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• WIKILEAKS: ABDULLAH CALLS FOR SNAP ELECTIONS; A PRIMER FOR THE POLLS
• WIKILEAKS: CLEAN FINGERS, DIRTY ELECTIONS?
• WIKILEAKS: MALAYSIA'S EIGHTH ANNUAL TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT
• WIKILEAKS: PRESS STIFLED IN ALTANTUYA MURDER TRIAL OVER MENTION OF PRIME MINISTER
• WIKILEAKS: BLUE LANTERN PRE-LICENSE END USE CHECK ON APPLICATION 05-050085478 (U)
• WIKILEAKS: PROSECUTOR DOWNBEAT ON ALTANTUYA MURDER CASE
• WIKILEAKS: CONTROVERSIAL SQURES OF CHRISTIAN BOOKS
• WIKILEAKS: EMBASSY RAISES RELA ROLE WITH MALAYSIAN IMMIGRATION
• WIKILEAKS: MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENT DECIDES PROTON
• WIKILEAKS: Malaysia's 2008 Budget: Pork Sold Separately

WIKILEAKS: ABDULLAH CALLS FOR SNAP ELECTIONS; A PRIMER FOR THE POLLS Posted: 23 Oct 2011 01:00 AM PDT While most opposition leaders are optimistic of some level of success compared to the 11th General Election, few are confident enough to predict the opposition's ability to break the National Front's two-thirds majority in Parliament. In fact, the opposition parties would need a 400 percent increase in parliamentary seats to capture the 75 seats necessary to break the National Front's super majority in parliament-- a feat no observers deem possible in the current political climate.  THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b, d). 1.   (C) Summary:  Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi announced the dissolution of Malaysia's Parliament on February 13 and called for snap elections, a fully expected move, but one that came a year before elections were required under the constitution.  Malaysia's Election Commission (EC) will announce on February 14 the nomination and polling dates. This year's polling date could be set as early as March 1, a mere 17 days from the dissolution of Parliament with a window of only 10 days for active campaigning.  Approximately 7.6 million voters are expected to cast their ballots, electing all 222 members of Parliament, as well as 505 State Assembly members from 12 of 13 states.  Malaysia's ruling coalition, the National Front (Barisan Nasional or BN), faces a challenge from markedly increased dissatisfaction in Chinese and Indian communities.  The crown jewel of this election remains the fight for the state of Kelantan, where the National Front and PM Abdullah's United Malays National Organization (UMNO) will try to wrest control from the conservative Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS).  Anwar Ibrahim's People's Justice Party (PKR) and the Chinese dominated Democratic Action Party (DAP) will focus on the states of Penang, Perak, and Sabah, while PAS will also focus its efforts on regaining lost seats in Terengganu. Opposition parties are expected to garner some 40 to 45 percent of the popular vote, but actual gained seats may in fact be modest.  Political gerrymandering, control over the mainstream media, and the financial and institutional power of 50 years of incumbency will ensure the National Front's success at the ballot box even in the face of increased opposition votes.  The significance of the 12th General Election does not rest with the widely anticipated victory of UMNO and the National Front.  Instead, observers will look to the margin of victory as well as the minority vote, factors that have implications for Prime Minister Abdullah's strength as a government and UMNO leader in a second term, and the future viability of Malaysia's inter-ethnic status quo.  In the short-term, however, the National Front's expected triumph will offer more continuity than change to Malaysia. End Summary. Rapid Timeline for Elections 2.  (SBU) Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi announced the dissolution of Parliament on February 13 and officially set the wheels in motion for Malaysia's 12th General Election. On February 14, the EC will meet to officially set the date for nomination of candidates, the official campaign period, and the nation-wide polling date.  Recent election timelines indicate this year's polling date will likely be set for March 1 or 2, a mere 17 days from the dissolution of Parliament with a window of only 10 days for active campaigning.  Consistent with previous election tallying, official results are generally known within two to three hours of the polls closing.  The Prime Minister is expected to announce a new Cabinet within one to two weeks following the polls.  There is no official date for the new parliament to sit, but in 2004 the 11th Parliament sat approximately 6 weeks after Election Day.  We expect the 12th Parliament to follow a similar schedule. The Voters 3.  (U) The EC gazetted the 2007 Master Electoral Roll on February 5, 2008, showing 10,922,139 registered voters.  The 2007 roll is expected to be the final revision prior to the election, and under current law, cannot be challenged after the polls have been held.  Based on past elections, nation-wide voter turn out is expected to hover around 70 percent (or approximately 7.6 million voters), but heavily contested areas in 2004 showed voter turn outs as high as 91 percent in the state of Terengganu.  Of the 10.9 million voters in Malaysia, 84.2 percent reside on the Peninsula, while the other 15.8 percent reside in East Malaysia (broken down by 912,454 voters in Sarawak and 807,862 in Sabah).  A recent survey by the Election Commission showed that some 80 percent of voters no longer live in the district in which they are registered.  Since only Malaysian students studying abroad, government officials, police and military personnel are authorized to vote via postal or absentee ballot, the nation expects to see large numbers of travelers on or before Election Day. Who's on the Ballot 4.  (U) As has been the case for four decades, voters will choose only Members of Parliament (Ahli Dewan Rakyat) and State Assembly members.  Senators (Ahli Dewan Negara) are not elected but are appointed and therefore will not stand for office in the general election.  Similarly, Malaysia has not held elections for municipal offices since 1965, and all municipal positions continue to be filled by appointment only.  All 222 seats of the federal Parliament must stand for election.  An increase in population in the East Malaysian state of Sarawak has prompted the government to enlarge the size of Parliament, and in the 12th General Election, there will be three additional seats proportioned to Sarawak, increasing the size of the Parliament from its current 219 seats to 222 seats.   State Assembly elections will take place in 12 of Malaysia's 13 states.  Only Sarawak's State Assembly is in a different election cycle-- a hold over from Sarawak's later entry into the Federation. Who Wins? 5.  (SBU) Under Malaysia's "first past the post", or "winner take all system", the top vote getter in each State Assembly or Parliamentary district captures the seat.  There is no run-off system to limit the field nor is there a requirement to win an absolute majority.  Under these conditions, the National Front coalition chooses only one candidate from among its 14 component parties to stand for each seat.  In general practice the opposition parties attempt to compromise on seat allocations and run only one opposition candidate in each district.  However, because the opposition parties do not always agree on which party would have a better chance against the National Front candidate, there are often instances of three or more candidates vying for the same seat, an event known locally as a "three cornered fight". Such contests generally guarantee the National Front candidate will capture a plurality and win the seat. National Parliament -- Maintaining 2/3 Majority 6.  (SBU) Of principal concern to the National Front coalition is the ability to control a two-thirds majority in Parliament.  While most ordinary legislation requires only a simple majority to pass, constitutional amendments can be passed, with or without the consent of the King, with a two-thirds majority in Parliament.  This is an important tool of the ruling government as in its short 50 year history, Malaysia's constitution has been amended some 52 times and almost always over the objections of the opposition. Maintaining a two-thirds majority in Parliament is the highest priority for the National Front coalition.  To maintain its two-thirds majority in the 12th General Election, the National Front will need to win 148 out of 222 seats.  (Note:  In the 2004 (11th General) Election, there were 219 parliamentary seats at stake and the National Front captured 199 of those seats, or 91 percent. End Note.) Malay Majority Vote 7.  (SBU) The coalition's dominant United Malays National Organization (UMNO) commands significant but not unchallenged support of the country's ethnic Malay majority.  UMNO is highly organized, enjoys vastly superior funding compared with any opposition party, and benefits from 50 years of incumbency as the leader of government.  The Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) poses the largest challenge to UMNO for ethnic Malay votes.  In 2004 UMNO garnered 2.48 million votes to PAS' 1.05 million votes, figures that do not disaggregate ethnic Malay and non-Malay votes or the number of seats contested but nevertheless demonstrate that UMNO clearly is in the driver's seat.  Malaysia's first past the post system and politically gerrymandered districts further reinforce UMNO's electoral dominance over PAS, in addition to many other factors that favor the incumbent BN.  In 2008, it does not appear that many UMNO parliamentary or state assembly seats are at risk.  UMNO, however, cannot take its position completely for granted and national vote totals mask UMNO's small margin of victory in many contests.  In 1999, BN candidates (including UMNO) received only 48.5 percent of votes in heavily Malay areas, with BN improving its record to 59 percent in 2004.  In the "Malay Belt" of Perlis, Kedah, Terengganu and Kelatan, PAS took in 56 percent of the votes in 1999, dropping to 45 percent in 2004. 8.  (SBU) Such is UMNO's current confidence that one UMNO vice president recently commented to the press that "we don't need the Indians or the Chinese" to win the election.  Given that in 2004 UMNO garnered roughly a third of the vote, its non-Malay partners took another third, and the opposition accounted for the remaining third, such a statement may not be altogether accurate.  Since independence, UMNO's critical advantage has been its ability to maintain a solid coalition with ethnic Chinese and also Indian voters.  Nevertheless, in the current Parliament UMNO alone controls 110 of the coalition's 199 total seats, and many seats held by other coalition members were indisputably dominated by Malay voters.  Likewise, in the 11th General Election, UMNO won 302 of the 505 State Assembly seats up for election in 2004.  The 12th General Election will reflect the same dominating strength of UMNO and the National Front coalition, and it remains very unlikely that the National Front will win any less than 80 percent of the seats in Parliament and maintain control of all the state assemblies except Kelantan. Kelantan will remain the most heavily contested of the Malay majority areas (see below). Ethnic Chinese 9.  (SBU) One of the National Front's greatest challenges will come from dissatisfied Chinese voters.  With 26 percent of the total population and outright majorities in many urban districts, Malaysia's ethnic Chinese population constitutes a sizable voting block.  For 50 years the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) has been the largest ethnic Chinese party in the country and a faithful partner in the National Front coalition.  Likewise, for nearly 40 years, the People's Movement Party (Gerakan) has attracted a sizable block of Chinese votes for the National Front coalition and held the reins of government in the State of Penang.  However, leadership in both parties have publicly acknowledged growing Chinese voter dissatisfaction in the economic progress of the country and increasing perceptions of ethnic polarization in the country.  A late December 2007 voter opinion survey by the Merdeka Center indicated that PM Abdullah's approval rating among ethnic Chinese stood at 42 percent, down from 62 percent in late 2006.  Accordingly, both MCA and Gerakan leaders anticipate some loss of support at the polls. Nevertheless, because most Gerakan and MCA leaders are actually elected from districts with an ethnic-Malay majority, even a decline in support at the polls will have very little effect on the leadership of the National Front's largest Chinese parties.  Years of gerrymandering have created few Chinese majority districts that actually challenge the dominance of the National Front's constituent parties, and while the opposition Democratic Action Party (DAP) stands to gain a few seats in both State Assemblies and in the federal Parliament as a result of this dissatisfaction, DAP's potential gains will not be significant enough to materially change the make up of government, either locally or nationally. Ethnic Indians 10.  (SBU) Although Malaysia's ethnic Indian community constitutes less than 8 percent of the population and is thus less influential than the Chinese minority, the National Front's Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) also faces significant voter dissatisfaction, and internal divisions threaten the unity of the once fiercely loyal coalition partner.  Following a year of highly publicized and emotionally charged issues surrounding the razing of Hindu temples and various court cases seen to be dragging Hindu families into Sharia courts, Indian dissatisfaction with the government pinnacled with a mass street demonstration on November 25 (ref A).  A recent public opinion poll conducted by the Merdeka Center noted a dramatic 41 percent decline in Prime Minister Abdullah's approval rate among Malaysia's ethnic Indians following the Hindraf rally of November 25 (ref A), leaving only 38 percent of ethnic Indians approving of Abdullah's performance.  Voices within MIC have called for the party's president, Works Minister Samy Vellu, to step aside and end his 29 year grasp on the party.  Samy has refused to step down, but voter dissatisfaction within the Indian community assures greater sympathy for opposition parties than ever before.  Just as most Chinese leaders are elected from Malay-majority districts, Samy Vellu also holds his parliamentary seat from a Malay dominated district, and under the BN banner his election is all but guaranteed and no significant changes in MIC leadership are expected as a result of the general election.  