Isnin, 22 Ogos 2011

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Resisting Any Witch Hunt Aimed at Blaming the Illegals

Posted: 21 Aug 2011 06:32 PM PDT

The 10th Malaysian Plan document has a chart showing that the number of foreign workers in the country exceeded over 2 million in 2008. This figure has most likely increased rather than decreased. The current hi-tech, hi-cost biometric exercise seems to have registered only half of all workers with permits and probably fewer than half of those without.

Commentary by Dr. Lim Teck Ghee

The statement by the Home Minister Datuk Seri Hishammuddin Hussein that the presence of more illegal workers compared to the legal ones is a cause of concern and could undermine national unity reveals either an ignoramus or an idiot. Did he expect many less illegals given the super-efficiency of his Ministry and the other government agencies sharing responsibility on this vital matter of securing our borders against unauthorized intrusion and stay in the country?

According to the current ongoing exercise, as of Friday, a total of 2,088,358 foreign workers had been registered, of whom 1,135,499 were illegals. Probably everyone else in the country knows that this number is an under-estimate and that a very large number are still waiting processing or are avoiding being included in the count altogether. 

Since his appointment in 2009 as the Minister in charge of this portfolio, Hishammuddin has been lurching from one self inflicted debacle to another. From bending over backwards to defend the indefensible conduct of demonstrators in the infamous cow head incident to his most recent use of repressive force against the Bersih rally, he has shown a standard of leadership of this important Ministry which must be plumbing new lows or matching those lows attained by Dr. Mahathir.  

Perhaps he has not had time to study and understand the situation with illegals in Malaysia, given the so many other important distractions posed by alleged anti-national and possibly terrorist groupings such as those Parti Rakyat members members recently taken in under the Emergency Ordinance  for sporting Che Guevara and other communist attire; or the Bersih supporters who needed tear-gassing and perhaps even a big clout on their thick skulls for upsetting the traffic flow on a weekend; or the MoSC supporters who want to tear down the lily white and incorruptible reputation of one of the country most trusted and respected leaders through their Kuching walk rally aborted on "friendly police advice" – by  the way, is Hishammuddin related in any way to Taib?

If he has still not been briefed by his Ministry officials on the foreign labour issue, this quick summary of facts, figures and other considerations may be useful.

·      The 10th Malaysian Plan document has a chart showing that the number of foreign workers in the country exceeded over 2 million in 2008. This figure has most likely increased rather than decreased. The current hi-tech, hi-cost biometric exercise seems to have registered only half of all workers with permits and probably fewer than half of those without.

·      The presence of so many foreign workers is due to not only to economic factors but also socio-political ones which everyone in the country, except the non-Malay Barisan parties seem to be aware of.

·      Thanks to 'enlightened' Barisan policies, Malaysian economy and society is presently hopelessly and irredeemably addicted to foreign workers. 

·      The great majority of foreign workers work a lot harder for a lot less than their Malaysian counterparts.  They deserve to be treated with fairness and respect, and there should be no witch-hunt to blame them for self inflicted socio-economic and political ills.   

·      The profits in the foreign labour market have generated pervasive corruption amongst all levels of the police force, the Immigration Department, RELA, agents and other agencies – public and private.

·       The extortion of payments, services and loyalty from this marginalized segment and attempts to use them as a pawn in the demographic and racial power game will continue whatever the changes in policy and new stances adopted for public consumption.

In the view of some though who have observed the Home Minister closely, this graduate from the University of Wales and London School of Economics is not an ignoramus or idiot.  He is a political animal aiming for the top position through scrupulous or unscrupulous means.  According to the latest hot news in the internet, there is more at stake behind the Home Minister's new found enthusiasm for pursuing the registration of foreign workers such as the disclosure that the new biometrics is the cash cow for the coming UMNO elections. Much of this hot news cannot be verified but readers can visit the website http://biometricscandal.wordpress.com/ for details.

 

Malaysia – a simple institutional analysis

Posted: 21 Aug 2011 02:21 PM PDT

http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/401372pijak_kepala_lembu.jpg

Malaysia is classified as a non – democratic state by all international index measuring quality of democracies. This is also affirmed in academic circles.

