, and lamented the lack of works by original historians like Swettenham, Wilkinson, or Winstedt. "In our schools, the history of Malaya starts in 1946. This is when Umno was born. Umno also claimed to have fought for independence from the British." Raja Petra rubbished Umno's claims that they had fought for independence. "Umno did not fight anybody. The real fight started in 1941 when the Malay nationalists got together, Pak Sako, Mustapha Hussain and Ibrahim Yaacob. We also had Chinese nationalists like Chin Peng who wanted to fight for the independence of Malaya. "The fact that he was a communist is secondary. Ibrahim Yaacob was a socialist. Shamsiah Fakeh, a communist. Pak Sako, who is today celebrated as one of the greatest Malay writers, was a socialist." He recommended that the audience to read, "The Memoirs of Mustapha Hussain: 1910 to 1957: Malay nationalism before Umno" which details the journey of nationalism before the formation of Umno and how the Malay nationalists supported the Japanese to free the country from western imperialism. Umno formed to resist Malayan Union To a stunned audience, Raja Petra claimed that the Malay nationalists and the Japanese had decided that the date for Merdeka would be Aug 17, 1945. This failed to materialise because of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the eventual Japanese surrender on Aug 15, 1945. After WWII, he said that the British decided to educate the Malayans, in Britain, to groom them for independence. A bankrupted Britain needed to protect her economic interests in Malaya to help their country recover. The British also introduced the Malayan Union, in which the powers of the sultans would be reduced, thus diminishing the powers of the Malays. "In 1946, Umno was formed not to fight for Merdeka but to resist the Malayan Union," said Raja Petra. During the negotiations for Merdeka, the British wanted the Malays to persuade the non-Malays to join forces with them. "There was a trade off and so all non-Malays who happened to be in the country, were made citizens. The notion of "Pendatangs" stopped at the time of Merdeka. Merdeka was given to Malaya in 1957, for the Alliance party to administer, and not to Umno." "With the new parliamentary set-up in 1959, the politicians started to mess things up. From 1959 to 1969, they played up various issues. One of the guilty people was Dr Mahathir, the author of 'The Malay Dilemma'." Raja Petra blasted the propaganda aimed at the Tunku during May 13, the increase of religious intolerance, the resurgence of racism and talk of "pendatangs". He did not spare parties like PAS which felt that Malaysia was "not religious enough". "Tunku felt that the country was messed up by Umno politicians who played politics using race and religion". Reading an excerpt from the book he had earlier recommended, he said, "Mustapha was humiliated and labeled as "the Malay who brought the Japanese into Malaya" because he was negotiating with the Japanese for independence. "Although Mustapha was already negotiating for Merdeka in 1945, Umno claimed that negotiations for Merdeka only took place in 1957. The 12 year difference is crucial. "If Umno were to recognise that people like Mustapha Hussain, Pak Sako, Ibrahim Yaacob, as the real "pejuang Merdeka" or fighters for Merdeka, then Umno's legitimacy is gone. "Umno cannot then claim they are the fighters of Merdeka anymore. They cannot then explain the history they have presented us, which is that Umno was formed in 1946 to fight for Merdeka. None of that happened." BN and Opposition no different
Raja Petra said that certain people in Umno feared the Tunku's vision of Malaya; a more multiracial and less Islamic Malaya, and so they plotted to make the country more radical and ultra-religious. Their plans started in 1959, and they plotted continuously until the eruption of violence in 1969. He regretted the entry of the "Young Turks" who grabbed power in 1969, which signaled the beginning of the end, for national unity. He said that from then on, both sides of the political fence played the 3Rs (race, religion, royalty), ketuanan Melayu, the NEP, Article 153 and continued the British policy of divide and rule.