Nevertheless, MIC faces a near certain loss of votes and such a weakened state could affect the outcome in closely contested districts where previous BN incumbents won with a less than 5 percent margin. Battle for Kelantan 11.  (SBU) In the 2004 elections, Malaysia's ruling National Front won or controlled an overwhelming majority in 12 of the 13 State Assembly elections winning a total of 453 of the 505 State Assembly seats contested.  (The National Front also won a dominant majority in the 14th state, Sarawak, in 2006). Only the State of Kelantan elected a non-BN state government. In fact, the conservative Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) has controlled the State Assembly in Kelantan for 39 of the last 50 years.  In this the 12th General Election, PAS once again presents the strongest challenge in Kelantan to a nation-wide dominance by the ruling National Front coalition. National Front efforts to wrest Kelantan away from PAS have intensified over the past year with the announcement of new development projects, the establishment of the Northern Economic Corridor, and promises of new mosques to be built if the Kelantanese will elect a BN government.  The Kelantan State Assembly currently consists of 23 PAS assembly members and 22 National Front members.  The mere "one seat" majority has led National Front political leaders to conclude that this is the coalition's best opportunity to win back the state, and Prime Minister Abdullah's political machinery has promised to focus great efforts on capturing the state. Senior BN politicians from around the country have begun unofficial campaign stops in Kelantan over the past few months, and BN's political machinery is in high gear to win the hearts and minds of Malaysia's most opposition-minded state.  Nevertheless, PAS spiritual leader Nik Abdul Aziz bin Nik Mat remains highly popular in Kelantan and has committed to seeking reelection to the State Assembly and another term as Chief Minister of Kelantan.  Kelantan is definitely the state to watch. Other States to Watch 12.  (SBU) Among the other states to watch in the 12th General Election are Penang, Perak, Terengganu and Sabah. These states represent traditional areas of support for opposition candidates and here the opposition parties stand to make their biggest gains.  Chinese discontent mentioned above poses the biggest threat to the National Front's People's Movement Party (Gerakan) in Penang.  Gerakan has held the Chief Minister office and controlled the State Assembly as the leading National Front party in Penang since 1969.  Most significant in Penang will be the results of the State Assembly elections.  In 2004 the National Front won 38 of 40 state seats, but only 8 of 13 parliamentary seats. Both DAP and PKR are heavily targeting Penang to try to increase the number of opposition members in the State Assembly, with DAP targeting the Chinese majority seats and PKR targeting the Malay majority seats.  Similarly, Perak and Terengganu represent areas where opposition parties have historically captured higher numbers of state seats and are generally more receptive to opposition candidates for state and parliamentary seats.  Sabah was under opposition control from 1985 to 1994, and Anwar Ibrahim's People's Justice Party (PKR) believes that many Sabahans would prefer to vote in another opposition government if given a viable chance. Accordingly, PKR has actively sought a foothold in the East Malaysian state, and while PKR's chance of winning a significant number of seats is doubtful, Sabah promises to be a point of focus for PKR.  Sabah yielded neither state nor parliamentary seats to the opposition in 2004, so any gain is progress for the opposition. The Anwar Factor and PKR 13.  (SBU) Former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim's ouster from power in 1998 and his 1999 conviction on politicized corruption charges spurred the "reformasi" movement that eventually saw his People's Justice Party (PKR or KeADILan) win five parliamentary seats in the 1999 general elections.  As time passed and with Anwar still in prison, the party's popularity waned and only Anwar's wife, Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, was able to hold on to her parliamentary seat in the 11th General Election in 2004, and then only by a 500 vote margin.  Anwar was released from prison in September 2004 and acquitted of the alleged sodomy charge, but federal election law excluded him from seeking political office for five years from the completion of his sentence for a previous conviction on corruption, thus dating back to April 2003. Accordingly, Anwar's exclusion period is set to end in April 2008, and it has long been held that Prime Minister Abdullah would call the elections prior to Anwar's eligibility to seek office.  While on a larger scale Anwar and PKR pose little threat to the UMNO and National Front political machinery, most UMNO politicians see Anwar as a threat to the political status quo and as a possible challenge over the long term to the coalition's two-thirds majority in Parliament.  Long held animosities towards Anwar, fomented by Malaysia's last Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, and seconded by the national media, have remained a dominate force within UMNO, and there is no doubt that Anwar's eligibility influenced the date of the 12th General Election. 14.  (SBU) The 12th General Election is, for all intents and purposes, Anwar's first test in national politics since his expulsion from UMNO and his release from prison.  Despite his ineligibility to run for office, Anwar has proven he can draw sizable crowds to political rallies as well as to the polls. In the Ijok by-election of 2007 (ref B), Anwar proved that even against a well-oiled and heavily financed National Front campaign, he could attract a crowd and win some 40 percent of the popular vote for his PKR candidate.  Nevertheless, in 2004 nearly 40 percent of the votes nation-wide went to the opposition without Anwar's assistance, so it remains unclear if Anwar will play a significant drawing-factor in the upcoming election.  Anwar's near constant attacks on the country's BN leadership over corruption, judicial appointments and democratic reform have resonated in many quarters and promise to garner attention during the campaign phase of the election.  Still, Anwar and PKR are basically starting from scratch as PKR won no state assembly seats in 2004 and only one parliamentary seat.  2008 will prove whether Anwar can remain relevant in Malaysian politics and whether PKR will go extinct. Opposition Solidarity and Coordination 15.  (SBU) Despite Anwar's lingering ineligibility, his party, PKR, has worked closely with Malaysia's other two opposition parties, PAS and DAP, to coordinate an election strategy in which only one opposition candidate will face any single National Front candidate.  The opposition parties have recognized that their only chance for success in the 12th General Election is by avoiding "three cornered fights". Although this cooperation is less formal than the "Alternative Front" coalition which the opposition parties entered into in 1999, the basic tenet remains the same-- unseat as many National Front candidates as is possible under the current electoral system.  While most opposition leaders are optimistic of some level of success compared to the 11th General Election, few are confident enough to predict the opposition's ability to break the National Front's two-thirds majority in Parliament.  In fact, the opposition parties would need a 400 percent increase in parliamentary seats to capture the 75 seats necessary to break the National Front's super majority in parliament-- a feat no observers deem possible in the current political climate.  The last and only time the opposition broke the two-thirds majority was in the 3rd General Election of 1969-- the election that precipitated Malaysia's worst racial violence in its short history.  In that year the opposition won an outright majority of the popular vote (50.7 percent), but still captured only 34 percent of the seats in Parliament.  In 1990 the opposition captured 46.6 percent of the popular vote but only 29 percent of the seats in Parliament.  Malaysia's electoral system simply is not designed to allow the ruling coalition to lose control of the government. Comment 16.  (C) Beyond the National Front's appeal to voters, political gerrymandering, control over the mainstream media, and the financial and institutional power of 50 years of incumbency will ensure the National Front's success at the ballot box even in the face of increased opposition votes. Although Malay urbanization is slowly changing historical inequities, Malaysia's disproportionate allocation of parliamentary seats favors Malay majority regions with more parliamentary seats in the rural areas than minority dominated urban areas.  Coupled with its first-past-the-post electoral system, these political machinations create an electoral environment in which it is possible that, as shown in the 11th General Election, the opposition can win almost 40 percent of the popular vote nation-wide and still win less than 10 percent of the total seats in parliament. 17.  (C) The significance of the 12th General Election does not rest with the widely anticipated victory of UMNO and the National Front, but its implications for Prime Minister Abdullah's strength as a government and UMNO party leader in a second term, and the future viability of Malaysia's inter-ethnic status quo.  The national election results set the stage for UMNO's critical internal party elections, which could be held in the last quarter of 2008.  While some slippage of BN's margins is widely expected, the greater the opposition gains the more criticism and challenge Abdullah will face from within UMNO.  An embattled Prime Minister, or one perceived as having only tepid support, will have a more difficult time pushing reforms or significant new policies. The results of the state election in Kelantan could prove a boost to Abdullah if UMNO is able to wrest the state away from PAS.  Such a win would represent the first time since 1994 that the National Front would control all 14 state governments -- a tangible measure of success for Abdullah. 18.  (C) The national election also will be significant for the signals it sends as to the future viability of the National Front's multi-racial alliance and the country's long heralded "social contract," given that Chinese and Indian discontent appears to have reached a high water mark, unseen since 1969.  If such fractures widen over the longer-term, they will threaten the country's status quo politics, and force Malaysian politicians to reexamine seriously the political formula that has been in place since independence. In the short term, however, the National Front's expected triumph will offer more continuity than change to Malaysia. KEITH (February 2008)

WIKILEAKS: CLEAN FINGERS, DIRTY ELECTIONS? Posted: 22 Oct 2011 01:00 AM PDT Proponents of electoral reform had lobbied for the introduction of indelible ink and hailed the EC's original decision to institute this measure, which would have represented the most significant improvement in the integrity of the elections since the last polls in 2004. The EC's grounds for reversing itself on the use of indelible ink do not appear very convincing, and clearly suggest pressure from the ruling BN government. Regardless, the EC has damaged its credibility on the eve of the elections and invited greater suspicion of Malaysia's electoral process. THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b, d). Summary 1.  (C) With only three days remaining before the March 8 general election, Malaysia's Election Commission (EC) abruptly announced its decision not to apply indelible ink to the fingers of voters, citing police reports of alleged sabotage plans and previously unidentified constitutional barriers.  The opposition immediately cried foul and condemned the EC for abandoning this fraud prevention measure.  All sides have braced for the impact of illegitimate "phantom voters," particularly in tightly-contested races.  The Islamist opposition party PAS stated it would stop buses ferrying suspect voters into the states of Kelantan and Terengganu, while the police warned against obstructing citizens from casting their votes.  The leading UMNO party and its allies within the National Front coalition have stepped up attacks against opposition figure Anwar Ibrahim, including for his ties to prominent Americans. The Embassy has dispatched election observer teams to six key states.  The EC's grounds for reversing itself on the use of indelible ink do not appear very convincing, and suggest pressure from the ruling BN government.  Regardless, the EC has damaged its credibility on the eve of the election and invited greater suspicion of Malaysia's electoral process. End Summary. EC nixes use of indelible ink 2.  (SBU) With only three days remaining before the March 8 general election, Chairman of Malaysia's Election Commission Abdul Rashid Abdul Rahman made an abrupt about-face on March 4 when he announced polling officials would not mark the fingers of voters with indelible ink after they cast their ballots.  In a hastily announced press conference and flanked by both the Inspector-General of Police (IGP), Musa Hassan, and the Attorney General, Abdul Gani Patail, Rashid stuttered through a prepared statement officially terminating the fraud prevention method that the EC had embraced only nine months ago.  Referencing four police reports filed between February 16 and 21 of an alleged plan to sabotage the election process in the states of Kedah, Perlis and Kelantan, Rashid explained that the police believed people had smuggled unidentified quantities of indelible ink into the country to trick villagers into believing that they must have their fingernails marked before they can go vote.  "Their intention is to create confusion and suspicion as to the status of such voters," he said. "This may cause chaos at polling stations.... The EC views these issues seriously as the election process and public order and security cannot be compromised," Rashid read from his prepared statement. 3.  (SBU) Beyond allegations of sabotage, Rashid further explained that Malaysia's laws would not allow for the denial of a person's constitutional right to vote merely because of indelible ink marked on their fingernail.  