By New Mandala  (Greg Lopez)

The works of Angus Maddison on world economic history identifies that economic growth only took off after the British Industrial Revolution. Maddison notes that from the year 1000 – 1820, advance in per capita income was a slow crawl with per capita income rising by about 50 per cent but population increased fourfold. Since 1820 however, per capita income exceeded population growth with per capita income rising by more than eightfold and population more than fivefold. Maddison also notes that these growth rates were concentrated in Western Europe.

Michael Spence, in a lecture based on his latest book, "The Next Convergence: The Future of Economic Growth in a Multi-Speed World" quotes the works of Maddison and points out that the higher growth rates since the British Industrial Revolution benefited approximately only 15 per cent of world population, namely the elites in Western Europe and its European offshoots. However, since World War II (WWII), far more people in far more geographical regions have benefited from this open international economic order created after WWII.

Why is this so?

Elhanan Helpman captures the above the phenomenon brilliantly with this quote in his book "The Mystery of Economic Growth."

"…What makes some countries rich and others poor? Economists have asked this question since the days of Adam Smith. Yet after more than two hundred years the mystery of economic growth has not been solved…"

The growth mystery has yet to be solved but economists have after two hundred years, isolated what are the determinants of long term sustainable economic growth. Economists divide these determinants into two categories: deep and proximate determinants. In general the deep determinants are institutions, geography and trade while the proximate determinants are capital in all its forms (resources, finance, knowledge, ideas, and technology). The combination of the deep determinants when done correctly facilitates the proximate determinants which lead to productivity rising faster than wages. This leads to welfare gains to all stakeholders in the economy. However, more often than not, countries get this wrong, hence the disparity in economic performance.

The role of institutions in explaining the difference in economic performance was not always explicit. It was Douglass North who first forcefully and successfully advocated the primacy of institutions in explaining the difference in cross – country performance. In summary, the ability to combine the various determinants of growth and the factors of production optimally relies on the proper institutional set-up. Institutions function as the meta-structure within which other determinants are able to function properly. Challenges and opportunities related to trade, geography, human capital accumulation (entrepreneurship, ideas, knowledge and innovation) and investment in factors of production — physical and technological — can be mitigated, overcome, synergised and optimised through the correct institutional structures and arrangements.

In post WWII, East Asian economies, including Malaysia, appears to have got this right, notwithstanding the dissenting views.  In 1993, the World Bank in its publication, "The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy", identified eight miracle East Asian economies – including Malaysia – that had real GDP growth of around or above four per cent from 1960 to 1990, which was far better than the rates achieved since the Industrial Revolution. More importantly, these economic growth benefited the poorest in society.

Malaysia was also one of thirteen countries identified by the Growth Report to have recorded average growth rates of more than 7 per cent per year for twenty five years or more. Malaysia achieved this spectacular performance from 1967 to 1997.

Since the East Asian Financial Crisis (EAFC) of 1997/1998, Malaysia's economic performances when compared to previous decades are lacklustre and most macroeconomic indicators are trending downwards (declining rates of growth). This was confirmed by Prime Minister Najib Razak himself in the publication of the New Economic Model – Part 1 (NEM – 1). This was a very brave move but a necessary one by the Prime Minister as he acknowledged publicly the failures of Malaysia's current economic model in order to demonstrate urgency for reforms.

There are other studies that have come to the same conclusion. Among the more prominent ones are "Tiger Economies Under Threat" by Yusuf and Nabeshima (2009) and "Malaysia's Development Challenges – From Middle Income to Advance Economy" by Hill, Mat Zin and Tham (2011). The World Bank through its Malaysia Economic Monitor has also produced a series of reports identifying the same key problems that are effecting Malaysia's growth.

The NEM – 1 identifies domestic factors such as weak investor confidence, capability constraints (weak human capital, entrepreneurial base and innovative capacity) , productivity ceilings and institutional degradation and external factors such as a sluggish global economy caused by the global financial crisis (GFC) and the rise of neighbours in the region in contributing to the declining growth trajectory.

Now IF we revisit the determinants of growth and agree with the view that proper institutions are the meta-structure that determines long term sustainable growth, then the logical response is to reform Malaysia's institutional set-up as it must be the deepest determinant of what is hindering economic growth.

This view is further strengthened as the other deep determinants, geography and trade, are favourable in the case of Malaysia. Malaysia has abundant natural resources, is shielded from natural hazards and is located strategically both geopolitically and economically. Malaysia has also benefitted tremendously from being an open economy especially in the merchandise sector.

