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• WIKILEAKS: MALAYSIA'S NEW CABINET - STATUS QUO WITH ONLY HINTS OF REFORM
• WIKILEAKS: POST-ELECTION VIEWS FROM EAST MALAYSIA
• WIKILEAKS: MALAYSIA'S ELECTION: EMBASSY OBSERVATIONS IN BATTLEGROUND STATES
• WIKILEAKS: ELECTION AFTERMATH: ABDULLAH AND UMNO STOKE MALAY FEARS
• WIKILEAKS: AMBASSADOR'S DISCUSSION WITH MFA PERMSEC HO ON MALAYSIAN ELECTIONS
• WIKILEAKS: SPECIAL 301 REVIEW: MALAYSIA
• WIKILEAKS: ABDULLAH CALLS FOR SNAP ELECTIONS; A PRIMER FOR THE POLLS
• WIKILEAKS: CLEAN FINGERS, DIRTY ELECTIONS?
• WIKILEAKS: MALAYSIA'S EIGHTH ANNUAL TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT
• WIKILEAKS: PRESS STIFLED IN ALTANTUYA MURDER TRIAL OVER MENTION OF PRIME MINISTER

WIKILEAKS: MALAYSIA'S NEW CABINET - STATUS QUO WITH ONLY HINTS OF REFORM Posted: 29 Oct 2011 01:00 AM PDT Abdullah, who boasted of selecting only honorable, uncorrupted ministers, was forced at his live March 18 press conference to field pointed questions from the journalists regarding his reappointment of Najib as DPM. One reporter specifically asked Abdullah to explain Najib's re-appointment given the frequent allegations of wrongdoing in military contracts. Abdullah, initially taken aback by the question, responded that "there is no proof that Najib is involved in any corrupt activities. People can make all kinds of allegations, but what is important is that there is no evidence of that." THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b, d). Summary 1.  (C) Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi announced his new cabinet on March 18, retaining roughly half (17) of his ministers from the previous cabinet, but bringing in only a few politicians identifiable for their reform credentials. Abdullah remained Finance Minister I, but gave up his position as Internal Security Minister.  Najib Tun Razak remains Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister.  Other senior UMNO stalwarts continue to occupy the most important portfolios, including Internal Security/Home Affairs (now combined), Finance II, Agriculture, and International Trade/Industry.  Former Culture Minister Rais Yatim has been appointed the new Minister of Foreign Affairs.  Abdullah shed a number of prominent cabinet members including Rafidah Aziz and Samy Vellu, while Abdullah's son-in-law Khairy Jamaluddin did not make the cut.  Identifiable reformers or UMNO progressives include Zaid Ibrahim with the de facto justice portfolio, Shahrir Samad for Domestic Trade, and possibly Shabery Cheek as Information Minister. 2.  (C) The cabinet make-up reflects UMNO's dominance in the National Front (BN) coalition, with 23 positions, unchanged from the outgoing cabinet.  East Malaysia only received a total of four cabinet seats, also unchanged from the previous cabinet despite Sabah and Sarawak's contribution of roughly one-third of BN's parliament seats.  The cabinet does not appear to strengthen DPM Najib's hand and possibly weakens it with the removal of several long-time Mahathir cronies, suggesting Abdullah does not want to empower the man best poised to challenge him for UMNO leadership.  Following the election debacle, Prime Minister Abdullah stated that he understood Malaysians were not satisfied with his first administration, but he will have a difficult time presenting the new cabinet as a strong platform for change in response to many voters' desertion of the National Front.  Regardless, PM Abdullah is not likely to be able to remain in office beyond the next UMNO elections, and we believe most observers will view this cabinet as an interim line-up until UMNO has settled its leadership question.  End Summary. Abdullah restructures his cabinet 3. (SBU) Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi announced his new cabinet in a noon press conference on March 18, just 10 days after his National Front (Barisan Nasional or BN) coalition emerged from a hotly contested snap election with a significantly decreased majority.  Malaysia's monarch, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, is scheduled to swear in the new ministers on March 19 at the National Palace.  In announcing the cabinet, Abdullah reduced the number of ministries from 28 to 27 and retained roughly half (17) of his former ministers.  Abdullah merged the Ministry of Internal Security and the Ministry of Home Affairs, recreating a significant concentration of power.  He also merged the Office of National Unity (formerly a division in the PM's Department) with the Ministry of Culture, Arts and Heritage.  By eliminating all Parliamentary Secretaries, whose value to government efficiency appeared questionable, Abdullah further reduced the overall size of his cabinet from 90 to 68.  BN's reduced majority in the 12th Parliament and the corresponding increase in opposition parliamentarians mean Abdullah needs more back-benchers to regularly attend parliament sessions. A smaller cabinet will ensure BN controls sufficient seats in parliament on a daily basis to achieve their legislative objectives. Out with the old 4. (SBU) Conspicuously absent from the new line up are former Minister of International Trade and Industry, Rafidah Aziz; former Minister of Science and Technology, Dr. Jamaluddin Jarjis; former Minister of Home Affairs and current UMNO Secretary General, Radzi Ahmad; former Minister of Tourism, Tengku Adnan Tengku Mansor; former Minister of Human Resources, Dr. Fong Chan Onn; former Minister in the PM's Department, Dr. Abdullah Md Zin; and former Minister of Natural Resources, Azmi Khalid.  As previously announced, Abdullah did not nominate as senators and subsequently reappoint any previous cabinet member who failed to be reelected in the 2008 General Election, to include: former Minister of Rural and Regional Development Abdul Aziz Shamsuddin; former Minister of Public Works, S. Samy Vellu; and former Information Minister Zainuddin Maidin.  Former Minister of Housing and Local Government, MCA President Ong Ka Ting, declined to accept a new cabinet posting, and former ministers Chua Soi Lek (Health) and Dr. Lim Keng Yaik (Energy, Water and Communications) resigned before the 2008 elections.  Chan Kong Choy (Transportation) and Mohd Effendi Norwawi (PM's Department) did not seek re-election and were thus ineligible for reappointment. 5. (SBU) Former Women's Ministry Shahrizat Jalil became an exception to Abdullah's decision not to reappoint ministers who failed at the polls.  In a separate written announcement from the PM's office, Abdullah announced that Shahrizat, current deputy and possible heir apparent for UMNO's women's wing, has been appointed as a Special Advisor to the PM for women's issues, with the rank of minister. 6.  (C) We note that Abdullah's son-in-law Khairy Jamaluddin was absent from the new line up.  Prior to BN's shocking election set-back, Khairy was widely touted for a minister or deputy minister slot.  Many in UMNO appear to blame Khairy as an significant factor behind UMNO and BN's poor showing. In with the new 7.  (SBU) While several previous deputy ministers were promoted in the new cabinet, there were a number of new faces to Abdullah's administration.  Most notable of the new additions are attorney and former parliamentarian Zaid Ibrahim; former President of the BN Backbenchers' Club Shahrir Samad; former Parliamentary Secretary in the MFA, Ahmad Shabery Cheek; and former Chief Minister of Selangor and current UMNO Information Chief Muhammad Muhammad Taib. Zaid has been appointed a Minister in the PM's Department and charged with overseeing reforms in the judiciary. Shahrir Samad, who also served as the outgoing chairman of Parliament's Public Accounts Committee, has been appointed as the new Minister of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs. Shabery Cheek is a relatively young and seemingly progressive parliamentarian who could bring a new approach to the Ministry of Information.  Muhammad, a long-term UMNO insider and power player, has returned to federal politics as the Minister of Rural Development. Party, Race and Gender 8. (SBU) Although the new cabinet saw the number of ministries reduced by one to 27, the number of cabinet ministers remained unchanged at 32, with UMNO Malay ministers not only occupying the large majority of the seats but also the key cabinet portfolios.  Out of the 32 member cabinet, UMNO holds 23 positions, followed by MCA with 4, and MIC, Sabah's PBS and UPKO, and Sarawak's SUPP and PBB each with one.  Old-time UMNO stalwarts continue to hold the most important portfolios of Finance I and II (PM Abdullah and Nor Yakcop), Defense (DPM Najib), Internal Security/Home Affairs (former FM Syed Hamid Albar), Agriculture (Mustapha Mohamad), and International Trade/Industry (UMNO VP Muhyiddin).  Former Culture Minister Rais Yatim, not known for his dynamism, has been appointed the new Minister of Foreign Affairs. 9.  (SBU) The racial breakdown of the cabinet includes 23 Malays (those of UMNO), five Chinese, and one each from the Indian, Kadazan-Dusun and Iban-Dayak Communities.  The number of cabinet positions represented by Sabah (non-UMNO) and Sarawak Members of Parliament remain unchanged with two cabinet portfolios from each state, despite East Malaysia's contribution of one-third of BN's seats in parliament.  From Sabah, both the non-UMNO cabinet positions are held by leaders from the indigenous Kadazan-Dusun community, while from Sarawak, one is held by a Chinese Sarawakian and the other by a leader from the indigenous Iban-Dayak community. Except for Melaka and Perlis, all other states had representatives in the cabinet with Johor having the largest representation with seven ministers, followed by Pahang and Selangor with four each. 10.  (SBU) There are only two women in the cabinet-- one each from UMNO and MCA.  This compares to three women in Abdullah's previous cabinet. Whither support for Najib? 11.  (C) Prior to the cabinet announcement, observers speculated about the involvement of Deputy Prime Minister Najib in the cabinet making, but at first glance the new cabinet does not appear to strengthen Najib's hand.  The cabinet removes some long-time Mahathir cronies, notably Jamaluddin Jarjis and Tengku Adnan Mansor, and consequently two close allies of Najib, given Mahathir's backing of Najib over Abdullah.  Of course, Najib retains the key Defense portfolio, and another important member of his camp, Education Minister and UMNO Youth chief Hishammuddin, remains in place.  We have not identified other Najib supporters newly included in the cabinet.  Speculation has already begun in opposition circles that Abdullah has resisted efforts to strengthen Najib ahead of the UMNO leadership elections. 12.  (C) Abdullah, who boasted of selecting only honorable, uncorrupted ministers, was forced at his live March 18 press conference to field pointed questions from the journalists regarding his reappointment of Najib as DPM.  One reporter specifically asked Abdullah to explain Najib's re-appointment given the frequent allegations of wrongdoing in military contracts (ref E). Abdullah, initially taken aback by the question, responded that "there is no proof that Najib is involved in any corrupt activities.  People can make all kinds of allegations, but what is important is that there is no evidence of that."  (Comment: Abdullah's reappointment of Najib as DPM was a foregone conclusion, given Najib's position as Deputy President of UMNO.  Najib faces public and private criticism for allegedly profiting greatly from the Sukhoi jet and Scorpene submarine purchases, and for rumored ties to the Razak Baginda murder case.  End Comment). Comment 13.  (C) After the election debacle, Prime Minister Abdullah stated that he understood many Malaysians were not satisfied with his first administration.  Abdullah, however, will have a difficult time presenting the new cabinet as a platform for change in response to voters' desertion of the National Front.  Despite the appointment of Zaid Ibrahim and Shahrir Samad, two noted reformists, and possibly Shabery Cheek, there is little other initial indication that Abdullah has broken the status quo.  The majority of appointees are long-time UMNO insiders who have benefitted from the system, not challenged it.  The states of Sabah and Sarawak have not gained any significant influence in the cabinet, despite their critical role in voting in roughly one-third of BN's parliamentary seats.  De facto opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim has already spoken publicly of his desire to woo BN's East Malaysia partners into the opposition, and thus remove BN from power, and the cabinet line-up does not appear to cement East Malaysia's allegiance to Abdullah's National Front.  We still assess that PM Abdullah is not likely to be able to remain in office beyond the next UMNO elections (septel), and as challenges to Abdullah's authority continue so do rumors of plans to remove him even sooner than the UMNO vote.  This cabinet is best viewed as an interim line-up until UMNO has settled its looming leadership question.  End Comment. New Cabinet Line-Up 14.  (U) The new cabinet is presented below.  Septel provides more detail about changes in the portfolios.   Prime Minister: Abdullah Ahmad Badawi Deputy Prime Minister: Najib Tun Razak   Ministers in the Prime Minister's Department: Bernard Dompok Nazri Aziz Ahmad Zahid Hamidi Mohd Zaid Ibrahim Amirsham Abdul Aziz   Deputy Ministers in the Prime Minister's Department: Johari Baharom Dr Mashitah Ibrahim K. Devamany Hassan Malik   Finance Minister - Abdullah Ahmad Badawi Second Finance Minister - Nor Mohamed Yakcop Deputies - Ahmad Husni Hanadzlah, Kong Cho Ha   Defense Minister - Najib Tun Razak Deputy - Abu Seman Yusop   Internal Security and Home Affairs Minister - Syed Hamid Albar Deputies - Chor Chee Heong, Senator Wan Ahmad Farid Wan Salleh   Housing and Local Government Minister - Ong Ka Chuan Deputies - Robert Lau , Hamzah Zainuddin   Works Minister - Mohd Zin Mohamad Deputy- Yong Khoon Seng   Energy, Water and Communications Minister - Shaziman Abu Mansor Deputy- Joseph Salang Gandum   Agriculture and Agro-based Industry Minister - Mustapa Mohamed Deputy - Rohani Abdul Karim   International Trade and Industry Minister - Muhyiddin Yassin Deputies- Loh Wei Keong, Jacob Dungau Sagan   Foreign Affairs Minister - Dr. Rais Yatim Deputy- Tunku Azlan Abu Bakar   Education Minister - Hishammuddin Hussein Deputies - Wee Ka Siong, Razali Ismail   Higher Education Minister - Khaled Nordin Deputies - Khoo Kok Choong, Idris Harun   Transport Minister - Ong Tee Keat Deputy - Anifah Aman   Human Resources Minister - S. Subramaniam Deputy- Noraini Ahmad   Women, Family and Community Development Minister- Dr Ng Yen Yen Deputy- Noriah Kasnon   National Unity, Culture, Arts and Heritage Minister- Shafie Apdal Deputy- Teng Boon Soon   Science, Technology and Innovation Minister- Dr Maximus Ongkili Deputy- Fadilah Yusof   Entrepreneurial and Cooperative Development Minister - Noh Omar Deputy- Saiffuddin Abdullah   Natural Resources and Environment Minister - Douglas Unggah Embas Deputy - Abu Ghapur Salleh   Rural and Regional Development Minister - Muhammad Muhd Taib Deputy- Joseph Kurup   Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs Minister - Shahrir Samad Deputy - Jelaing Mersat   Plantation Industries and Commodities Minister - Peter Chin Fah Kui Deputy- Senator A. Kohilan   Youth and Sports Minister - Ismail Sabri Yaacob Deputy - Wee Jack Seng   Health Minister - Liow Tiong Lai Deputy- Dr. Abdul Latiff Ahmad   Information Minister - Ahmad Shabery Cheek Deputy- Tan Lian Hoe   Tourism Minister - Azalina Othman Deputy - Sulaiman Abdul Rahman Abu Taib   Federal Territories Minister - Zulhasnan Rafique Deputy- M. Saravanan SHEAR (March 2008)