Rashid explained that only a constitutional amendment could rectify this situation, and since Parliament was dissolved, the Constitution could not be amended before the election. Notwithstanding the presence of both the IGP and the Attorney General, Rashid reiterated the independence of the EC's decision process and reassured the media that no political pressure had been exerted to compel the EC's action.  From the campaign trail, Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi echoed Rashid's denial and remarked that "this didn't have any connection with us (the National Front, BN), the decision was solely made by the EC and we want to hear the full explanation from them as well....  What is more important is that the rights of the people who had registered to vote must be upheld.  That must be the guarantee from the EC to all citizens and voters on March 8," the Prime Minister said. 4.  (C) Comment:  EC Chairman Rashid reportedly confided to a longstanding Embassy contact on March 5 that the Attorney General had instructed Rashid to rescind the EC's decision to use the ink.  End Comment. Opposition parties cry foul 5. (SBU) Opposition politicians immediately attributed the EC's decision to BN's pressure.  People's Justice Party (PKR) deputy president Dr. Syed Husin Ali lambasted the EC's decision: "At a moment when the eyes of the entire world are upon us, the commission has now conclusively and irrevocably shown that any overtures towards reform that it had made previously were in bad faith."  Democratic Action Party (DAP) Secretary General Lim Guan Eng also chided the decision: "DAP unreservedly condemns the EC's betrayal of public trust by deciding to abandon the use of indelible ink, which is the central premise of their commitment towards a free, fair and clean election."  Likewise, the opposition-linked election watchdog Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections (Bersih) released a statement declaring that Bersih "rejects the EC's excuses for the cancellation of this move on legal and security grounds," and criticized the EC for not seeking any necessary parliamentary action long ago.  "The decision by the EC shows very clearly that it has neither intention nor the commitment to carry out electoral reform," Bersih concluded. Election monitor steps back 6. (SBU) The election monitoring NGO Malaysians for Free and Fair Elections (MAFREL) reacted with criticism and disappointment at the EC's decision.  Despite being the only NGO accredited by the EC, MAFREL's Chairman Malik Hussin expressed lack of faith in the election process and vowed not to send observers inside the nation's polling stations so as not to lend credibility to a flawed process.  MAFREL had planned to deploy around 330 observers at polling stations nationwide to monitor the voting process on March 8.  MAFREL Deputy Chairman Syed Noh Ibrahim told reporters they will continue with their monitoring operation, "just not within the polling stations as accredited by the EC." Haunted by "phantom" voters 7.  (SBU) The IGP Musa Hassan publicly warned all political parties against obstructing citizens from turning out to cast their votes on March 8.  The warning was in response to statements made by Islamist opposition party PAS leaders that they would stop buses allegedly ferrying "phantom voters" from entering Kelantan and Terengganu.  The term "phantom voters" ("undi hantu") in Malaysia has several interpretations.  These could be legally registered voters in a particular district who are not resident of the district or not known to the local community; non-citizens issued with Malaysian identity cards for the purpose of voting; voters who have passed away but whose names still appear on the electoral roll with their identity cards abused by someone else to vote; and large numbers of voters inexplicably registered at a single address. In this context both the BN and the opposition parties, particularly PAS, have registered hundreds their supporters in tightly-contested districts especially in Kelantan, Kedah and Terengganu. 8.  (SBU) The Election Commission declared prior to the dissolution of Parliament February 13 that they had cleared the electoral roll of all phantom voters, a claim opposition leaders dispute.  For instance, a DAP candidate in Selangor alleged that 26 unknown individuals have been registered as voters using her family home address in her district.  MAFREL released a statement February 20 that claimed 500 voters were registered as voters using an abandoned army base in Penang where the BN candidate is Gerakan's acting President Koh Tsu Koon.  Not to be outdone, Kelantan UMNO leaders claimed that the party has difficulty in identifying more than 118,000 voters in the PAS controlled state. 9.  (SBU) Although both UMNO and PAS leaders have been guilty in the past of recruiting phantom voters, PAS leaders accuse the EC of allowing UMNO to pad the electoral roll with its supporters to help UMNO win Kelantan and maintain its hold in Terengganu.  PAS President Hadi Awang's press secretary Roslan Shair told reporters March 4 that the party had ample proof that phantom voters will be ferried to the two states on polling day.  He added that PAS "would stop at nothing to prevent the voters from entering Kelantan and Terengganu." In response, IGP Musa Hassan stated that he had issued a directive to his men to act against those trying to stop voters from casting their votes.  He added, "We have stationed 300 policemen at entry points to the state and will take stern action against those who try to stop people from casting their votes." UMNO and BN step up assault on Anwar 10.  (SBU) Leading opposition figure Anwar Ibrahim, who has drawn large crowds to his political gatherings across the country during the campaign, has come under increasing attack from UMNO, other BN leaders and the government dominated mainstream media.  At several gatherings in Kuala Lumpur, poloffs have observed multi-racial crowds responding enthusiastically to Anwar's attacks on the government. Political observers told poloffs that Anwar has managed to galvanize the voters especially in the urban areas by articulating the voters concerns effectively and urging them to reject the UMNO-dominated BN coalition.  In response to Anwar's criticisms, UMNO and BN leaders have stepped up their attacks on the former DPM by describing him as a "political chameleon" who cannot be trusted. Anwar attacked for Washington connections 11.  (SBU) Government owned newspapers have joined in the fray and have increased their negative reports on the former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar.  The papers gave prominence to human rights activist and former Peoples Justice Party Deputy President (1999-2001) Chandra Muzaffar's comment on March 4 that it would be an "unmitigated disaster for Malaysia" should Anwar become the PM.  Chandra also stated in another interview for an UMNO-owned newspaper that Anwar's close relationships with individuals and groups in Washington including former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz "had very serious implications on Malaysia's sovereignty and independence."  The UMNO owned newspaper condemned Anwar on March 6 for "tarnishing the image" of the country by giving an interview in Singapore that criticized government policies and the conduct of elections.  The paper cited Anwar's comments that he is a "close friend" of former Vice President Al Gore, whom the paper claimed supported "the 'reformasi' demonstration of 1998 that threatened the stability of the country." Embassy observers in the field 12.  (U) The Embassy dispatched six election observer teams to the field on March 6.  The teams will monitor developments in six key states:  Kelantan, Terengganu, Penang, Kedah, Perak, and Sabah from March 6 thru March 9. Comment 13.  (C) Proponents of electoral reform had lobbied for the introduction of indelible ink and hailed the EC's original decision to institute this measure, which would have represented the most significant improvement in the integrity of the elections since the last polls in 2004.  The EC's grounds for reversing itself on the use of indelible ink do not appear very convincing, and clearly suggest pressure from the ruling BN government.  Regardless, the EC has damaged its credibility on the eve of the elections and invited greater suspicion of Malaysia's electoral process. KEITH (March 2008)

WIKILEAKS: MALAYSIA'S EIGHTH ANNUAL TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT Posted: 21 Oct 2011 01:00 AM PDT There were no accurate statistics for the total number of trafficking victims in Malaysia. Malaysia employed approximately 2.5 million migrant workers in 2007, 40 to 45% of whom were undocumented. Government and NGO statistics assess there are some 380,000 to 400,000 women employed as domestic servants in Malaysia, an unknown number of whom worked in abusive situations exacerbated by conditions of debt bondage.  THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin  Summary 1.  (SBU) Malaysia made significant efforts to combat trafficking in persons during this reporting period, marking a positive shift from previous years.  Malaysia's drafting, passage, and enactment of a comprehensive anti-trafficking in persons law represents an important advance in Malaysia's commitment to meet international standards for combating this crime.  The government of Malaysia (GOM) took action on most of the elements included in the Tier 3 action plan that the U.S. proposed during the reporting period.  The GOM established the National Council for Anti-Trafficking in Persons (National Council).  The Council, working with Malaysia's Human Rights Commission (SUHAKAM) drafted a national action plan.  The GOM also instituted training programs for law enforcement and government officials with new anti-trafficking responsibilities.  The Ministry for Women, Family, and Community Development (Women's Ministry) built two shelters for trafficking victims and trained the shelters' staff, along with newly designated protection officers, but had not opened the shelters as of the end of February pending full activation of the anti-TIP law.  The Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) rescued trafficking victims and often referred them to NGOs, the Catholic Church, and foreign embassies that operated shelters and/or provided social services to trafficking victims.  The RMP continued to investigate several trafficking cases, and detained 55 suspected traffickers under the Emergency Ordinance and Restricted Residence Act.  Police often referred rescued victims to NGOs, the Catholic Church, and foreign embassies operated shelters.  On February 28, the GOM issued three necessary "legislative supplements" bringing the new anti-TIP law fully into effect.  Malaysia has yet to comply fully with U.S. minimum standards and should address many shortfalls primarily through full enforcement of its comprehensive anti-trafficking law to include: opening of victims shelters, screening for TIP victims by relevant government agencies, and enforcement action against traffickers under the law. Malaysia was a destination, and to a lesser extent, a transit and source country for adults and minors trafficked for the purposes of forced labor and sexual exploitation.  End Summary. 2.  (U) Embassy's submission for the Eighth Annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report for Malaysia follows. Responses are keyed to paragraphs 27 - 30 of ref A. Embassy's point of contact for TIP is political officer Enrique R. Gallego (phone: 603-2148-4891 or 984-4831 (IVG), fax: 603-2168-5165, email: gallegoer@state.gov).  The Embassy spent the following time preparing the TIP report: FS-2: 12 hours; FS-3: 60 hours; FSN: 40 hours. 3.  CHECKLIST (PARA 27) A. (SBU) Malaysia was a destination, and to a lesser extent, a transit and source country for adults and minors trafficked for the purposes of forced labor and sexual exploitation. The overwhelming majority of victims came to Malaysia seeking greater economic opportunities, but later found themselves victimized either by their employers, employment agents, or traffickers that supplied migrant laborers and prostitutes in Malaysia.  Trafficking in Malaysia was a regional problem driven by economics.  Migrant workers from Indonesia, Nepal, India, Thailand, China, the Philippines, Burma, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Vietnam accounted for nearly all of Malaysia's trafficking victims.  Trafficking of Malaysians, specifically women from indigenous groups and rural areas, for labor and sex exploitation occurred within Malaysia. There were no accurate statistics for the total number of trafficking victims in Malaysia.  Malaysia employed approximately 2.5 million migrant workers in 2007, 40 to 45% of whom were undocumented.  Government and NGO statistics assess there are some 380,000 to 400,000 women employed as domestic servants in Malaysia, an unknown number of whom worked in abusive situations exacerbated by conditions of debt bondage.  Tenaganita and foreign embassies reported migrant workers on plantations and construction sites were often subject to similar restrictions on their movement, deceit and fraud concerning their wages, confiscation of their passports, and often were in debt bondage to agents or employers.  There were no reliable statistics for the number of victims trafficked into prostitution, but the Royal Malaysian Police (RMP), foreign embassies and NGOs reported at least 800 female victims were rescued from trafficking conditions in the commercial sex trade in 2007. Approximately 20 percent of the trafficking victims sheltered and rescued by NGOs and foreign embassies were below the age of 18.  The Women's Ministry sought to contract a statistician to develop a new database so the Ministry could better document trafficking.  The draft national action plan included using data collection to analyze the scale and nature of trafficking in Malaysia. B.  (SBU) Most trafficking victims in Malaysia were economic migrants seeking better wages than those available in their countries of origin.  Anecdotal evidence from the Indonesian Embassy, GOM, the press, and NGOs indicated Indonesia, the dominant source of migrant labor to Malaysia, remained the source of the greatest number of trafficking victims.  Our interviews with trafficking victims revealed a common pattern.  Typically, an employment agent recruited the trafficking victim from his or her home village, in the first step of a debt-bondage arrangement with a Malaysian employer. For an initial payment, or more often for a certain debt, the recruiter obtained a passport (with false data for underage girls, usually showing the girls' age as 25), an exit permit, and transportation from Indonesia to Malaysia. Upon arrival, a Malaysian employment agent assumed control of and assisted with entry.  