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WIKILEAKS: AMBASSADOR'S JANUARY 29 MEETING WITH EDUCATION MINISTER HISHAMMUDDIN

Posted: 30 Aug 2011 01:00 AM PDT

The country's "racial splits are now more pronounced," and Malays still do not feel on par with other races. At times, the Malay youth became overly emotional regarding matters of race and religion, and needed to "release pressure," as they did during the November 2006 UMNO General Assembly (which featured heated racial rhetoric that was broadcast on national television).

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUALA LUMPUR 000209

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2017

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KISL, KPAO, MY

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S JANUARY 29 MEETING WITH EDUCATION MINISTER HISHAMMUDDIN

 

Classified By: Ambassador Christopher J. LaFleur for reasons 1.4 (b and d).

Summary

1.  (C) Education Minister and UMNO Youth chief Hishammuddin responded favorably to the Ambassador's call to expand dialogue between the Embassy and Muslim Malay youth during their January 29 meeting. 

Hishammuddin described the Malaysian political scene as "volatile" due to the increased racial divide and Malay insecurity over their relative economic status and the role of Islam.  Malay youth would continue to vent their emotions publicly, as they did during the 2006 UMNO General Assembly, but those on the receiving end, whether ethnic Chinese or the U.S. Government, should look beyond the rhetoric to the bigger and longer term picture. 

In any event, the Malaysian Government would never allow anti-U.S. sentiment to get out of hand.  Hishammuddin strongly endorsed the U.S. English language assistant program and hoped that this could be expanded nationwide.  End Summary.

2.  (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by polchief, called on Hishammuddin Tun Hussein, Malaysia's Education Minister and head of the UMNO party's youth wing, on January 29 and explored opportunities for expanded dialogue with the influential UMNO Youth. 

The Ambassador explained our interest in conveying the U.S. perspective on issues of common concern, while acknowledging that U.S. and Muslim Malay views will differ on some important topics, like aspects of Middle East policy.  UMNO constituents and the U.S.-Malaysia relationship would benefit from direct information from the U.S. Embassy, rather than relying on sometimes inaccurate media reports. 

Hishammuddin, accompanied by UMNO Youth Secretary General Abdul Rahman

Datuk Hj. Dahlan and his personal Ministry senior staff, welcomed the Ambassador's call for expanded dialogue.  The Embassy and UMNO Youth would need to determine appropriate topics to address given UMNO Youth's sensitivity and "immaturity," avoiding, for example, the Middle East, but perhaps addressing the subject of Islam in some fashion.

3.  (C) Hishammuddin described the Malaysian political scene as "volatile beneath the surface."  The Minister, assuming a friendly and frank manner, went on to explain, "this is a difficult period for the psyche of the Malays, particularly because there is uncertainty about the role of Islam."  In the context of rapid development, the Malays had doubts about the foundation of their own country. 

The country's "racial splits are now more pronounced," and Malays still do not feel on par with other races.  At times, the Malay youth became overly emotional regarding matters of race and religion, and needed to "release pressure," as they did during the November 2006 UMNO General Assembly (which featured heated racial rhetoric that was broadcast on national television).

Naturally, there would be a reaction to such venting.  In the case of the UMNO General Assembly, it was a shame, Hishammuddin added, that the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA, UMNO's partner in the coalition government) had not been strong enough to manage the reaction. 

As a result, Hishammuddin admitted that UMNO still would not allow him to carry out public activities in ethnic Chinese areas.  The Minister confided that, in the wake of the controversial UMNO General Assembly, Prime Minister Abdullah had acknowledged his decision to allow a live, national television broadcast of the event as his worst decision in 2006.

4.  (C)  Hishammuddin argued that MCA and other non-Malay political partners needed to understand the emotional background behind Malay frustration and look beyond the heated words.  The Malay relationship with the U.S. featured "the same dynamic," and from time to time the U.S. would be the object of emotional public criticism. 

"This will never get out of hand, the government will not allow it," Hishammuddin assured the Ambassador, but the U.S. would need to adopt a long-term view similar to that of UMNO's national coalition partners.

5.  (C) On the subject of Islam, Hishammuddin said, "the moderates don't speak out" and described Prime Minister Abdullah's "Islam Hadari" concept as an attempt to provide a useful platform for moderates.  While most Malays were not extreme in their views of Islam, "if you push us, we have no other choice," and the younger generation will begin to look to "tyrants" like Saddam Hussein as role models.

6.  (U) The Ambassador raised the U.S. English Language Assistant program, now in its second year with some 13 American assistants and one English Teaching Fellow deployed in the state of Terrangganu.  The Education Minister applauded this program and said he would like to expand it into a national effort, coordinated through his office. 

The focus should remain on assistance and training of Malaysian English language teachers.  Hishammuddin said he fully supported increased exchanges between Malaysians and Americans at all levels, and he particularly valued the International Visitor Program.

7.  (C) COMMENT:  Hishammuddin, the son of Malaysia's third Prime Minister, Hussein Onn, has the pedigree as well as the personal standing to be a future prime minister. He is now punching important tickets on the way to that goal by holding down the Education and UMNO Youth jobs.