WIKILEAKS: POST-ELECTION VIEWS FROM EAST MALAYSIA Posted: 28 Oct 2011 05:42 PM PDT Dominic told us Anwar must win the trust of Sabahans through action and not words. The burden is on Anwar to show he is no longer a Muslim fundamentalist. Sabahans mistrust peninsular-based parties because of their experience with the United Malay National Organization (UMNO) after the party gained entry into Sabah. Sabahans voted on the merits of individual opposition candidates and not for their parties. Sarawakians accepted DAP, which focuses on political issues. However, they distrust both Anwar's People's Justice Party (PKR) and the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS). THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin Classified By: Classified By: POLITICAL SECTION CHIEF MARK D. CLARK, RE ASON 1.4 (B AND D). Summary 1. (C)  East Malaysians, whose support in the March 8 election provided Prime Minister Abdullah with the necessary majority to form the new government, are closely watching what opposition parties do with their newly won states, especially Penang, according to our contacts in Sabah and Sarawak on March 14. If they are successful, the opposition parties could make significant gains in East Malaysia during the next election.  A journalist speculated that East Malaysia would have voted for the opposition if it had known how well the opposition would fare on the peninsula.  The fact that East Malaysian parliamentary seats are now essential for Abdullah's National Front government has generated high expectations in Sabah and Sarawak of stronger representation in the Prime Minister's cabinet.  Given the ruling National Front's (BN) vulnerabilities on the peninsula, the Prime Minister cannot afford political missteps in Sabah and Sarawak as he struggles to remain in power.  End Summary. View from Sabah 2.  (C) We spoke on March 14 with contacts in the East Malaysia states of Sabah and Sarawak to find out what people are saying about the election.  Jaswendar Kaur, a journalist for the government-influenced New Strait Times (NST), told poloff that if Sabah's general election were held 3-4 days after the peninsula's and its strong opposition showing, Sabah would have gone with the opposition.  She said people, especially from rural communities, remember when Sabah voted against BN in the early 1990s.  Afterwards, the federal government froze Sabah out of federal funding until the next general election as punishment.  Not willing to be the lone voice, Sabahans voted BN.  However when combined, opposition candidates won the popular vote.  Within Sabah, the opposition parties lacked the cooperation achieved in West Malaysia.  As a result, many of the election races had multiple candidates vying against a BN opponent.  As in prior elections, allegations of vote rigging in key races were widespread, including allegations that some election officials were complicit in the rigging.  Sabahans are watching how the opposition will run the key state of Penang to measure the opposition's effectiveness. 3. (C) Dominic Lim, Coordinator for the Catholic Diocese's Human Development Committee told poloff that if the opposition successfully runs Penang, BN "will lose" its hold on Sabah.  However, Sabahans are slow to embrace Anwar Ibrahim.  He is widely remembered in Sabah from his days as Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister, when he spoke disparagingly about Sabah.  Dominic told us Anwar must win the trust of Sabahans through action and not words.  The burden is on Anwar to show he is no longer a Muslim fundamentalist.  Sabahans mistrust peninsular-based parties because of their experience with the United Malay National Organization (UMNO) after the party gained entry into Sabah. Sabahans voted on the merits of individual opposition candidates and not for their parties.  A Sabah-based opposition party could expect to find strong support, but as contacts noted, Sabah lacks a strong leader capable of uniting Sabahans across ethnicities (Kadazan, Chinese, and Malay).  The key issues dominating Sabah's local politics during the election continued to be the status of thousands of illegal aliens residing in Sabah and land being seized by businesses, sometimes in violation of indigenous customary law. View from Sarawak 4.  (C) According to Father Simon Poh, Chancellor to Catholic Archbishop John Ha, Sarawak's voters split mostly along urban and rural lines.  Urban voters leaned towards the opposition Democratic Action Party (DAP) and rural voters, dependent upon federal government funding for development, voted BN. However, a common consensus of our contacts is that the people want change.  If the opposition could cooperate in Sarawak, they could make significant gains in future elections.  Sarawakians accepted DAP, which focuses on political issues.  However, they distrust both Anwar's People's Justice Party (PKR) and the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS).  Sarawakians perceive both parties using religion for political gain and fear they will bring an Islamic agenda to Sarawak.  (Note: PAS does not have a presence in Sarawak and DAP and PKR are not on good terms with each other in the state.  End Note.)  The Catholic Church, while publicly neutral, privately favors a change from BN and advised parishioners to "vote their conscience."  Sarawakians, like Sabahans, are closely watching how the opposition will run their newly controlled states. 5.  (C) Nancy Nais (protect), journalist for NST, told poloff that vote buying was widespread in the rural areas, with alleged payments ranging from about USD30-130 (50-200 Malaysian Ringgit).  She also described how during the campaign period, UMNO sent censors to the editorial offices for NST, and other government-influenced mainstream press. The teams were empowered to edit or stop publication of all articles.  After the election and because of the opposition's strong gains, the NST's senior editors distributed a memorandum informing all NST offices they "must now provide balanced reporting" of the opposition. Comment 6.  (C) The people in East Malaysia are awakening to their new political leverage, holding 51 of BN's 138 parliamentary seats.  East Malaysia's consequently anticipate a greater number and more important cabinet positions.  Just as important as the number of cabinet positions will be who fills them.  Sabahans and Sarawakians will fill cheated once more by the peninsula if ethnic Malays, a minority in Malaysian Borneo, dominate the Cabinet appointments allocated to East Malaysia.  Given BN's vulnerabilities on the peninsula, the Prime Minister cannot afford political missteps in Sabah and Sarawak as he struggles to remain in power. KEITH (March 2008)

WIKILEAKS: MALAYSIA'S ELECTION: EMBASSY OBSERVATIONS IN BATTLEGROUND STATES Posted: 27 Oct 2011 01:00 AM PDT On March 6, we went to a DAP ceramah that drew some 50,000 people. In contrast, we attended a BN ceramah in Jelutong for Gerakan candidate Thor Teong Gee. There were only about 100 people in attendance, and they milled around and chatted while he spoke. The crowd was completely ethnic Malay and Dr. Thor spoke Bahasa. BN provided food and drinks, but still there were many empty chairs. Dr. Thor was not very animated, and after he finished his 30-minute speech he left immediately. THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin Summary 1. (SBU) Embassy KL positioned election observers in six hotly contested states during the final days of Malaysia's campaign period and on the March 8 polling day.  In addition to our previous reporting on campaigns in the capital city areas of Kuala Lumpur and Selangor, this message provides first hand observations from Perak, Terengganu, Penang, Kedah, Kelantan and Sabah.  We observed common patterns in many of these states which highlight some factors that may have brought about the unprecedented opposition gains (ref A).  Despite the prevalence of signs, banners and flags around the country for Prime Minister Abdullah's National Front (Barisan Nasional or BN) coalition, and despite the coalition's heavy dominance of the mainstream media, the BN was out-campaigned in many areas.  The opposition parties' ceramahs, or street rallies, dwarfed BN's efforts, and the coalition's decision to limit most campaigning to small groups and "walk-a-bouts" failed to draw the large number of votes to which it was accustomed.  Issues of corruption, crime, good governance, fair elections and racial equality resonated loudly in the communities that eventually fell to the opposition, and many voters chose "anyone but BN." Finally, on the peninsula we also saw a general lack of confidence among both BN volunteers and candidates in constituencies that the eventually fell to the opposition. The opposition's energetic campaigns contrasted with lackluster BN efforts, foreshadowing the serious political setback suffered by Prime Minister Abdullah and BN in the March 8 polls.  End Summary. Perak 2. (SBU) In our early visits around Perak's capital of Ipoh we heard many conclude that the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) would have a tough time beating DAP.  The MCA ceramahs were far from a success and turn outs were minimal.  Staffers of the BN-MCA candidates went around the tables, shook hands and handed out brochures, hand fans and CDs.  We attended a typical ceramah that had a maximum of 500 people in attendance with about 30 per cent of the crowd being children.  They were there primarily to watch the Lion Dance (which the party paid RM 8000 for a 10 minute performance). When the performance ended the people began leaving.  By the time the 3 late-teens girls act finished singing and the politicians started talking, the crowd was less than 200 and most were ignoring the speakers.  People were just not interested.  Looking for other BN activities, we walked into the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) building, but it was sparsely staffed and looked like a ghost town.  We were told they were not holding any ceramahs, only going door-to-door. 3. (SBU) We also attended parliamentary opposition leader Lim Kit Siang's last ceramah in Perak.  It was raining heavily up until the start of the event.  When we arrived the rain had just stopped and there were almost 2000 people, with umbrellas.  There were no performances or gimmicks to attract the crowd, only speakers.  The people came in droves and by 11:30pm there were about 20,000 people mostly of Chinese and Indian descent, at the event.  Speakers worked up the crowd mentioning the brandishing of the ceremonial Malay kris at the UMNO conventions. They emphasized that Chinese born in Malaysia are also true Malaysians; and touched on religious cases of Lina Joy, and other conversion cases; and on education and the number of Chinese schools allocated in the last 10 years.  Speakers also complained of the Altantuya murder case and called it the "MongolianNajib" case, in reference to Deputy Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak's alleged connections to the case.  Making fun of Prime Minister Abdullah's reputation of sleeping through meetings, one speaker commented that the Royal Malaysian Customs close "one eye" to matters but the Prime Minister closes "both eyes".  Speakers frequently referenced the rising crime rates and linked the crimes with corruption and poor governance. Speakers made reference to the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) and renamed it "Another Collection Agency," and highlighted the endemic corruption that was apparent in the VK Lingam case. 4. (SBU) Election day was uneventful.  Embassy observers traveled around Ipoh to different polling sites.  At each site the people were coming in a steady trickle.  Volunteer civil-defense personnel (RELA) or police were at all the polls, with a BN booth (locally called a "pondok panas") set-up near-by to help voters verify their registrations. Observers did not see any buses or other overt forms of possible voting irregularities. Terengganu 5.  (SBU) We observed the election in three districts - Marang, Kuala Terengganu, and Kuala Nerus. Kuala Terengganu was awash with banners and posters of both parties.  However, both the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) and UMNO did not hold any mass ceramahs two days prior to polling, but instead focused on smaller neighborhood ceramahs door-to-door campaigning and the distribution of political pamphlets and CDs. In Kuala Nerus, it was a similar situation as in Kuala Terengganu.  However, in the PAS stronghold of Marang and the state constituencies within the district, it was obvious that there were many more PAS posters and banners compared to BN. 6. (SBU) In PAS ceramahs, we noted that speakers were focusing on two issues - Islamic values and the "kain kapan" (or funeral shrouds). The speakers were emphasizing the importance of Islam and the afterlife. They told the people that they should vote for the "right candidate" but reminded everyone that it is sinful to vote for a candidate or party who is corrupt.  The rationale being, since all BN candidates are corrupt, the vote should go to PAS. In one small ceramah at Kuala Terengganu, a local PAS leader campaigning for PAS Vice President Mohamed Sabu, also stated that although they hated Mahathir, they could still tolerate him but not PM Abdullah whom they claim was "stupid."  PAS also accused BN of stealing the people's money and added that Terengganu does not need any more development that only benefits the rich. 7. (SBU) BN supporters on the other hand were generally happy with the PM and developments in Terengganu.  A MCA party worker told us that the people should give the PM at least two terms before judging his administration but "the uneducated folks in Terengganu want to see results in a day." Another BN supporter shared her experience on how PAS supporters had openly questioned her at the local market for supporting the BN and gave her a "religious lecture" on why she should be supporting PAS.  Due to these incidents, BN supporters told us that they would normally pretend to agree with PAS whenever they are approached by the Opposition party to avoid a lecture, and because of "the fear of a mishap from Allah" (as PAS supporters would claim if someone did not support the party). Penang 8. (SBU) On March 6, two days before the election, we met DAP candidate Liew Chin Tong and asked if he felt confident.  He replied that he felt confident in himself, but still not sure if the voters would turn out.  Nevertheless, the DAP headquarters and PKR operations center we visited were buzzing with people and activity.  Groups of people were chatting outside, and seemed charged up and excited. A steady stream of people were coming and going, while candidates Liew Chin Tong and Jason Ong Khan Lee (PKR) were among the group of workers greeting people and handing out literature. 9.  (SBU) On March 7, at the People's Movement Party (Gerakan) headquarters, a volunteer told us that he felt like it was hopeless, and that he felt very discouraged. We visited Barisan Nasional's MCA headquarters and Gerakan headquarters and both were relatively quiet and empty.  In fact MCA's office was so quiet that we initially thought it was closed.  We tried calling one of the Gerakan election centers for directions to a ceramah, and no one answered. When we inquired about ceramahs at the MCA headquarters, a volunteer suggested that we attend the DAP ceramah instead. Issues of importance to Penang voters 10. (SBU) From Chinese and Indians, most comments were about the economy, high prices, and declining standard of living. Several Chinese mentioned that huge schools are being built for Malays in areas where there are few Malays, and the Chinese are packed into tiny schools.  There is anger on this point and on other race-related inequities. They said that they cannot demand higher wages from the multi-nationals or the companies will be driven out of Malaysia.  People are fed up that the government is not keeping costs down.  Many Chinese and Indians said that they are poor, and the government does not help them. 11. (SBU) We attended several ceramahs in the state, but without exception, only DAP and PKR were able to draw a crowd.  On March 6, we went to a DAP ceramah that drew some 50,000 people. Speakers included Karpal Singh, Lim Guan Eng, and Lim Kit Siang among others.  They spoke a mix of Hokkien, Mandarin, English, and Malay; all speakers using at least two languages and some using four.  The crowd's reaction to Lim Guan Eng stood out the most. He first approached while someone else was speaking.  The crowd which had been sitting on the grass stood and chanted his name, cheering wildly.  He didn't come up on stage then, but came back later.  Again the crowd stood, with deafening chanting and cheering greeted his entrance.  When he finally spoke, he was given a rock-star reception, again with deafening cheers to his words. Although others received enthusiastic receptions, the standing, cheering and roaring applause were reserved for Lim Guan Eng. 12. (SBU) In contrast, we attended a BN ceramah in Jelutong for Gerakan candidate Thor Teong Gee.  There were only about 100 people in attendance, and they milled around and chatted while he spoke.  The crowd was completely ethnic Malay and Dr. Thor spoke Bahasa.  BN provided food and drinks, but still there were many empty chairs.  Dr. Thor was not very animated, and after he finished his 30-minute speech he left immediately.  BN later hosted several other speakers, and though the crowd fluctuated in size, there were at most only 200 people at its height. Kedah 13. (SBU) Upon arriving in Alor Star, the capital of Kedah, we stopped at the UMNO headquarters and spoke with a worker. The office was empty except for him and one other, and they were entirely at a loss when asked about ceramah schedules. They said another office took care of that, and searched for the phone number of someone to call.  When we called, we only got an error message.  With little support from the party we decided to speak with locals about the campaign.  We spoke with a Chinese Malaysian vendor at a printing shop with large a Gerakan banner posted above the entrance.  He said that a large number of BN banners around Alor Star were not necessarily representative of widespread support, and estimated the town at 60-40 pro-BN.  He himself was not sure whom he would vote for and seemed to weigh some of the same things that media had been harping on -- making votes "count" by voting for BN vs. voting for the opposition as a way to signal displeasure at the current government. 14. (SBU) As we drove through the rural areas of the state we saw considerably more PAS banners, which increased markedly as we made our way into the small town centers. The owner of a local shop confirmed that PAS would be holding 22 ceramahs across the state every night of the campaign.  When talking about his own district of Pendang, he said the race was "hot" between PAS and UMNO but guessed it 50-50 that either side would win.  Not surprisingly for this conservative area, very few women were seen to be involved in the political process, and the people we spoke to seemed generally suspicious and uncomfortable when an American woman asked questions about the elections.  Although it was considered a "hot" race, there was little outward political activity to suggest active mobilization or participation on either side.  In general, it was very quiet for 2 days before polling, and we surmised that most voters had long since made up their minds about which party to vote for. 15.  (SBU) On the last day of campaigning we happened upon one of the campaign offices of PKR candidate Gobalakrishnan (a recent Embassy IVP alumnus) in Padang Serai.  One of the campaign's biggest concerns was about polling-day shenanigans, including phantom voters.  