The Malaysian employment agents often avoided individual immigration inspection of the trafficking victims.  Generally, the Malaysian employment agent paid the Indonesian agent for supplying the worker, or the worker acquired additional debt with the new agent for placement, employment documentation, transportation, temporary lodging, etc.  Employment agents placed most workers in their previously agreed positions as domestics, agricultural workers, etc.  However, some agents sold individuals into brothels, karaoke bars, or passed them to sex traffickers.  Employers commonly confiscated workers' passports.  Some employers forced laborers to work long hours, without pay, until the debt-bond was paid. Reportedly, similar modus operandi applied to migrant workers from Bangladesh and Vietnam. (SBU) Regardless of their origin, victims of trafficking were usually poor, uneducated, unskilled laborers recruited by their fellow citizens but later passed to Malaysian agents. Some victims were willingly smuggled into Malaysia or entered on tourist visas, but found themselves victimized when they voluntarily or involuntarily entered the undocumented labor market.  Debt bondage was the most common form of control employers exerted over victims, regardless of whether the victim was employed in licit or illicit activities. Information from the Royal Malaysian Police, Catholic Church, and the NGO Tenaganita indicated organized syndicates represented the bulk of traffickers (reftels E and G). Exploiters ranged from large plantations and factories to entertainment centers and karaoke bars to families exploiting domestic workers.  The RMP reported that a number of large organized criminal syndicates, as well as a few smaller groups, trafficked foreign women into Malaysia, using Malaysia either as the women's final destination or as a transit point to a third country.  The syndicates sometimes used employment agencies as fronts for both people smuggling and trafficking in persons.  Sex tourism was not common in Malaysia though there were reports of sex tourism on the Malaysian island of Labuan, off the coast of Borneo (reftel F).  There were a few reports of marriage brokers selling Vietnamese and Chinese women to Malaysian men, but such incidents appeared limited in number. C.  (SBU) The newly formed National Council for Anti-trafficking in Persons is made up of government agencies with a role in combating trafficking as mandated in the new anti-TIP law (reftels D, I, and J).  The Ministry of Internal Security is the lead ministry regarding trafficking and the Secretary General of the Ministry chairs the Council.  Other agencies with representation on the Council are: Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Home Affairs; Ministry of Women, Family, and Community Development; Ministry of Human Resources; Ministry of Transport; Ministry of Information; the Attorney General's Office; the Royal Malaysian Police; the Department of Immigration; the Department of Customs; and the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency.  Malaysia's Human Rights Commission (SUHAKAM) also sits on the Council. D.  (SBU) The police conducted internal training regimes to build capacity to address identified gaps in capabilities, which included identifying trafficking victims, evidence collection and management, and interagency and international coordination (reftels G and H).  The RMP worked with the United States, France, and Australia to develop training programs.  The Women's Ministry lacked practical experience assisting trafficking victims and organized training for Ministry officers, tapped as trafficking victim protection officers, and personnel tasked to operate trafficking victims' shelters (reftel D).  Low-level corruption remained a secondary issue in stemming the flow of trafficking victims.  The RMP instituted a proactive anti-corruption campaign to combat low-level corruption.  Low-level immigration officials and police "beat cops" were among Malaysia's lowest paid public servants, making them vulnerable to corruption. E.  (SBU) The GOM did not maintain specific statistics for trafficking in persons.  The RMP and Immigration Department provided anecdotal reports on trafficking victims rescued but had little or no data to share on actual trafficking victims. Two local NGOs, Tenaganita and the Women's Aid Organization (WAO), and the Embassies of Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines reported the RMP referred over 300 suspected victims of trafficking to their respective missions in 2007. At least 25 women, all Indonesians employed as domestic workers, were underage when brought to Malaysia.  In each case, they used authentic Indonesian passports, provided by recruiters, with false biographical data listing all of the girls as 25 years old. 4.  INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF TRAFFICKERS (PARA 28) A.  (SBU)  In this reporting period, the GOM completed drafting and passed the comprehensive Anti-trafficking in Persons Act (Act 670), gazetted on July 26, 2007 (reftels I and J).  The law includes provisions for both trafficking in persons for sexual and non-sexual exploitation.  The law's scope encompasses offenses that took place both in and out of Malaysia.  The law is applicable if Malaysia is the receiving country or exploitation occurs in Malaysia.  The law also includes cases when the receiving country is a foreign country, but the trafficking victim started in or transited through Malaysia.  The law includes extension of the Act to extra-territorial offenses including on ships and aircraft registered in Malaysia and Malaysian citizens and permanent residents outside and beyond the limits of Malaysia benefiting from the exploitation of trafficking victims.  The law states it is the prevailing law regarding trafficking in persons and supersedes conflicting or inconsistent provisions of other written laws. (SBU) Since gazetting the law in July 2007, the GOM brought the anti-TIP Act into force in a step-by-step process.  On February 28, 2008, the GOM issued three necessary "notifications of legislative supplements," essentially administrative notifications that put all sections of the law into force, according to the Attorney General's Office.  The notifications were legal preconditions for Malaysian police and prosecutors to take law enforcement actions under the anti-TIP law (as well as open shelters for victims, see below). (SBU) The law's definitions of trafficking include both trafficking of persons and trafficking of children for the purpose of exploitation.  If persons convicted of trafficking also used threats, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power, etc., the law provides for lengthier prison sentences.  The law includes provisions for punishing persons profiting from the exploitation of trafficking victims. (SBU) Malaysia has other laws that can criminalize trafficking or elements of trafficking.  The following is a summary of the legal provisions that authorities could use in Malaysia against traffickers in addition to the new comprehensive anti-TIP law. -- Constitution, Articles 6(1) and 6(2): Prohibit slavery and forced labor. -- Penal Code, Sections 340-348: Address "wrongful confinement" of a person against his/her will.  Punishments include maximum prison terms from one to three years and a fine. -- Penal Code, Section 372: Amended in 2002 to include stronger anti-trafficking language, addresses exploitation of any person for purposes of prostitution.  Exploitation is defined to include selling, hiring, or otherwise obtaining possession of any person with the intention to employ or use the person for the purpose of prostitution (either inside or outside of Malaysia) or knowing or having reason to believe that the person will be so employed or used.  Section 372 expands the offense of exploitation to include using false pretense or deceitful means to bring into or take out of Malaysia any person; harboring or receiving any (exploited) person and wrongfully restraining any person in any place. Wrongfully restraining is further defined as withholding clothing or property, threatening the person with legal proceedings to recover any debt or alleged debt, and detaining a person's identity card or passport.  Punishment under this section of the Code includes a prison term, which may extend to 15 years, caning and a fine. -- Penal Code, Section 372A: Provides the same penalties as section 372 for anyone who lives wholly or in part on the earnings of the prostitution of another person. -- Penal Code, Section 373: Provides the same penalties as section 372 for anyone who keeps, manages, or assists in the management of a brothel. -- Penal Code, Section 374: Addresses unlawful compulsory labor and includes punishment by imprisonment for a maximum one-year term and the possibility of a fine. -- Immigration Act, Sections 55(A) and Sections 56(1)(d): Covers a wide spectrum of immigration violations related to illegal entry or entry under false pretenses.  The Act also addresses "employing" and "conveying" illegal aliens.  The Act was amended in 2002 to toughen significantly punishments for immigration violators.  Those convicted of illegal entry face a fine of up to MYR 10,000 (USD 3,125) (USD 1 = MYR 3.2) and/or a prison sentence of up to five years, and caning of up to a maximum of six strokes.  The penalty for employing an illegal alien is a fine of between MYR 10,000-50,000 (USD 3,125-15,625) for every illegal immigrant employed and/or a prison term of up to 12 months.  An employer employing more than five illegal immigrants will be imprisoned from six months to five years and caned up to a maximum of six strokes.  The penalty for "conveying" (trafficking) illegal immigrants is a fine of MYR 10,000-50,000 (USD 3,125-15,625) for every individual trafficked.  An individual convicted for trafficking more than five illegal immigrants will also be imprisoned for between six months and five years, and caned up to a maximum of six strokes. -- Child Act (2001): Merges provisions from an array of diverse legislation pertaining to children and young persons (the Women and Girls Protection Act, the Juvenile Court Act, and the Child protection Act) into one law.  The Act specifically prohibits trafficking of children and makes it an offense to sell, let to hire, or procure (by threat or intimidation by false pretense, fraud, or deceit) any child (defined as anyone under the age of 18) for the purpose of sexual exploitation.  Penalties for these offenses are a maximum prison term of 15 years and a maximum fine of MYR 50,000 (USD 15,625).  The Child Act also authorizes the police to provide protection and rehabilitation for children in need.  A child in need is defined to include a child who "is being induced to perform any sexual act, or being in any physical or social environment which may lead to the performance of such act". -- Passports Act: Criminalizes the forgery or alteration of travel documents (including passports, residence permits, and visas).  Also criminalizes false statements or misrepresentation used to gain illegal entry into Malaysia. Penalties range from MYR 10,000-100,000 (USD 3,125-31,250) fine, 5-10 years in prison, and six strokes of a cane. Section 12(1)(f) of the Passports Act also criminalizes the unlawful possession of another persons passport; the penalty for which is a fine not exceeding MYR 10,000 and/or imprisonment not exceeding five years. Preventive Laws: -- The Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance (EO): Used against persons, usually criminal syndicates that are involved in illicit activities (such as violent crime, document forgery and people smuggling), which threaten public order. -- Restricted Residence Act (RRA): Allows the government to require individuals who are suspected of engaging in criminal activity including trafficking to move to a pre-determined location in the country and remain there under close police supervision.  The RRA does not require a formal charge to be filed against the suspected individual. B.  (SBU) The new comprehensive anti-TIP law does not distinguish between trafficking for sexual and non-sexual exploitation.  In both cases, the law includes the same guidelines for imprisonment and fines.  The Attorney General's office did not convict anyone specifically for trafficking in persons for sexual exploitation, but detained 34 suspected traffickers under RRA and 21 suspected traffickers under EO in 2007.  The 55 suspected traffickers were allegedly involved with trafficking for sexual exploitation. C.  (SBU) If convicted of trafficking in persons under the new anti-TIP law, a person is subject to a maximum sentence of 15 years and a fine.  For cases involving coercion, fraud, deception and cases of child trafficking, the maximum sentence is 20 years and fine.  Profiting from the exploitation of a trafficking victim carries a maximum sentence of 15 years and a fine of ranging from MYR 50,000 - 150,000 (USD 15,625 - 46,875).  The law makes inadmissible and irrelevant prior consent of the trafficking victim and past sexual behavior. D.  (SBU) The prescribed penalties for rape include a maximum sentence of 20 years and caning.  If the woman is hurt, "put in fear of death," is under 16 years of age, pregnant, or a victim of incest, the maximum sentence is 30 years and caning.  If the victim dies, the sentence is 15-30 years and a minimum caning of ten strokes.  Under Malaysian law, rape is a crime of a man against a woman.  Rape between men is covered under a different section of the law with sentence guidelines of 5-20 years imprisonment and caning. E.  (SBU) Federal law criminalizes profiting from prostitution and bans pornography.  The law also criminalizes the act of prostitution by foreigners.  Although not widely enforced, under Malaysia's dual legal system incorporating shari'a courts, Muslims are subject to Islamic laws prohibiting khalwat, or "close proximity", between men and women who are not married to each other.  Punishments varied from state to state, usually included a fine and jail sentence, but in most cases were settled with a warning and did not involve selling of sexual services.  Under federal criminal law, solicitation and operating and/or owning a brothel are criminal offenses.  These laws were enforced. Child prostitution is not legal. F.  (SBU) The GOM formally brought into force the law enforcement provisions of the anti-TIP Act as of February 28, 2008, according to the Attorney General's Office (see above). Pending this step, the GOM did not prosecute traffickers under the new anti-TIP law.  The GOM took other legal actions against traffickers and the RMP had several pending investigations into TIP rings as of late February.  On November 23, 2007, a Malaysian court convicted a 32-year old, HIV positive Malaysian citizen for procuring a 14-year-old girl for sex.  He received a sentence of 43 years in jail, 20 strokes of the cane, and fined MYR 50,000 ($15,625).  Police arrested a couple in Sabah on January 26, 2008 for holding seven Filipina women to work as prostitutes.  The couple recruited the seven women with promises of jobs as waitresses.  The couple remained in detention and the case remained under investigation at the end of February. (SBU) The RMP reported it actively investigated cases of trafficking involving victims of commercial sexual exploitation.  Police efforts to break criminal syndicates were complicated by layers of intermediaries, some of whom reside outside Malaysia.  Often trafficking victims, both Malaysians who have gone abroad and foreigners brought to Malaysia, may only know one intermediary, who is probably using a false identity.  In investigating cases of trafficking, police investigators attempted to question repatriated Malaysian victims as soon as they returned, but the victims usually could not or refused to provide enough information to assist the investigation.  In some cases, rescued victims feared retaliation by the traffickers.  In other cases, such as the rescue of four Filipina women trafficked into prostitution in November 2007, the women preferred to assist police in their countries of origin. (SBU) Some of the investigations involved raids to rescue trafficking victims.  A recent raid, in January 2008, rescued 34 suspected trafficking victims hidden in a false room within a hotel.  The RMP were actively pursuing leads resulting from the rescue/raid at the end of the reporting period. (SBU) According to Malaysia's Director of Immigration Enforcement, the government did not prosecute employers who confiscated passports of migrant workers although confiscation of passports is in violation of Section 12(1)(f) of the Passports Act.  It was common practice for the wages of the employee to be held in "escrow" until completion of a contract and widely accepted by homeowners employing a domestic servant, plantation owners, or small factory owners employing migrant laborers.  Police did not charge most bona fide traffickers, but jailed them under preventive laws. This was consistent with law enforcement actions taken against terrorists, narcotics traffickers, and perpetrators of other complex criminal conspiracies.  Generally, authorities charged petty pimps under the penal code.  The chief of the RMP's vice squad did not see any end to the use of preventive laws intackling trafficking issues, even with a new anti-trafficking law, due to the difficulties in collecting evidence necessary to bring proper convictions. G.  (SBU) The GOM provided specialized training to government personnel with responsibilities to combat trafficking under the new law.  The Women's Ministry conducted a series of training events to build capacity for its new trafficking victims protection officers.  The RMP also conducted various training events, both internal and training assisted by the U.S. Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and the governments of Australia and France.  The RMP participated in two workshops sponsored by ICITAP in co-operation with the French government.  The RMP co-hosted one of the workshops in the east Malaysian state of Sarawak.  In November, an ICITAP instructor met with senior RMP officials to discuss the basic elements of the new anti-TIP law and to share experiences from other regional countries' efforts to confront trafficking.  The government sponsored or co-sponsored a number of conferences and workshops aimed at developing implementation guidelines for the new anti-TIP law, formulating strategies aimed at preventing trafficking.  Both Tenaganita and SUHAKAM presented a series of workshops to government representatives on TIP throughout the year.  The Malaysian Armed Forces received TIP awareness training prior to peacekeeping deployments. H. (SBU) Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Cambodia, Brunei and Thailand used the guidelines of the multilateral "Agreement on Information Exchange and the Establishment of Communication Procedures" as a framework for cooperation on border and security incidents, transnational crimes (including trafficking in persons), and other illegal activities.  Malaysia was an active partner in the "Bali Process," a regional mechanism to combat people smuggling and human trafficking initiated by Australia and Indonesia. (SBU) Additionally, Malaysia shared intelligence on trafficking syndicates with the United Kingdom, Australia, and Interpol.  The Sabah state government maintained an agreement with the government of the Indonesian province of East Kalimantan to cooperate on a range of shared cross-border challenges, including finding and arresting human traffickers and dismantling syndicates. I.  (SBU) There were no extraditions of Malaysian nationals for trafficking offenses in 2007.  Section 108A of the Penal Code allows Malaysian authorities to prosecute a Malaysian who commits or abets a crime in another country that would be deemed an offense under the Penal Code.  Malaysia is a party to the ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, which is designed to facilitate and expedite regional cooperation in fighting transnational crime.  Malaysian law does not prohibit extradition of Malaysian nationals.  The Philippines and Indonesian Embassies reported that the RMP cooperated with them on anti-trafficking law enforcement matters. J.  (SBU) There were no substantiated reports of direct government involvement in trafficking of persons at either the local or institutional level.  Senior RMP officials and NGOs reported local police and immigration authorities often lacked the awareness and skills to identify trafficking victims trapped in prostitution or situations of forced labor.  The RMP developed new procedures to increase police officers' abilities to identify trafficking victims. K.  (SBU) No government officials were implicated, arrested, or tried for involvement in the trafficking in persons or corruption related to trafficking in persons. L.  (SBU) All troops assigned to peacekeeping missions received training on trafficking in persons at Malaysia's Peacekeeping Training Center at Port Dickson.  There were no allegations that Malaysian servicemembers were involved in TIP or exploited trafficking victims. M.  (SBU) Malaysia did not have an identified child sex tourism problem, although there were known instances of victims under 18 years of age that were trafficked for sexual exploitation. 5.  PROTECTION AND ASSISTANCE TO VICTIMS (PARA 29) A/B/C.  (SBU) The RMP referred over 200 suspected trafficking victims to NGO and embassy operated shelters.  The government prepared, but did not open two designated trafficking victims' shelters during the reporting period.  The GOM did not release budgetary information regarding the two shelters. Some suspected trafficking victims continued to be housed at immigration detention centers, pending repatriation, but were not charged under immigration or other possible violations. There was no information available regarding funding and assistance the GOM provided to trafficking victims and to NGOs involved in combating trafficking. D.  (SBU) The Royal Malaysian Police instituted an informal referral process referring known victims to their respective embassies and the Tenaganita TIP shelter.  Police also delivered some suspected TIP victims to immigration detention centers.  The RMP and the National Council were developing procedures for identifying victims of trafficking and a formal system for referring known victims to appropriate care facilities. E.  (SBU) N/A F.  (SBU) Potential victims continued to be charged for prostitution and immigration charges.  If victims were not identified, they were often fined and later deported as illegal immigrants. G.  (SBU) The Malaysian government encouraged victims to assist in the investigation and prosecution of traffickers, but reported that most victims were unwilling to testify or did not have sufficient information to assist in a prosecution.  A trafficking victim may file a civil suit against a trafficker under Malaysian law.  Many migrant workers filed civil suits against employers that did not pay them the salary promised or forced them to work in abusive conditions.  While there were no specific impediments to the victims' access to such legal redress, they usually were not allowed to obtain employment while the court considered their cases.  Thus, for economic reasons victims usually did not pursue this type of action.  Victims who were material witnesses in court cases against former employers were also required to remain in the country until the case was concluded.  Most victims were unwilling or unable to wait for justice, and returned home without their cases coming to trial.  There were no government restitution programs for victims during the reporting period. H.  (SBU) The GOM referred over 200 victims to shelters, operated by NGOs and embassies, during the reporting period. Pending opening of the shelters established by the new anti-TIP law, the GOM did not provide shelter or housing benefits.  In some cases, child victims were referred to their embassies for repatriation.  One of the two government-funded trafficking victims' shelters was designated for children and has a capacity for 45 individuals.  Immigration authorities did not use a formal system to screen detained foreign prostitutes for identification as trafficking victims.  Instead, immigration officials processed them for the quickest possible deportation.  In some cases, especially those involving deportation over land borders such as along the Malaysian-Indonesian border on Borneo, this made trafficking victims vulnerable to traffickers operating near the border. I.  (SBU) Protection officers from the Women's Ministry received specialized training for assisting trafficking victims (reftel D).  The RMP also initiated training on trafficking victim identification.  Information was not available regarding specialized training for assisting child victims.  GOM did not provide training to its embassies and consulates located in destination and transit countries. J.  (SBU) Repatriated Malaysian victims who did not have the support of family or friends were referred to the Women's Ministry for public assistance.  The welfare wing of a political party, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), also offered services to repatriated victims. K.  (SBU) Tenaganita offered comprehensive services to TIP victims.  Tenaganita worked with the RMP, various international organizations, including the International Organization for Migration and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, as well as with other foreign NGOs to combat labor and sex trafficking throughout Malaysia. Previously, Tenaganita received funding from G/PRM to operate their shelter for TIP victims.  Tenaganita's shelter can house up to 25 women.  Most victims remained at the shelter for an average of three months.  Tenaganita provided counseling, medical assistance and language training to foreign and domestic victims of trafficking.  The NGO Women's Aid Organization (WAO) used its domestic violence shelter to house eight trafficking victims during the reporting period. WAO provided counseling services and assisted the RMP interview victims.  The Malaysian Bar Council and the International Federation of Women Lawyers (IFWL) continued to provide pro bono legal assistance to victims of trafficking. 6.  PREVENTION (PARA 30) A.  (SBU) The GOM acknowledged that trafficking is a problem and senior Malaysian leaders spoke publicly about the need for action.  When the Anti-TIP law was first tabled in parliament, Minister in the Prime Minister's Office Nazri Aziz said, "This law will address concerns raised about human trafficking and arm enforcement agencies with the tools to fight it."  Commenting on the drafting of the new comprehensive anti-TIP law, Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi said, "We do whatever we can to curb human trafficking and that is why we decided to have that bill."  He added that the severity of the penalties and punishment for human traffickers in the law reflected the government's will to see the crime stopped.  Secretary General for the Ministry of Home Affairs Aseh Che Mat publicly stated that the issues of abused and unpaid maids needed to be addressed and properly handled.  SUHAKAM Commissioner N. Siva stated, "We need co-operation from non-governmental organizations, government agencies and other instruments in neighboring countries to curb this organized trans-national crime."  On January 11, 2008, Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi and Indonesian President Yudhoyono issued a joint statement that reiterated their countries' stance that TIP was a crime against humanity and restated the commitment of both leaders' to work together to combat trafficking. B.  (SBU)  The GOM did not sponsor anti-trafficking information or education campaigns during the reporting period. C.  (SBU)  Government agencies worked closely with NGOs, civil society organizations, and international organizations on TIP during the reporting cycle.  The GOM collaborated with SUHAKAM during the drafting of the national action plan. SUHAKAM was the lead agency during the drafting of the plan, which was presented to the Ministry of Internal Security in December 2007 for adoption and implementation (reftel D). Police worked with Tenaganita and the Catholic Church to shelter and assist repatriating rescued trafficking victims to their countries of origin.  Police cooperation with the Catholic Church provided an international network capable of linking rescued victims with NGOs and civil society organizations in their countries of origin.  Tenaganita worked with police in assisting over 100 rescued TIP victims during the reporting period. D.(SBU) As part of the new comprehensive anti-TIP law, the National Council, law enforcement agencies, and, the Women's Ministry established working groups to develop and implement new TIP monitoring procedures.  