The NEM – 1 also reports that regional challenges (e.g. China, India and Vietnam) are a cause for Malaysia's declining economic performance. What has changed about these countries? They have all undertaken institutional reforms: China since 1978, India since 1992 and Vietnam since 1986 and are reaping the benefits while Malaysia has stagnated since the 1990s and is suffering from it.

The above points stress the importance of institutional reforms in Malaysia, something that Mr. Najib Razak has ironically neglected in his signature policies – 1Malaysia, Government Transformation Programme and Economic Transformation Programme.

What are institutions and how do we go about analysing them?

There is no consensus of what is meant by institutions or institutional analysis. I use the most widely quoted definition on institutions. North defines institutions and its impact on economic performance as:

"…Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms of behaviour, conventions, and self imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics. Together they define the incentive structure of societies and specifically economies. Institutions and the technology employed determine the transaction and transformation costs that add up to the costs of production…"

Geoffrey Hodgson simplifies this to:

"…systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions. Language, money, law, systems of weight and measures, table manners, and firms (and other organisations) are thus all institutions…"

The key terminology here are norms and incentives. I add ideology to these key terminologies. Incentives (and disincentives) I define to include psychological and material benefits and penalties. Therefore, institutions provide the incentives that structure human behaviour in a society.

Thus far, we've established that institutions play an important role in driving growth. We've also established what constitutes institutions broadly. Analysing institutions and the role it plays in economic growth is a challenge when there is no consensus on what are institutions and its definition is very broad. However, Hollingsworth provides an approach which is meaningful for our purpose. Hollingsworth suggests that institutions are best compartmentalised by the strength of their resistance to change and by extension, the ability to exert influence. Once compartmentalised, they can each be analysed.

Hollingsworth notes that:

The five components (levels) in the schema are arranged in descending order of permanence and stability with Level 1 being the most enduring and persistent compared to all other components. Each component is interrelated with every other component, and changes in one are highly likely to have some effect in bringing about change in each of the other components.

Level 1: Institutions – norms; rules; conventions; habits and values

Level 2: Institutional arrangements – markets; states; corporate hierarchies; networks; associations; communities

Level 3: Institutional sectors – financial system; systems of education; business system; system of research

Level 4: Organisations

Level 5: Outputs and performance – statues; administrative decisions; the nature, quantity and quality of industrial products.

According to the Growth Commission:

"…fast sustained growth is not a miracle; it is attainable for developing countries with the "right mix of ingredients." Countries need leaders who are committed to achieving growth and who can take advantage of opportunities from the global economy. They also need to know about the levels of incentives and public investments that are necessary for private investment to take off and ensure the long-term diversification of the economy and its integration in the global economy…"

Michael Spence, the Chair of the Growth Commission, reflected and elaborated further on his extensive experience working with developing countries on growth issues in his latest book by affirming the findings of the Growth Report and further identifying two important characteristics for developing countries to ensure long term sustainable growth – the role of political leadership and democratic norms. He suggests four characteristics for governments that are necessary requirements to underpin long term growth:

1. The government takes economic performance and growth seriously.

2. The governing group has values that cause it to try to act in the interest of the vast majority of the people (as opposed to themselves or some subgroup, however defined)

3. The government is competent and effective and selects a viable sustained-growth strategy that includes openness to the global economy, high levels of investment, and a strong future orientation.

4. Economic freedom is present and is supported by the legal system and regulatory policy

Manifestations of Malay/Muslim Supremacy 

Malaysia is classified as a non – democratic state by all international index measuring quality of democracies. This is also affirmed in academic circles. During the boom years, Malaysians accepted this trade-off – restricted  freedom for economic growth. Since 1997/98, this has changed as expected. The government has not delivered on growth, therefore the natural demand for reforms and by extension freedom.

There is consensus that Malaysia needs extensive economic, political and social reforms. This is all the more evident IF we agree that institutions are key to long term growth. Also, IF we agree with Spence, these reforms must come from a government with the four characteristics identified above.