The indelible ink issue was brought up constantly, as evidence that the government was intent on ensuring that voting would not be fair while at the same time blaming others for it. Gobal described how the local Indians were very angry with Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) President Sammy Vellu, so much so that when Samy came to the town last week to support the BN candidate he did not inform the Indian community. When word got out, according to Gobal, there was a spontaneous protest demonstration by 10,000 people that clogged roads and brought out the police.  Police arrested the PKR candidate's son, claiming his stereo speakers were too loud, then told Gobal they would release him if Gobal told the crowd to disperse.  Gobal proudly said that he told them to keep his son locked up.  The campaign figured their chances of success were about 50-50, but in the end won by almost 12,000 votes and the opposition took the state. Kelantan 16. (SBU) In the battle of banners, Kelantan was the Maginot Line of Malaysia where the green banners of PAS buttressed the navy blue of Barisan Nasional at every corner.  Yet despite the constant flag warfare, and despite repeated visits earlier in the campaign by the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, little else was observed that would indicate BN was truly prepared to fight.  In the final days of the campaign, while PAS held street rallies (ceramahs) and mass prayers at the local stadium in Kota Bahru, BN candidates quietly visited their neighbors and limited their campaigns to "walk-a-bouts."  On March 6, just two nights before the election, we were informed by a sparsely staffed campaign headquarters that UMNO would not be holding any ceramahs or public events before the elections. 17. (SBU) Nevertheless, PAS candidates continued to campaign hard throughout the state and in the capital city.  Former State Assembly Speaker and parliamentary candidate Wan Rahim Wan Abdullah invited us to attend a PAS ceramah in a Chinese village on the outskirts of Kota Bahru, "to get a real feeling for the issues facing Kelantan."  Upon arriving, we quickly noticed that the only Muslims at the ceramah were the candidate and his family. Yet, a crowd of some 200 Chinese voters bought food from local hawkers and listened for hours as Hokkien speakers explained why even non-Muslims should support PAS over Barisan Nasional.  The crowd laughed and cheered as the speakers disparaged the BN national government.  As one attendee explained, "PAS cleaned up our state.  So you want to gamble or go to a night club. . .go to Thailand.  It's not far.  Some of us go, but we don't need he problems those things bring us here." 18. (SBU) We spent the final day of campaigning in Bachok, the hotly contested seat of Deputy Finance Minister Dr. Awang Adek Hussin and his challenger PAS Deputy President Nasharuddin Mat Isa.  BN supporters confirmed that the coalition had taken the same approach throughout the campaign and limited most of their campaigning to small group meetings, door-to-door encounters, and relied heavily on the personal reputation of the candidate.  We met briefly with Awang, and he expressed optimism of retaining his parliamentary seat, but less confident of winning the state seat which would designate him the coalition's choice for Chief Minister.  PAS supporters remained confident of sweeping the parliamentary and state assembly elections in the district and held ceramahs nightly even to the last day of campaigning. 19. (SBU) Election Day in Kota Bahru remained calm and voters flowed to the polls in steady streams throughout the day. There was a true feeling of excitement in the air as both PAS and BN "pondok panas" workers greeted arriving voters with enthusiasm and attention.  But by the end of the day, BN workers confided that they had hoped for a better turn out. They estimated that turn-out was around 70 percent, and they had hoped for 80 percent to ensure a BN victory.  In the end they were right, and PAS and PKR candidates handily defeated BN in both state and parliamentary elections across Kelantan. Sabah 20. (SBU) Prior to election day in Sabah, there was sentiment expressed both in news articles and even by some supporters within the BN's Sabah People's Progressive Party (SAPP)  that some Barisan seats were likely to be lost in the general election, with the Democratic Action Party (DAP) expected to reap the benefit of any BN losses.  Journalists speculated in the run-up to Election Day that the areas with Chinese voter majorities were being targeted by opposition parties such as the People's Justice Party (PKR) and DAP. 21.  (SBU) When the voting was done and the ballots were counted, DAP managed wins only in the Kota Kinabalu and Sri Tanjung districts.  Just days before the election, however, many BN candidates confided that they were not sure how well the BN would perform in urban areas, and that they expected to lose more seats.  Still, one BN party activist we interviewed made the interesting comment that Chinese voters in Sabah become anxious when they see demonstrations leading to crackdowns such as those taking place in the peninsula where Bersih and Hindraf demonstrations came to grief.  He noted that Chinese in East Malaysia would, in order to avoid strife, rather stay away from supporting parties like PKR in the elections and prefer instead to support moderate mainline groups like the SAPP who are already aligned to folks in power. 22. (SBU) During the period of observations, we saw no buses being used to transport potential voters.  However, at one site we could overhear an UMNO worker on his cell phone requesting that transportation (including buses) be provided to bring voters to the station.  We observed an interesting situation when a youthful voter exited from the polling area and asked one of the uniformed UMNO party workers what he should do now.  Paraphrasing, she told him "not now" but to "come to the office tomorrow." KEITH (March 2008)

WIKILEAKS: ELECTION AFTERMATH: ABDULLAH AND UMNO STOKE MALAY FEARS Posted: 26 Oct 2011 01:00 AM PDT UMNO leaders publicly warn the Penang government not to foment unrest, but UMNO's media campaign itself seems intent on stoking the fires. Were demonstrations for Malay rights to break out (or be staged) in Penang, UMNO and BN would have grounds to discredit the fledgling opposition authorities or, in a more extreme scenario, to invoke Article 150 of the Constitution to declare a state of emergency.  THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin Classified By: POLITICAL SECTION CHIEF MARK D. CLARK, REASON 1.4 (B AND D). 1.  (C) Summary:  Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi and senior officials from his UMNO party seemingly are using the media to stoke ethnic Malay fears over opposition Chinese political gains at the expense of Malays, using the new Chinese-led opposition government in Penang as the lightening rod. UMNO's coordinated media offensive appears intended to rally ethnic Malays back to UMNO while undermining the Penang state government, and represents the first counter-attack against the opposition that fared so well in the March 8 polls.  End Summary. 2.  (C) In the aftermath of the shocking March 8 election set-back (reftel), Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi and senior officials from his United Malays National Organization (UMNO) party seemingly are using the media to stoke ethnic Malay fears over opposition Chinese political gains at the expense of Malays, using opposition-held Penang as the lightening rod.  In bold initial statements, newly-installed Penang Chief Minister Lim Guan Eng of the opposition Democratic Action Party (DAP) announced that his state government would stop implementation of measures under the New Economic Policy (NEP), which provides for Malay preferences in contracting, hiring and other areas.  Abdullah and UMNO leaders quickly seized upon this assault on the NEP, a long-held centerpiece of Malay politics, to launch their own offensive against the opposition. 3.  (U) Since March 11, a day after the King swore in Abdullah for a new term as Prime Minister, the government-dominated Malay-language media, both television and print, have carried strong warnings by the Prime Minister and other senior UMNO leaders against actions that disadvantage Malays and thus fuel racial tensions.  In statements carried on Malay television news broadcasts on March 12, Abdullah publicly warned, "the (Penang) state government must not try to create an atmosphere which can cause racial tension...."  UMNO Vice President Muhyuddin Yassin told reporters, "I'm not sure if the rights and fate of the Malays will be taken care of...," while a second UMNO Vice President, Ali Rustam, said Penang's decision victimizes Malays.  Former de facto Law Minister Nazri Aziz called Malays who voted for the opposition "traitors" and veteran UMNO leader Tan Sri Abdul Aziz said such Malays lacked patriotism. 4.  (U) The UMNO-owned Utusan, the largest circulation Malay language hard news daily, has led the way in the print media, exemplified by its March 13 front-page headline, "Warning to Guan Eng - Don't Take Actions that Fuel Racial Tensions." Political columnists cautioned that Penang could break away "like Singapore" and letters from unnamed contributors attracted headlines like "Malays' Survival Threatened." State news agency Bernama carried similar articles, including one on March 13 under the headline "DAP's Arrogance Can Stoke Racial Tension," quoting former deputy Information Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi. 5.  (U) Lim Guan Eng and senior leaders of his Democratic Action Party (DAP) tried to refute publicly the UMNO attacks and assure ethnic Malays.  The Penang Chief Minister told reporters on March 13 that Malays in his state would not be marginalized and he clarified that doing away with the NEP meant a transparent tender process for government contracts. Lim accused Utusan and the Bernama news agency of inaccurate reporting, and said unnamed parties were spreading tension-building rumors, for example that the Chinese-led Penang government had ordered mosques to turn down the volume in the call for prayers.  Lim said, "It is easy to play up this kind of sentiment.  If the BN (UMNO's National Front coalition) has any dignity, it should do things according to the facts and not just create issues and they whack us." 6.  (C) Comment:  Lim Guan Eng's bold announcement of the end of NEP provided UMNO with a convenient opportunity to play the Malay race card.  Charges of marginalization of the Malays at the hands of ethnic Chinese and rumored challenges to the practice of Islam are highly emotive issues in Malaysian politics and invoke memories of the 1969 race riots that followed gains by the Chinese political opposition. UMNO's coordinated public attack on the new Chinese-led government in Penang, carried out primarily in the Malay media, appears intended in part to rally ethnic Malays back to UMNO, following its electoral set-back which saw a swing in Malay votes in support of the opposition.  Additionally, UMNO's campaign serves to undermine the legitimacy of the Penang state government and represents UMNO's first counter-attack against the opposition that fared so well in the March 8 polls. 7.  (C) UMNO leaders publicly warn the Penang government not to foment unrest, but UMNO's media campaign itself seems intent on stoking the fires.  Were demonstrations for Malay rights to break out (or be staged) in Penang, UMNO and BN would have grounds to discredit the fledgling opposition authorities or, in a more extreme scenario, to invoke Article 150 of the Constitution to declare a state of emergency.  The intense UMNO media campaign is reminiscent of government tactics used to set the stage for Abdullah's decision in December 2007 to jail ethnic Indian rights activists on national security grounds. KEITH (March 2008)

WIKILEAKS: AMBASSADOR'S DISCUSSION WITH MFA PERMSEC HO ON MALAYSIAN ELECTIONS Posted: 25 Oct 2011 01:00 AM PDT Ho said that on the ruling National Front (BN) side, PM Abdullah Badawi is probably done for politically, despite having been sworn in again as PM on March 10. Former PM Mahathir Mohamad will keep throwing stones at Abdullah. The political knives will be out for Abdullah's son-in-law UMNO politician Khairy Jamaluddin, whom nobody likes because he got where he is through family ties. As for Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak, he is an opportunist. Although he has not been critical of Singapore, he will not hesitate to go in that direction if it is expedient for him to do so. Najib's political fortunes continue to be haunted by the Mongolian murder scandal. THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin Classified By: Ambassador Patricia L. Herbold for reasons 1.4 (b, d). 1.  (C) The Ambassador and MFA Permanent Secretary Peter Ho met over lunch on March 12, discussing issues including Singapore's perceptions of the elections in Malaysia (reftel.)  Ho said that in Singapore "everybody was shocked" by the extraordinarily strong showing by the opposition in Malaysia.  People knew that change was coming, perhaps one election down the road, but did not anticipate that change could come this fast. 2.  (C) Ho said that on the ruling National Front (BN) side, PM Abdullah Badawi is probably done for politically, despite having been sworn in again as PM on March 10.  Former PM Mahathir Mohamad will keep throwing stones at Abdullah.  The political knives will be out for Abdullah's son-in-law UMNO politician Khairy Jamaluddin, whom nobody likes because he got where he is through family ties.  As for Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak, he is an opportunist.  Although he has not been critical of Singapore, he will not hesitate to go in that direction if it is expedient for him to do so.  Najib's political fortunes continue to be haunted by the Mongolian murder scandal.  (Note: The scandal involves the ongoing trial of Najib's former political adviser Abdul Razak Baginda for abetting the 2006 murder of the Mongolian woman who had been Abdul Razak's ex-lover; two policemen from Najib's protective detail also are on trial for carrying out the murder.  End Note.)  The MIC's Samy Vellu bears a large share of the responsibility for the BN's poor showing in the elections.  The Indian community's unhappiness, which helped create the current political dynamic in Malaysia, reflects the fact that Samy Vellu neglected the interests of the Indian community, even when its temples were being destroyed, focusing instead on his business activities in India, Ho said. 3.  (C) Ho stated that on the opposition side, former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim came out of the elections in a strong position, as shown by the electoral victories by his wife (whom Ho commented he has met and finds very impressive) and his daughter.  The Islamic PAS will be pushed in a more pragmatic, less radical direction by its increased proximity to real political power.  Within the ruling coalition, UMNO could find itself pulled in the opposite direction as it comes under increasing pressure to compete with PAS, Ho said. 4.  (C) Ho expressed pessimism about Malaysia's future prospects.  Malaysians from the Chinese and Indian minority communities keep leaving the country.  The relative size of the Malay Muslim majority keeps increasing.  As a result, more Malaysian students are studying in religious schools and fewer are studying in more rigorous secular schools.  This is harming Malaysia's international competitiveness, Ho said. Visit Embassy Singapore's Classified website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/singapore/ind ex.cfm HERBOLD (March 2008)