The Department of Immigration began to deploy a new biometric system intended for all border entry points to screen individuals for prior entry into Malaysia.  This system also guarded against entry under assumed identities, which traffickers often used when bringing victims through border crossings.  Additionally, the biometric system guarded against traffickers attempts to re-traffic a previous trafficking victim to Malaysia. E.  (SBU) The National Council for Combating Trafficking is the formal interagency group, formed under the new anti-TIP law.  The Council met three times during the reporting period to address initial implementation of the new law.  The Council established three committees, Law Enforcement, Protection, and Legislative, to develop new operating procedures and deal with specific issues, identified as necessary for the implementation and enforcement of the new anti-TIP law.  The Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) is responsible for investigating alleged public corruption. F.  (SBU)  SUHAKAM drafted the GOM's national action plan. The plan addressed four main components, 1) prevention and awareness, 2) victim protection, care, and support, 3) legislative framework and policy development, and 4) law enforcement.  SUHAKAM consulted with local NGOs during its initial drafting of the action plan.  During the final drafting, SUHAKAM representatives joined a working group led by the Ministry of Internal Security to finalize the draft before the action plan was presented for adoption to the Ministry of Internal Security in December 2007. G.  (SBU) The RMP conducted multiple police investigations and raids during the reporting cycle.  Police targeted raids on venues used as fronts for brothels, such as karaoke bars, hotels, spas, etc. (SBU) In January 2008, Mohamed Ishak, Director General for Enforcement in the Department of Immigration, issued a public warning to potential employers of foreign workers.  He said employers could be charged under the new anti-TIP law for cases involving abuse and exploitation of foreign workers. The Department of Immigration began issuing to foreign students and workers new identification cards to use in lieu of passports to show legal status in Malaysia.  Director General of Immigration Wahid stated the card gave a possible trafficking victim a greater chance to escape abusive employment without the fear of being mistaken for an illegal immigrant (reftel D). I.  (SBU) All Malaysian troops assigned to peacekeeping missions attended specialized training at the Peacekeeping Training Center in Port Dickson, Malaysia.  Training included embedded modules on trafficking in persons.  No charges or allegations of misconduct were filed against Malaysian service members during the reporting period. 7.  NOMINATION OF HEROES & BEST PRACTICES (PARAS 31 & 32) (SBU) Post submits as best practices Sections 16 and 17 of Malaysia's comprehensive Anti-trafficking in Persons Act 2007.  Section 16 states that a trafficker cannot use as a defense that the victim consented to the act of trafficking in persons.  Section 17 states that the past sexual behavior of a trafficking victim is irrelevant and inadmissible for proving the trafficked person was engaged in other sexual behavior or to prove the trafficked person's sexual predisposition.  These two sections of the new law will strengthen law enforcement cases against traffickers and protect a trafficking victim from potential humiliation and re-victimizing on the witness stand.  Dr. Mohamed Mattar, an internationally recognized expert on TIP legislation from Johns Hopkins University, identified these two sections of Malaysia's law and highlighted them during discussions with GOM representatives (reftel D).  Post provided the full text of Malaysia's comprehensive anti-trafficking law to G/TIP and EAP. KEITH (March 2008)

WIKILEAKS: PRESS STIFLED IN ALTANTUYA MURDER TRIAL OVER MENTION OF PRIME MINISTER Posted: 20 Oct 2011 01:00 AM PDT The short-lived exception was the English language newspaper The Sun, which included the quotations from Razak in its early morning February 21 edition. Sources at newspaper confirmed to us in confidence that the Ministry of Internal Security compelled The Sun to withdraw and recall thousands of copies of their first run paper in which the original quote was included. Prime Minister Abdullah serves concurrently as Minister of Internal Security. THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b and d). 1.  (C) In the latest turn of the ongoing Altantuya murder trial (reftels), accused political insider Abdul Razak Baginda, who has remained calm and composed through most of the proceedings, unleashed an emotional tirade shortly after the February 20 noon recess on the trial's 90th day. Referring to the Prime Minister by his nick-name "Pak Lah", Razak reportedly exclaimed:  "You can die, Pak Lah! (in Malaysian - "Matilah kau, Pak Lah!") I'm innocent!", according to unpublished journalist accounts.  Local newspapers and the government news service Bernama reported the fact of the outburst, but did not print Razak's statements.  The short-lived exception was the English language newspaper The Sun, which included the quotations from Razak in its early morning February 21 edition.  Sources at newspaper confirmed to us in confidence that the Ministry of Internal Security compelled The Sun to withdraw and recall thousands of copies of their first run paper in which the original quote was included.  Prime Minister Abdullah serves concurrently as Minister of Internal Security. 2.  (C) Razak Baginda, who is on trial for abetting two police officers in murdering Mongolian Altantuya Shaariibuu, had appeared uneasy throughout the morning session of court on February 20.  Razak's father, Abdullah Malim Baginda had whispered something to him shortly before the trial had begun for the morning and apparently upset the accused.  Razak had remained quiet throughout the morning hearings, but just after the noon recess was called and as he was leaving the courtroom he kicked and banged the door and yelled "You can die, Pak Lah! Die, Pak Lah!  I am innocent.  I am innocent." He was later seen crying before his lawyer while his mother attempted to comfort him. 3.  (C) Comment:  Speculation is rife in Malaysia's on-line community concerning what it was that set off Razak Baginda outburst, including conspiracy theories alleging the Prime Minister's office had urged Razak to implicate Deputy Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak (see also ref B) in return for sparing Razak a guilty verdict and its mandatory death sentence.  Regardless, the Internal Security Ministry would want to limit any possibly inflammatory reference to the Prime Minister at the trial, and particularly at this juncture due to the proximity of Malaysia's general election to be held on March 8.  Any connection between the Prime Minister and the murder trial would be scandalous.  The GOM reportedly has worked hard to "drive (the case) from public view" (ref B) and is not about to allow the case to influence the coming elections. KEITH (February 2008)

WIKILEAKS: BLUE LANTERN PRE-LICENSE END USE CHECK ON APPLICATION 05-050085478 (U) Posted: 19 Oct 2011 01:00 AM PDT Reason for request: the Foreign Intermediate Consignee, Kontena Nasional Global SDN BHD, is identified on the license application as the "Malaysian government's appointed freight forwarder." Kontena Nasional is, however, also the freight forwarder frequently utilized by a Malaysian-based front company to divert U.S.-origin electronics and aircraft spare parts to Iran. THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin Classified By: MULTIPLE SOURCES 1.  (U)  This is an action message.  See paragraphs 2-4. 2.  (U)  The Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance (PM/DTCC) requests post assistance in conducting a pre-license check for the export of plastic bonded explosives to Malaysia.  Post is requested to complete this Blue Lantern check within 30 days.  Lack of response to a Blue Lantern check will affect pending and future licenses involving parties to this license. 3.  (S//NF)  Reason for request: the Foreign Intermediate Consignee, Kontena Nasional Global SDN BHD, is identified on the license application as the "Malaysian government's appointed freight forwarder."  Kontena Nasional is, however, also the freight forwarder frequently utilized by a Malaysian-based front company to divert U.S.-origin electronics and aircraft spare parts to Iran, e.g., see Ref. A-F as recent examples.  PM/DTCC would therefore like to conduct a Blue Lantern check to confirm this order for explosives with the Foreign End User. 4.  (U)  ACTION: Please contact the Foreign End User, Royal Malaysia Police, and verify its request for the exact quantity and specific type of commodity listed below.  Please also confirm intended use.  END ACTION. 5.  (U)  License Information: DDTC Case Number 05-050085478 COMMODITY: Advanced Cutting Explosive (ACE) ASSY, KYX 1800-5400 GR/FT, P/N D10515-2400-1, Military Stock Number 1375-01-328-8048, MK 145/MM53 QUANTITY: 500 meters LICENSE VALUE: USD 90,385.00 APPLICANT: Ensign-Bickford Aerospace & Defense Company 640 Hopmeadow Street Simsbury, Connecticut 06070 USA   SOURCE: Ensign-Bickford Aerospace & Defense Company Highway 175 Graham, Kentucky 42344 USA   FOREIGN INTERMEDIATE CONSIGNEE: Kontena Nasional Global SDN BHD 12th Floor West Wing, Wisma Consplant 2 Selangor Darul Ehsan MALAYSIA   FOREIGN CONSIGNEE: Interarms SDN BHD 73M, Medan Setia 1, Plaza Damansara Bukit Damansara 50490 Kuala Lumpur MALAYSIA   FOREIGN END USER: Royal Malaysia Police Bukit Aman 50560 Kuala Lumpur MALAYSIA   STATEMENT OF PURPOSE: For use by the Bomb Disposal Unit of the Royal Malaysian Police for training and operational purposes. 6.  (U)  Additional documentation submitted in support of license application: A)  Interarms SDN BHD Purchase Order Number KKDN/POL/PT/43/2007, dated 13 August 2007. B)  U.S. Department of State DDTC DSP-83 Non-Transfer and Use Certificate, signed by Omar Bansir (no date), Manager Interarms; signed by Adnan B. Abd. Latif (13 Aug 2007), Logistic Department, Royal Malaysia Police; and signed by Marhizah Bt Abdul Razak (17 Ogos 2007), Malaysia Ministry of Internal Security. C)  Malaysia Ministry of Internal Security End User Certificate, cites Contract No. KKDN/POL/PT/43/2007 and Reference KKDN/PL(S)1118/27(18), and signed by Marhizah Bt Abdul Razak (dated 17 Ogos 2007). 7.  (U)  Please slug reply for PM/DTCC - BLUE LANTERN COORDINATOR and include the words "Blue Lantern" and the DDTC Case Number in the subject line.  POC on this case is Peter Sabatini, PM/DTCC, phone: 202-663-2819; ClassNet email: sabtinipj@state.sgov.gov; OpenNet email: sabatinipj@state.gov.  The 2006 Blue Lantern Guide Book is available on OpenNet at http://fsi.state.gov/fsi/spas/default.asp?ID= 1588 Department thanks Post for its assistance in this matter. RICE (FEBRUARY 2008)

WIKILEAKS: PROSECUTOR DOWNBEAT ON ALTANTUYA MURDER CASE Posted: 18 Oct 2011 01:30 AM PDT In another incident a witness testified that she had seen previous photos of the victim with Deputy Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak, and both the prosecution and the defense leapt to their feet to have the testimony stricken from the record. The same witness also testified that hers and the victim's immigration records showing entry to Malaysia had been mysteriously deleted. THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b and d). 1.  (C) Deputy Public Prosecutor Noorin Badaruddin, a member of the prosecution team in the Altantuya murder case (reftel), told Polchief during an informal conversation January 30 that there was almost no chance of winning guilty verdicts in the on-going trial of defendants Razak Baginda, a close advisor to Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak, and two police officers.  She described the trial as interminably long.  Nearly seven months after the trial began (but with only 83 days of actual hearings), the prosecution now is presenting its 63rd witness out of an anticipated 80 and the defense has yet to make its case. (Note: The prosecution notified 132 potential witnesses that they might be called to testify.  End Note.)  Noorin anticipated the trial would continue for several more months and said that she actively sought excuses to escape from the courtroom monotony. 2.  (C) By all accounts the trial has been a prosecutorial embarrassment from its inception, leading many to speculate that the ineptitude was by design.  On the eve of the trial Malaysia's Attorney General Abdul Gani Patail dropped his lead prosecutors and replaced them with less experienced attorneys.  Similarly, a lead counsel for one of the defendants (Zulkifli Noordin) abruptly resigned before the trial "because of (political) attempts to interfere with a defense he had proposed, in particular to protect an unnamed third party." Then in the first 30 days the prosecution fumbled through a series of key witnesses whom later had to be impeached for proffering testimony contradictory to their pre-trial statements.  In one case, a police officer testified that police interrogators "tortured and coaxed" her to make pre-trial statements which were untrue.  Subsequent witnesses testified that police reports and phone records had been changed and that other evidence had been tainted and should therefore be thrown out.  In another incident a witness testified that she had seen previous photos of the victim with Deputy Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak, and both the prosecution and the defense leapt to their feet to have the testimony stricken from the record.  The same witness also testified that hers and the victim's immigration records showing entry to Malaysia had been mysteriously deleted. Neither the prosecution nor the defense pursued a line of questioning regarding that testimony. 3.  (SBU) The protracted nature case has led at least one regional newspaper to speculate that "the case is being deliberately delayed to drive it from public view." Malaysia's daily newspapers rarely mention the case's latest developments, and it is unprecedented in Malaysian judicial history that a murder trial could drag on for seven months and still not give the defense an opportunity to present its case.  Such an environment has led many to conclude that the case was too politically sensitive to yield a verdict before the anticipated general elections. KEITH (February 2008)