Astute observers of Malaysia know the reasons why the present administration and the ones before were unable to make fundamental reforms in Malaysia. This has much to do with the ideology of Malay/Muslim Supremacy as defined by United Malays National Organisation's (UMNO) and accepted by large swaths of Malaysians, Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

From the literature we can infer that the ideology of Malay/Muslim supremacy has provided the perverse incentives that has manifested itself in many ways. The more critical ones are:

- Institutional degradation: The deterioration in the quality of Malaysia's institutions, particularly during Mahathir's years such as  the lack of independence between the branches of government; the politicisation of the civil service, producing a culture of risk aversion and a lack of creativity; and the expansion of the non-transparent Government Linked Corporations (GLCs);

- Crony capitalism: Affirmative action in the name of Malays have become a smokescreen  for crony capitalism. Affirmative action is the instrument for rampant elite-based (elites from all races, not only Malays) cronyism. High levels of income inequality in Malaysia in general but more so within the Malay community proves this.

- Race based affirmative action: Race-based affirmative action in itself is recognised as one of the important reasons for Malaysia's declining economic performance. Malaysia's focus on the ex-post equalisation of outcomes across ethnicities rather than ensuring effective ex-ante equalisation of access to opportunities has had important direct efficiency implications, affecting growth by distorting incentives and thereby the competitive process.

- Excessive centralisation: An interesting institutional feature is the lack of decentralisation in the country which is nominally a Federation and the top-down approach in public policymaking. This is a key disconnect in the reform rethoric in the ETP and GTP. To strengthen public service delivery, local communities need to be empowered. Fiscal relationships between federal-state-local also demonstrates institutional failure.

- Feedback mechanisms:  Related to Malaysia's top-down approaches is an almost complete disregard of the monitoring and evaluation function. As a result there is little feedback from outcomes into policy design. The obsession with centralising policy making is also evident in lack of information sharing both within government and with the public.

The need to remove UMNO to create a new "people based ideology"

First let me put forward what I think are the two most critical issue affecting Malaysia: competency and competition.

In relation to competition, the quality of the human capital base in Malaysia is suspect. This is due to the quality of education from pre-school through tertiary and on-the-job. It is linked with ethnicity issues and is exacerbated by the outflow of high-skilled individuals and affected by the inflow of low-skilled labor. There are not only problems on the supply side of the market for skills, but also on the demand side, where firms may not be competitive enough to offer higher wages. The market for skills itself is also problematic in that the price mechanism does not work adequately and this is were wage setting issues play a role.

A bigger and more important challenge than competency is internal competition. This is quite distinct from external competitiveness, on which front Malaysia has scored relatively well in the merchandise sector given its stage of development and the nature of its manufacturing processes which is still dominated by competitiveness identified by low cost rather than high value.

Read more at: http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2011/08/22/malaysia-%E2%80%93-a-simple-institutional-analysis/

Greg Lopez is a PhD scholar at the Crawford School of Economics and Government at the Australian National University. 

 

Malaysia in the Era of Globalization #79

Posted: 21 Aug 2011 01:03 PM PDT

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M. Bakri Musa

Defining whether one has actually repaid in full what one has borrowed can be problematic. There is a difference between nominal and real values. Most of the time the difference is small or very subtle, but there are times when it can be very dramatic. When the Koran says you must repay in full, it means to my common sense thinking to repay the real original value.

Chapter 9: Islam in Malay Life

 

 

Reform in Islam

 

 

Islamic Economics
Dealing With the Concept of Interest

 

 

As alluded to earlier, the biggest stumbling block to Islamic economics is the concept of interest. Stripped of its complexities, the issue can be simply reduced thus. When B borrows money ($X) from A, there is a cost involved. Regardless of the terminology, someone has to bear that cost. If at the end of the year B returns to A the same amount of money he borrowed the year earlier, that is $X, he claims to have satisfied the Koranic admonition that he repays his loan at its original amount, nothing more and nothing less. But has B done that?

Consider two facts. First is what economists refer to as the opportunity cost for A; he could use that money for something else that would give him profit or pleasure, instead of lending it to B. Assume the monetary value of that opportunity cost incurred by A to be $Y. The second factor is inflation. Inflation can be simply defined as the diminishing purchasing power of a given nominal sum of money. That is to say, an $X today does not buy quite the same amount of goods and services as a year earlier, or stated in another way, an $X today is not the same ("real") value as the $X of a few years ago. It is only nominally the same. In actuality X is valued less now than in the past because of inflation. If B were to repay A fully a year later, B should also include the amount lost due to inflation. Had inflation rate been 10 percent, then B should return to A $X plus that 10 percent more. If B only repaid the original $X, then he has only nominally paid the whole sum. In actual practical value, B has only partially repaid in the amount of only $(X minus 10 percent).