WIKILEAKS: SPECIAL 301 REVIEW: MALAYSIA Posted: 24 Oct 2011 01:00 AM PDT Despite the many positive trends, however, industry estimates on current IPR piracy levels indicate that it remains a serious problem. Piracy will require sustained government attention in many areas for the foreseeable future, and improved government attention in some areas that are currently deficient. Embassy therefore recommends that Malaysia remain on the Special 301 Watch List. THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin 1.  Summary. In 2007 Malaysian IPR enforcement authorities continued to make good progress in fighting IPR piracy.  The single most promising development of the year was the long-awaited launch of the country's specialized intellectual property court. The United States and Malaysia continued to cooperate closely, in particular through ongoing negotiations on IPR issues within the framework of a free trade agreement. Piracy levels for motion pictures and for entertainment software declined in 2007. However, the overall piracy rates remain high for most types of IP, and the government will need to continue to strengthen its enforcement and prosecution efforts, and to seek certain legislative changes to strengthen Malaysian authorities. Embassy recommends that Malaysia remain on the Special 301 Watch List.  End summary. Optical Media Piracy 2. In 2007 Malaysian IPR enforcement officers continued to exert strong pressure on the producers and exporters of counterfeit optical disc media.  The Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs (MDTCA), Malaysia's principal IPR enforcement authority, reports that in 2007 it conducted 70,863 raids, resulting in the seizure of 2,395,733 optical discs with an approximate value of 54 million Malaysian ringgit (approximately USD 16.8 million).  The number of cases taken under the Copyright Act of 1987 was 2,720 involving 597 arrestees.  MDTCA also reported 566 new criminal prosecutions. 3. Statistics compiled by the copyright industry indicate a seven percent drop in piracy rates (from 90 to 83 percent) in entertainment software.  MDTCA is carrying out more raids on pirated computer game sellers, and is working more closely with the Entertainment Software Alliance and the Motion Picture Association (MPA) to facilitate enforcement actions and subsequent prosecutions. 4. The estimated piracy level of records and music remained steady at 45 percent, and the business software piracy rate also was unchanged, at 60%.  The book publishing industry also reports continued large-scale piracy in Malaysia, principally in and around university campuses, though increased enforcement efforts lessened the overall monetary value of this form of piracy. 5. In July 2007 the MDTCA announced a new program targeting the use of pirated software. MDTCA has worked with the Business Software Alliance to target students, company directors, and employees, and include both educational efforts as well as targeted enforcement. One of the new IP court's first successful prosecutions involved a prominent retail establishment that admitted to possession of pirated software, paying a hefty fine while generating unwelcome publicity. Digital Music - The Future of Piracy 6. In 2007 the Recording Industry Association of Malaysia (RIM) called on the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC), Malaysia's regulatory body for telecommunications, to block internet users from accessing illegal song download sites.  RIM has claimed a significant increase in demand for digitized music in Malaysia, which has eroded the sales of compact discs (including pirated discs).  Much of the demand is being met by foreign websites offering free music downloads. MCMC continues to deliberate whether to take action against such sites, which would constitute a shift in the government's generally hands-off approach to internet website access. 7. RIM has been pushing Malaysian authorities to take stronger action against landlords who allow pirating operations at their premises. RIM has also taken direct action against such landlords by filing a number of lawsuits seeking damages as well as the closure of such operations.  RIM has also sent out warnings of imminent lawsuits to hundreds of landlords, many of whom have complied with the warning by expelling the pirates.  Following RIM's lead, MDTCA has begun to initiate criminal actions against a few landlords as well.  Industry is pushing legislation that would specifically address the liability of landlords who allow their premises to be used for copyright infringement. Progress on Motion Picture Piracy 8. Malaysian authorities successfully attacked the problem of pirate recordings in Malaysian cinemas, in particular those recordings using advanced cell phone technology (since cell phones are less detectable than camcorders).  In 2006 the Motion Picture Association (MPA) had estimated that 88% of pirated DVDs and VCDs circulating on the streets of Malaysia originated from illegal recordings in cinemas. The MDTCA focused its efforts to combat this illegal activity, acting on tips provided by cinema employees as well as patrons (the local branch of MPA offers a reward for such tips).  In early 2008 MPA announced that the joint efforts of cinemas and MDTCA officials had effectively eliminated cinemas as a source for illegal recordings; in 2007 some 30 cases of illegal recording were stemmed in Malaysia.  As a positive corollary, MPA noted that cinema attendance in Malaysia increased 20 percent in 2007 compared to 2006. 9. Malaysian authorities currently use existing Malaysian statutes to arrest and prosecute those caught recording movies in cinemas. However, such arrestees can be charged only with theft, not piracy. The MPA continues to push for the implementation of standalone anti-camcording legislation, both to strengthen the authorities' hands (by broadening the scope of illegal activity and by increasing fines) as well as to promote the problem among the Malaysian public. The Attorney General is also reportedly considering amendments to the Copyright Act to take into account copyright offenses conducted over the Internet, though there reportedly was little movement on such legislation in 2006. 10. The export of pirated discs, in particular those purchased over the Internet, remains a significant problem, although most industry sectors report fewer exports of pirated material from Malaysia than in previous years (with the one exception being the entertainment software industry). MPA reports good cooperation with MDTCA enforcement officers, Malaysian Post, Royal Malaysian Customs, cargo handling companies and courier companies in order to tackle the export of pirated discs. 11. MPA was instrumental in bringing two sniffer dogs to Malaysia in 2007 to help MDTCA officials detect hidden optical discs and replicating machines.  The resulting seizure of more than 1.6 million discs received extensive publicity, and has convinced MDTCA to establish a permanent canine enforcement unit. 12. In early 2007 Prime Minister Abdullah announced the development of a national IP policy that had as its centerpiece the allocation of RM 5 billion (USD 1.55 billion) to promote IP protection.  The MDTCA solicited suggestions from the private sector on the best uses for the targeted funds, which should begin to be used in early 2008. IPR-Related Prosecution 13. The first branch of Malaysia's new intellectual property court was launched in Kuala Lumpur in July 2007 (ref 2007 KL 1238). The new court eventually will consist of 15 session courts with criminal jurisdiction, to be located in each of Malaysia's 14 states plus the administrative capital of Putrajaya.  Six high courts, holding both civil and appellate jurisdiction, will be established in Kuala Lumpur, Selangor, Johor, Perak, Sabah and Sarawak. Allaying the concerns of local IP lawyers, the court is organized to operate independently of the rest of the court system, with both judges and prosecutors assigned exclusively to the IP courts. Although the government had hoped that most of the new IP court branches would be open by the end of 2007, it appears more likely that such a goal will not be achieved until late 2008. 14. The MDTCA has taken steps to improve the ability of its enforcement officers to handle complex evidence in order to build strong criminal cases against IP pirates. Local industry associations have provided a large amount of this training. U.S.-Malaysia IPR Cooperation 15. In 2007 the U.S. government continued close cooperation with the Malaysian government to promote increased IPR protection.  Nineteen Malaysian officials attended 10 USG-funded IP training programs that were offered in 2007 by the U.S Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Among the programs attended by Malaysian officials were USPTO Global Intellectual Property Academy programs on enforcement, patents, and trademarks. 16. In 2007 and early 2008 U.S. and Malaysian officials continued to negotiate the IPR chapter of the proposed U.S.-Malaysia Free Trade Agreement.  These negotiations were an unprecedented opportunity for both sides to learn the details about each other's enforcement regimes, and to discuss ways in which such enforcement could be strengthened. Malaysia's International IP Obligations 17. Following accession to the Patent Cooperation Treaty in 2006, Malaysia has made progress towards ratifying more multilateral IP treaties. Malaysian government officials hope to secure parliamentary ratification of Malaysia's accession to the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty by the end of 2008.  Over the medium term, the GOM also foresees Malaysian accession to several other IP treaties, including the Convention Relating to the Distribution of Program-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite; the Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks; the Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure; and the Trademark Law Treaty.  Malaysia has not committed yet to joining the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (aka the UPOV Convention), preferring to wait until it can evaluate the effect of its newly-implemented domestic plant protection legislation. 18. In April 2007 the Ministry of Health announced that the government would implement a legal framework to protect pharmaceutical data in order to meet the data protection obligations under TRIPS Article 39.3.  The announcement indicated that such protection would be extended for 5 years for new products, and 3 years for new indications of existing products.  The time period in both cases would begin from the date that such protection was extended in the product's country of origin.  As of early 2008 the Ministry of Health continues to deliberate (including consultations with multinational pharmaceutical companies and other stakeholders) before finalizing its policy.  Extensive discussions of the issue have taken place at each round of the U.S.-Malaysia FTA negotiations. Recommendation:  Malaysia Should Remain on Watch List 19. The Malaysian government's record in 2007 showed a solid commitment to strengthening IPR protection.  In addition to devoting more resources to the single largest IPR problem - optical disc media piracy - government officials are also paying increasing attention to newer problems such as Internet downloads of pirated material.  U.S.-Malaysia FTA negotiations continue to provide a forum to discuss best practices across the range of IPR issues related to both enforcement and policy, fostering an ongoing dialogue among experts from both governments that will provide further dividends in the future.  Malaysia's intention to join the WIPO treaties this year, and its growing commitment to implement data protection in some form, show the importance to the government of strengthened multilateral IP protection. 20. Despite the many positive trends, however, industry estimates on current IPR piracy levels indicate that it remains a serious problem. Piracy will require sustained government attention in many areas for the foreseeable future, and improved government attention in some areas that are currently deficient.  Embassy therefore recommends that Malaysia remain on the Special 301 Watch List. KEITH (February 2008)

WIKILEAKS: ABDULLAH CALLS FOR SNAP ELECTIONS; A PRIMER FOR THE POLLS Posted: 23 Oct 2011 01:00 AM PDT While most opposition leaders are optimistic of some level of success compared to the 11th General Election, few are confident enough to predict the opposition's ability to break the National Front's two-thirds majority in Parliament. In fact, the opposition parties would need a 400 percent increase in parliamentary seats to capture the 75 seats necessary to break the National Front's super majority in parliament-- a feat no observers deem possible in the current political climate.  THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b, d). 1.   (C) Summary:  Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi announced the dissolution of Malaysia's Parliament on February 13 and called for snap elections, a fully expected move, but one that came a year before elections were required under the constitution.  Malaysia's Election Commission (EC) will announce on February 14 the nomination and polling dates. This year's polling date could be set as early as March 1, a mere 17 days from the dissolution of Parliament with a window of only 10 days for active campaigning.  Approximately 7.6 million voters are expected to cast their ballots, electing all 222 members of Parliament, as well as 505 State Assembly members from 12 of 13 states.  Malaysia's ruling coalition, the National Front (Barisan Nasional or BN), faces a challenge from markedly increased dissatisfaction in Chinese and Indian communities.  The crown jewel of this election remains the fight for the state of Kelantan, where the National Front and PM Abdullah's United Malays National Organization (UMNO) will try to wrest control from the conservative Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS).  Anwar Ibrahim's People's Justice Party (PKR) and the Chinese dominated Democratic Action Party (DAP) will focus on the states of Penang, Perak, and Sabah, while PAS will also focus its efforts on regaining lost seats in Terengganu. Opposition parties are expected to garner some 40 to 45 percent of the popular vote, but actual gained seats may in fact be modest.  Political gerrymandering, control over the mainstream media, and the financial and institutional power of 50 years of incumbency will ensure the National Front's success at the ballot box even in the face of increased opposition votes.  The significance of the 12th General Election does not rest with the widely anticipated victory of UMNO and the National Front.  Instead, observers will look to the margin of victory as well as the minority vote, factors that have implications for Prime Minister Abdullah's strength as a government and UMNO leader in a second term, and the future viability of Malaysia's inter-ethnic status quo.  In the short-term, however, the National Front's expected triumph will offer more continuity than change to Malaysia. End Summary. Rapid Timeline for Elections 2.  (SBU) Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi announced the dissolution of Parliament on February 13 and officially set the wheels in motion for Malaysia's 12th General Election. On February 14, the EC will meet to officially set the date for nomination of candidates, the official campaign period, and the nation-wide polling date.  Recent election timelines indicate this year's polling date will likely be set for March 1 or 2, a mere 17 days from the dissolution of Parliament with a window of only 10 days for active campaigning.  Consistent with previous election tallying, official results are generally known within two to three hours of the polls closing.  The Prime Minister is expected to announce a new Cabinet within one to two weeks following the polls.  There is no official date for the new parliament to sit, but in 2004 the 11th Parliament sat approximately 6 weeks after Election Day.  We expect the 12th Parliament to follow a similar schedule. The Voters 3.  (U) The EC gazetted the 2007 Master Electoral Roll on February 5, 2008, showing 10,922,139 registered voters.  The 2007 roll is expected to be the final revision prior to the election, and under current law, cannot be challenged after the polls have been held.  Based on past elections, nation-wide voter turn out is expected to hover around 70 percent (or approximately 7.6 million voters), but heavily contested areas in 2004 showed voter turn outs as high as 91 percent in the state of Terengganu.  Of the 10.9 million voters in Malaysia, 84.2 percent reside on the Peninsula, while the other 15.8 percent reside in East Malaysia (broken down by 912,454 voters in Sarawak and 807,862 in Sabah).  A recent survey by the Election Commission showed that some 80 percent of voters no longer live in the district in which they are registered.  Since only Malaysian students studying abroad, government officials, police and military personnel are authorized to vote via postal or absentee ballot, the nation expects to see large numbers of travelers on or before Election Day. Who's on the Ballot 4.  (U) As has been the case for four decades, voters will choose only Members of Parliament (Ahli Dewan Rakyat) and State Assembly members.  Senators (Ahli Dewan Negara) are not elected but are appointed and therefore will not stand for office in the general election.  Similarly, Malaysia has not held elections for municipal offices since 1965, and all municipal positions continue to be filled by appointment only.  All 222 seats of the federal Parliament must stand for election.  An increase in population in the East Malaysian state of Sarawak has prompted the government to enlarge the size of Parliament, and in the 12th General Election, there will be three additional seats proportioned to Sarawak, increasing the size of the Parliament from its current 219 seats to 222 seats.   State Assembly elections will take place in 12 of Malaysia's 13 states.  Only Sarawak's State Assembly is in a different election cycle-- a hold over from Sarawak's later entry into the Federation. Who Wins? 5.  (SBU) Under Malaysia's "first past the post", or "winner take all system", the top vote getter in each State Assembly or Parliamentary district captures the seat.  There is no run-off system to limit the field nor is there a requirement to win an absolute majority.  Under these conditions, the National Front coalition chooses only one candidate from among its 14 component parties to stand for each seat.  In general practice the opposition parties attempt to compromise on seat allocations and run only one opposition candidate in each district.  However, because the opposition parties do not always agree on which party would have a better chance against the National Front candidate, there are often instances of three or more candidates vying for the same seat, an event known locally as a "three cornered fight". Such contests generally guarantee the National Front candidate will capture a plurality and win the seat. National Parliament -- Maintaining 2/3 Majority 6.  (SBU) Of principal concern to the National Front coalition is the ability to control a two-thirds majority in Parliament.  While most ordinary legislation requires only a simple majority to pass, constitutional amendments can be passed, with or without the consent of the King, with a two-thirds majority in Parliament.  This is an important tool of the ruling government as in its short 50 year history, Malaysia's constitution has been amended some 52 times and almost always over the objections of the opposition. Maintaining a two-thirds majority in Parliament is the highest priority for the National Front coalition.  To maintain its two-thirds majority in the 12th General Election, the National Front will need to win 148 out of 222 seats.  (Note:  In the 2004 (11th General) Election, there were 219 parliamentary seats at stake and the National Front captured 199 of those seats, or 91 percent. End Note.) Malay Majority Vote 7.  (SBU) The coalition's dominant United Malays National Organization (UMNO) commands significant but not unchallenged support of the country's ethnic Malay majority.  UMNO is highly organized, enjoys vastly superior funding compared with any opposition party, and benefits from 50 years of incumbency as the leader of government.  The Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) poses the largest challenge to UMNO for ethnic Malay votes.  In 2004 UMNO garnered 2.48 million votes to PAS' 1.05 million votes, figures that do not disaggregate ethnic Malay and non-Malay votes or the number of seats contested but nevertheless demonstrate that UMNO clearly is in the driver's seat.  Malaysia's first past the post system and politically gerrymandered districts further reinforce UMNO's electoral dominance over PAS, in addition to many other factors that favor the incumbent BN.  In 2008, it does not appear that many UMNO parliamentary or state assembly seats are at risk.  UMNO, however, cannot take its position completely for granted and national vote totals mask UMNO's small margin of victory in many contests.  In 1999, BN candidates (including UMNO) received only 48.5 percent of votes in heavily Malay areas, with BN improving its record to 59 percent in 2004.  In the "Malay Belt" of Perlis, Kedah, Terengganu and Kelatan, PAS took in 56 percent of the votes in 1999, dropping to 45 percent in 2004. 8.  (SBU) Such is UMNO's current confidence that one UMNO vice president recently commented to the press that "we don't need the Indians or the Chinese" to win the election.  Given that in 2004 UMNO garnered roughly a third of the vote, its non-Malay partners took another third, and the opposition accounted for the remaining third, such a statement may not be altogether accurate.  Since independence, UMNO's critical advantage has been its ability to maintain a solid coalition with ethnic Chinese and also Indian voters.  Nevertheless, in the current Parliament UMNO alone controls 110 of the coalition's 199 total seats, and many seats held by other coalition members were indisputably dominated by Malay voters.  Likewise, in the 11th General Election, UMNO won 302 of the 505 State Assembly seats up for election in 2004.  The 12th General Election will reflect the same dominating strength of UMNO and the National Front coalition, and it remains very unlikely that the National Front will win any less than 80 percent of the seats in Parliament and maintain control of all the state assemblies except Kelantan. Kelantan will remain the most heavily contested of the Malay majority areas (see below). Ethnic Chinese 9.  (SBU) One of the National Front's greatest challenges will come from dissatisfied Chinese voters.  With 26 percent of the total population and outright majorities in many urban districts, Malaysia's ethnic Chinese population constitutes a sizable voting block.  For 50 years the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) has been the largest ethnic Chinese party in the country and a faithful partner in the National Front coalition.  Likewise, for nearly 40 years, the People's Movement Party (Gerakan) has attracted a sizable block of Chinese votes for the National Front coalition and held the reins of government in the State of Penang.  However, leadership in both parties have publicly acknowledged growing Chinese voter dissatisfaction in the economic progress of the country and increasing perceptions of ethnic polarization in the country.  A late December 2007 voter opinion survey by the Merdeka Center indicated that PM Abdullah's approval rating among ethnic Chinese stood at 42 percent, down from 62 percent in late 2006.  Accordingly, both MCA and Gerakan leaders anticipate some loss of support at the polls. Nevertheless, because most Gerakan and MCA leaders are actually elected from districts with an ethnic-Malay majority, even a decline in support at the polls will have very little effect on the leadership of the National Front's largest Chinese parties.  Years of gerrymandering have created few Chinese majority districts that actually challenge the dominance of the National Front's constituent parties, and while the opposition Democratic Action Party (DAP) stands to gain a few seats in both State Assemblies and in the federal Parliament as a result of this dissatisfaction, DAP's potential gains will not be significant enough to materially change the make up of government, either locally or nationally. Ethnic Indians 10.  (SBU) Although Malaysia's ethnic Indian community constitutes less than 8 percent of the population and is thus less influential than the Chinese minority, the National Front's Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) also faces significant voter dissatisfaction, and internal divisions threaten the unity of the once fiercely loyal coalition partner.  Following a year of highly publicized and emotionally charged issues surrounding the razing of Hindu temples and various court cases seen to be dragging Hindu families into Sharia courts, Indian dissatisfaction with the government pinnacled with a mass street demonstration on November 25 (ref A).  A recent public opinion poll conducted by the Merdeka Center noted a dramatic 41 percent decline in Prime Minister Abdullah's approval rate among Malaysia's ethnic Indians following the Hindraf rally of November 25 (ref A), leaving only 38 percent of ethnic Indians approving of Abdullah's performance.  Voices within MIC have called for the party's president, Works Minister Samy Vellu, to step aside and end his 29 year grasp on the party.  Samy has refused to step down, but voter dissatisfaction within the Indian community assures greater sympathy for opposition parties than ever before.  Just as most Chinese leaders are elected from Malay-majority districts, Samy Vellu also holds his parliamentary seat from a Malay dominated district, and under the BN banner his election is all but guaranteed and no significant changes in MIC leadership are expected as a result of the general election.  Nevertheless, MIC faces a near certain loss of votes and such a weakened state could affect the outcome in closely contested districts where previous BN incumbents won with a less than 5 percent margin. Battle for Kelantan 11.  (SBU) In the 2004 elections, Malaysia's ruling National Front won or controlled an overwhelming majority in 12 of the 13 State Assembly elections winning a total of 453 of the 505 State Assembly seats contested.  (The National Front also won a dominant majority in the 14th state, Sarawak, in 2006). Only the State of Kelantan elected a non-BN state government. In fact, the conservative Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) has controlled the State Assembly in Kelantan for 39 of the last 50 years.  In this the 12th General Election, PAS once again presents the strongest challenge in Kelantan to a nation-wide dominance by the ruling National Front coalition. National Front efforts to wrest Kelantan away from PAS have intensified over the past year with the announcement of new development projects, the establishment of the Northern Economic Corridor, and promises of new mosques to be built if the Kelantanese will elect a BN government.  The Kelantan State Assembly currently consists of 23 PAS assembly members and 22 National Front members.  The mere "one seat" majority has led National Front political leaders to conclude that this is the coalition's best opportunity to win back the state, and Prime Minister Abdullah's political machinery has promised to focus great efforts on capturing the state. Senior BN politicians from around the country have begun unofficial campaign stops in Kelantan over the past few months, and BN's political machinery is in high gear to win the hearts and minds of Malaysia's most opposition-minded state.  Nevertheless, PAS spiritual leader Nik Abdul Aziz bin Nik Mat remains highly popular in Kelantan and has committed to seeking reelection to the State Assembly and another term as Chief Minister of Kelantan.  Kelantan is definitely the state to watch. Other States to Watch 12.  (SBU) Among the other states to watch in the 12th General Election are Penang, Perak, Terengganu and Sabah. These states represent traditional areas of support for opposition candidates and here the opposition parties stand to make their biggest gains.  Chinese discontent mentioned above poses the biggest threat to the National Front's People's Movement Party (Gerakan) in Penang.  Gerakan has held the Chief Minister office and controlled the State Assembly as the leading National Front party in Penang since 1969.  Most significant in Penang will be the results of the State Assembly elections.  In 2004 the National Front won 38 of 40 state seats, but only 8 of 13 parliamentary seats. Both DAP and PKR are heavily targeting Penang to try to increase the number of opposition members in the State Assembly, with DAP targeting the Chinese majority seats and PKR targeting the Malay majority seats.  Similarly, Perak and Terengganu represent areas where opposition parties have historically captured higher numbers of state seats and are generally more receptive to opposition candidates for state and parliamentary seats.  Sabah was under opposition control from 1985 to 1994, and Anwar Ibrahim's People's Justice Party (PKR) believes that many Sabahans would prefer to vote in another opposition government if given a viable chance. Accordingly, PKR has actively sought a foothold in the East Malaysian state, and while PKR's chance of winning a significant number of seats is doubtful, Sabah promises to be a point of focus for PKR.  Sabah yielded neither state nor parliamentary seats to the opposition in 2004, so any gain is progress for the opposition. The Anwar Factor and PKR 13.  (SBU) Former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim's ouster from power in 1998 and his 1999 conviction on politicized corruption charges spurred the "reformasi" movement that eventually saw his People's Justice Party (PKR or KeADILan) win five parliamentary seats in the 1999 general elections.  As time passed and with Anwar still in prison, the party's popularity waned and only Anwar's wife, Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, was able to hold on to her parliamentary seat in the 11th General Election in 2004, and then only by a 500 vote margin.  Anwar was released from prison in September 2004 and acquitted of the alleged sodomy charge, but federal election law excluded him from seeking political office for five years from the completion of his sentence for a previous conviction on corruption, thus dating back to April 2003. Accordingly, Anwar's exclusion period is set to end in April 2008, and it has long been held that Prime Minister Abdullah would call the elections prior to Anwar's eligibility to seek office.  While on a larger scale Anwar and PKR pose little threat to the UMNO and National Front political machinery, most UMNO politicians see Anwar as a threat to the political status quo and as a possible challenge over the long term to the coalition's two-thirds majority in Parliament.  Long held animosities towards Anwar, fomented by Malaysia's last Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, and seconded by the national media, have remained a dominate force within UMNO, and there is no doubt that Anwar's eligibility influenced the date of the 12th General Election. 14.  (SBU) The 12th General Election is, for all intents and purposes, Anwar's first test in national politics since his expulsion from UMNO and his release from prison.  Despite his ineligibility to run for office, Anwar has proven he can draw sizable crowds to political rallies as well as to the polls. In the Ijok by-election of 2007 (ref B), Anwar proved that even against a well-oiled and heavily financed National Front campaign, he could attract a crowd and win some 40 percent of the popular vote for his PKR candidate.  Nevertheless, in 2004 nearly 40 percent of the votes nation-wide went to the opposition without Anwar's assistance, so it remains unclear if Anwar will play a significant drawing-factor in the upcoming election.  Anwar's near constant attacks on the country's BN leadership over corruption, judicial appointments and democratic reform have resonated in many quarters and promise to garner attention during the campaign phase of the election.  Still, Anwar and PKR are basically starting from scratch as PKR won no state assembly seats in 2004 and only one parliamentary seat.  2008 will prove whether Anwar can remain relevant in Malaysian politics and whether PKR will go extinct. Opposition Solidarity and Coordination 15.  (SBU) Despite Anwar's lingering ineligibility, his party, PKR, has worked closely with Malaysia's other two opposition parties, PAS and DAP, to coordinate an election strategy in which only one opposition candidate will face any single National Front candidate.  The opposition parties have recognized that their only chance for success in the 12th General Election is by avoiding "three cornered fights". Although this cooperation is less formal than the "Alternative Front" coalition which the opposition parties entered into in 1999, the basic tenet remains the same-- unseat as many National Front candidates as is possible under the current electoral system.  While most opposition leaders are optimistic of some level of success compared to the 11th General Election, few are confident enough to predict the opposition's ability to break the National Front's two-thirds majority in Parliament.  In fact, the opposition parties would need a 400 percent increase in parliamentary seats to capture the 75 seats necessary to break the National Front's super majority in parliament-- a feat no observers deem possible in the current political climate.  The last and only time the opposition broke the two-thirds majority was in the 3rd General Election of 1969-- the election that precipitated Malaysia's worst racial violence in its short history.  In that year the opposition won an outright majority of the popular vote (50.7 percent), but still captured only 34 percent of the seats in Parliament.  In 1990 the opposition captured 46.6 percent of the popular vote but only 29 percent of the seats in Parliament.  Malaysia's electoral system simply is not designed to allow the ruling coalition to lose control of the government. Comment 16.  (C) Beyond the National Front's appeal to voters, political gerrymandering, control over the mainstream media, and the financial and institutional power of 50 years of incumbency will ensure the National Front's success at the ballot box even in the face of increased opposition votes. Although Malay urbanization is slowly changing historical inequities, Malaysia's disproportionate allocation of parliamentary seats favors Malay majority regions with more parliamentary seats in the rural areas than minority dominated urban areas.  Coupled with its first-past-the-post electoral system, these political machinations create an electoral environment in which it is possible that, as shown in the 11th General Election, the opposition can win almost 40 percent of the popular vote nation-wide and still win less than 10 percent of the total seats in parliament. 17.  (C) The significance of the 12th General Election does not rest with the widely anticipated victory of UMNO and the National Front, but its implications for Prime Minister Abdullah's strength as a government and UMNO party leader in a second term, and the future viability of Malaysia's inter-ethnic status quo.  The national election results set the stage for UMNO's critical internal party elections, which could be held in the last quarter of 2008.  While some slippage of BN's margins is widely expected, the greater the opposition gains the more criticism and challenge Abdullah will face from within UMNO.  An embattled Prime Minister, or one perceived as having only tepid support, will have a more difficult time pushing reforms or significant new policies. The results of the state election in Kelantan could prove a boost to Abdullah if UMNO is able to wrest the state away from PAS.  Such a win would represent the first time since 1994 that the National Front would control all 14 state governments -- a tangible measure of success for Abdullah. 18.  (C) The national election also will be significant for the signals it sends as to the future viability of the National Front's multi-racial alliance and the country's long heralded "social contract," given that Chinese and Indian discontent appears to have reached a high water mark, unseen since 1969.  If such fractures widen over the longer-term, they will threaten the country's status quo politics, and force Malaysian politicians to reexamine seriously the political formula that has been in place since independence. In the short term, however, the National Front's expected triumph will offer more continuity than change to Malaysia. KEITH (February 2008)