WIKILEAKS: CONTROVERSIAL SQURES OF CHRISTIAN BOOKS Posted: 17 Oct 2011 01:00 AM PDT The Malaysian Council of Churches immediately condemned the confiscation. Council Secretary Reverend Herman Shastri stated on January 17 that the government officials have "no right (to confiscate the Christian books) and have over stepped their bounds." Shastri argued that such actions offended the sensitivities of Christians, and he urged the government to take immediate action to stop enforcement officials from undermining inter-religious harmony.  THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b and d). Summary 1. (C) Ministry of Internal Security officials confiscated some Christian children's books from stores in early January. Officials took the action because the books contained pictures of Moses and Noah, and they judged portraits of these figures, who are also prophets in Islam, would offend Muslims.  On January 21, the Ministry returned all the books following public condemnation by the Malaysian Council of Churches.  In a separate case, the Evangelical Church of Borneo filed a lawsuit after Ministry of Internal Security officials confiscated children's Sunday school books.  The books are in the Malay language and use "Allah" when referring to God in contravention of a GOM decision to reserve the term "Allah" for Muslims. Separately, the Internal Security Ministry recently banned 11 books on Islam. While the GOM took corrective action in one instance, institutional mandates and policies based on the preeminent position of Islam will continue to generate controversy in multi-religious Malaysia.  End Summary. Christian Books Confiscated, Returned 2.  (U) The Ministry of Internal Security's Publications and Al-Koran Texts Control Department confiscated several Christian children's titles containing pictures of Moses and Noah from bookstores in early January.  Ministry officials deemed the pictures were "offensive caricatures of prophets" recognized by Islam.  The Malaysian Council of Churches immediately condemned the confiscation.  Council Secretary Reverend Herman Shastri stated on January 17 that the government officials have "no right (to confiscate the Christian books) and have over stepped their bounds." Shastri argued that such actions offended the sensitivities of Christians, and he urged the government to take immediate action to stop enforcement officials from undermining inter-religious harmony.  On January 21, Deputy Internal Security Minister II Fu Ah Kow announced that the ministry had returned the Christian titles to bookstores.  A representative from one of the largest publications companies confirmed to poloff that government authorities returned all confiscated books. God by any other name 3.  (U) In December 2007, leaders from the Evangelical Church of Borneo, in the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak, filed a lawsuit against Prime Minister Abdullah and the government for banning the importation of Christian publications using "Allah" when referring to God.  This followed the August 2007 seizure at Kuala Lumpur International Airport of a shipment of Christian children's books destined for Sunday school programs in Sabah.  Deputy Internal Security Minister Johari Baharom justified the action by saying only Muslims could use the term "Allah" (to describe God) as "it is a Muslim word."  He added that we cannot let other religions "use it because it will confuse the people."  Minister Abdullah Mohammed Zin, responsible within in the Prime Minister's Department for religious affairs, backed Johari's comments, referring to a 1986 Cabinet decision that reserved the name "Allah" and several other Arabic terms for the exclusive use of Muslims. 4.  (U) In their suit, church officials are seeking a declaration that they have the constitutional right to use the word "Allah" in all their religious publications and practices, and not just within the church.  They claim that the GOM failed to take into account that Malay language-speaking Christians had used "Allah" in printed Malay language materials since 1629.  Church officials also seek a court ruling against any faith having exclusive right to the use of any word.  A magistrate's initial hearing of the case on January 29 failed to set any date for further action before the court. 5.  (U) Separately, the Internal Security Ministry banned 11 books about Islam in a decision finalized on January 17 under the Printing Presses and Publications Act, according to media reports.  Officials found that the books deviated from state-sanctioned interpretation of Islam.  Eight of the books are English languagetexts from U.S. publishers, while three are Malay language texts.  During 2007, the Ministry banned a total of 85 books of various subjects because of religious or sexual content, according to Embassy records. Comment 6.  (C) Government machinery set up to uphold the state-approved interpretation of Islam and protect Muslim sensitivities has again generated controversy in Malaysia's substantial non-Malay/non-Muslim community.  The number of books seized may be limited, but the symbolism and precedent of officials confiscating Christian children's books are nevertheless damaging to inter-faith relations.  The Internal Security Ministry's quick about-face in one highly publicized case suggests that some senior leaders recognize the risks to religious and ethnic harmony.  Institutional mandates and policies based on the preeminent position of Islam remain firmly in place, however, and we can expect further controversies of this sort in multi-religious Malaysia. KEITH  (January 2008)

WIKILEAKS: EMBASSY RAISES RELA ROLE WITH MALAYSIAN IMMIGRATION Posted: 16 Oct 2011 01:00 AM PDT RELA, a volunteer auxiliary security force under the Home Affairs Ministry, has attracted criticism for reported abuses by RELA members primarily when rounding up illegal immigrants. RELA members receive a bounty for each illegal immigrant detained. Largely untrained RELA members have been accused of stealing the belongings of suspected illegal immigrants, extortion, using unnecessary force, and mistakenly detaining foreign tourists and legal residents. Given the lack of recognition for refugees under Malaysian law, RELA also has targeted refugee communities for immigration round ups, drawing concern from the UNHCR among others. THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin 1.  (SBU) Summary:  Members of Malaysia's People's Volunteer Corps (RELA) began taking up guard duties at immigration detention centers beginning January 15, according to press reports.  Government officials describe RELA's assignment as a stop-gap measure while responsibility for the immigration detention centers shifts from the Prison Department to the Immigration Department.  Given RELA's poor reputation, Consular Chief raised questions about RELA's role with a senior Immigration official on January 22.  In response, the official emphasized the temporary nature of RELA's assignment.  Separately, RELA members reportedly raided two unsanctioned Burmese refugee camps over the past five days. We will continue to raise the issue of RELA with the Malaysian government and coordinate with UNHCR on refugee protection.  End Summary. 2.  (U) According to Malaysian press accounts, approximately 1,840 RELA members on January 15 began to take up duties as guards at immigration detention centers across Malaysia, with the exception of Sabah (due to Sabah's separate authority over immigration matters).  Home Affairs Minister Radzi Sheikh Ahmad told reporters that by March RELA would be responsible for 13 detention centers.  The GOM is shifting responsibility for the detention centers from the Prisons Department to the Immigration Department, both under the Home Affairs Ministry.  As RELA gradually assumes its new role, it takes over from guards from the Prisons Department.  Minister Radzi indicated that RELA's role would last approximately one year while the government hired 1,100 new Immigration guards. Government statements in November 2007 suggested RELA's role at detention centers could remain necessary for up to two years. 3.  (SBU) RELA, a volunteer auxiliary security force under the Home Affairs Ministry, has attracted criticism for reported abuses by RELA members primarily when rounding up illegal immigrants.  RELA members receive a bounty for each illegal immigrant detained. Largely untrained RELA members have been accused of stealing the belongings of suspected illegal immigrants, extortion, using unnecessary force, and mistakenly detaining foreign tourists and legal residents. Given the lack of recognition for refugees under Malaysian law, RELA also has targeted refugee communities for immigration round ups, drawing concern from the UNHCR among others. 4.  (SBU) Embassy's Consular Chief called on Immigration Director General Wahid bin Md. Don on January 22 and raised questions concerning RELA's deployment to the detention centers.  Consular chief noted that supervision of immigration detention facilities is a key government responsibility and Malaysia's handling of this function would attract international attention.  Wahid responded that RELA's involvement at the detention centers represented a stop-gap measure until the Immigration Department could recruit and train 1,100 new immigration enforcement officers to staff the centers.  In the interim, Wahid emphasized that RELA members would provide only security and not overall management of the detention centers, and he stressed the temporary nature of RELA's new role.  In addition, the government planned to hire another 3,000 new immigration enforcement officers to detect and detain illegal immigrants, implying that this would take away some pressure to use RELA in such a role. 5.  (SBU) Separately, Embassy received reports and documentary evidence of a RELA raid on January 19 on a refugee camp in the jungle near Putrajaya.  (Note:  The GOM does not recognize or sanction any refugee camps.  End Note.) The camp contained about 75 Chin refugees, and had received prior warnings that it should disband.  RELA reportedly burned the camp, and took or destroyed the refugees' belongings.  The New Strait Times daily also reported the destruction of the camp, but stated that RELA Director-General Zaidon Asmuni denied RELA started the fires. Instead, he pointed fingers at a local municipal council, whose president denied knowledge of the raid.  (Note:  RELA raids on camps sometimes occur following complaints by local residents or landowners.  End Note.)  The news report stated RELA detained 23 persons following the raid.  Embassy also received a report of a RELA pre-dawn raid on January 23 on a second Burmese refugee jungle camp, which contained over 150 ethnic Chin.  RELA reportedly detained 26 refugees, including a four-month old baby.  Post forwarded the information to the UNHCR. 6.  (SBU) Comment:  Post will continue to monitor actions by RELA and seek ways to impress upon the Malaysian government that RELA's treatment of refugees and illegal migrants will be a matter of U.S. and international attention.  Post continues to coordinate closely with UNHCR on matters pertaining to refugee protection and, together with Refcoord Bangkok, facilitate UNHCR and U.S. refugee processing entities' access to refugees in immigration detention. KEITH (January 2008)

WIKILEAKS: MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENT DECIDES PROTON Posted: 15 Oct 2011 01:00 AM PDT Given the political sensitivities surrounding both Proton and its pyramid of local suppliers, most of which are owned by ethnic Malays, only a foreign partner could have demanded the kinds of reforms necessary to make the company competitive. Unfortunately, as long as the government continues to subsidize Proton's losses, neither the national automaker nor its vendors will have the incentive to become globally competitive. In the case of Proton, the GOM's unwillingness to upset its spoils system has once again undercut its efforts to rationalize the economy. THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin 1. (SBU)  Summary:  After nearly two years of back-and-forth negotiations with Volkswagen, the Malaysian government has decided that government-controlled auto maker Proton would no longer pursue a strategic partnership with the German auto manufacturer or any other foreign partner (including General Motors, with which it had also held discussions). Rather than look to a foreign partner to help revive the perennial loss-maker, the government announced that the firm was doing well and should be given a chance to turn around. Its auto sales were expected to more than double in Asia, particularly for its new models. Industry experts claim the government backed off the idea of Proton taking on an international partner because hundreds of local vendors would be unlikely to survive the kinds of reforms a world-class partner would demand. Many of these vendors are owned by ethnic Malays who enjoy protected status in multicultural Malaysia.  Taking action to force Proton to reform therefore would be unpalatable to part of the government's key Malay constituency, a particular concern to UMNO now with a national election on the horizon.  End summary. 2. (U) The Malaysian Cabinet has decided that national automaker Proton would no longer pursue a foreign partner. In announcing the decision on November 20, Finance Minister (II) Nor Mohamed Yackop said that recent signs of a financial turnaround by Proton had convinced the government that Proton could prosper without a foreign partner.  These signs included stronger than expected orders for Proton's new Persona model. The announcement came as a surprise to most analysts, given reports that Proton was in the final stages of negotiations with Volkswagen which would have allowed the German automaker an equity (though likely not controlling) stake in Proton. (General Motors reportedly was also still in the running as an alternative to VW).  Malaysian Automotive Association (MAA) President Aishah Ahmad publicly voiced doubts about the durability and depth of Proton's supposed turnaround, noting that a partnership with a foreign manufacturer would have been good for Proton's branding, and that Proton still needs to develop a sustainable, long term strategy to reverse its years-long slide from dominating the Malaysian market. SMOKE AND MIRROR PROFITS 3. (U) Boosted by the sale of land and the wrap-up of some project development costs, Proton posted a million-dollar profit for its second quarter ending September 30, compared to USD 75 million in losses in Q2 last year in a long succession of multi-million dollar losses.  Revenue was up 3% over second quarter figures last year due to a 1.3% increase in auto sales.  