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| Human Rights Watch Report: Malaysia Posted: 31 Jan 2013 11:50 AM PST
In a nationally televised speech on Malaysia Day in September 2011, Prime Minister Seri Najib Tun Razak called for a Malaysia "which practices functional and inclusive democracy, where peace and public order are safeguarded in line with the supremacy of the Constitution, the rule of law and respect for basic human rights and individual rights." However he added that there had to be "checks and balances … between national security and personal freedom," and ensuing reforms have favored security over internationally recognized human rights. Parliamentary elections must be held no later than April 2013, and political tensions were already high in November with both the opposition and the government alleging engagement by their political opponents in election-related intimidation and violence. Preventive Detention In his September 2011 speech, Prime Minister Najib pledged to replace the notorious Internal Security Act (ISA), which permitted long-term detention without trial, and other rights-restricting legislation. The Banishment Act 1959 and the Restricted Residence Act 1933 were the first to be rescinded, followed by three emergency declarations and the emergency-related laws they made possible. One of the rescinded laws, the Emergency (Public Order and Crime Prevention) Ordinance 1969, had been regularly used to hold criminal suspects indefinitely without charge or trial. The Security Offences (Special Measures) 2012 Act (SOSMA) replaced the ISA on July 31, 2012. On a positive note, SOSMA reduced initial detention without charge from 60 to no more than 28 days, and required that a suspect be charged in court or released thereafter. However, other provisions reduce human rights protections, including an overly broad definition of a security offense, allowing police rather than courts to authorize interception of communications during investigations, and permitting prosecutors to conceal the source of evidence and to keep the identities of witnesses secret, thereby preventing cross-examination. Even if a suspect is acquitted under SOSMA, the law permits a series of appeals, with bail disallowed, that could result in a suspect's indefinite detention. Malaysian authorities, using transitional authority at the time SOSMA replaced the ISA, still hold 27 ISA detainees. Freedom of Assembly and Association In 2012, the government continued to violate rights to free association and peaceful public assembly. While Prime Minister Najib agreed in September 2011 to review section 27 of the Police Act, which mandated police permits for public assemblies, the government hastily drafted and passed a replacement Peaceful Assembly Act on December 20, 2011. The new law rescinded the requirement for a permit but also introduced major new restrictions, including a broad ban on "moving assemblies" of any kind. Static protests are also prohibited closer than 50 meters from many prohibited sites, making it virtually impossible to hold an assembly in an urban setting. Other restrictions include empowering the police to set assembly conditions such as time, place, and date after taking into consideration other groups' objections or "any inherent environmental factor." Police were also given the power to use all "reasonable force" to break up a protest. City and federal officials sought to prevent an April 28 sit-in sponsored by Bersih 3.0, the Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections. They barred Bersih from using Dataram Merdeka (Independence Square) in central Kuala Lumpur and barricaded the area. Nevertheless, marchers numbering in the tens of thousands walked peacefully toward the barricaded square and when the announcement came that the rally was over began a peaceful dispersal. However, a small group breached the barricades. The police reacted with excessive force in what became a four-hour onslaught of tear gas, water cannon, and indiscriminate beatings and arrests. On July 1, 2011, Home Affairs Minister Hishammuddin Hussein declared Bersih an illegal organization under the Societies Act. On July 24, 2012, the Kuala Lumpur High Court overturned that decision, ruling that the original decision was "tainted with irrationality." Freedom of Expression Most major newspapers and television and radio stations remain controlled by media companies close to political parties in the government coalition. A recent amendment to the Evidence Act has raised fears that intermediary liability on the internet will further decrease freedom of expression. The provision creates a legal presumption that an owner, administrator, host, editor, or subscriber to a network service who has in their custody or control any computer from which any publication originates is presumed to have published or republished the content of the publication unless the contrary is proven. The Printing Presses and Publications Act (PPPA) retains its potency despite some reforms, such as ending the need to renew licenses annually and adding judicial oversight to what was the home minister's unchecked power to approve or reject license applications. New publications still require initial approval and licenses still may be arbitrarily revoked. Other means of control include calls from the ministry offering "advice" to editors and prison terms and fines for "maliciously" printing so-called false news. The home minister maintains absolute discretion over licensing of printing presses. In 2012, Malaysian courts partially advanced the right of free expression. Malaysiakini, the largest online newspaper in Malaysia, had repeatedly and unsuccessfully applied to publish a daily print version. On October 1, the Kuala Lumpur High Court ruled the home minister's refusal was "improper and irrational" and the application should be resubmitted. In a significant statement contradicting the prevailing government view, the judge said that a license to publish was "a right, not a privilege." The attorney general's chambers and the Home Ministry appealed the court's decision. Sisters in Islam, a local nongovernmental organization, also won a significant victory in July when the Court of Appeal dismissed a government appeal to overturn a 2010 High Court decision lifting the ban on Muslim Women and the Challenge of Islamic Extremism, a book of essays originally banned in 2008. A civil court's decision that the arrest of political cartoonist Zunar under the Sedition Act and the PPPA in September 2012 was lawful had a more negative impact, reinforcing the unwillingness of printing presses, publishers, and bookstores to be associated with controversial books. Police Abuses and Impunity Human Rights Watch and local civil society groups have documented police abuses, including excessive use of force during arrests, suspicious deaths in custody, failure to adequately investigate such incidents and to hold accountable those responsible; and inadequate post-mortem inquiries and investigations. Victims of police violence reported few effective avenues for redress and decried an apparent culture of police impunity for mistreatment. Read more at: http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/malaysia
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| Fact File: The Selangor water crisis Posted: 30 Jan 2013 04:06 PM PST
Tarani Palani and Stephanie Sta Maria, fz.com THE latest water disruption due to breakdown of the Wangsa Maju water pump in late December has sparked a fresh round of finger pointing between Syarikat Bekalan Air Selangor (Syabas) and the Selangor state government over the state's long-standing water issue. The Selangor government once again questioned Syabas' capability to cater to the needs of over seven million people in Selangor, Kuala Lumpur and Putrajaya. Syabas on the other hand argued that the state has blocked essential funding to improve its piping and other important maintenance work, hence crippling its efforts to provide quality service. Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak has pledged to solve the water problem if BN wins back the state in the coming general election. Selangor Menteri Besar Tan Sri Khalid Ibrahim announced on Jan 29 that the state government will take over all four water concessionaires – Puncak Niaga Sdn Bhd (PNSB), Syarikat Pengeluaran Air Sungai Selangor Holdings (Splash), Konsortium ABASS and Syabas – in 14 days. This will no doubt bring about another round of arguments on the matter. fz.com gives the low-down on the issue by retracing the stalemate and details of the relevant parties in the infrastrctural problem that has no resolve in sight yet. In the meantime, the people suffer while the bickering continues. |
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