WIKILEAKS: CLEAN FINGERS, DIRTY ELECTIONS? Posted: 22 Oct 2011 01:00 AM PDT Proponents of electoral reform had lobbied for the introduction of indelible ink and hailed the EC's original decision to institute this measure, which would have represented the most significant improvement in the integrity of the elections since the last polls in 2004. The EC's grounds for reversing itself on the use of indelible ink do not appear very convincing, and clearly suggest pressure from the ruling BN government. Regardless, the EC has damaged its credibility on the eve of the elections and invited greater suspicion of Malaysia's electoral process. THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b, d). Summary 1.  (C) With only three days remaining before the March 8 general election, Malaysia's Election Commission (EC) abruptly announced its decision not to apply indelible ink to the fingers of voters, citing police reports of alleged sabotage plans and previously unidentified constitutional barriers.  The opposition immediately cried foul and condemned the EC for abandoning this fraud prevention measure.  All sides have braced for the impact of illegitimate "phantom voters," particularly in tightly-contested races.  The Islamist opposition party PAS stated it would stop buses ferrying suspect voters into the states of Kelantan and Terengganu, while the police warned against obstructing citizens from casting their votes.  The leading UMNO party and its allies within the National Front coalition have stepped up attacks against opposition figure Anwar Ibrahim, including for his ties to prominent Americans. The Embassy has dispatched election observer teams to six key states.  The EC's grounds for reversing itself on the use of indelible ink do not appear very convincing, and suggest pressure from the ruling BN government.  Regardless, the EC has damaged its credibility on the eve of the election and invited greater suspicion of Malaysia's electoral process. End Summary. EC nixes use of indelible ink 2.  (SBU) With only three days remaining before the March 8 general election, Chairman of Malaysia's Election Commission Abdul Rashid Abdul Rahman made an abrupt about-face on March 4 when he announced polling officials would not mark the fingers of voters with indelible ink after they cast their ballots.  In a hastily announced press conference and flanked by both the Inspector-General of Police (IGP), Musa Hassan, and the Attorney General, Abdul Gani Patail, Rashid stuttered through a prepared statement officially terminating the fraud prevention method that the EC had embraced only nine months ago.  Referencing four police reports filed between February 16 and 21 of an alleged plan to sabotage the election process in the states of Kedah, Perlis and Kelantan, Rashid explained that the police believed people had smuggled unidentified quantities of indelible ink into the country to trick villagers into believing that they must have their fingernails marked before they can go vote.  "Their intention is to create confusion and suspicion as to the status of such voters," he said. "This may cause chaos at polling stations.... The EC views these issues seriously as the election process and public order and security cannot be compromised," Rashid read from his prepared statement. 3.  (SBU) Beyond allegations of sabotage, Rashid further explained that Malaysia's laws would not allow for the denial of a person's constitutional right to vote merely because of indelible ink marked on their fingernail.  Rashid explained that only a constitutional amendment could rectify this situation, and since Parliament was dissolved, the Constitution could not be amended before the election. Notwithstanding the presence of both the IGP and the Attorney General, Rashid reiterated the independence of the EC's decision process and reassured the media that no political pressure had been exerted to compel the EC's action.  From the campaign trail, Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi echoed Rashid's denial and remarked that "this didn't have any connection with us (the National Front, BN), the decision was solely made by the EC and we want to hear the full explanation from them as well....  What is more important is that the rights of the people who had registered to vote must be upheld.  That must be the guarantee from the EC to all citizens and voters on March 8," the Prime Minister said. 4.  (C) Comment:  EC Chairman Rashid reportedly confided to a longstanding Embassy contact on March 5 that the Attorney General had instructed Rashid to rescind the EC's decision to use the ink.  End Comment. Opposition parties cry foul 5. (SBU) Opposition politicians immediately attributed the EC's decision to BN's pressure.  People's Justice Party (PKR) deputy president Dr. Syed Husin Ali lambasted the EC's decision: "At a moment when the eyes of the entire world are upon us, the commission has now conclusively and irrevocably shown that any overtures towards reform that it had made previously were in bad faith."  Democratic Action Party (DAP) Secretary General Lim Guan Eng also chided the decision: "DAP unreservedly condemns the EC's betrayal of public trust by deciding to abandon the use of indelible ink, which is the central premise of their commitment towards a free, fair and clean election."  Likewise, the opposition-linked election watchdog Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections (Bersih) released a statement declaring that Bersih "rejects the EC's excuses for the cancellation of this move on legal and security grounds," and criticized the EC for not seeking any necessary parliamentary action long ago.  "The decision by the EC shows very clearly that it has neither intention nor the commitment to carry out electoral reform," Bersih concluded. Election monitor steps back 6. (SBU) The election monitoring NGO Malaysians for Free and Fair Elections (MAFREL) reacted with criticism and disappointment at the EC's decision.  Despite being the only NGO accredited by the EC, MAFREL's Chairman Malik Hussin expressed lack of faith in the election process and vowed not to send observers inside the nation's polling stations so as not to lend credibility to a flawed process.  MAFREL had planned to deploy around 330 observers at polling stations nationwide to monitor the voting process on March 8.  MAFREL Deputy Chairman Syed Noh Ibrahim told reporters they will continue with their monitoring operation, "just not within the polling stations as accredited by the EC." Haunted by "phantom" voters 7.  (SBU) The IGP Musa Hassan publicly warned all political parties against obstructing citizens from turning out to cast their votes on March 8.  The warning was in response to statements made by Islamist opposition party PAS leaders that they would stop buses allegedly ferrying "phantom voters" from entering Kelantan and Terengganu.  The term "phantom voters" ("undi hantu") in Malaysia has several interpretations.  These could be legally registered voters in a particular district who are not resident of the district or not known to the local community; non-citizens issued with Malaysian identity cards for the purpose of voting; voters who have passed away but whose names still appear on the electoral roll with their identity cards abused by someone else to vote; and large numbers of voters inexplicably registered at a single address. In this context both the BN and the opposition parties, particularly PAS, have registered hundreds their supporters in tightly-contested districts especially in Kelantan, Kedah and Terengganu. 8.  (SBU) The Election Commission declared prior to the dissolution of Parliament February 13 that they had cleared the electoral roll of all phantom voters, a claim opposition leaders dispute.  For instance, a DAP candidate in Selangor alleged that 26 unknown individuals have been registered as voters using her family home address in her district.  MAFREL released a statement February 20 that claimed 500 voters were registered as voters using an abandoned army base in Penang where the BN candidate is Gerakan's acting President Koh Tsu Koon.  Not to be outdone, Kelantan UMNO leaders claimed that the party has difficulty in identifying more than 118,000 voters in the PAS controlled state. 9.  (SBU) Although both UMNO and PAS leaders have been guilty in the past of recruiting phantom voters, PAS leaders accuse the EC of allowing UMNO to pad the electoral roll with its supporters to help UMNO win Kelantan and maintain its hold in Terengganu.  PAS President Hadi Awang's press secretary Roslan Shair told reporters March 4 that the party had ample proof that phantom voters will be ferried to the two states on polling day.  He added that PAS "would stop at nothing to prevent the voters from entering Kelantan and Terengganu." In response, IGP Musa Hassan stated that he had issued a directive to his men to act against those trying to stop voters from casting their votes.  He added, "We have stationed 300 policemen at entry points to the state and will take stern action against those who try to stop people from casting their votes." UMNO and BN step up assault on Anwar 10.  (SBU) Leading opposition figure Anwar Ibrahim, who has drawn large crowds to his political gatherings across the country during the campaign, has come under increasing attack from UMNO, other BN leaders and the government dominated mainstream media.  At several gatherings in Kuala Lumpur, poloffs have observed multi-racial crowds responding enthusiastically to Anwar's attacks on the government. Political observers told poloffs that Anwar has managed to galvanize the voters especially in the urban areas by articulating the voters concerns effectively and urging them to reject the UMNO-dominated BN coalition.  In response to Anwar's criticisms, UMNO and BN leaders have stepped up their attacks on the former DPM by describing him as a "political chameleon" who cannot be trusted. Anwar attacked for Washington connections 11.  (SBU) Government owned newspapers have joined in the fray and have increased their negative reports on the former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar.  The papers gave prominence to human rights activist and former Peoples Justice Party Deputy President (1999-2001) Chandra Muzaffar's comment on March 4 that it would be an "unmitigated disaster for Malaysia" should Anwar become the PM.  Chandra also stated in another interview for an UMNO-owned newspaper that Anwar's close relationships with individuals and groups in Washington including former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz "had very serious implications on Malaysia's sovereignty and independence."  The UMNO owned newspaper condemned Anwar on March 6 for "tarnishing the image" of the country by giving an interview in Singapore that criticized government policies and the conduct of elections.  The paper cited Anwar's comments that he is a "close friend" of former Vice President Al Gore, whom the paper claimed supported "the 'reformasi' demonstration of 1998 that threatened the stability of the country." Embassy observers in the field 12.  (U) The Embassy dispatched six election observer teams to the field on March 6.  The teams will monitor developments in six key states:  Kelantan, Terengganu, Penang, Kedah, Perak, and Sabah from March 6 thru March 9. Comment 13.  (C) Proponents of electoral reform had lobbied for the introduction of indelible ink and hailed the EC's original decision to institute this measure, which would have represented the most significant improvement in the integrity of the elections since the last polls in 2004.  The EC's grounds for reversing itself on the use of indelible ink do not appear very convincing, and clearly suggest pressure from the ruling BN government.  Regardless, the EC has damaged its credibility on the eve of the elections and invited greater suspicion of Malaysia's electoral process. KEITH (March 2008)

WIKILEAKS: MALAYSIA'S EIGHTH ANNUAL TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT Posted: 21 Oct 2011 01:00 AM PDT There were no accurate statistics for the total number of trafficking victims in Malaysia. Malaysia employed approximately 2.5 million migrant workers in 2007, 40 to 45% of whom were undocumented. Government and NGO statistics assess there are some 380,000 to 400,000 women employed as domestic servants in Malaysia, an unknown number of whom worked in abusive situations exacerbated by conditions of debt bondage.  THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin  Summary 1.  (SBU) Malaysia made significant efforts to combat trafficking in persons during this reporting period, marking a positive shift from previous years.  Malaysia's drafting, passage, and enactment of a comprehensive anti-trafficking in persons law represents an important advance in Malaysia's commitment to meet international standards for combating this crime.  The government of Malaysia (GOM) took action on most of the elements included in the Tier 3 action plan that the U.S. proposed during the reporting period.  The GOM established the National Council for Anti-Trafficking in Persons (National Council).  The Council, working with Malaysia's Human Rights Commission (SUHAKAM) drafted a national action plan.  The GOM also instituted training programs for law enforcement and government officials with new anti-trafficking responsibilities.  The Ministry for Women, Family, and Community Development (Women's Ministry) built two shelters for trafficking victims and trained the shelters' staff, along with newly designated protection officers, but had not opened the shelters as of the end of February pending full activation of the anti-TIP law.  The Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) rescued trafficking victims and often referred them to NGOs, the Catholic Church, and foreign embassies that operated shelters and/or provided social services to trafficking victims.  The RMP continued to investigate several trafficking cases, and detained 55 suspected traffickers under the Emergency Ordinance and Restricted Residence Act.  Police often referred rescued victims to NGOs, the Catholic Church, and foreign embassies operated shelters.  On February 28, the GOM issued three necessary "legislative supplements" bringing the new anti-TIP law fully into effect.  Malaysia has yet to comply fully with U.S. minimum standards and should address many shortfalls primarily through full enforcement of its comprehensive anti-trafficking law to include: opening of victims shelters, screening for TIP victims by relevant government agencies, and enforcement action against traffickers under the law. Malaysia was a destination, and to a lesser extent, a transit and source country for adults and minors trafficked for the purposes of forced labor and sexual exploitation.  End Summary. 2.  (U) Embassy's submission for the Eighth Annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report for Malaysia follows. Responses are keyed to paragraphs 27 - 30 of ref A. Embassy's point of contact for TIP is political officer Enrique R. Gallego (phone: 603-2148-4891 or 984-4831 (IVG), fax: 603-2168-5165, email: gallegoer@state.gov).  The Embassy spent the following time preparing the TIP report: FS-2: 12 hours; FS-3: 60 hours; FSN: 40 hours. 3.  CHECKLIST (PARA 27) A. (SBU) Malaysia was a destination, and to a lesser extent, a transit and source country for adults and minors trafficked for the purposes of forced labor and sexual exploitation. The overwhelming majority of victims came to Malaysia seeking greater economic opportunities, but later found themselves victimized either by their employers, employment agents, or traffickers that supplied migrant laborers and prostitutes in Malaysia.  Trafficking in Malaysia was a regional problem driven by economics.  Migrant workers from Indonesia, Nepal, India, Thailand, China, the Philippines, Burma, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Vietnam accounted for nearly all of Malaysia's trafficking victims.  Trafficking of Malaysians, specifically women from indigenous groups and rural areas, for labor and sex exploitation occurred within Malaysia. There were no accurate statistics for the total number of trafficking victims in Malaysia.  Malaysia employed approximately 2.5 million migrant workers in 2007, 40 to 45% of whom were undocumented.  Government and NGO statistics assess there are some 380,000 to 400,000 women employed as domestic servants in Malaysia, an unknown number of whom worked in abusive situations exacerbated by conditions of debt bondage.  Tenaganita and foreign embassies reported migrant workers on plantations and construction sites were often subject to similar restrictions on their movement, deceit and fraud concerning their wages, confiscation of their passports, and often were in debt bondage to agents or employers.  There were no reliable statistics for the number of victims trafficked into prostitution, but the Royal Malaysian Police (RMP), foreign embassies and NGOs reported at least 800 female victims were rescued from trafficking conditions in the commercial sex trade in 2007. Approximately 20 percent of the trafficking victims sheltered and rescued by NGOs and foreign embassies were below the age of 18.  The Women's Ministry sought to contract a statistician to develop a new database so the Ministry could better document trafficking.  The draft national action plan included using data collection to analyze the scale and nature of trafficking in Malaysia. B.  (SBU) Most trafficking victims in Malaysia were economic migrants seeking better wages than those available in their countries of origin.  Anecdotal evidence from the Indonesian Embassy, GOM, the press, and NGOs indicated Indonesia, the dominant source of migrant labor to Malaysia, remained the source of the greatest number of trafficking victims.  Our interviews with trafficking victims revealed a common pattern.  Typically, an employment agent recruited the trafficking victim from his or her home village, in the first step of a debt-bondage arrangement with a Malaysian employer. For an initial payment, or more often for a certain debt, the recruiter obtained a passport (with false data for underage girls, usually showing the girls' age as 25), an exit permit, and transportation from Indonesia to Malaysia. Upon arrival, a Malaysian employment agent assumed control of and assisted with entry.  The Malaysian employment agents often avoided individual immigration inspection of the trafficking victims.  Generally, the Malaysian employment agent paid the Indonesian agent for supplying the worker, or the worker acquired additional debt with the new agent for placement, employment documentation, transportation, temporary lodging, etc.  