 

Then there is the opportunity costs incurred by A in lending the money to B; that is the $Y discussed above. Thus to fully repay A, B would not only have to repay the 10 percent inflation rate but also the additional $Y opportunity cost incurred. Thus to really fulfill the Koranic requirement of equivalency, the $X of a year ago is now in reality $X plus Y plus 10 percent for inflation. Note that there is no interest at all involved here; these are all real, tangible costs.

 

My essential point is this: when things are nominally (seen to be) the same, it may not be so in reality. Money was invented in part to put a quantitative value on a transaction so as to make it easier to compare the various costs. If economic transactions were accounted in terms of commodities, for example the number of durians, there will be the added issue of the quality of the fruit, size, and whether it is ripe, unripe or rotten and good only for making tompoyak and not for eating.

 

Ancient Arabs chose precious metals like gold and silver. Those can be standardized by weight and their quality cannot be adulterated.

 

Today money is merely paper or beeps of "on" or "off" signs on the digital highway. It is backed not by precious metals but by the people's faith in the underlying supporting economy. Inflation apart, money may lose its value through formal devaluation or changes in the foreign exchange market. To take an extreme example, a ringgit immediately before September 1, 1998 (the date Malaysia imposed capital control and devalued the ringit) was not the same value immediately afterward; it had lost 40 percent of its value with respect to the dollar. Thus if you borrowed one ringgit the day before the devaluation and then returned that same ringgit the next day, you have not returned the original loan even though nominally you have returned exactly what you borrowed.

 

I can further simplify my argument, this time by not using money but a concrete example. Suppose last year my friend "borrowed" a she-camel from me. A year later he returned the same camel to me. Many would consider such a transaction halal (not sinful) as no riba (interest) was incurred; he returned what he borrowed, nothing more and nothing less. But is that true? Imagine my camel was in heat at the time he borrowed it and was later "serviced" in the pasture by some loose bull. After a year (and a few weeks before he was to return my camel), she delivered a baby. Of course that baby camel would belong to my friend, but two questions would immediately arise. One, is the camel he returned a year later the same one (in monetary value as well with common sense assessment) he borrowed? Obviously not; not only is my camel now "worn out" (depreciated, to use a business term) but also I cannot immediately breed her as she had just delivered a baby. That baby camel may be my friend's gain but it is definitely my "opportunity cost" loss. Had I not lent him the beast I would have a baby camel.

 

Another is a real life example. During the Japanese occupation a neighbor back in my old village borrowed some money for a short term to buy land. The working currency then was the Japanese "banana" notes. A few months later, as promised, he repaid the loan in full. But by this time there were rumors of the Japanese defeat, and although the currency was still accepted officially, in the marketplace it was rapidly becoming worthless. The crux of the issue: Has the man repaid his creditor in full? Nominally and technically he had; in practical and real terms he had not. This is a very dramatic example, much more than the ringgit depreciation case noted earlier.

 

In both examples there was no interest calculation to complicate the issue. Yet even without interest involved, defining whether one has actually repaid in full what one has borrowed can be problematic. There is a difference between nominal and real values. Most of the time the difference is small or very subtle, but there are times when it can be very dramatic. When the Koran says you must repay in full, it means to my common sense thinking to repay the real original value. Modern economists differentiate between real and nominal interest rates. If a bank charges an (nominal) interest rate of 15 percent per year but during that time the inflation rate is 10 percent, then the real interest is only 5 percent (15-10). Had the bank charged a rate of 10 percent, then the real interest rate would have been zero, that is, no interest, technically as well as in reality. Looked at another way, the interest rates charged by banks are not interests at all, rather the anticipated inflation rates.

 

Again this concept can be readily adapted to the tangible items of life. Suppose last year there was a drought and the rice fields were damaged. The price of rice jumped because of the shortage. I borrowed ten pounds of rice from my neighbor. Two years later, the rains came and the harvest was bountiful and the price of rice dropped. At this time I repaid my neighbor with exactly ten pounds of rice. Have I returned exactly what I borrowed? Common sense says no. Two years ago during the drought, ten pounds of rice was worth $20, but with the glut it dropped to $5. To fully repay my neighbor, I should have given him 40 pounds ($20 worth), not 10. And that extra 30 pounds would not be riba.

