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| Re-examining the 1948 revolt of the MCP in Malaya Posted: 07 Sep 2011 03:39 PM PDT
C.C. Chin, CPI Yesterday's introduction to this article by CPI and Richard Mason of UKM's Institute of Occidental Studies can be read here. This paper brings forward the idea of Malayan Communist Party's (MCP) plan for the revolt by examining various MCP documents at that time and oral history records of several important senior MCP cadres in order to determine its rationale. The MCP original document, especially those resolutions passed during the Central Committee Meetings suggest that the MCP did have a plan for revolt. An analytical approach of the MCP documents will help to determine whether the action taken by the MCP was simply an inevitable action against British repression rather than an act that took place because of external forces. Within the MCP, there were also arguments and debates regarding the revolt. Was the revolt necessary and were constitutional means completely exhausted? Could lack of alertness and adventurism be blamed for the ill-prepared revolt? The paper also examines if the Cold War setting in Asia was intentional on the part of the British. By examining British and Australian archival sources and CIA reports, we can determine to what extent the British in collaboration with the Australians and Americans, acted intentionally to extend the Cold War to Asia and create a confrontational situation in order to contain Southeast Asian communism. In short, were the imperialists responsible for the armed revolts in Southeast Asia? Introduction There are different schools of thought1 as to whether the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) revolt in 1948 was engaged in upon advice from Moscow obtained through the Calcutta Conference in February 1948, whether it was simply the local situation whereby the British engaged in severe repression of the MCP labour movement and other actions that had triggered the revolt, or whether the MCP had been planning for a revolt? This paper, on the basis of various MCP contemporary documents and the oral history accounts of several important senior MCP cadres at that time, suggests that the MCP had their own plans for revolt. The original MCP documents, especially those resolutions passed during the Central Committee meetings of the crucial period, does suggest that the MCP did have a plan for revolt. By analysing the MCP documents, we can see why the MCP took the actions it did. The armed revolt was an inevitable action in response to British repression in accordance with essentially local conditions rather than in response to external forces. However, it is obvious that the Zhdanov doctrine issued at the inauguration of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in late 1947 did influence the MCP. The victorious of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Chinese civil war also encouraged the MCP to a certain extent. There is no doubt, however, that the MCP over-estimated its own strength vis-à-vis the British, on the basis of their experiences during the guerrilla warfare against the Japanese during the Second World War. Within the MCP itself, there were also arguments and debates as to whether revolt was necessary and whether the constitutional avenue had been completely exhausted. There were also accusations that they were ill-prepared for a revolt due to lack of vigilance and errors of "Left adventurism". The argument reflects the MCP critical review of their democratic endeavour during the Peace period. The MCP revolt in Malaya cannot be looked at in isolation as the entire Southeast Asia region was in turmoil at that time. How the regional revolutions affect the MCP especially when the MCP had looked upon its own disbandment of the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) was indeed an act of right deviationist capitulationism. This right capitulationist political line was condemned few months later after the abscondence of Loi Teck. There was also question that whether Chin Peng a radical leader who, after being elected as the Secretary-General in May 1947, forced the MCP to take the route of armed revolt? It is also important to examine British, CIA and Australian report to determine if the Cold War situation in Southeast Asia was created intentionally by the British. By examining the British records and other newly-released archival materials, we can examine whether the British in collaboration with the Australians and Americans, acted intentionally to extend the Cold War to Asia and create a confrontational situation in order to contain Southeast Asian Communism. Were the imperialists responsible for the armed revolts in Southeast Asia? This is a question for others to examine. This paper will rather concentrate on the role of the MCP itself. How did the Emergency start in Malaya?