Employment agents placed most workers in their previously agreed positions as domestics, agricultural workers, etc.  However, some agents sold individuals into brothels, karaoke bars, or passed them to sex traffickers.  Employers commonly confiscated workers' passports.  Some employers forced laborers to work long hours, without pay, until the debt-bond was paid. Reportedly, similar modus operandi applied to migrant workers from Bangladesh and Vietnam. (SBU) Regardless of their origin, victims of trafficking were usually poor, uneducated, unskilled laborers recruited by their fellow citizens but later passed to Malaysian agents. Some victims were willingly smuggled into Malaysia or entered on tourist visas, but found themselves victimized when they voluntarily or involuntarily entered the undocumented labor market.  Debt bondage was the most common form of control employers exerted over victims, regardless of whether the victim was employed in licit or illicit activities. Information from the Royal Malaysian Police, Catholic Church, and the NGO Tenaganita indicated organized syndicates represented the bulk of traffickers (reftels E and G). Exploiters ranged from large plantations and factories to entertainment centers and karaoke bars to families exploiting domestic workers.  The RMP reported that a number of large organized criminal syndicates, as well as a few smaller groups, trafficked foreign women into Malaysia, using Malaysia either as the women's final destination or as a transit point to a third country.  The syndicates sometimes used employment agencies as fronts for both people smuggling and trafficking in persons.  Sex tourism was not common in Malaysia though there were reports of sex tourism on the Malaysian island of Labuan, off the coast of Borneo (reftel F).  There were a few reports of marriage brokers selling Vietnamese and Chinese women to Malaysian men, but such incidents appeared limited in number. C.  (SBU) The newly formed National Council for Anti-trafficking in Persons is made up of government agencies with a role in combating trafficking as mandated in the new anti-TIP law (reftels D, I, and J).  The Ministry of Internal Security is the lead ministry regarding trafficking and the Secretary General of the Ministry chairs the Council.  Other agencies with representation on the Council are: Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Home Affairs; Ministry of Women, Family, and Community Development; Ministry of Human Resources; Ministry of Transport; Ministry of Information; the Attorney General's Office; the Royal Malaysian Police; the Department of Immigration; the Department of Customs; and the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency.  Malaysia's Human Rights Commission (SUHAKAM) also sits on the Council. D.  (SBU) The police conducted internal training regimes to build capacity to address identified gaps in capabilities, which included identifying trafficking victims, evidence collection and management, and interagency and international coordination (reftels G and H).  The RMP worked with the United States, France, and Australia to develop training programs.  The Women's Ministry lacked practical experience assisting trafficking victims and organized training for Ministry officers, tapped as trafficking victim protection officers, and personnel tasked to operate trafficking victims' shelters (reftel D).  Low-level corruption remained a secondary issue in stemming the flow of trafficking victims.  The RMP instituted a proactive anti-corruption campaign to combat low-level corruption.  Low-level immigration officials and police "beat cops" were among Malaysia's lowest paid public servants, making them vulnerable to corruption. E.  (SBU) The GOM did not maintain specific statistics for trafficking in persons.  The RMP and Immigration Department provided anecdotal reports on trafficking victims rescued but had little or no data to share on actual trafficking victims. Two local NGOs, Tenaganita and the Women's Aid Organization (WAO), and the Embassies of Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines reported the RMP referred over 300 suspected victims of trafficking to their respective missions in 2007. At least 25 women, all Indonesians employed as domestic workers, were underage when brought to Malaysia.  In each case, they used authentic Indonesian passports, provided by recruiters, with false biographical data listing all of the girls as 25 years old. 4.  INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF TRAFFICKERS (PARA 28) A.  (SBU)  In this reporting period, the GOM completed drafting and passed the comprehensive Anti-trafficking in Persons Act (Act 670), gazetted on July 26, 2007 (reftels I and J).  The law includes provisions for both trafficking in persons for sexual and non-sexual exploitation.  The law's scope encompasses offenses that took place both in and out of Malaysia.  The law is applicable if Malaysia is the receiving country or exploitation occurs in Malaysia.  The law also includes cases when the receiving country is a foreign country, but the trafficking victim started in or transited through Malaysia.  The law includes extension of the Act to extra-territorial offenses including on ships and aircraft registered in Malaysia and Malaysian citizens and permanent residents outside and beyond the limits of Malaysia benefiting from the exploitation of trafficking victims.  The law states it is the prevailing law regarding trafficking in persons and supersedes conflicting or inconsistent provisions of other written laws. (SBU) Since gazetting the law in July 2007, the GOM brought the anti-TIP Act into force in a step-by-step process.  On February 28, 2008, the GOM issued three necessary "notifications of legislative supplements," essentially administrative notifications that put all sections of the law into force, according to the Attorney General's Office.  The notifications were legal preconditions for Malaysian police and prosecutors to take law enforcement actions under the anti-TIP law (as well as open shelters for victims, see below). (SBU) The law's definitions of trafficking include both trafficking of persons and trafficking of children for the purpose of exploitation.  If persons convicted of trafficking also used threats, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power, etc., the law provides for lengthier prison sentences.  The law includes provisions for punishing persons profiting from the exploitation of trafficking victims. (SBU) Malaysia has other laws that can criminalize trafficking or elements of trafficking.  The following is a summary of the legal provisions that authorities could use in Malaysia against traffickers in addition to the new comprehensive anti-TIP law. -- Constitution, Articles 6(1) and 6(2): Prohibit slavery and forced labor. -- Penal Code, Sections 340-348: Address "wrongful confinement" of a person against his/her will.  Punishments include maximum prison terms from one to three years and a fine. -- Penal Code, Section 372: Amended in 2002 to include stronger anti-trafficking language, addresses exploitation of any person for purposes of prostitution.  Exploitation is defined to include selling, hiring, or otherwise obtaining possession of any person with the intention to employ or use the person for the purpose of prostitution (either inside or outside of Malaysia) or knowing or having reason to believe that the person will be so employed or used.  Section 372 expands the offense of exploitation to include using false pretense or deceitful means to bring into or take out of Malaysia any person; harboring or receiving any (exploited) person and wrongfully restraining any person in any place. Wrongfully restraining is further defined as withholding clothing or property, threatening the person with legal proceedings to recover any debt or alleged debt, and detaining a person's identity card or passport.  Punishment under this section of the Code includes a prison term, which may extend to 15 years, caning and a fine. -- Penal Code, Section 372A: Provides the same penalties as section 372 for anyone who lives wholly or in part on the earnings of the prostitution of another person. -- Penal Code, Section 373: Provides the same penalties as section 372 for anyone who keeps, manages, or assists in the management of a brothel. -- Penal Code, Section 374: Addresses unlawful compulsory labor and includes punishment by imprisonment for a maximum one-year term and the possibility of a fine. -- Immigration Act, Sections 55(A) and Sections 56(1)(d): Covers a wide spectrum of immigration violations related to illegal entry or entry under false pretenses.  The Act also addresses "employing" and "conveying" illegal aliens.  The Act was amended in 2002 to toughen significantly punishments for immigration violators.  Those convicted of illegal entry face a fine of up to MYR 10,000 (USD 3,125) (USD 1 = MYR 3.2) and/or a prison sentence of up to five years, and caning of up to a maximum of six strokes.  The penalty for employing an illegal alien is a fine of between MYR 10,000-50,000 (USD 3,125-15,625) for every illegal immigrant employed and/or a prison term of up to 12 months.  An employer employing more than five illegal immigrants will be imprisoned from six months to five years and caned up to a maximum of six strokes.  The penalty for "conveying" (trafficking) illegal immigrants is a fine of MYR 10,000-50,000 (USD 3,125-15,625) for every individual trafficked.  An individual convicted for trafficking more than five illegal immigrants will also be imprisoned for between six months and five years, and caned up to a maximum of six strokes. -- Child Act (2001): Merges provisions from an array of diverse legislation pertaining to children and young persons (the Women and Girls Protection Act, the Juvenile Court Act, and the Child protection Act) into one law.  The Act specifically prohibits trafficking of children and makes it an offense to sell, let to hire, or procure (by threat or intimidation by false pretense, fraud, or deceit) any child (defined as anyone under the age of 18) for the purpose of sexual exploitation.  Penalties for these offenses are a maximum prison term of 15 years and a maximum fine of MYR 50,000 (USD 15,625).  The Child Act also authorizes the police to provide protection and rehabilitation for children in need.  A child in need is defined to include a child who "is being induced to perform any sexual act, or being in any physical or social environment which may lead to the performance of such act". -- Passports Act: Criminalizes the forgery or alteration of travel documents (including passports, residence permits, and visas).  Also criminalizes false statements or misrepresentation used to gain illegal entry into Malaysia. Penalties range from MYR 10,000-100,000 (USD 3,125-31,250) fine, 5-10 years in prison, and six strokes of a cane. Section 12(1)(f) of the Passports Act also criminalizes the unlawful possession of another persons passport; the penalty for which is a fine not exceeding MYR 10,000 and/or imprisonment not exceeding five years. Preventive Laws: -- The Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance (EO): Used against persons, usually criminal syndicates that are involved in illicit activities (such as violent crime, document forgery and people smuggling), which threaten public order. -- Restricted Residence Act (RRA): Allows the government to require individuals who are suspected of engaging in criminal activity including trafficking to move to a pre-determined location in the country and remain there under close police supervision.  The RRA does not require a formal charge to be filed against the suspected individual. B.  (SBU) The new comprehensive anti-TIP law does not distinguish between trafficking for sexual and non-sexual exploitation.  In both cases, the law includes the same guidelines for imprisonment and fines.  The Attorney General's office did not convict anyone specifically for trafficking in persons for sexual exploitation, but detained 34 suspected traffickers under RRA and 21 suspected traffickers under EO in 2007.  The 55 suspected traffickers were allegedly involved with trafficking for sexual exploitation. C.  (SBU) If convicted of trafficking in persons under the new anti-TIP law, a person is subject to a maximum sentence of 15 years and a fine.  For cases involving coercion, fraud, deception and cases of child trafficking, the maximum sentence is 20 years and fine.  Profiting from the exploitation of a trafficking victim carries a maximum sentence of 15 years and a fine of ranging from MYR 50,000 - 150,000 (USD 15,625 - 46,875).  The law makes inadmissible and irrelevant prior consent of the trafficking victim and past sexual behavior. D.  (SBU) The prescribed penalties for rape include a maximum sentence of 20 years and caning.  If the woman is hurt, "put in fear of death," is under 16 years of age, pregnant, or a victim of incest, the maximum sentence is 30 years and caning.  If the victim dies, the sentence is 15-30 years and a minimum caning of ten strokes.  Under Malaysian law, rape is a crime of a man against a woman.  Rape between men is covered under a different section of the law with sentence guidelines of 5-20 years imprisonment and caning. E.  (SBU) Federal law criminalizes profiting from prostitution and bans pornography.  The law also criminalizes the act of prostitution by foreigners.  Although not widely enforced, under Malaysia's dual legal system incorporating shari'a courts, Muslims are subject to Islamic laws prohibiting khalwat, or "close proximity", between men and women who are not married to each other.  Punishments varied from state to state, usually included a fine and jail sentence, but in most cases were settled with a warning and did not involve selling of sexual services.  Under federal criminal law, solicitation and operating and/or owning a brothel are criminal offenses.  These laws were enforced. Child prostitution is not legal. F.  (SBU) The GOM formally brought into force the law enforcement provisions of the anti-TIP Act as of February 28, 2008, according to the Attorney General's Office (see above). Pending this step, the GOM did not prosecute traffickers under the new anti-TIP law.  The GOM took other legal actions against traffickers and the RMP had several pending investigations into TIP rings as of late February.  On November 23, 2007, a Malaysian court convicted a 32-year old, HIV positive Malaysian citizen for procuring a 14-year-old girl for sex.  He received a sentence of 43 years in jail, 20 strokes of the cane, and fined MYR 50,000 ($15,625).  Police arrested a couple in Sabah on January 26, 2008 for holding seven Filipina women to work as prostitutes.  The couple recruited the seven women with promises of jobs as waitresses.  The couple remained in detention and the case remained under investigation at the end of February. (SBU) The RMP reported it actively investigated cases of trafficking involving victims of commercial sexual exploitation.  Police efforts to break criminal syndicates were complicated by layers of intermediaries, some of whom reside outside Malaysia.  Often trafficking victims, both Malaysians who have gone abroad and foreigners brought to Malaysia, may only know one intermediary, who is probably using a false identity.  In investigating cases of trafficking, police investigators attempted to question repatriated Malaysian victims as soon as they returned, but the victims usually could not or refused to provide enough information to assist the investigation.  In some cases, rescued victims feared retaliation by the traffickers.  In other cases, such as the rescue of four Filipina women trafficked into prostitution in November 2007, the women preferred to assist police in their countries of origin. (SBU) Some of the investigations involved raids to rescue trafficking victims.  A recent raid, in January 2008, rescued 34 suspected trafficking victims hidden in a false room within a hotel.  The RMP were actively pursuing leads resulting from the rescue/raid at the end of the reporting period. (SBU) According to Malaysia's Director of Immigration Enforcement, the government did not prosecute employers who confiscated passports of migrant workers although confiscation of passports is in violation of Section 12(1)(f) of the Passports Act.  It was common practice for the wages of the employee to be held in "escrow" until completion of a contract and widely accepted by homeowners employing a domestic servant, plantation owners, or small factory owners employing migrant laborers.  Police did not charge most bona fide traffickers, but jailed them under preventive laws. This was consistent with law enforcement actions taken against terrorists, narcotics traffickers, and perpetrators of other complex criminal conspiracies.  Generally, authorities charged petty pimps under the penal code.  The chief of the RMP's vice squad did not see any end to the use of preventive laws intackling trafficking issues, even with a new anti-trafficking law, due to the difficulties in collecting evidence necessary to bring proper convictions. G.  (SBU) The GOM provided specialized training to government personnel with responsibilities to combat trafficking under the new law.  The Women's Ministry conducted a series of training events to build capacity for its new trafficking victims protection officers.  The RMP also conducted various training events, both internal and training assisted by the U.S. Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and the governments of Australia and France.  The RMP participated in two workshops sponsored by ICITAP in co-operation with the French government.  The RMP co-hosted one of the workshops in the east Malaysian state of Sarawak.  In November, an ICITAP instructor met with senior RMP officials to discuss the basic elements of the new anti-TIP law and to share experiences from other regional countries' efforts to confront trafficking.  