Although this growth was modest, Proton Chairman Mohammed Azlan Hashim pointed to it as an indication that Proton's sales would rise from their current levels of 30,000 to 40,000 units per model to between 100,000 and 150,000 units per model by 2011, primarily through greater exports to China, India, ASEAN, and to a lesser extent Iran. HOPES PINNED ON NEW MODELS, ASIAN DEMAND 4. (U) Ministry of International Trade and Industry Minister Rafidah Aziz told the press that Proton had its own strategic plans to capture regional markets, especially in India, China and Southeast Asia.  She said the American and European automotive markets were different and "not for us"; rather, the growth market is in Asia. Proton recently signed partnerships with the Governments of China and Thailand, including a deal to allow for the export of 30,000 Proton cars to China by the end of the year.  At an auto show in Thailand this week, Proton unveiled its new fuel-efficient model, the Savvy, its new sportscar the Neo, and its re-designed Gen.2, all of which Proton expects will help improve its sales in Asia.  As recently as July Rafidah had told the press that the government was interested in selling its 43 percent stake in Proton that it holds through government investment arm Khazanah (the government indirectly controls additional shares of Proton, including 12 percent through the Employee Provident Fund and 8.8 percent through national petroleum corporation Petronas). BUT QUALITY AND COMPETITIVENESS A PROBLEM 5. (U) At a recent panel discussion on Creating Global Champions Mr. Rameli bin Musa, Executive Vice Chairman for Ingress Corporation, a tier one vendor for Proton, said that a lot of vendors depended on Proton.  He described some of the challenges Ingress faced when the company began supplying auto parts for Honda and Toyota, including much tougher quality standards. Another panelist, Mr. Yong Poh Kon, President of the Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers, elaborated on this point, explaining that where Proton capped defective parts at 200 parts per million, Honda demanded no more than six per million, and Toyota ten per million.  This level of quality was one reason Malaysian auto parts suppliers were reluctant to venture beyond Proton for business, he said. 6. (U) Also at the conference, Akifumi Kuchiki, Executive Vice President of Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) pointed out that Thailand quickly was becoming the "Detroit of Asia" and that Malaysia was being left behind. He suggested that Malaysia could focus on exporting automatic compact cars, while firms in Indonesia and Thailand could engage more in exporting pickup trucks and multipurpose vehicles, respectively. He said some of the constraints facing the Malaysian auto industry included an insufficient supply of unskilled labor, a need to upgrade the skills of its skilled labor, and an inadequate supply of quality parts manufacturers. Malaysia also needed to liberalize and deregulate national auto policies if it wanted to attract foreign firms in the support industries. COMMENT: 7. (SBU) Comment:  The Malaysian Cabinet's decision to prohibit Proton from taking a foreign partner surprised most industry watchers, likely including Proton itself, which had appeared on the cusp of signing a deal with VW.  With the government focused on upcoming elections, however, politics trumped economic rationality. Although long a supporter of Proton's efforts to seek a foreign partner, the government decided in the end that it was not yet ready to permit a fundamental shift away from a 20-year tenet of Malaysian industrialization - the promotion of a national car.  Given the political sensitivities surrounding both Proton and its pyramid of local suppliers, most of which are owned by ethnic Malays, only a foreign partner could have demanded the kinds of reforms necessary to make the company competitive.  Unfortunately, as long as the government continues to subsidize Proton's losses, neither the national automaker nor its vendors will have the incentive to become globally competitive.  In the case of Proton, the GOM's unwillingness to upset its spoils system has once again undercut its efforts to rationalize the economy.  KEITH (December 2007)

WIKILEAKS: Malaysia's 2008 Budget: Pork Sold Separately Posted: 14 Oct 2011 01:00 AM PDT The issue the Prime Minister isn't bringing up for this election-year budget is the problem of declining oil revenues. Petronas provides 35 to 40% of the GOM's budget. However, Malaysia is projected to be a net importer of oil within the next several years, based on a continued trajectory of 4% annual increases in domestic demand. This is a major problem because Petronas is obliged by the GOM to provide oil and gas for the domestic market at subsidized prices and it is responsible for covering the price gap between international and domestic prices. THE CORRIDORS OF POWER Raja Petra Kamarudin 1.  Summary:  On September 7, Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi unveiled his 2008 budget proposal. Billed as a "fiscally responsible" budget, it projects a deficit of 3.1%, down from 3.2% in 2007.   Although spending is up, the GOM projects higher GDP growth will generate more than adequate additional revenue flows to compensate for it.  The Prime Minister (PM) also announced that he expects the private sector, including foreign investors, to help fund government-initiated development plans.  While the budget contained some important new tax provisions including a welcomed decrease in corporate tax rates, simplified tax collection on dividends, and enactment of additional tax preferences for the Islamic financial sector, the most important tax reform measure, implementation of the new Goods and Services Tax (GST) proposed in 2004, was missing.  In a panel discussion following the release of the budget, Ministry of Finance officials insisted it was still on the table.  However, absent up-front support from the PM and with elections just around the corner, the GOM is unlikely to submit a GST proposal to Parliament in the coming year.  This leaves the GOM without an answer to how it will reduce its dependence on revenues from the oil sector, even though depleting oil reserves imply this revenue stream will shrink in the near future.  Absent tax broadening measures like the GST, the GOM, which currently gets 38 percent of its revenue from the national oil company, will find it increasingly difficult to maintain its fiscal deficit within manageable bounds over the next decade.  End summary. First, what the budget didn't do: 3.  For an election year budget, many Malaysians were surprised by what it did not do.  A widely anticipated voter-friendly cut in the top individual income tax bracket did not materialize, but neither did any additional "sin" taxes (on tobacco or alcohol) which the GOM tends to increase every year.  Consistent with its billing as a "fiscally responsible" budget, no large new development projects were announced as part of the budget.  However, the Prime Minister already had announced plans to invest heavily in three regions on the peninsula, including the "Iskandar Development Region" bordering Singapore, plus Northern and Eastern Corridor Regional Development Plans. Similar regional development projects are rumored to be in the works for East Malaysia as well.  The Prime Minister announced that he is relying in large part on the private sector to finance these government initiatives. Reducing the deficit?  A closer look at the numbers: 4.  A closer look at the numbers shows that the GOM's formula for lowering the deficit is a result of two underlying assumptions, both of which have been received with some skepticism by local analysts. The first assumption is that real GDP will grow by 6 percent to 6.5% - a projection that analysts find somewhat optimistic. (Currently GDP is growing at approximately 5.7%.)  The second assumption is that the private sector - particularly foreign investors - will provide the lion's share of the funding needed for the three regional development plans laid out by the Prime Minister. Spending up 2.5% from last year 5.  Total budget expenditures (operating and development) for 2008 are RM 168.8 billion ($ 48.2 billion) in 2008, up 2.5% from RM 164.7 billion ($ 47 .1 billion) in 2007. Operating expenses up: 6.  Operating costs will grow 4% to RM 128.8 billion ($ 36.8 billion) in 2008.  Salaries comprise 28.1% ($ 10.3 billion) of operating expenditures and fixed charges and grants 49.6% ($ 18.3 billion). $ 11.4 billion for development: 7.  Gross development expenditure is budgeted at RM 40.0 billion ($ 11.4 billion), 2.1% lower than the revised allocation of RM 40.9 billion ($ 11.7 billion) in 2007 as the government intends to count on the private sector to drive economic growth. This 8% reduction came as a surprise to many analysts, some of whom had projected an allocation of RM 48 to 50 billion ($ 13.7 to 14.3 billion) for 2008. However, the Ministry of Finance also may tap into its supplementary allocation of US$ 2.35 billion when the government does a mid-term review of the Ninth Malaysian Plan in mid-2008. 8.  The biggest slice of the $ 11.4 billion development budget will go to education and training with $ 2.1 billion (18.4%), transport $ 1.9 billion (16.9%) and security $1.4 billion (15.2%).  Trade & Industry and agriculture will receive $ 1.1 billion (9.7%) and $ 1.05 billion (9.4%) respectively. Plans to cut subsidies? 9.  Subsidies will constitute 7.9% ($ 2.9 billion) of operating expenditures, declining 15.8% from 9.8% ($ 3.5 billion) of operating expenditure in 2007, indicating the government will possibly reduce fuel subsidies (perhaps on gas) in 2008.  Fuel subsidies are about three quarters of the total subsidy payment.  So far, the government has kept its promise not to raise domestic fuel prices this year as crude oil prices continue to rise. High oil prices to keep a lid on deficit, for now: 10.  Despite the increase in public spending, the government announced that it expected the fiscal deficit to remain under control at RM 20.9 billion ($ 6.0 billion) or 3.1% of GDP in 2008, down from an estimated RM 19.9 billion ($ 5.7 billion) or 3.2% of GDP in 2007.  The government projected revenue to increase 3.7% to RM 147.1 billion ($ 42 billion) in 2008 from RM 141.8 billion ($ 40.5 billion) in 2007, based on an assumption that oil prices will average $ 74 per barrel in 2007 and $ 75 per barrel in 2008. Oil-related revenues are expected to contribute $ 15.9 billion or 38% of total revenue in 2008, up marginally from $ 15.3 billion or 37.9% of total revenue in 2007. (Comment: As the petroleum income tax collection is based on preceding year's income, the government can be confident of its oil revenue in 2008.  National oil company Petronas' dividend payment to the government will accelerate to $ 6.9 billion in 2007 from $ 5.1 billion in 2006.) New tax provisions: 11.  Following are the most significant changes to the tax code proposed in the 2008 budget: --  Corporate tax, reduced from 28% in 2006 to 27% in 2007, will be reduced further to 26% in 2008 and 25% in 2009. This compares favorably to most countries in the region, with the exception of Singapore (18%) and Hong Kong (17.5%).  Vietnam, China, Thailand, India, Indonesia and the Philippines all have higher corporate tax rates, ranging from 28% to 35%.  (Taiwan's corporate tax rate is also 25%, but there is an additional 20% withholding tax on dividends.) --  Tax on dividends will no longer be adjusted to meet the recipient's tax rate.  Currently, taxpayers in brackets above the corporate rate are required to pay the difference; taxpayers in brackets below the corporate rate are eligible for a refund. (Dividend payments are not subject to double taxation in Malaysia.) Companies may opt for a six-year phase-in of this new provision. -- Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) will be exempt from filing monthly tax estimates and paying monthly installments for the first two years of operations.  Tax for the full two years will be liable upon filing at the end of the two years.  A SME is defined as a company with ordinary paid-up share capital of less than RM 2.5 million (US$ 727,000). --  Information & Communication Technology (ICT) companies will be required to locate within specified geographic areas to retain current tax incentives.  ICT companies will qualify for an exemption of import duties and sales tax for broadband equipment not produced in Malaysia. --  Income derived from trading of Certified Emission Reduction (CER) certificates will be tax exempt. --  Tax relief will be provided for post-graduate studies, sports and exercise equipment, children's educational accounts, computers, broadband subscription fees, and some retirement benefits. -- Expatriate income tax will be calculated according to the number of days physically present in Malaysia. --  A 7% cap on deductions for approved charitable contributions will be extended to individual taxpayers as well as companies. (Currently only companies are subject to the cap.) --  Companies located in the Labuan Offshore Financial Center can make an irrevocable election to be taxed at the regular Malaysian rate, allowing them to benefit from bilateral tax treaties that otherwise would exclude them. --  Taxpayers will be permitted to make mortgage payments out of their retirement savings accounts. --  A number of new incentives will be enacted for companies engaged in Islamic finance, including Islamic insurance (reftel). Comment: 12.  The issue the Prime Minister isn't bringing up for this election-year budget is the problem of declining oil revenues. Petronas provides 35 to 40% of the GOM's budget.  However, Malaysia is projected to be a net importer of oil within the next several years, based on a continued trajectory of 4% annual increases in domestic demand.  This is a major problem because Petronas is obliged by the GOM to provide oil and gas for the domestic market at subsidized prices and it is responsible for covering the price gap between international and domestic prices. This of course eats away at its profits and its taxable income which is so essential to government revenue flows.  While Petronas increasingly expands its operations overseas, it is unlikely to be able to do so rapidly enough to compensate for lost revenue when oil imports exceed exports.  The problem of preventing a ballooning fiscal deficit when that happens is the elephant that everyone pretends not to see. KEITH (September 2007)

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