Why did the MCP begin its armed revolt in June 1948? Who initiated the armed conflict? Was it the British colonial regime or the MCP which fired the first shot? Did the Calcutta International Youth Conference convened in February 1948 allow the transmission of instructions from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) which instigated the communist uprisings in Southeast Asia? Was the Malayan case different from the rest? Was the revolt a product of the MCP's own initiatives in response to the British repression of the MCP, its trade unions and its united front activities? The so-called orthodoxy was that the MCP acted in response to the CPSU instructions issued at the Calcutta conference and for a long period of time this was the official propaganda of the British imperialists and their local agents in Malaya. It was in fact the dominant western Cold War interpretative orthodoxy that the communist parties in Southeast Asia were instigated by a CPSU directive to extend the Cold War to Asia. This was based mainly on the "Two-camp" theory put forward in Zhdanov's famous speech made during the inauguration of Cominform in September 1947. This interpretation was widely accepted, especially by various government administrations. A different school of thought was put forward by some academics suggesting that the Calcutta Conference played an insignificant role in the revolts which occurred in Southeast Asia, and particularly in respect of the MCP uprising in June 1948. This school considered that the local social and political situations were much more significant. There is no doubt that MCP activities were part of the world communist movement coordinated in Asia by the Far East Bureau of the Communist International (Comintern) based in Shanghai. In the early stage, the MCP looked toward the guidance of the CCP and the CPSU, particularly in reference to the style and method of the CCP struggle in China. In examining the MCP documents, it is very clear that the Zhdanov speech did influence the MCP in its doctrine. 2 The characteristics of the MCP were determined by the fact that it evolved from the CCP's Nanyang Branch.3 Thus, the MCP was greatly under the influence of the CCP and followed the CCP tactics in its political struggle. It is most unlikely that the MCP would simply act in accordance with CPSU instructions, as the MCP followed Mao's teaching that each individual party had to observe closely its own situation and decide its own course of action. Confrontational situation and the MCP own initiative In view of the intensified British repression of the MCP, its trade unions and united front activities during the period of peace prior to the 1948 revolt, the MCP feared that the British would eventually ban the party and terminate the constitutional avenues means of the MCP. The radical faction of the Party suggested the resumption of armed struggle.4 Chin Peng was in Hong Kong during June 1947 and in contact with the CCP Southern Bureau. There were discussions as to whether the MCP should engage in armed struggle. The answer later received from Zhou Enlai was that the MCP should make the decision based upon the local conditions.5 The British, on the basis of international intelligence reports and analysis no doubt believed that the Russians were moving the Cold War toward Asia by provoking armed insurgencies in Southeast Asia. Therefore they prepared through large-scale repression. The MCP thereby found no hope in its constitutional endeavours, when appeared doomed by British repression. They instead came to see armed revolt as the inevitable solution.6 Conflict was inevitable by 1948. Any serious provocation such as the Sungei Siput incident,7 could have triggered off the war and both sides were prepared for conflict. As such it is immaterial who fired the first shot, as rivalry and potential military contention was already well entrenched. One key omission of most studies is the lack of MCP documents evidence. This is perhaps due to the inaccessibility of the MCP documents and language barriers. Did the MCP have a plan for armed revolt? Right after the Japanese surrender, in the name of the MCP Central Committee, Loi Teck instructed the MPAJA to surrender their weaponry and hand them over to the British for marginal compensation of USD300 each person. However, almost all of the MCP State Secretaries and the rank and file were unwilling to comply with the order. Loi Teck finally agreed to a compromise of surrendering half of the less-efficient weaponry to seen as preparation for an armed revolt should there be such a necessity. This can be considered as an element of an indefinite MCP plan for an armed revolt against the British. Loi Teck asked the MCP State Secretaries to submit to him the maps of the weaponry dumps but this request was refused by them. In view of the increased suppression by the British imperialists, in early April 1948 the MCP convened a Politburo Meeting in Saleng, Johor. This was a follow up to the MCP Enlarged Central Committee Meeting held in March 1948 when a statement was issued declaring that the people's war was inevitable. 8 The Politburo meeting was intended to discuss in detail the action plan for the revolt. Subsequently, an order requiring the digging up of the weaponry kept secret following the Japanese surrender was issued and the ex-MPAJA rank and file was to be summoned in preparation of the uprising planned for September 1948. The formation of the MPABA9 was then formalised; certain units in Johor and Perak organised Min-Yuan operations and began collecting subscriptions and making food storage arrangements. However, no official order was issued requiring provocation. While the MCP Politburo meeting initiated the action plan for the revolt, the British were also, on the basis of reports received, preparing for a major offensive. But it was to be the local MCP units that took the initiative in provocation. The actions were not those of armed revolt but were simply an act of intimidation against the British planters. Nevertheless, the British took the incidents seriously and capitalised on the opportunity to immediately carry out a major offensive against the MCP, initiating well-planned mass arrests and declaring an Emergency.10 In fact, the British had cultivated the situation and had been expecting an armed revolt. Since late 1947, the success of the AMCJA-Putera Hartal 11 believed to be organised and backed by the MCP, had induced tremendous concern amongst the colonial officers. The British responded with a two-pronged strategy: they stamped over the democracy that they always claimed for but instead ignoring the Malayan people's demand for a rightful independence and denying the proposed People's Constitution, and secondly, against the Malayan People's will installed the Federation Constitution that was negotiated with the feudalistic sultans and their representative party Umno. In order to corner and cut off the MCP from the various fronts of open and constitutional struggle, the British had escalated their repression by means of arrests, banishment and implementing a new Society Ordinance aimed at eliminating and controlling trade unions and other left-wing cultural societies and organisations. These measures were aimed at driving the MCP toward a more radical reaction. In retrospect, the author sees the intensified hostile repression was, in fact, a well-planned tactic by the British to provoke the MCP to resort to armed struggle. Did the MCP have a plan for the revolt? The answer is yes. In response to the growing repression by the British, the MCP had analysed the situation as reflected in its documents during this period. Listed below are the MCP documents issued between December 1947 and February 1948 that relate to the objective and plan of an armed revolt. In some texts, the theme is relatively subdued and carefully worded in such a way that the constitutional struggle might still be seen as the key element. These documents reflected the critical review process taking place within the Party, specifically condemning the Loi Teck political line and reassessing the political situation and the Party's leadership in the overall political movement of the time.
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