The government sponsored or co-sponsored a number of conferences and workshops aimed at developing implementation guidelines for the new anti-TIP law, formulating strategies aimed at preventing trafficking.  Both Tenaganita and SUHAKAM presented a series of workshops to government representatives on TIP throughout the year.  The Malaysian Armed Forces received TIP awareness training prior to peacekeeping deployments. H. (SBU) Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Cambodia, Brunei and Thailand used the guidelines of the multilateral "Agreement on Information Exchange and the Establishment of Communication Procedures" as a framework for cooperation on border and security incidents, transnational crimes (including trafficking in persons), and other illegal activities.  Malaysia was an active partner in the "Bali Process," a regional mechanism to combat people smuggling and human trafficking initiated by Australia and Indonesia. (SBU) Additionally, Malaysia shared intelligence on trafficking syndicates with the United Kingdom, Australia, and Interpol.  The Sabah state government maintained an agreement with the government of the Indonesian province of East Kalimantan to cooperate on a range of shared cross-border challenges, including finding and arresting human traffickers and dismantling syndicates. I.  (SBU) There were no extraditions of Malaysian nationals for trafficking offenses in 2007.  Section 108A of the Penal Code allows Malaysian authorities to prosecute a Malaysian who commits or abets a crime in another country that would be deemed an offense under the Penal Code.  Malaysia is a party to the ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, which is designed to facilitate and expedite regional cooperation in fighting transnational crime.  Malaysian law does not prohibit extradition of Malaysian nationals.  The Philippines and Indonesian Embassies reported that the RMP cooperated with them on anti-trafficking law enforcement matters. J.  (SBU) There were no substantiated reports of direct government involvement in trafficking of persons at either the local or institutional level.  Senior RMP officials and NGOs reported local police and immigration authorities often lacked the awareness and skills to identify trafficking victims trapped in prostitution or situations of forced labor.  The RMP developed new procedures to increase police officers' abilities to identify trafficking victims. K.  (SBU) No government officials were implicated, arrested, or tried for involvement in the trafficking in persons or corruption related to trafficking in persons. L.  (SBU) All troops assigned to peacekeeping missions received training on trafficking in persons at Malaysia's Peacekeeping Training Center at Port Dickson.  There were no allegations that Malaysian servicemembers were involved in TIP or exploited trafficking victims. M.  (SBU) Malaysia did not have an identified child sex tourism problem, although there were known instances of victims under 18 years of age that were trafficked for sexual exploitation. 5.  PROTECTION AND ASSISTANCE TO VICTIMS (PARA 29) A/B/C.  (SBU) The RMP referred over 200 suspected trafficking victims to NGO and embassy operated shelters.  The government prepared, but did not open two designated trafficking victims' shelters during the reporting period.  The GOM did not release budgetary information regarding the two shelters. Some suspected trafficking victims continued to be housed at immigration detention centers, pending repatriation, but were not charged under immigration or other possible violations. There was no information available regarding funding and assistance the GOM provided to trafficking victims and to NGOs involved in combating trafficking. D.  (SBU) The Royal Malaysian Police instituted an informal referral process referring known victims to their respective embassies and the Tenaganita TIP shelter.  Police also delivered some suspected TIP victims to immigration detention centers.  The RMP and the National Council were developing procedures for identifying victims of trafficking and a formal system for referring known victims to appropriate care facilities. E.  (SBU) N/A F.  (SBU) Potential victims continued to be charged for prostitution and immigration charges.  If victims were not identified, they were often fined and later deported as illegal immigrants. G.  (SBU) The Malaysian government encouraged victims to assist in the investigation and prosecution of traffickers, but reported that most victims were unwilling to testify or did not have sufficient information to assist in a prosecution.  A trafficking victim may file a civil suit against a trafficker under Malaysian law.  Many migrant workers filed civil suits against employers that did not pay them the salary promised or forced them to work in abusive conditions.  While there were no specific impediments to the victims' access to such legal redress, they usually were not allowed to obtain employment while the court considered their cases.  Thus, for economic reasons victims usually did not pursue this type of action.  Victims who were material witnesses in court cases against former employers were also required to remain in the country until the case was concluded.  Most victims were unwilling or unable to wait for justice, and returned home without their cases coming to trial.  There were no government restitution programs for victims during the reporting period. H.  (SBU) The GOM referred over 200 victims to shelters, operated by NGOs and embassies, during the reporting period. Pending opening of the shelters established by the new anti-TIP law, the GOM did not provide shelter or housing benefits.  In some cases, child victims were referred to their embassies for repatriation.  One of the two government-funded trafficking victims' shelters was designated for children and has a capacity for 45 individuals.  Immigration authorities did not use a formal system to screen detained foreign prostitutes for identification as trafficking victims.  Instead, immigration officials processed them for the quickest possible deportation.  In some cases, especially those involving deportation over land borders such as along the Malaysian-Indonesian border on Borneo, this made trafficking victims vulnerable to traffickers operating near the border. I.  (SBU) Protection officers from the Women's Ministry received specialized training for assisting trafficking victims (reftel D).  The RMP also initiated training on trafficking victim identification.  Information was not available regarding specialized training for assisting child victims.  GOM did not provide training to its embassies and consulates located in destination and transit countries. J.  (SBU) Repatriated Malaysian victims who did not have the support of family or friends were referred to the Women's Ministry for public assistance.  The welfare wing of a political party, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), also offered services to repatriated victims. K.  (SBU) Tenaganita offered comprehensive services to TIP victims.  Tenaganita worked with the RMP, various international organizations, including the International Organization for Migration and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, as well as with other foreign NGOs to combat labor and sex trafficking throughout Malaysia. Previously, Tenaganita received funding from G/PRM to operate their shelter for TIP victims.  Tenaganita's shelter can house up to 25 women.  Most victims remained at the shelter for an average of three months.  Tenaganita provided counseling, medical assistance and language training to foreign and domestic victims of trafficking.  The NGO Women's Aid Organization (WAO) used its domestic violence shelter to house eight trafficking victims during the reporting period. WAO provided counseling services and assisted the RMP interview victims.  The Malaysian Bar Council and the International Federation of Women Lawyers (IFWL) continued to provide pro bono legal assistance to victims of trafficking. 6.  PREVENTION (PARA 30) A.  (SBU) The GOM acknowledged that trafficking is a problem and senior Malaysian leaders spoke publicly about the need for action.  When the Anti-TIP law was first tabled in parliament, Minister in the Prime Minister's Office Nazri Aziz said, "This law will address concerns raised about human trafficking and arm enforcement agencies with the tools to fight it."  Commenting on the drafting of the new comprehensive anti-TIP law, Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi said, "We do whatever we can to curb human trafficking and that is why we decided to have that bill."  He added that the severity of the penalties and punishment for human traffickers in the law reflected the government's will to see the crime stopped.  Secretary General for the Ministry of Home Affairs Aseh Che Mat publicly stated that the issues of abused and unpaid maids needed to be addressed and properly handled.  SUHAKAM Commissioner N. Siva stated, "We need co-operation from non-governmental organizations, government agencies and other instruments in neighboring countries to curb this organized trans-national crime."  On January 11, 2008, Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi and Indonesian President Yudhoyono issued a joint statement that reiterated their countries' stance that TIP was a crime against humanity and restated the commitment of both leaders' to work together to combat trafficking. B.  (SBU)  The GOM did not sponsor anti-trafficking information or education campaigns during the reporting period. C.  (SBU)  Government agencies worked closely with NGOs, civil society organizations, and international organizations on TIP during the reporting cycle.  The GOM collaborated with SUHAKAM during the drafting of the national action plan. SUHAKAM was the lead agency during the drafting of the plan, which was presented to the Ministry of Internal Security in December 2007 for adoption and implementation (reftel D). Police worked with Tenaganita and the Catholic Church to shelter and assist repatriating rescued trafficking victims to their countries of origin.  Police cooperation with the Catholic Church provided an international network capable of linking rescued victims with NGOs and civil society organizations in their countries of origin.  Tenaganita worked with police in assisting over 100 rescued TIP victims during the reporting period. D.(SBU) As part of the new comprehensive anti-TIP law, the National Council, law enforcement agencies, and, the Women's Ministry established working groups to develop and implement new TIP monitoring procedures.  The Department of Immigration began to deploy a new biometric system intended for all border entry points to screen individuals for prior entry into Malaysia.  This system also guarded against entry under assumed identities, which traffickers often used when bringing victims through border crossings.  Additionally, the biometric system guarded against traffickers attempts to re-traffic a previous trafficking victim to Malaysia. E.  (SBU) The National Council for Combating Trafficking is the formal interagency group, formed under the new anti-TIP law.  The Council met three times during the reporting period to address initial implementation of the new law.  The Council established three committees, Law Enforcement, Protection, and Legislative, to develop new operating procedures and deal with specific issues, identified as necessary for the implementation and enforcement of the new anti-TIP law.  The Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) is responsible for investigating alleged public corruption. F.  (SBU)  SUHAKAM drafted the GOM's national action plan. The plan addressed four main components, 1) prevention and awareness, 2) victim protection, care, and support, 3) legislative framework and policy development, and 4) law enforcement.  SUHAKAM consulted with local NGOs during its initial drafting of the action plan.  During the final drafting, SUHAKAM representatives joined a working group led by the Ministry of Internal Security to finalize the draft before the action plan was presented for adoption to the Ministry of Internal Security in December 2007. G.  (SBU) The RMP conducted multiple police investigations and raids during the reporting cycle.  Police targeted raids on venues used as fronts for brothels, such as karaoke bars, hotels, spas, etc. (SBU) In January 2008, Mohamed Ishak, Director General for Enforcement in the Department of Immigration, issued a public warning to potential employers of foreign workers.  He said employers could be charged under the new anti-TIP law for cases involving abuse and exploitation of foreign workers. The Department of Immigration began issuing to foreign students and workers new identification cards to use in lieu of passports to show legal status in Malaysia.  Director General of Immigration Wahid stated the card gave a possible trafficking victim a greater chance to escape abusive employment without the fear of being mistaken for an illegal immigrant (reftel D). I.  (SBU) All Malaysian troops assigned to peacekeeping missions attended specialized training at the Peacekeeping Training Center in Port Dickson, Malaysia.  Training included embedded modules on trafficking in persons.  No charges or allegations of misconduct were filed against Malaysian service members during the reporting period. 7.  NOMINATION OF HEROES & BEST PRACTICES (PARAS 31 & 32) (SBU) Post submits as best practices Sections 16 and 17 of Malaysia's comprehensive Anti-trafficking in Persons Act 2007.  Section 16 states that a trafficker cannot use as a defense that the victim consented to the act of trafficking in persons.  Section 17 states that the past sexual behavior of a trafficking victim is irrelevant and inadmissible for proving the trafficked person was engaged in other sexual behavior or to prove the trafficked person's sexual predisposition.  These two sections of the new law will strengthen law enforcement cases against traffickers and protect a trafficking victim from potential humiliation and re-victimizing on the witness stand.  Dr. Mohamed Mattar, an internationally recognized expert on TIP legislation from Johns Hopkins University, identified these two sections of Malaysia's law and highlighted them during discussions with GOM representatives (reftel D).  Post provided the full text of Malaysia's comprehensive anti-trafficking law to G/TIP and EAP. KEITH (March 2008)

WIKILEAKS: PRESS STIFLED IN ALTANTUYA MURDER TRIAL OVER MENTION OF PRIME MINISTER Posted: 20 Oct 2011 01:00 AM PDT The short-lived exception was the English language newspaper The Sun, which included the quotations from Razak in its early morning February 21 edition. Sources at newspaper confirmed to us in confidence that the Ministry of Internal Security compelled The Sun to withdraw and recall thousands of copies of their first run paper in which the original quote was included. Prime Minister Abdullah serves concurrently as Minister of Internal Security. THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b and d). 1.  (C) In the latest turn of the ongoing Altantuya murder trial (reftels), accused political insider Abdul Razak Baginda, who has remained calm and composed through most of the proceedings, unleashed an emotional tirade shortly after the February 20 noon recess on the trial's 90th day. Referring to the Prime Minister by his nick-name "Pak Lah", Razak reportedly exclaimed:  "You can die, Pak Lah! (in Malaysian - "Matilah kau, Pak Lah!") I'm innocent!", according to unpublished journalist accounts.  Local newspapers and the government news service Bernama reported the fact of the outburst, but did not print Razak's statements.  The short-lived exception was the English language newspaper The Sun, which included the quotations from Razak in its early morning February 21 edition.  Sources at newspaper confirmed to us in confidence that the Ministry of Internal Security compelled The Sun to withdraw and recall thousands of copies of their first run paper in which the original quote was included.  Prime Minister Abdullah serves concurrently as Minister of Internal Security. 2.  (C) Razak Baginda, who is on trial for abetting two police officers in murdering Mongolian Altantuya Shaariibuu, had appeared uneasy throughout the morning session of court on February 20.  Razak's father, Abdullah Malim Baginda had whispered something to him shortly before the trial had begun for the morning and apparently upset the accused.  Razak had remained quiet throughout the morning hearings, but just after the noon recess was called and as he was leaving the courtroom he kicked and banged the door and yelled "You can die, Pak Lah! Die, Pak Lah!  I am innocent.  I am innocent." He was later seen crying before his lawyer while his mother attempted to comfort him. 3.  (C) Comment:  Speculation is rife in Malaysia's on-line community concerning what it was that set off Razak Baginda outburst, including conspiracy theories alleging the Prime Minister's office had urged Razak to implicate Deputy Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak (see also ref B) in return for sparing Razak a guilty verdict and its mandatory death sentence.  Regardless, the Internal Security Ministry would want to limit any possibly inflammatory reference to the Prime Minister at the trial, and particularly at this juncture due to the proximity of Malaysia's general election to be held on March 8.  Any connection between the Prime Minister and the murder trial would be scandalous.  The GOM reportedly has worked hard to "drive (the case) from public view" (ref B) and is not about to allow the case to influence the coming elections. KEITH (February 2008)

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