 

A comparable episode occurred during the prophet's time. One of his companions had borrowed a sac of dates. They were the premium first pick of the season: thick, sweet, and luscious. A few months later he repaid with an equal sac of dates, but this was at the end of the harvest season and the nuts were dried up, less sweet, and plentiful. The lender rightly asked for more. The companion asked the prophet whether the added amount demanded was not riba. The prophet emphatically replied that it was not, and indeed asked the companion to go back to the marketplace to ascertain the price differential between the premium first-pick dates versus the season's leftovers, and make up the difference.

 

Two important points arise here. One is the concept of nominal versus real. The two sacs of dates may be nominally the same, but in reality they are worth quite a bit different. Two, the prophet (pbuh) trusted the marketplace to determine the true value of the two sets of dates. I will return to this second point later in Chapter 11 when I discuss free enterprise as an Islamic tradition.

 

Modern Islamic bankers have learned well from their predecessors in trying to circumvent the prohibition on riba by resorting to service charges, commissions, and other charges. Those ancient Muslims also published their bag of "tricks" in a book they blatantly titled The Book of Escapes and Ruses! It was these novel interpretations of traditional teachings that enabled the Muslim economic empire to expand. At least those ancient Arabs traders were honest enough to admit that they were circumventing the system. And being honest is the first precept in any religion.

 

My central thesis is this: money, deprived of its mystique, is like any other commodity and property. I can rent my house and rightly claim rental income. I could similarly "rent" out my capital (money) to someone and collect rental income (return on investment). This rental on my capital can be collected in a variety of forms: interests as in simple lending; dividends with bond investments; company shares with stock market (equity) investment; or co-ownership as with venture capital investments. The differences are only matters of degree and not in kind, quantitative not qualitative. They reflect gradations in magnitude of the risk/benefit ratio. The simple interest with bank deposits represents the lowest risk and also correspondingly the lowest returns. Venture capital investments represent the biggest potential for profits but also the greatest risks. It is an investment axiom that high rewards come only with high risks.

 

Enthusiasts of Islamic banking go through contorted reasoning in trying to differentiate between riba and other forms of returns on investments that are deemed religiously acceptable—halal. Techniques like cost-plus sales (Murabaha), deferred payment sales (Bay Mu'ajjal), deferred delivery sales (Bay' Salam), and credit sales (Bay Bi-Thaman 'Ajil) all carry hidden costs that, as El-Gamal rightly observes, any high school student could easily calculate their imputed interest rates. All these Islamic bankers have achieved is simply to complicate an ordinary and simple traditional credit transaction in an effort to camouflage the cost of the funds (interest) by calling it some other fancy name. In the process it makes "comparison shopping" difficult for the consumers.

 

The beauty of modern credit sales is that they reduced the costs of the credit to a simplified figure that can be used for easy comparison. Credit, which is a manifestation of lending, is a modern fact of life. If everything had to be done on a cash basis, the economy would be crawling. We use credit to build hospitals, schools, and hosts of other activities that benefit society.

 

Grameen Bank's Muhammad Yunus asserts that credit is a basic human right. Everyone is entitled to it, especially the poor. Grameen Bank has improved immensely the livelihood of many Bangladesh peasants with its micro credit lending programs. In any religion, that would be considered a praiseworthy deed.

 

Credit is a matter of faith, and not repaying a loan would be a breach of faith. And breach of faith is not only a sin, it is also a crime, and rightly so. Today we have some Muslim zealots who rationalize that they can borrow money but need not repay it, claiming that interest is haram, and therefore the loan itself is haram. They suddenly discover religion when it comes time to repay the loan. How convenient!

 

If they feel that way, then they should not have borrowed the money in the first place. To me the greater sin is to borrow with no intention of repaying.

 

The greatest obstacle to the economic growth of Malays and Muslims generally is that we have denigrated the rewards of savings by labeling them as interest and thus haram. Thus I purposely choose the neutral term "rewards on investments." We can encourage Malays to save even more if we can dispense with the theologically loaded term "interest" and substitute my "rewards on savings" instead. This is more than just a semantic change or an attempt at "spinning," rather it represents a qualitative change in concept. It recognizes that lending is a legitimate human activity – a valid service – and therefore profits on it are as valid as in with other economic activities. I will elaborate on this point in the following section on Islamic banks.

 

 

 

Next:   Islamic Financial Intermediaries

 

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