Hishammuddin is reported to be a strong Abdullah supporter and a key political ally of the Prime Minister's son-in-law and Deputy Youth Chief, Khairy Jamaluddin.  If and how Hishamuddin and Khairy will reconcile their prime ministerial ambitions remains to be seen.

We welcome the opportunity to interact more with UMNO Youth, which continues to brandish the banner of Malay nationalism and remains highly critical of the U.S. We intend to follow-up strongly on the English teaching program.  We welcomed the opportunity to meet with Hishammuddin, who, like his other cabinet colleagues, is not always easy to pin down.

LAFLEUR

 

The honeymoon period is the best time

Posted: 29 Aug 2011 07:39 PM PDT

The Malaysian voters are a very generous lot during the honeymoon period (like 1955, 1964, 1974, 1978 and 1982) but will punish the ruling party when there is internal strife (like 1969, 1990 and 1999). So, when Malaya saw independence, when Malaysia was formed, when Malaysia had a new Prime Minister and the Prime Minister was still in his honeymoon period, etc., the ruling party would do well. When the ruling party is facing internal strife or the honeymoon was over, it suffers. 

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

In 1955, during the first municipal elections to be held in Malaya, the Alliance Party won all but one of the 54 seats contested. This was due to the Merdeka euphoria.

In 1957, Malaya gained independence or Merdeka.

In 1959, two years AFTER Merdeka, during the first parliamentary elections to be held in Malaya, the Alliance Party won only 74 of the 104 seats and 52% of the popular votes. The ruling party lost 30 seats whereas two years BEFORE Merdeka it lost only one.

In 1963, Malaysia was formed, and in 1964 the Alliance Party recovered. The ruling party won 89 of the 104 seats contested and almost 59% of the popular votes.

In 1969, the Alliance managed only 95 of the 144 seats. The popular votes also dropped to below 50%. The Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, was forced to resign soon after that.

In 1974, soon after Barisan Nasional was formed, the ruling party won 135 of the 154 seats. The popular votes also increased to almost 61%. But this time it was under a new Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak -- the second Prime Minister of Malaysia.

In 1978, the ruling party won only 130 of the 154 seats contested. The popular votes dropped to almost 57%. This was under the third Prime Minister, Tun Hussein Onn, who had taken over more than a year earlier (he waited too long to hold the election).

In 1982, the ruling party won 132 of the 154 seats and almost 61% of the popular votes. This was also under a new Prime Minister, Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad -- the Fourth Prime Minister of Malaysia, who took over only a few months before the elections.

In 1986, the ruling party's performance declined slightly. It won only 148 of the 177 contested and less than 56% of the votes.

In 1990, the election held after the Umno crisis -- that resulted in the split into Umno Baru and Semangat 46 -- the ruling party's performance declined further to 127 of the 180 seats and about 53% of the popular votes.

In 1995, the ruling party recovered and won 162 of the 192 seats and almost 65% of the popular votes, partly because the opposition was in chaos. Semangat 46 closed down soon after that and most of its leaders/members rejoined Umno.

In 1999 (due to another split in Umno and the formation of Parti Keadilan Nasional) the ruling party's performance declined to 148 of the 193 seats and only 56% of the popular votes.

In 2004, the ruling party recovered and won 198 of the 219 seats and more than 64% of the popular votes. This was under a new Prime Minister, Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, who took over only a few months before the election.

In 2008, the ruling party won only 140 of the 222 seats and only 52% of the popular votes. Tun Abdullah was forced to resign soon after that.

The Malaysian voters are very a generous lot during the honeymoon period (like 1955, 1964, 1974, 1978 and 1982) but will punish the ruling party when there is internal strife (like 1969, 1990 and 1999). So, when Malaya saw independence, when Malaysia was formed, when Malaysia had a new Prime Minister and the Prime Minister was still in his honeymoon period, etc., the ruling party would do well. When the ruling party is facing internal strife or the honeymoon was over, it suffers.

Najib Tun Razak took over in 2009, more than two years ago. He should have called for a general election while he was still enjoying his honeymoon like what Tun Razak Hussein, Tun Hussein Onn, Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad and Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi did.

Now, the honeymoon is over. People do not love Najib as much as they did when he first took over as Prime Minister back in 2009. And, as the statistics above have shown, once the honeymoon is over, you no longer get the peoples' support.

Najib would have done better if he had called for the 13th General Election back in 2010. If he waits till 2012 or 2013, he is going to suffer (by then he would have been PM for three or four years respectively). And the longer he waits the worse it will be for him.

For the opposition, it is better that the general election is called later rather than sooner. In fact, if the election is held now, it will be a 50:50 situation. Both the opposition and the ruling party will face an uphill task.

Back in 2010, the opposition would not have performed so well. The ruling party would have been able to regain some ground it lost in 2008. In 2012 or 2013, the opposition will be able to perform better.

So, time is on the side of the opposition and the longer the time, the better. Time is not in Najib's favour and the longer the time, the worse it is for him.

That is what the statistics show and statistics do not lie.

 ** Sabah and Sarawak not part of the Federation yet

 

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